



## NATO: The Chicago Summit

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Author: Louisa Brooke-Holland and Tom Rutherford  
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) holds its Heads of State and Government summit in Chicago in the United States on 20-21 May 2012. The Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept, the first in eleven years, at its previous summit in Lisbon in 2010.

The main themes of the summit are Afghanistan, capabilities and partnerships. The Alliance is expected to clarify the transition of security responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces by 2014; outline its role in Afghanistan post-2014; assess the impact of defence budget cuts on the capabilities the Alliance has at its disposal; identify Smart Defence projects; consider the lessons of Operation Unified Endeavour in Libya in 2011; declare an interim missile defence capability and endorse the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. There will not be a separate NATO-Russia Council meeting as there was in 2010.

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# 1 The Chicago Summit

NATO is a trans-Atlantic political and military alliance of 28 member states, founded in 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The Secretary-General of NATO is Anders Fogh Rasmussen. It holds its next Heads of State and Government summit in Chicago in the United States on 20-21 May 2012. The Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept, the first in eleven years, at its previous summit in Lisbon in 2010.<sup>1</sup> The Chicago summit is expected to turn Lisbon's decisions into concrete programmes and initiatives.

The main themes of the summit are:

1. The Alliance's commitment to Afghanistan through transition and beyond
2. Ensuring the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to defend its population and territory and to deal with the challenges of the 21st century
3. Strengthening NATO's network of partners across the globe<sup>2</sup>

These themes reflect the ambition of the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, for the summit:

In Chicago we will deliver an Alliance which is committed to transatlantic solidarity and cooperation, capable of dealing with the security challenges of the future and connected to our partner nations and the rest of the international community.<sup>3</sup>

The lessons of NATO's operation in Libya in 2011, progress in expanding missile defence, NATO's nuclear posture, burden-sharing will also be discussed and the transatlantic link will be reaffirmed. Unlike at Lisbon, there will be no NATO-Russia Council meeting.

The Secretary General of NATO has stated categorically NATO has no intention to intervene in Syria and Syria is not currently expected to be on the official summit agenda.

## 1.1 Expectations for the summit

It is highly likely greater clarity on or firm commitments will be made in the following areas:

### ***Afghanistan***

- Detailed plan for the final stages of transition of security up to the end of 2014
- Goal for Afghan security forces to be in lead for combat operations by mid/end 2013
- Funding for the Afghan National Security Forces after 2014
- Plan for supporting Afghanistan after 2014
- Clear expression of NATO's enduring commitment to Afghanistan
- Likely announcement of French withdrawal of troops by end of 2012

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<sup>1</sup> Library note [NATO summit 2010](#) SN05788 summarises the outcomes of the Lisbon summit and reaction.

<sup>2</sup> "Preparing for Chicago", *NATO News*

<sup>3</sup> "A taste of Chicago comes to NATO", *NATO News*, 22 March 2012

## ***Afghanistan National Security Forces***

- Clear picture of size, structure and cost of sustaining the ANSF
- Commitment by NATO allies and ISAF partners to contribute to the financing of the ANSF
- Possible financial commitments by individual nations

## ***Capabilities and Smart Defence***

- Approve specific set of commitments and measures
- Approve and identify specific multinational projects
- Commit to making Smart Defence “the new way the Alliance does business”
- Connected Forces Initiative: measures to sustain and increase the links between the armed forces of different members in the fields of education and training, exercises and technology<sup>4</sup>
- Further discussion of the question “how to ensure NATO has the right defence capabilities?”<sup>5</sup>
- A clear vision of how NATO will maintain the capabilities it needs in line with the resources it has<sup>6</sup>

## ***Partnerships***

- Recognise the operational, financial and political contributions of partners

## ***Missile defence***

- Declare an interim missile defence capability
- Approve the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

### **1.2 The Lisbon summit**

The last NATO Heads of State and Government summit took place in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010. The primary focus of the summit was the launch of the Alliance’s new strategic concept; the progress of the military campaign in Afghanistan; capabilities development and reform of the Alliance; and NATO’s relations with Russia, including an agreement over co-operation on missile defence.<sup>7</sup>

The main agreements were:

- [Lisbon Summit Declaration](#)
- [Strategic Concept 2010](#)

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<sup>4</sup> “NATO Defence Ministers plan for NATO forces 2020”, *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>5</sup> “Press conference by NATO Secretary General”, *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>6</sup> “Remarks to the World Affairs Council 2012 NATO conference”, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, *State department website*, 3 April 2012

<sup>7</sup> C Taylor, *NATO summit 2010*, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN05788, 2 December 2010

- [Declaration by NATO and the Government of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership](#)
- [Declaration by the nations contributing to ISAF](#)
- [NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement](#)

## 2 Afghanistan

NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003. At its Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO agreed gradually to handover security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces by the end of 2014. The summit is expected to map out the next phase of the transition to Afghan forces and the transition of ISAF forces from a combat to a training and assistance role, as well as clarify NATO's role in Afghanistan after 2014.

Recent statements by NATO and member states suggest Afghan security forces will have "lead responsibility" by mid to late 2013 and take on "full responsibility" by the end of 2014. This has implications for the role of combat troops and when ISAF troops can expect to begin shifting from a combat to training and supportive role. President Obama expects NATO to agree formally the goal for Afghan forces to take the lead for combat operations across the country by the end of 2013.<sup>8</sup>

There are five phases, or tranches, of the transition. The first was completed in 2011, the second is underway and the third tranche was announced on 13 May 2012. The fifth and final tranche is expected to be announced in mid-2013. A commitment to financial support for Afghan security forces after 2014 is also expected to be agreed.

The International Security Assistance Force currently has nearly 129,000 troops from 50 nations in Afghanistan and the vast majority, barring some trainers, advisors and Special Forces, are expected to be withdrawn by the end of 2014.

This will be the first NATO summit attended by the new French President, François Hollande. During his campaign he pledged to withdraw French troops in 2012 rather than the current French plan of 2013 and his communications director has confirmed France will use the summit to "announce the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan between now and the end of the year".<sup>9</sup>

NATO will hold an expanded ISAF meeting including 22 non-NATO partners in Chicago.

### 2.1 The Lisbon agreement

The Lisbon summit declaration stated:

The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan. Through our enduring partnership with the Government of the Islamic

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<sup>8</sup> ["Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan"](#), *White House press office*, 1 May 2012

<sup>9</sup> ["Nato leaders said they expect France to remain part of Afghanistan effort"](#), *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 May 2012

Republic of Afghanistan, we reaffirm our long-term commitment to a better future for the Afghan people.<sup>10</sup>

Declaration by the nations contributing to ISAF, also made at the summit, reaffirmed support for “President Karzai’s objective for the Afghan National Security Forces to lead and conduct security operations in all provinces by the end of 2014.”

## **2.2 Transition timetable**

The timetable for transitioning lead security to Afghan security forces and drawing down ISAF troops by the end of 2014 was endorsed at the 2010 Lisbon summit. More recently, coalition partners have raised mid-2013 as the date they anticipate Afghan security forces taking the lead in operations. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said “how we will manage that transition in details will be discussed at the Chicago Summit.”<sup>11</sup>

Coalition countries are beginning to individually flesh out their plans for withdrawal. Australia, for example, has suggested it expects to withdraw the bulk of its force in 2013 rather than 2014.

### ***The five tranches of transition***

There are five phases or tranches to the transition process. The first phase was completed in July 2011 with the handover of seven districts and provinces to the ANSF. The second phase was announced in November 2011.<sup>12</sup> Following this phase of transition, Afghan Security Forces will be responsible for the security of 50% of the Afghan population.<sup>13</sup> The third tranche was announced on 13 May 2012 and includes 122 districts, including Kapisa, Uruzgan and Parwan provinces.<sup>14</sup> When complete, the Afghan security forces will have lead responsibility for 75% of the population. There is no date on when the fourth phase will begin.

ISAF Commander General Allen anticipates the fifth and final tranche will be announced by the Afghan Government in summer 2013. Once implementation of the fifth tranche begins, Afghan national security forces are considered to be in the lead across the country, according to General Allen.<sup>15</sup>

### ***2013 and 2014: has the target moved?***

In early February 2012 statements by senior politicians and NATO began mentioning 2013 rather than 2014 as the significant year in the transition process.<sup>16</sup> US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta told reporters on 1 February he hoped to see US troops make the final transitions from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role by mid-2013. His comment was interpreted by some as suggesting the timetable was being accelerated.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has since stated:

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<sup>10</sup> “Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon”, NATO, 20 November 2010

<sup>11</sup> “Monthly press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,” NATO, 2 April 2012

<sup>12</sup> More detail about the first two phases can be found in C. Taylor, *Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition*, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5851, 1 December 2011

<sup>13</sup> ISAF press release, 27 November 2011

<sup>14</sup> “Announcement by President Hamid Karzai on the Official Launch of Transition Tranche 3”, *Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, 13 May 2012

<sup>15</sup> Senate Armed Services Committee, *Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearing on the situation in Afghanistan*, 22 March 2012

<sup>16</sup> “Mixed messages leaves NATO scrambling to clarify Afghan policy”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 3 February 2012

In order to actually complete transition by the end of 2014, we need to hand over the last provinces and districts to lead Afghan responsibility at a certain time in 2013. Because based on experience it takes between 12 and 18 months to actually fully implement a transition.

So if the whole of the transition is to be completed by the end of 2014 we'll have to hand over the last provinces to lead Afghan responsibility by mid-2013, or at the latest in the second half of 2013. That's why the year 2013 has suddenly been mentioned. It's not about accelerating the transition process, but it's actually in order to stick to the Lisbon Road Map that we have to take 2013 into account.<sup>17</sup>

Foreign Secretary William Hague told the House on 9 February 2012:

We are firmly on track for the ANSF to have lead security responsibility by mid to late 2013. The ANSF will have full security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.<sup>18</sup>

Afghan President Karzai has likewise said:

2013 means the lead will be given to Afghans, except for a few provinces, or areas where we would still need the foreign forces' presence. But it will be 2014 when everything will be fully handed over, when everything will be completed, when the transition will have been completed, with the international forces leaving the country.<sup>19</sup>

However President Karzai has also said that, given 2014 is also a Presidential election year, he is considering the possibility of bringing forward by a year either the transition and withdrawal or the election.<sup>20</sup>

### 2.3 ISAF troop numbers

There are currently nearly 129,000 troops from 50 nations in ISAF.<sup>21</sup> This will drop to approximately 106,000 in October 2012 after the US withdraws the remaining 23,000 of its 30,000 surge force. The Commander of ISAF is General John Allen. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee he suggested he will require "significant combat power in 2013" but he does not expect to make a decision on the number of US troops he requires until late 2012, after the September withdrawal is complete.<sup>22</sup>

General Allen anticipates having 68,000 US troops plus approximately 40,000 ISAF forces at his disposal at the end of 2012.<sup>23</sup>

#### ***ISAF Troop Contributing Nations<sup>24</sup>***

Albania	290	Georgia	800	Norway	525
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<sup>17</sup> "Monthly press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen," NATO, 2 April 2012

<sup>18</sup> HC Deb 9 February 2012 c497

<sup>19</sup> "Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, Afghanistan", NATO, 12 April 2012

<sup>20</sup> "Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, Afghanistan", NATO, 12 April 2012

<sup>21</sup> "ISAF: key facts and figures", NATO, 18 April 2012

<sup>22</sup> Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 March 2012

<sup>23</sup> Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 March 2012

<sup>24</sup> "ISAF: key facts and figures", NATO, 18 April 2012, notes taken from the placemat



Armenia	126	Germany	4,900	Poland	2,457
Australia	1,550	Greece	122	Portugal	133
Austria	3	Hungary	337	Romania	1,843
Azerbaijan	94	Iceland	6	Singapore	39
Bahrain	95	Ireland	7	Slovakia	331
Belgium	522	Italy	3,816	Slovenia	89
Bosnia & Herzegovina	59	Jordan	0	Spain	1,481
Bulgaria	605	Republic of Korea	350	Sweden	500
Canada <sup>1</sup>	508	Latvia	175	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	177
Croatia	320	Lithuania	245	Tonga	55
Czech Republic	527	Luxembourg	10	Turkey	1,327
Denmark	692	Malaysia	46	Ukraine	23
El Salvador	25	Mongolia	113	United Arab Emirates	35
Estonia	153	Montenegro	39	United Kingdom	9,500
Finland	176	Netherlands <sup>2</sup>	274	United States	90,000
France	3,308	New Zealand	153	<b>Total</b>	<b>128,961</b>

<sup>1</sup> To train Afghan National Security Forces. In total, Canada deploys approx. 950 personnel

<sup>2</sup> In total the Netherlands deploys approx. 500 personnel

### ***Withdrawal plans***

The **UK** will reduce its 9,500 strong force by 500 by the end of 2012 and expects to withdraw combat troops by the end of 2014.<sup>25,26</sup> The Government has not made definitive plans for the withdrawal of UK troops after 2012.<sup>27</sup>

**France** and **Australia** have announced plans to withdraw the bulk of their troops ahead of the 2014 deadline.

France, under President Sarkozy, announced it would withdraw its 3,300 plus troops in 2013 after an incident in which four French troops were killed by an Afghan soldier in January 2012. The new French President, Francois Hollande, may use the summit to announce plans to withdraw its troops by the end of 2012, confirming a campaign pledge.<sup>28</sup>

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced in mid-April she expects Australian troops to complete the transition of security in Uruzgan province, part of the third tranche, in 2013.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> HC Deb 6 July 2011, c1512

<sup>26</sup> HC Deb 9 February 2012 c497

<sup>27</sup> HC Deb 26 April c1127

<sup>28</sup> [Nato leaders said they expect France to remain part of Afghanistan effort](#), *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 May 2012

<sup>29</sup> ["We are serving our national interest in Afghanistan"](#), *Julia Gillard speech, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 17 April 2012

Australian newspapers speculate the majority of the troops will withdraw before federal elections in August 2013.<sup>30</sup> The Australian government has since sought to end speculation it means a “premature Australian withdrawal.”<sup>31</sup> Philip Hammond says her comments “do not represent a shift in Australian or ISAF policy... (and) is in line with the strategy agreed by international partners at the Lisbon summit in 2010.”<sup>32</sup> Australia is not a member of NATO but is attending the summit as a contributor to ISAF.

William Hague says the timetable for the withdrawal of British troops is unaffected by the announcements of other ISAF partners.<sup>33</sup>

## 2.4 **Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)**

- 194,466 Afghan National Army (ANA)
- 149,642 Afghan National Police (ANP)
- Target for end of 2012: 352,000

NATO established its Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) in November 2009, bringing together NATO and national training efforts under one umbrella. There are currently 38 nations contributing to it.<sup>34</sup> ISAF troops are involved in training, mentoring and operating alongside the Afghan security forces in preparation for the full handover of responsibility. NATO says both the police and army are “well on track” to reach the goal of 352,000 by the end of 2012 ahead of schedule.<sup>35</sup>

However the UK Government has expressed concern that “too many people are leaving” the Afghan National Army and the attrition rate “remains consistently above target.” It says the actual monthly attrition rate for Army personnel was 1.9% in February 2012, above the target of 1.4%.<sup>36</sup>

### **Funding and size of the Afghanistan National Security Forces after 2014**

The goal of 352,000 is considered to be a surge force and the peak number required. President Obama said in his 1 May 2012 speech in Afghanistan the security forces will be sustained at that level for three years and then reduced. ISAF Commander General Allen had previously talked of there being an “expectation” that after 2014 that number will reduce to between 231,000 to 236,000, based on a study of scenarios for 2017.<sup>37</sup> No decision has been made as to the future force structure after 2014. Afghan President Karzai says the number will depend on the situation on the ground and the capacity of the ANSF.<sup>38</sup>

There are concerns about the implications of making so many trained soldiers unemployed in a few years time. *The Independent* newspaper quoted a senior British officer who worried about the message being sent out to the men currently risking their lives that they may lose

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<sup>30</sup> “Coalition questions timetable for Afghanistan exit”, *The Australian*, 17 April 2012

<sup>31</sup> “Remarks With Australian Foreign Minister Robert Carr After Their Meeting”, *US State department*, 24 2012

<sup>32</sup> HC Deb 1 May 2012, c1523W

<sup>33</sup> HC Deb 17 April 2012 c152

<sup>34</sup> “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development”, *NATO factsheet*, April 2012. More about the training programme is available on its website <http://www.ntm-a.com>

<sup>35</sup> “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development”, *NATO factsheet*, April 2012

<sup>36</sup> *Afghanistan: Monthly Progress Report*, February 2012

<sup>37</sup> *Testimony to Armed Services Committee*, 22 March 2012

<sup>38</sup> “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, Afghanistan”, *NATO*, 12 April 2012

their jobs in a few years.<sup>39</sup> There are also concerns that demobilised soldiers may present a danger to stability in future years.

### *Funding*

NATO has confirmed the Afghan authorities and the international community have endorsed a sum equivalent to US\$4 billion per year to fund the Afghan National Security Forces. NATO's Secretary General expects members and ISAF partners to contributing a fair share of this overall bill" at the summit but does not expect concrete commitments, noting that it is not a pledging conference.<sup>40</sup>

The UK has already announced it will provide £70 million a year, starting from 2015.<sup>41</sup> The UK is also intending to building an Afghan officer training academy. Other countries may also make specific pledges at the summit. Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard says she will go to Chicago "prepared for Australia to pay our fair share."<sup>42</sup>

### *Concerns about ANSF*

The number of 'Green on Blue' attacks, in which members of Afghan security forces (or men dressed in their uniforms) attack ISAF troops, has raised concerns among ISAF contributing nations. ISAF Commander General John Allen said such attacks "should be expected in counter-insurgency operations", adding it is "characteristic of this kind of warfare."<sup>43</sup>

Eight ISAF soldiers were killed in a ten day period between 20 February and 1 March 2012. Two British soldiers were killed by a member of the Afghan army on 26 March 2012.<sup>44</sup> Four of the eleven Australian soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan in 2011 were the result of attacks by members of the Afghan National Army.<sup>45</sup>

France suspended its training and support operations with the Afghan army after four French troops were killed by an Afghan soldier on 20 January 2012. France announced plans to withdraw its troops in 2013, a year earlier than expected, in the wake of the attacks.<sup>46</sup>

## **2.5 NATO's role in Afghanistan after 2014**

NATO and individual ISAF contributing nations are expected to outline their vision of the relationship with the Afghanistan government and their role in Afghanistan after the transition is completed at the end of 2014. NATO agreed a [Declaration on an Enduring Partnership](#) with Afghanistan at its Lisbon summit in 2010. A separate [Declaration](#) was also signed at the Lisbon summit by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to ISAF in Afghanistan.

NATO is expecting to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014 in a supportive role, continuing the training mission and training, assisting and advising the Afghan Security Forces.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> K Sengupta, "[NATO chiefs and politicians battle to delay Afghan troop depletion](#)", *The Independent*, 19 April 2012

<sup>40</sup> "[Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen](#)", *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>41</sup> "[Defence Secretary announces £70 for Afghan security forces](#)", *MOD news*, 19 April 2012

<sup>42</sup> "[We are serving our national interest in Afghanistan](#)", *Julia Gillard speech, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 17 April 2012

<sup>43</sup> "ISAF commander: rogue Afghan army attacks 'to be expected'", *Daily Telegraph*, 26 March 2012

<sup>44</sup> "[Afghan security forces kill 3 ISAF troops in south, east](#)", *The Long War Journal*, 26 March 2012

<sup>45</sup> "[We are serving our national interest in Afghanistan](#)", *Julia Gillard speech, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 17 April 2012

<sup>46</sup> "French troops to withdraw from Afghanistan early", *Jane's Country Risk Report*, 31 January 2012

<sup>47</sup> "[Monthly press briefing by Anders Fogh Rasmussen](#)", *NATO newsroom*, 19 April 2012

President Obama signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with President Karzai during a visit to Kabul on 1 May 2012. It is a ten year agreement that sets the framework for the relationship between the two countries beyond 2014.<sup>48</sup>

US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta identified three missions the US intends to continue in Afghanistan after 2014 as part of its enduring presence: counter-terrorism; training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces; provide enabling capabilities to support Afghan forces. Discussions as to the number of US troops required after 2014 are ongoing.<sup>49</sup>

The Strategic Partnership Agreement allows US forces in Afghanistan to pursue two missions: train Afghan forces and target the remnants of Al Qaeda. It commits Afghanistan to providing US personnel access to and use of Afghan facilities; commits both countries to initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement to supercede the current Status of Forces Agreement.<sup>50</sup>

The UK signed an Enduring Strategic Partnership agreement on 28 January 2012 during a visit to London by the Afghan President. David Cameron said:

After our combat troops have left in 2014, there will still be a strong relationship between Britain and Afghanistan; a relationship based on diplomacy, based on trade, based on our continued aid programme to help the Afghans build a stronger country<sup>51</sup>

William Hague told the House:

The Enduring Strategic Partnership signals our shared vision of a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan able to maintain its own security and prevent the country from again being used as a safe haven for international terrorists.

Building on the strong message from the Bonn conference last year of the international community's commitment to Afghanistan post-2014, the Enduring Strategic Partnership demonstrates our long-term partnership with Afghanistan.

The document reaffirms both countries' commitment to continuing partnership and friendship. It makes clear that we will have a wide-ranging relationship with Afghanistan which will continue beyond transition and the drawdown of international combat troops.

The partnership sets out our agreement to co-operate on political dialogue, security, governance and rule of law, economic and social development, and cultural links.<sup>52</sup>

The Prime Minister announced during his visit in July 2011 plans to create an Afghan National Officer Academy, along the lines of Sandhurst. It will open in 2013 and is expected to accept 1,350 recruits annually. Approximately 120 British troops will be based at the academy to provide training and related support. The academy is being built within the perimeter of an Afghan facility and UK personnel based there will operate from within a coalition force Operating Base, protected by UK or coalition military personnel.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> More information about the Strategic Partnership Agreement is available on the [White House website](#)

<sup>49</sup> "[Press Gaggle with Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at Kabul, Afghanistan](#)", *US Department of Defence*, 16 March 2012

<sup>50</sup> "[Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement](#)", *White House press office*, 1 May 2012

<sup>51</sup> "[Transcript: PM and President Karzai press conference](#)", *Number 10 press office*, 28 January 2012

<sup>52</sup> HC Deb 9 February 2012 c46WS. The full document has been placed in the Library and is available as Deposited Paper [DEP2012-0265](#)

<sup>53</sup> HC Deb 1 May 59WS

Other countries may also sign bilateral agreements with the Afghan President while at the summit. Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard has already outlined plans for Australia's post-2014 relationship and said she hopes to sign a comprehensive, long-term agreement in Chicago and intends to announce details of Australian development assistance to Afghanistan through 2015-2016 and beyond. She's pledged to support the UK-led Afghan National Army Officer Academy; train and support policing and provide a limited Special Forces contribution.<sup>54</sup>

## **2.6 Talking to the Taliban?**

On 3 January 2012, the Taliban announced that it would open an office in the capital of Qatar, Doha. This led observers to conclude that a shift in Taliban thinking had taken place and that the organisation was ready for negotiations. In a statement, a spokesman for the organisation said:

We are at the moment, besides our powerful presence inside the country, ready to establish a political office outside the country to come to an understanding with other nations.<sup>55</sup>

The early preconditions for entering talks were mainly for certain Taliban prisoners held in Guantánamo bay to be released. Both Pakistan and the Afghan government were initially opposed the opening of the Qatar office, fearing that it would lessen their influence over the process.

### ***Taliban abandon negotiations***

The announcement in March by the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar that it would suspend participation in the "pointless" negotiations with the US was a blow to the idea that, by agreement with the insurgents, some of the gains of the West could be secured. It happened just as the idea was gaining ground in Washington, where politicians had resisted calls for negotiations for some time. The Taliban is reported to have made the move because they did not accept the presence of the Karzai government, which it regards as illegitimate, at the talks.<sup>56</sup>

The increasing enthusiasm in Western circles for talking to the Taliban may anyway have come too late – too close to the announced withdrawal of Western troops for the insurgency to take it seriously. This impression was strengthened by the announcement by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami, hitherto thought of as the most likely group to cooperate with the process, that it would abandon the talks.<sup>57</sup>

The imminence of the withdrawal of the bulk of ISAF troops and the resulting weakness of the West's position is one obstacle to an agreement with the insurgents. The other is the weakness of President Karzai's government. Insurgents see little need to come to any accommodation with the Karzai government, partly because the government's approach to compromising with the insurgents has been half-hearted. The various power centres in Afghanistan, such as the Taliban, other Pashtun insurgent groups in the south and east of the country and the non-Pashtun power-brokers associated with the former Northern Alliance, see the government as dependent on Western military support and therefore have every reason to wait until that disappears.

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<sup>54</sup> ""We are serving our national interest in Afghanistan", *Prime Minister of Australia press office*, 17 April 2012

<sup>55</sup> "Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Door to Talks", *New York Times*, 3 January 2012

<sup>56</sup> "Table talk - Negotiating with the Taliban", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 16 March 2012

<sup>57</sup> "Second Afghan Insurgent Group Backs Out of Peace Talks", *New York Times*, 30 March 2012

While the government may be weak now, President Karzai's last term ends in 2014, coinciding with the withdrawal of the last US ground troops, and no-one knows who will succeed him. There is no clear front runner in a list of possible successors. In fact, Anatol Lieven argued recently, "each one looks disastrous, especially from the point of view of ethnic relations."<sup>58</sup>

The Afghan government does not appear to have an over-arching plan for negotiations with insurgent groups, and those Afghan groups that have benefitted from the West's intervention, particularly women but also ethnic minorities, are fearful that the government will sacrifice the protections that have been installed over the last ten years, in order to woo "a phalanx of unsavoury powerbrokers."<sup>59</sup>

Another threat to the negotiations is the feared upsurge in violence as the date for withdrawal approaches. Damaging attacks on withdrawing Western troops could make it politically difficult for the US to continue in the dialogue.

The Taliban, and other groups, are divided as to the desirability of entering negotiations, with younger Taliban commanders reportedly more radical and less willing to engage, while the leadership around Mullah Omar are more enthusiastic. If there is a peace deal, this may pose a problem in making it peace deal stick, since local groups might continue fighting.

### ***Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme***

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), the programme to tempt fighters away from the armed struggle in return for money (about \$120 a month for ordinary fighters, until their re-training is completed), is reported to have had little impact. Around 3,500 fighters have signed on to the programme, mainly low-level but with some mid-level commanders.<sup>60</sup> According to ISAF, only a handful have returned to the battlefield.

Critics claim, however, that the take-up of the scheme has been low and that many of those who have cooperated with the programme have little connection with the insurgency, although ISAF does claim that applicants thought not to be genuine insurgents are rejected. Higher level commanders have not taken up the programme in any numbers because the security advantage of no longer being a target of ISAF or Afghan government forces may be seen as declining and outweighed by the threat of being targeted by the Taliban. The greater ideological commitment of higher commanders is another barrier to their re-integration.

### ***Commentary***

The International Crisis Group recommended in a report released in March that the mediation effort should be far more structured and international, and should be led by the United Nations:

A lasting peace accord will ultimately require far more structured negotiations, under the imprimatur of the UN, than are presently being pursued. The Security Council should mandate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to appoint a small team of mutually agreeable mediators as soon as possible to ensure that critical stakeholders are fully consulted and will remain engaged in the negotiations process. The unequivocal commitment of the Security Council, which includes among its members Pakistan (through December 2013), will be vital to this endeavour.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Anatol Lieven, "Afghanistan: The Best Way to Peace", *New York Review of Books*, 9 February 2012

<sup>59</sup> *Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan* International Crisis Group, 26 March 2012

<sup>60</sup> "Program pays enemies to train for peace", *Army Times*, 23 April 2012

<sup>61</sup> *Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan* International Crisis Group, 26 March 2012

The report also cast doubt on the value of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme and said it should be abandoned if it did not prove more successful.

Anatol Lieven proposed the following as broad terms of a possible settlement:

- (1) complete withdrawal of all US troops according to a fixed timetable;
- (2) exclusion of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups from areas controlled by the Taliban;
- (3) a government in Kabul headed—at least nominally—by men the Taliban would see as good Muslims and Afghan patriots;
- (4) negotiations on a new Afghan constitution involving the Taliban and leading to the transfer of most powers from the center to the regions;
- (5) de facto—though not formal—Taliban control of the region of Greater Kandahar, and by the Haqqanis of Greater Paktika;
- (6) a return to the Taliban offer of 1999–2001 of a complete ban on opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in the areas under their control, in return for international aid.<sup>62</sup>

Many observers think that the position of other countries in the region will be as important as any deal between the Taliban, the US and the Afghan government.

### **UK position**

Asked about his views on getting the political process restarted after the Taliban's suspension of talks, David Cameron said in March:

It is vital that we get this right. Since we took office—to be fair to the previous Government, they took this view as well—the British position has always been that we need a political settlement to ensure the best possible outcome for the people of Afghanistan. Britain has been pushing for political reconciliation and reintegration, and I had very productive talks with President Obama last week because the American view is now the same; they want to support that political process. Of course, the Taliban said what they said last week [that they would abandon talks]. I would make this point: we are committed to handing over to the Afghan Government, the Afghan military and the Afghan police—and the numbers of Afghan military and police are on track—at the end of 2014. We believe that that can happen even without a political settlement, with a satisfactory outcome for the United Kingdom, but clearly it would be better for everyone concerned if it was accompanied by a political settlement. The work for that, including setting up a Taliban political office in Qatar, is progressing well, and I believe that it is in everyone's interest that we keep pushing that agenda. However, the Taliban should be in no doubt: there are opportunities for a political settlement if they give up violence, renounce al-Qaeda and want to play a part in the future politics of Afghanistan, but if they do not take those steps, we will continue to defeat them on the battlefield every time they raise their head.<sup>63</sup>

The British government is not directly involved in any negotiations. The Government was asked about its participation:

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<sup>62</sup> Anatol Lieven, "Afghanistan: The Best Way to Peace", *New York Review of Books*, 9 February 2012

<sup>63</sup> HC Deb 21 March 2012, c784-5

**Lord Stoddart of Swindon:** To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in the light of the numbers of British troops fighting in Afghanistan, they are directly involved in peace talks between the Taliban, the United States and the Government of Afghanistan; and, if not, why not.

**The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford):** The UK has always supported an Afghan-led political process to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. At the start of the year, the Taliban issued a statement expressing a willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. President Karzai recently publicly endorsed the idea of an office in Qatar. We are supporting the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to take this process forward.<sup>64</sup>

Former Foreign Secretary David Miliband recently echoed the International Crisis Group in suggesting that international mediation would be helpful:

There needs to be a political solution in Afghanistan. I think the Prime Minister has the right instincts on this. However, I think that what has happened is the international community has not been able to prosecute a clear political strategy.

No one trusts anyone else. We desperately need an independent mediator who all the sides will talk to. There will be no stability inside Afghanistan without the regional powers on side.<sup>65</sup>

### **3 Defence budgets, capabilities and Smart Defence**

How to work together “to do more, with less” is the second theme of the summit.

NATO will formally approve the *Smart Defence* Initiative. This is a new concept unveiled by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in February 2011 to encourage nations to “maximise the efficiency of their defence spending by focusing on greater prioritisation, specialisation and multinational cooperation in their acquisition of modern equipment.”<sup>66</sup>

The concept is a specific response to the pressures on the defence budgets of its members in a time of financial austerity. It is also a response to concerns over the interoperability and variety of capabilities available among European nations and capability shortfalls, exposed by the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the Libya operation in 2011. The Americans have also clearly signalled they are no longer willing to shoulder quite so much of the burden of NATO without a change in approach from its European allies, particularly as it shifts its focus towards the Pacific.

Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond, recently argued that although NATO has “fretted earnestly” about these problems in the past, “this time we cannot afford to brush them under the carpet and carry on as before.”<sup>67</sup>

#### **3.1 Defence spending**

The tables below show spending levels (as a proportion of GDP) and spending changes on defence by NATO members over the past decade. For most of the period since 2000, the majority of European countries spent between 1 and 2 per cent of GDP on defence, with the NATO average boosted by the relatively high defence spending of the USA. However, since

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<sup>64</sup> HL Deb 6 March 2012, c399WA

<sup>65</sup> “Britain should be talking to the Taliban, says David Miliband”, *Daily Telegraph*, 8 March 2012

<sup>66</sup> [NATO Defence Ministers plan for NATO forces 2020](#), *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>67</sup> [“Shared security: transforming defence to face the future”](#), *MoD news*, 2 May 2012



2009, the majority of countries have reduced defence spending as a proportion of GDP, as a part of the wide ranging decline in public spending as a result of the recent global recession.

**Defence Expenditure as percentage of GDP, NATO members 2000 - 2011**

	percentage of GDP			
	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011*
	Average	Average		
Albania	-	-	1.6	1.5
Belgium	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1
Bulgaria	-	2.2	1.7	1.4
Croatia	-	-	1.5	1.5
Czech Republic	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.1
Denmark	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4
Estonia	-	1.6	1.8	1.7
France	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.9
Germany	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4
Greece	3.3	2.9	2.6	2.1
Hungary	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.0
Italy	2.2	1.5	1.2	1.2
Latvia	-	1.4	1.0	1.0
Lithuania	-	1.1	0.9	0.8
Luxembourg	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5
Netherlands	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3
Normway	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6
Poland	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7
Portugal	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.5
Romania	-	1.6	1.3	1.3
Slovak Republic	-	1.6	1.3	1.1
Slovenia	-	1.5	1.6	1.3
Spain	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9
Turkey	3.2	2.0	1.9	1.8
UK	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.6
<b>Europe Total</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.6</b>
Canada	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4
USA	3.5	4.5	5.4	4.8
<b>North America Total</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.5</b>
<b>NATO Total</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>

Source: NATO

Notes:

\* - estimated

Iceland is excluded as it has no military forces or significant defence expenditure

Missing data indicates that country was not a member of NATO during relevant period

Data may not be precisely comparable between countries owing to different accounting conventions and financial years

## Annual percentage change in defence expenditure - NATO members, 2000 - 2011

percentage change on previous year

	2000-2004 Average	2005-2009 Average	2009	2010	2011*
Albania	-	-	-5.0	7.9	-0.2
Belgium	-2.7	3.2	-5.8	-3.7	-0.9
Bulgaria	-	2.3	-21.4	-6.0	-17.4
Canada	3.1	5.9	5.5	-2.4	3.7
Croatia	-	-	-11.6	-6.5	0.8
Czech Republic	1.1	-0.6	10.9	-13.3	-14.8
Denmark	1.0	2.6	-6.0	6.5	-6.8
Estonia	-	9.4	-12.5	-2.5	7.6
France	1.2	-1.2	-14.0	-0.7	-3.2
Germany	-0.8	1.0	2.9	1.6	-1.5
Greece	-9.8	3.9	3.1	-19.7	-24.3
Hungary	2.1	-5.1	-11.8	-8.8	-3.2
Italy	-1.7	-11.3	-5.7	-3.7	-3.2
Latvia	-	11.2	-37.7	-14.7	4.6
Lithuania	-	3.6	-17.2	-16.5	-1.2
Luxembourg	7.3	-7.4	-0.9	22.9	3.7
Netherlands	0.9	1.9	1.4	-4.2	-4.9
Normway	5.0	0.8	3.6	-1.1	0.5
Poland	2.8	3.4	14.7	8.1	0.2
Portugal	-5.3	-2.2	5.6	2.2	-7.7
Romania	-	-4.6	-13.8	-7.8	1.2
Slovak Republic	-	2.7	-1.7	-12.0	-12.5
Slovenia	-	7.1	-1.4	2.5	-18.6
Spain	4.0	2.8	-4.5	-9.1	-10.9
Turkey	-8.1	-0.1	-0.7	1.9	3.8
UK	1.5	2.7	-1.0	1.7	-0.1
USA	7.2	8.0	2.7	1.8	-8.3

Source: NATO

Notes:

\* - estimated

Iceland is excluded as it has no military forces or significant defence expenditure

Missing data indicates that country was not a member of NATO during relevant period

Data may not be precisely comparable between countries owing to different accounting conventions and financial years

### 3.2 The concept of Smart Defence

The concept of Smart Defence was unveiled by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in February 2011 in his Munich Security Conference speech.<sup>68</sup> NATO describes it as:

A concept that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.<sup>69</sup>

The Lisbon 2010 summit identified a number of capability areas deemed critical for NATO. These include Ballistic missile defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and force preparation, effective engagement and force protection.

In addition, a series of measures in the fields of education and training, exercises and technology will be adopted in Chicago, called the Connected Forces Initiative.<sup>70</sup>

NATO is also encouraging members to communicate more to ensure that, as defence budgets are cut, certain capabilities are not lost altogether. They also want to reduce cost and increase efficiency and interoperability by encouraging greater coordination when procuring capabilities. This could be in the form of small groups of countries rather than Alliance-wide.

#### **Projects**

NATO will unveil a batch of approximately twenty to thirty multinational projects that fall under the *Smart Defence* umbrella, each of which will be led by an individual nation.

Two examples of the type of projects being considered, according to the Director of Smart Defence in NATO, Ludwig Decamps: Italy is leading a project into clearing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from roads; Germany is leading a project on pooling and sharing maritime patrol aircraft as there is a shortfall of this capability within the alliance.<sup>71</sup>

Decamps has previously said a task force has identified 200 areas which could be suitable for either bilateral or multilateral programmes. These include surveillance, unmanned aerial systems, and counter improvised explosive device development. This work is being refined with potential projects being grouped into 'clusters' including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, training, and sustainment.<sup>72</sup>

Progress on the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is also expected to be made with contracts signed in Chicago.<sup>73</sup> This is an unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, also known as drones) project funded by thirteen members to be operated and maintained by NATO on behalf of the entire alliance to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, has warned that failure to move ahead

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<sup>68</sup> ["Building security in an age of austerity"](#), Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *Munich Security Conference speech*, NATO website, 4 February 2011

<sup>69</sup> [NATO website](#), accessed 17 February 2012

<sup>70</sup> [Press conference by NATO Secretary General](#), *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>71</sup> ["Smart Defence: what does it mean?"](#), *NATO Review*, April 2012

<sup>72</sup> ["NATO: building capabilities in times of austerity"](#), *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 19 January 2012

<sup>73</sup> ["Secretary General's Monthly Press Conference"](#), *NATO newsroom*, 11 May 2012

with AGS “could hurt the drive for similar cost-effective multinational approaches kind of smart defense that the secretary general wants to try to implement for NATO.”<sup>74</sup> US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has more recently said she expects a decision on how to use the system as a hub for joint operations will be made in Chicago.<sup>75</sup>

### **Collaboration**

There are also calls for greater collaboration among NATO members in either bilateral partnerships or regional groupings.

The Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have long pursued closer collaboration. The defence ministers of all three countries signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in April. The countries’ armed forces will train and exercise together more frequently, the air forces will make use of each other’s airfields, the Belgium and Dutch navies (which already have an integrated command) will intensify their combined operations. The Belgium defence minister described as “we are moving towards a totally new structure, with a tri-national command. This is a first step towards full integration of equipment and joint employability.”<sup>76</sup>

The Netherlands, Germany and France have signed a communiqué announcing plans to present a plan in Chicago to address the shortfall of tanker aircraft, saying “for the long term, we will not only aim at pooling our capacities more efficiently, but also see whether it is possible to replace our current assets jointly.”<sup>77</sup>

Philip Hammond cited the 2011 Franco-British defence treaties as models for bilateral collaboration between nations “of similar ambition and similar approach to the generation and deployment of armed force.” He has also spoken in favour of an enhanced defence and security relationship with Germany.<sup>78</sup>

### **3.3 The US: a shift in focus**

The Obama administration is shifting its focus towards the Pacific and Asia.<sup>79</sup> This was clearly signposted to allies at a NATO defence ministers meeting in June 2011 by then US Defence Secretary Robert Gates in his last major policy speech. He forcefully criticised NATO members who he argued are failing to share the burden adequately, singling out those who specialise in ‘soft tasks’ rather than the ‘hard’ combat missions and bemoaning the fact the majority of allies have failed to reach the agreed 2% of GDP on defence. He said it was “unacceptable” that the Alliance has split into this “two-tiered alliance” and warned:

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.... Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders– those

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<sup>74</sup> “[Press Conference with Secretary Panetta at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium](#)”, *US Department of Defence transcript*, 6 October 2012

<sup>75</sup> “[Remarks to the World Affairs Council 2012 NATO conference](#)”, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, *State department website*, 3 April 2012

<sup>76</sup> “Benelux nations pursue further military cooperation”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 20 April 2012

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>78</sup> “[Shared security: transforming defence to face the future](#)”. *MoD news*, 2 May 2012

<sup>79</sup> “[Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> century defense](#)”, *US Department of Defense*, 9 January 2012

for whom the Cold War was *not* the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.<sup>80</sup>

Acknowledging this shift in focus to the Pacific, Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond is calling on European members to be prepared to take on more responsibility for security in their backyard, which includes North Africa and the Middle East, and be more willing to project power to meet threats further afield. Hammond said in his speech in Berlin “this isn’t about the United States walking away; this is about the nations of Europe taking more of the strain of our collective defence in our own region.”<sup>81</sup>

### 3.4 The lessons of Libya

On 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 (2011), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorised the use of force, including enforcement of a no-fly zone, enforcement of a UN arms embargo against Libya and to protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by the Qaddafi regime and its supporters.

The weekend of 19/20 March saw French, British and US begin military action under Operation Odyssey Dawn. NATO formally assumed command under Operation Unified Protector at 0600 hours on 31 March 2011.

Following the fall of Sirte and the death of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya’s transitional government declared liberation on 23 October 2011. Operation Unified Protector formally ended on 31 October 2011.<sup>82</sup>

Operation Unified Protector exposed the imbalance among contributions from members of the Alliance. Con Coughlin wrote in July “from the start of the military offensive, NATO’s operations have been severely hampered by the fact that only half a dozen countries have been prepared to conduct combat operations.”<sup>83</sup> William Hague called for greater contributions from NATO allies during the early period of the military operation.<sup>84</sup>

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates pointedly said, in June 2011, the operation had exposed the military shortcomings of the Alliance:

While every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t there [...]

Furthermore, the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.<sup>85</sup>

Philip Hammond likewise has said that while Operation Unified Protector was success:

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>81</sup> “[Shared security: transforming defence to face the future](#)”, *MoD news*, 2 May 2012

<sup>82</sup> Further reading on Operation Unified Protector is available in Library Note [Military Operations in Libya](#) SN05909, 24 October 2011

<sup>83</sup> “A campaign built on sand”, *Daily Telegraph*, 11 July 2011

<sup>84</sup> “Libya: William Hague calls on more powerful strike force”, *The Telegraph*, 13 April 2011

<sup>85</sup> “[The Security and Defense Agenda \(future of NATO\)](#)”, *Secretary of Defence Robert Gates speech*, 10 June 2011

The Libya operation also cruelly exposed the imbalances and weaknesses in the Alliance and thus the scale of the task facing European NATO nations. Even with the very limited nature of the Libyan campaign, the nations of Europe could not have undertaken this operation without the US shouldering much of the weight.<sup>86</sup>

A confidential NATO analysis of the air campaign in Libya, reported by *The New York Times* in April 2012, found “the allies struggled to share crucial target information, lacked specialized planners and analysts, and overly relied on the United States for reconnaissance and refueling aircraft.” It also identified a known lack of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities among European allies, noting that “NATO remains overly reliant on a single ally to provide I.S.R. collection capabilities that are essential to the commander”.<sup>87</sup> A subsequent editorial warned patience in America is running out with Europe failing to “shoulder its fair share of NATO’s collective military burden.”<sup>88</sup>

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has acknowledged that “without significant American contributions... Operation Unified Protector would have been less effective. Assets like air-to-air refueling, surveillance, and intelligence, made all the difference.”<sup>89</sup> The Combined Forces Air Component Commander for the Operation has also admitted “we did not enjoy a full spectrum of ISR assets”.<sup>90</sup>

The UK Government, in its response to Defence Committee’s report on operations in Libya in April 2012, acknowledged the imbalance and called for it to be addressed. More broadly, the Government said:

There is a discrepancy between what some allies are willing to contribute to the Alliance in terms of defence spending and willingness to deploy on NATO operations, and the benefit they expect to take from it in terms of security guarantees, infrastructure, appointments and influencing policy direction. We agree (with the committee) that this is something at which we, NATO and our allies should take a hard look.<sup>91</sup>

Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed some of these criticisms in a speech on 30 September 2011:

The Libya operation shows the strength and the solidarity of our Alliance even in the middle of an economic crisis. When the United Nations called for support to protect the people of Libya, all Allies agreed it was the right thing to do. They agreed that NATO should act.

NATO acted within 6 days -- faster than ever before. And we acted successfully. All Allies took part, directly or indirectly, through our common command structure and common funding.

In Libya, European Allies and Canada took the lead. In Afghanistan, the United States has been the leading nation from the start. And in Kosovo, Germany is currently playing the leading role.

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<sup>86</sup> “Shared security: transforming defence to face the future”, *MoD news*, 2 May 2012

<sup>87</sup> “NATO sees flaws in Air Campaign against Gaddafi”, *The New York Times*, 14 April 2012

<sup>88</sup> “NATO after Libya”, *The New York Times*, 18 April 2012

<sup>89</sup> “NATO chief: “Europe must invest sufficiently in our common security”, *NATO Source Alliance news blog*, 30 April 2012

<sup>90</sup> Interview with Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 25 April 2012

<sup>91</sup> Defence Committee, *Operations in Libya: Government Response*, 25 April 2012, HC 1952 2010-12, para 17

These are all demanding operations. NATO's operational flexibility allows each and every Ally to play to its particular strengths. And to contribute where they can have greatest effect. The Alliance framework combines all these individual contributions. And it multiplies their impact.<sup>92</sup>

### 3.5 Commentary

There are serious questions about the Smart Defence initiative. Will nations willingly relinquish sovereignty over certain military capabilities and trust their allies to provide the hardware or specialised personnel? <sup>93</sup> The Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the Centre for European Reform, Tomas Valasek, believes NATO needs to provide firm reassurances to members willing to relinquish some capabilities in order to specialise in others.<sup>94</sup> Of interest is the reaction of the Netherlands defence minister to the recent memorandum of understanding on cooperation signed by the Benelux countries in April 2012. He acknowledged the three nations will be relinquishing part of their control over their own armed forces but said "cooperation comes at a price."<sup>95</sup>

There are also those (mindful of history) who hear echoes of past initiatives in the current one. A NATO source told Jane's Defence Weekly:

It's mostly a new label on an old hat: that we've got to spend our defence budgets in a more efficient way - yet NATO sec gens [secretary generals] have been saying that for as long as anyone can remember. I think what's new is the realisation by everyone that this time, due to the severe financial climate, more multi-nation projects really do have to get off the ground because no one - even the United States - can go it alone any more.<sup>96</sup>

Philip Hammond argued in a speech in Berlin ahead of the Chicago summit that NATO needs a clear sighted assessment of its collective competence "taking account of what we know of reductions already planned and how these will impact on current capabilities." He argued the Alliance must recognise the gap between what it wishes to do and what it is capable of doing. He called for "greater pooling and sharing of capabilities; mission, role and geographic specialisation; greater sharing of technology; co-operation on logistics; and more collaborative training."<sup>97</sup>

## 4 Missile defence and the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

The purpose of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review is to "determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities."<sup>98</sup> Or, more simply, "how to deter whom with what?"<sup>99</sup>

NATO agreed in Lisbon, as part of its core task of collective defence, to develop a capability to protect NATO populations and territory in Europe against ballistic missile attacks. Anders

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<sup>92</sup> "Towards NATO's Chicago summit", *Speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels*, 30 September 2011

<sup>93</sup> T. Valasek, "*How to make Smart Defence a success*", *Globsec Policy Briefs*, Central European Policy Institute and Slovak Atlantic Commission, April 2012

<sup>94</sup> T. Valasek, "*How to make Smart Defence a success*", *Globsec Policy Briefs*, Central European Policy Institute and Slovak Atlantic Commission, April 2012

<sup>95</sup> "Minister Hillen: Cooperation in the Benelux comes at a price", *Netherlands ministry of defence*, 25 April 2012

<sup>96</sup> "Afghanistan, missile defence and 'smart defence' set to dominate NATO summit", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 Oct 2011

<sup>97</sup> *Shared security: transforming defence to face the future*", *MoD news*, 2 May 2012

<sup>98</sup> "NATO-Russian experts discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy", *NATO News*, 27 October 2011

<sup>99</sup> "NATO's nuclear posture review", *NATO Research Paper n68*, May 2011

Fogh Rasmussen has said on several occasions he expects to declare an interim missile defence capability at Chicago.<sup>100</sup>

#### 4.1 The Strategic Concept: excerpts

The Strategic Concept commits NATO “to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.” The agreement goes on to state:

16: Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

17: The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19: We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;

26: NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces...

- We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
- In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.<sup>101</sup>

#### 4.2 Missile Defence

NATO agreed in Lisbon, as part of its core task of collective defence, to develop a capability to protect NATO populations and territory in Europe against ballistic missile attacks. The command, control and communications capabilities of NATO's current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence programme (ALTBMD), hitherto largely concerned with the

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<sup>100</sup> [“Press conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”](#), *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>101</sup> [“Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government at Lisbon”](#) *NATO*, 19 November 2010



defence of deployed forces, will be expanded.<sup>102</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said on several occasions NATO's ambition is to declare an interim missile defence capability at Chicago.<sup>103</sup>

NATO established the ALTBMD programme in 2005 to protect NATO deployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to 3,000km).

The Obama administration announced its intention to deploy a regional Ballistic Missile Defence capability in Europe – the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – in September 2009.<sup>104</sup> This is a different proposal to the missile defence system the Bush administration planned to deploy. The proposal was welcomed by NATO at the Lisbon summit as an “indispensable contribution to the NATO Missile Defence architecture”.<sup>105</sup>

The first phase of the US system consists of missiles based on US Aegis warships based in the Mediterranean. The US signed an agreement to base four warships in Spain in October 2011.<sup>106</sup> In 2015, the system will be augmented by land-based missiles based in Romania and Poland and a radar system based in Turkey (all three countries have signed agreements with the US). After that, the system will be enhanced to be able to intercept longer-range missiles that would put London within range, and the last phase, in 2020, would be an upgrade to be able to deal with inter-continental ballistic missiles.<sup>107</sup>

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reaffirmed America's commitment to missile defence when he signed the Aegis agreement with Spain:

The United States is fully committed to building a missile defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European populations, their territory and their forces against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles.<sup>108</sup>

However two US reports suggest problems with the missile shield programme: “missile interceptors are running into production glitches, radars are underpowered and sensors cannot distinguish between warheads and other objects.”<sup>109</sup>

### ***Lisbon summit declarations on missile defence***

The Strategic Partnership:

We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will....develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.

### ***The Summit Declaration:***

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<sup>102</sup> Further information on NATO's theatre missile defence programme is available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49635.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm)

<sup>103</sup> “Press conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”, *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>104</sup> “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy A “Phased, Adaptive Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe”, *White House press office*, 17 September 2009

<sup>105</sup> “Allied leaders agree on NATO Missile Defence system”, *NATO newsroom*, 20 November 2010

<sup>106</sup> “Statement by the Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on Stationing Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain”, *US Department of Defence*, 5 October 2011

<sup>107</sup> “Nato chief tries to allay Russian concerns over missile defence”, *Financial Times*, 6 July 2011

<sup>108</sup> “Statement by the Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on Stationing Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain”, *US Department of Defence*, 5 October 2011

<sup>109</sup> “Reports cast doubt on European missile defense”, *AP*, 21 April 2012

2. We have... decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with us;

23. We are actively pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the resumption of theatre missile defence exercises

30. Our Strategic Concept underscores our commitment to ensuring that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of our populations and the security of our territory. To that end, NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defence forces. Missile defence will become an integral part of our overall defence posture. Our goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.

36. The threat to NATO European populations, territory and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing. As missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, we have decided that the Alliance will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.

37. To this end, we have decided that the scope of NATO's current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme's command, control and communications capabilities will be expanded beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory and forces. In this context, the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture, as are other possible voluntary contributions by Allies. We have tasked the Council to develop missile defence consultation, command and control arrangements by the time of the March 2011 meeting of our Defence Ministers. We have also tasked the Council to draft an action plan addressing steps to implement the missile defence capability by the time of the June 2011 Defence Ministers' meeting.

38. We will continue to explore opportunities for missile defence co-operation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence. We reaffirm the Alliance's readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways. NATO missile defence efforts and the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach provide enhanced possibilities to do this. We are also prepared to engage with other relevant states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase missile defence mission effectiveness.

#### **4.3 Country commitments**

NATO is currently developing the command and control arrangements for the Missile Defence System. Sensors and interceptors will be provided by nations or groups of nations through voluntary contributions. Since the Lisbon summit, the US has signed agreements with several European countries regarding the basing of radar and interceptors:

- Turkey: US AN/TPY-2 early-warning radar based at Kurecik<sup>110</sup>
- Romania: 24 Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors to be based at Deveselu airbase, along with up to 500 US military personnel, in 2015<sup>111</sup>
- Poland: SM-3 interceptors to be deployed by 2018 at former Slupsk-Redzikowo airbase<sup>112</sup>
- Spain: four US Aegis missile defence ships to be based in Rota, Spain<sup>113</sup>

In addition, the Netherlands has announced plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range missile defence early warning radars.<sup>114</sup>

#### 4.4 Relations with Russia

There will not be a NATO-Russia Council meeting alongside this summit, as there was in Lisbon. Newly elected President Vladimir Putin will attend neither the NATO nor the G8 summit immediately preceding it.

The formal reason given is that President Putin is too busy attending to domestic affairs. However Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in early March without agreement on missile defence, there won't be a meeting.<sup>115</sup> NATO's spokeswoman admitted "We haven't made as much progress (with Russia) as we were hoping for in the area of missile defence".<sup>116</sup> *Jane's Intelligence Weekly* says the decision not to hold the meeting "essentially means that neither side believes the structure is currently in place to hold constructive talks, confirming the ongoing deadlock."<sup>117</sup> NATO has invited Russia to send a representative to a meeting for partners in the Afghanistan operation.<sup>118</sup>

NATO held a meeting of its joint council with Russia (NRC) alongside the summit in Lisbon in 2010, at which they agreed to:

- Discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation
- A joint ballistic missile threat assessment
- Continue dialogue over missile defence
- Resume theatre missile defence cooperation<sup>119</sup>

NATO and Russia have long had a somewhat tense relationship over missile defence. The US maintains that the missile defence stations are intended to counter the potential missile threat from Iran, while Russia insists that the Eastern European sites proposed are in the

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<sup>110</sup> "Romania and Turkey agree to ABM deployments", *Jane's Missiles and Rockets*, 26 September 2011

<sup>111</sup> "Romania agrees to US missile defence base", *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, 5 May 2011; "Romania and US finalise missile defence base agreement details", *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, 6 May 2011

<sup>112</sup> Poland, Romania deepen missile defence ties with US", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 20 September 2011

<sup>113</sup> "Statement by the Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on Stationing Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain", *US Department of Defence*, 5 October 2011

<sup>114</sup> "Enhancing NATO's missile defence", *NATO newsroom*, 13 March 2012

<sup>115</sup> NATO Secretary-General press conference, 5 March 2012

<sup>116</sup> "Press briefing by the NATO Spokesperson and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation", *NATO newsroom*, 7 May 2012

<sup>117</sup> "US confirms absence of NATO-Russia meeting at summit", *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, 24 April 2012

<sup>118</sup> J Benitez, "The Russia's are coming to Chicago! (maybe)", *NATO source: Alliance News Blog*, 19 April 2012

<sup>119</sup> "NATO-Russia council joint statement", *NATO newsroom*, 20 November 2010

wrong place to deal with Iranian missiles. The Russian government also questions the logic of installing the missile defence system when the US has stated that Iran will not be allowed to gain a nuclear weapons capability. Russia therefore strongly opposes what it views as an attempt to neutralise its own nuclear defence capabilities. NATO says missile defence is not aimed at any one country. The final statement from NATO's 7 December 2011 foreign ministers meeting said:

We remain convinced that transparency gained through missile defence cooperation would further strengthen NATO-Russia relations. We have made clear that NATO's ballistic missile defence capability is defensive in nature and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrent.<sup>120</sup>

Russia and NATO held a theatre missile defence exercise in March 2012.<sup>121</sup>

#### **4.5 The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR)**

NATO agreed as part of the 2010 Strategic Concept to "continue to review NATO's overall defence and deterrence posture". This has evolved into a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) which is expected to be put forward for discussion and approval at the summit.

A senior US official, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the DDPR will:

reaffirm NATO's determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities that are tailored to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. The DDPR will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities that NATO needs to meet these challenges, as well as reaffirm NATO's commitment to making consensus decisions on Alliance posture issues. The DDPR will outline the priorities that NATO needs to address, and the actions we need to take, to ensure that we have the capabilities needed to fulfil the three core missions identified in the new strategic concept, namely: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.<sup>122</sup>

The US deploys nearly 200 nuclear weapons (B-61 gravity bombs) in five countries in Europe. Most are in Italy and Turkey with the rest in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Some are stored at US bases intended for delivery by US aircraft and others are stored at 'host' or national bases for delivery by allied aircraft.<sup>123</sup>

Hans M. Kristensen observes that the language of the 2010 Strategic Concept significantly constrains the scope of the DDPR in that it is likely to only examine the contribution of the US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe rather than the deterrence effect of the larger strategic nuclear forces of the US, Britain and France. He warns that this constraint could result in a lopsided review.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> "Final statement: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 7 December 2011", *NATO newsroom*, 7 December 2011

<sup>121</sup> Further analysis of Vladimir Putin's third term as President, including Russia's views on missile defence, is available in Library Note *The Russian crisis and Putin's third term* SN06289

<sup>122</sup> Philip H. Gordon Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US State department, "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee", *US State department*, 10 May 2012

<sup>123</sup> Hans M. Kristensen "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons", *Federation of American Scientists*, Special Report no.3, May 2012

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*

### ***NATO's nuclear declaratory policy***

NATO's declaratory policy – i.e. the circumstances in which it envisages using nuclear weapons - was most recently stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept:

Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.<sup>125</sup>

Oliver Thranert, of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, suggests some members of NATO “would like to steer the DDPR to approve language similar to the (US Nuclear Posture Review) statement.”

The United States' nuclear declaratory policy is stated in its [Nuclear Posture Review](#) (NPR) published in April 2010:

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the US will sustain safe, secure and effective nuclear forces.... The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

...The United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

However the NPR goes on to state that because:

there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.<sup>126</sup>

The UK “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT”. This position was articulated in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. However it notes “this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.” The SDSR also states:

We also note that while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.<sup>127</sup>

The Foreign Office makes clear that the ambiguity on the precise details of when, how and at what scale the UK may consider the use of its nuclear weapons capability is quite deliberate.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> [NATO Strategic Concept 2010](#), section 17

<sup>126</sup> “[Nuclear Posture Review Report](#)”, *US Government*, April 2010

<sup>127</sup> “[Strategic Defence and Security Review](#)”, *UK Government*, October 2010

<sup>128</sup> “[Q&A nuclear questions answered](#)”, FCO website, 21 September 2011

## 5 Partnerships

'Partnerships' is one of the three major themes of the summit. This will not be an enlargement summit, unlike some have previous summits have been. Instead, the focus is on NATO's relations with non-Alliance members. The focus is on broadening, deepening and strengthening existing partnerships rather than establishing a new partnership format.<sup>129</sup>

In Chicago, NATO will hold a meeting with a group of 13 partner nations to recognise their important contributions to current and recent NATO missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya.

The 2010 Strategic Concept identifies 'cooperative security' as one of NATO's three core tasks. It states:

The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.

A new partnership policy was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers in April 2011 at their Berlin meeting. The strategic objectives of NATO's partner relations are to:

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;
- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
- Promote democratic values and reforms;
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
- Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;
- Build confidence, achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO's role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy.<sup>130</sup>

Specifically, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says NATO will recognise the "operational, financial and political contributions of our partners" in Chicago.<sup>131</sup>

NATO has a range of relationships with non-members:

- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – 50 nation body of European and North American countries

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<sup>129</sup> "Press briefing by the NATO Spokesperson and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation- Full transcript", *NATO newsroom*, 7 May 2012

<sup>130</sup> "Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security", *NATO website*, accessed 30 April 2012

<sup>131</sup> "Remarks to the World Affairs Council 2012 NATO conference", US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, *State department website*, 3 April 2012

- Partnership for Peace – bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners
- Mediterranean Dialogue – relations with the southern Mediterranean-rim countries (i.e. North Africa)
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – involves countries from the Gulf region

For countries not included in the above structures, NATO refers to its relations as ‘partners across the globe’ or ‘global partners’. These include Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>132</sup>

NATO is working on providing all partners with access to a new Partnership and Cooperative Menu, which has 1600 activities available for partners to participate in.

## 6 Syria

The success of NATO’s operation in Libya has raised calls for NATO to similarly act in Syria. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said categorically “we have no intention to intervene in Syria” although he has strongly condemned the crackdowns on civilians in Syria.<sup>133 134</sup>

Syria’s northern neighbour, Turkey, is a member of the alliance. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed Turkey is considering formally invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

As of 30 April there has been no formal request by the Turkish government for consultations in an Article 4 or Article 5 scenario and there has been no formal tasking in terms of planning for a possible engagement, according to the US National Security Council’s senior director for Europe, Liz Sherwood-Randall.<sup>135</sup>

The Washington Treaty:

### Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

### Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

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<sup>132</sup> The [Partnerships](#) section of the NATO website provides more information about each individual structure or relationship, including a full list of partner countries

<sup>133</sup> “Press point by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the joint North Atlantic Council meeting in Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers session”, *NATO newsroom*, 18 April 2012

<sup>134</sup> Further information on the situation in Syria is available in Library note [The Syrian Crisis](#) SN06271, 9 May 2012

<sup>135</sup> “Obama official: no NATO planning underway in Syria”, *The Cable blog*, 30 April 2012

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> [The North Atlantic Treaty](#), *NATO website*, accessed 2 May 2012



## Appendix: About NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The Treaty created an alliance of ten European and two North American nations, dedicated to ensuring their collective security and preservation and intended to counter the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and later the countries of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>137</sup>

When the Cold War ended in 1989 and the threat of the Soviet Union diminished, some began to question NATO's continued relevance. However, conflict in the Balkans and instability throughout the former Soviet bloc countries in the early 1990s led NATO to develop a new role. In addition to its original purpose of collective security, NATO became a catalyst for extending security and stability throughout Europe via its peacekeeping and peace-support operations.

The main tenet of the Alliance is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which sets out the principle of collective security as laid down by the UN Charter. It states unequivocally that an armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against them all. Article 5 was invoked for the first time the day after the 11 September 2001 attacks in America. NATO took control of international forces in Afghanistan in 2003. Since its last summit, NATO has conducted a seven month military operation in Libya in 2011.

NATO has embarked on several periods of expansion, particularly in 2004 when seven countries joined.

There are currently 28 member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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<sup>137</sup> A full copy of the Treaty can be accessed online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>

## **Appendix: Current operations**

NATO is currently involved in five operations, on three continents:

- Afghanistan - Established by UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.
- Kosovo – KFOR (Kosovo Force) first entered Kosovo in June 1999. Currently approximately 5,500 troops operate in the Balkans as part of KFOR. In June 2008, the Alliance decided to take on responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps and to help create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force.
- Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea - Operation Active Endeavour launched in October 2001 and is led by NATO naval forces to detect and deter terrorist activity. Since 2003 NATO forces have boarded suspect vessels.
- Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa - Operation Ocean Shield focuses on at-sea counter-piracy operations. Approved in August 2009.
- Support the African Union – provides airlift support for African Union peacekeepers in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Established in June 2007 at African Union's request.