



Somalia: recent political, security and humanitarian developments

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Throughout 2011, al-Shabaab suffered a number of military setbacks. These have continued into 2012. A number of factors made this possible: a substantial increase in the size of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been accompanied by an enhanced offensive capability; from October, a Kenyan incursion across the country's southern border, justified on security grounds; and divisions within al-Shabaab which affected its own military cohesion.

Whether the most recent incarnation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which has a long track-record of incompetence and corruption, can take advantage of al-Shabaab's mounting problems remains to be seen. Its latest mandate expires in August 2012. Efforts to broker a viable and legitimate political process up to and beyond August led to have produced agreements called 'The Garowe Principles'. On 22 February, the UN Security Council agreed to further increase the size of AMISOM, from 12,000 to 17,730 personnel. Then, on 23 February, the UK Government hosted a major international conference on Somalia in London which broadly endorsed these developments and approved a number of other significant initiatives, including the creation of a Joint Financial Management Board and a Stability Fund.

Is this a "turning point" for Somalia, as UK Prime Minister David Cameron claimed at the London Conference? *Africa Confidential* hazarded the following prediction for this year in its 6 January edition: "Intervention by Kenya and Ethiopia will drive Al Shabaab from its strongholds but won't produce a viable government." But the UN Secretary-General was more optimistic, stating that "[...] the prospects for positive change appear greater than they have been for many years."

Over the last year or so, ordinary Somalis have found themselves in even more of a life-and-death struggle to survive than before. During the second half of 2011, famine struck six regions in southern Somalia. An estimated four million people, or 53% of the Somalia population, were affected. The UN has declared that the famine has ended; however, the situation remains extremely fragile and could regress unless international humanitarian support is maintained.

For further background, see the following House of Commons Library briefing papers:

RP 08/86, [Interlocking crises in the Horn of Africa](#), 24 November 2008

SN05816, [In brief: The Horn of Africa – review of events during 2010 and prospects for](#)

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[2011](#)", 4 January 2011

This note does not discuss the issue of Somali piracy, which was also on the agenda of the London conference on Somalia. For discussions of the issue, see:

SN06237, "[Preventing and prosecuting piracy at sea: legal issues](#)" (28 February 2012)

SN03794, "[Shipping: piracy](#)" (28 February 2012)

SN06238, "[Does Somali piracy have any developmental effects'?](#)" (28 February 2012)

See also the recent report by the Foreign Affairs Committee, [Piracy off the coast of Somalia](#) (5 January 2012).

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1 Recent political and security developments

1.1 Al-Shabaab on the defensive

Throughout 2011, al-Shabaab suffered a number of military setbacks at the hands of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces. A number of factors made this possible: an increase in the size of AMISOM from 8,000 to nearly 10,000, which was accompanied by an enhanced offensive capability; from October, a Kenyan incursion across the country's southern border, justified on security grounds; divisions within al-Shabaab which affected its own military cohesion; and a shift in its strategy that reflected its growing weakness – but, perhaps also a degree of design.

The big AMISOM/TFG military breakthrough occurred on 6 August 2011, when al-Shabaab withdrew almost entirely from Mogadishu, ceding control over the strategically important Bakara market area. The market had provided al-Shabaab with much revenue and its loss, along with a wider loss in 'tax revenues' from ordinary Somalis affected by the food crisis that has erupted this year (see below), damaged its ability to pay for resupplies of military equipment.¹ Increased US drone attacks also contributed to the pressure that al-Shabaab felt on the ground. Key commanders were killed during 2011. Although official figures have not been released, it is clear that AMISOM also paid a substantial price in lives in pursuit of its objectives, with Ugandan forces bearing the main burden.

Al-Shabaab experienced internal tensions that may have contributed to the decision to withdraw from Mogadishu. The 'merger' in December 2010 between al-Shabaab and its then rival, Hizb-ul-Islam, did not go smoothly, with al-Shabaab admitting that there had been problems with mismanagement and corruption within the group. Along with its failure to help people affected by the food crisis, this seriously damaged the group's reputation amongst ordinary Somalis.² On 21 February 2012, Human Rights Watch published a report alleging mass recruitment, forced marriage and rape of children by al-Shabaab.³ In the same month, al-Shabaab announced that it had joined al-Qaida, pledging obedience to its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While this is an alarming development, this may in time deepen internal tensions further, given that many of al-Shabaab's members are more strongly motivated by nationalism than international *jihad* – and potentially, therefore, more amenable to participating in future political negotiations.⁴

Al-Shabaab is not an entirely spent force in Mogadishu. Many of its cadres have gone underground. In October 2011, a suicide bomber from its ranks killed over 70 people, many of them teenagers there to take an exam, in the TFG compound. There have been regular attacks in Mogadishu since the turn of the year. In the run up to the London Conference (see below), the group pledged another wave of car bomb and suicide bomber attacks. At the end of January, AMISOM and TFG forces launched further operations to try and push all al-Shabaab operatives out of Mogadishu.⁵ In December and January, there were also operations in Hiraan region involving AMISOM, TFG and Ethiopian troops, which led to a series of reversals for al-Shabaab, including the loss of the main town, Beledweyne.⁶

¹ "Al Shabaab – neither gone nor forgotten", *Africa Confidential*, 26 August 2011

² B. Bruton and J. Peter Pham, "The splintering of al Shabaab", *Foreign Affairs*, 2 February 2012

³ Human Rights Watch, "[No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia](#)", 21 February 2012

⁴ "Somalia's al-Shabab join al-Qaeda", *BBC News Online*, 10 February 2012

⁵ "Fighting erupts in Mogadishu", *Garowe Online*, 31 January 2012

⁶ "Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up", *The East African*, 16 January 2012

While al-Shabaab may have turned, largely out of necessity, towards guerrilla warfare in Mogadishu, and suffered a wider decline in its fortunes during 2011, it still occupies and holds much of central and southern Somalia, including the strategically vital southern port of Kismayo, al-Shabaab's largest remaining source of revenue and a transit point for many of the drugs shipments that ultimately find their way to Kenya. There was also a wave of attacks and kidnappings of foreign tourists in nearby Kenyan resorts in late 2011, including two Britons, Judith and David Tebbutt (the latter resisted and was killed). Kenya had to cope with major flows of refugees from Somalia fleeing the famine there and making their way to the Dadaab refugee camps near the border, from which two Danish aid workers were kidnapped. There continues to be debate about whether these kidnappings were committed by al-Shabaab, which has consistently denied responsibility, or by Kenyan sympathisers with al-Shabaab – or indeed, by bandits with links to pirates operating off the coast – in what remains “a fragmented and diverse security landscape.”⁷

1.2 The Kenyan incursion

Al-Shabaab is unlikely to have expected the forthright response to the kidnappings that came from Kenya on 15 October 2011, when about 1,600 of its troops crossed the border. Originally described by the Kenyan government as an operation aimed at capturing those who had engaged in the attacks on foreign tourists, it soon came to be characterised as Kenya's contribution to defeating al-Shabaab and creating peace in Somalia. At the same time, the TFG announced that it was launching a new offensive from Mogadishu. The ultimate target of the Kenyan incursion appears to be al-Shabaab strongholds in the south, above all the port of Kismayo.⁸

On 1 November 2011, Kenya's military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir, stated that a wave of attacks against al-Shabaab forces, including those based in Kismayo, could begin at any time. In practice, its operations have been often been messier and more inconclusive, targeting mainly logistics and command centres. Nonetheless, there have been claims that al-Shabaab has ceded over 50% of the territory that it controlled in the south, as a result of the incursion, and is “halfway” to defeat.⁹ This cannot be independently confirmed, but al-Shabaab does appear to be struggling to persuade local clan leaders to back an armed campaign of resistance, which has led to a rise in press-ganging.

In mid January 2012, it was claimed that Kenyan forces were within striking distance of Kismayo. However, no frontal attack has yet been launched, suggesting that there is some hesitation about whether this would be the right course of action. Analyst Ken Menkhaus has argued against initiating a military assault against such a crucial target unless there is a coherent and feasible idea of what would follow.¹⁰ The Kenyan Defence Minister, Yusuf Haji, has indicated that Kenya wants to ensure that it has the full backing of the international community before it acts, saying that: “The Kismayu question is for the international community to decide.”¹¹

⁷ “Al Shabaab sets the agenda”, *Africa Confidential*, 7 October 2011; A. Rader, “Time to secure Somalia”, RUSI, 5 October 2011

⁸ “Kibaki gambles on regional war with al Shabaab”, *Africa Confidential*, 21 October 2011

⁹ “Al-Shabaab on the run in South Zone”, *The Nation* [Kenya], 8 November 2011; “Somalia may be Kenya's Afghanistan, but its army doesn't get it”, *Maverick*, 24 January 2012

¹⁰ K. Menkhaus, “[After the Kenyan intervention in Somalia](#)”, Enough Project, 13 January 2012

¹¹ “Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up”, *The East African*, 16 January 2012

Al-Shabaab has engaged sporadically with the Kenyan army.¹² In mid January, it launched a raid on a police post on the other side of the Kenyan border. Concerns have been raised that the incursion may be contributing to a radicalisation of some young Kenyan Somalis, who might in time undertake attacks on Kenyan soil.¹³ There have also been reports that Kenya may start moving some of the Somalis currently based at the Dadaab camps in northeastern Kenya (see below) back into Somalia. This is partly motivated by fears that al-Shabaab has infiltrated the camps.¹⁴ The Kenyan Government has denied that it has plans to close the camp entirely.¹⁵

There have been reports that it has been re-arming, with fingers again pointing at Eritrea as al-Shabaab's main supplier. Eritrea has denied these allegations and a leaked preliminary UN report in January is said to have refuted claims that it sent three plane-loads of arms at the end of 2011.¹⁶ However, the UN continues to assert that Eritrea retains "active linkages to Somali armed groups".¹⁷ UN sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009 remain in force.¹⁸

Most observers believe that Kenya's main intention is to create a buffer zone in southern Somalia. To facilitate this it has encouraged a recently formed local polity known as 'Jubaland', or 'Azania', of which several factions are competing for control. But both the TFG and Ethiopia, which has also sent a small contingent of troops back into Somalia in recent months, are not keen on yet another small-scale polity emerging in Somalia.¹⁹ Humanitarian concerns have not been much invoked by the Kenyan Government as a justification for the incursion. Human Rights Watch is amongst those that have drawn public attention to human rights abuses committed by Kenyan forces against civilians.²⁰

For now, public opinion in Kenya remains largely acquiescent, but there are some critics and their ranks could grow quickly if the Kenyan army starts to experience significant set-backs. One Kenyan opponent of the incursion has claimed:

Contrary to the impression that this is an angry national reaction to a recent provocation, the fact of the matter is that this military operation has been in the planning pipeline for quite some time. According to impeccable sources who are quite familiar with the inside workings of Kenya's military, intelligence and security machinations, what is happening in Somalia is part of a detailed and coordinated Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development joint intervention in Somalia with specific roles for Ethiopia, the TFG in Mogadishu, the African Union troops and the Kenyan military.²¹

If there was an element of pre-planning for the incursion, it would be highly surprising if Western stakeholders such as the US and UK did not know about the Kenyan incursion in advance. Past experience suggests that executing such a plan will not be straightforward. As the 2006-08 intervention by Ethiopia demonstrated, the presence of foreign troops invariably

¹² "Somali al-Shabaab militants attack Kenyan army convoy", *BBC News Online*, 2 November 2011

¹³ See, for example, the International Crisis Group's recent report, "[Kenyan Somali Islamist radicalisation](#)", Africa Briefing No. 85, 25 January 2012

¹⁴ "Kenya planning to relocate Daadab refugee camp to Somalia", *The Standard*, 23 January 2012

¹⁵ "Somalia: Kenya denies plan to close Somali refugee camp", *Guardian*, 23 February 2012

¹⁶ "Nation dismisses UN report on Eritrea", *Capital FM (Kenya)*, 24 January 2012

¹⁷ "UN asserts Eritrea role in arming Shabaab", *The Nation*, 18 January 2012

¹⁸ "Eritrea denies sending weapons to al-Shabaab in Somalia", *BBC News Online*, 2 November 2011. For background on sanctions, see Library Standard Note SN05259, "[The UN imposes sanctions on Eritrea](#)", 30 December 2009

¹⁹ "Are Kenyans seeking a buffer zone in Somalia?", *BBC News Online*, 28 October 2011

²⁰ See, for example, "[Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border](#)", 12 January 2012

²¹ O. Oloo, "The quixotic invasion of Somalia will devastate Kenya", *Pambazuka News*, 27 October 2011

provokes an armed counter-response sooner or later. An analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG) predicted in October 2011: "I think the Kenyans are into a very long and messy intervention in Somalia."²²

The think-tank issued a report in February 2012, which described the incursion as being poorly prepared and organised and argued that the Ethiopian forces have proved more effective so far against al-Shabaab.²³ On 22 February, Ethiopian forces took the important south-western town of Baidoa, second only in importance to al-Shabaab after Kismayo. Al-Shabaab reportedly withdrew without a fight. This has opened up the main road between Mogadishu and the south-west.²⁴

In recent days, there have been press reports that substantial numbers of al-Shabaab fighters have been withdrawing from Kismayo, with some leaders allegedly making their way to Yemen. Some fighters are reported to have relocated to Puntland. Only time will tell if such developments reflect a regrouping rather than a retreat. There are also reports that preparations are under way to launch targeted guerrilla attacks in Kismayo after al-Shabaab has 'left'.²⁵

1.3 An opportunity for the TFG?

These developments ostensibly leave the TFG in a much stronger position than before. There is, at last, some prospect that it can hold and control a significant portion of Somali territory, rather than simply being holed up in part of Mogadishu. Will it take this opportunity? Its record and performance are not promising and it is far from the broad, inclusive government that Somalia needs.²⁶

With the expiry of its mandate in August 2011, the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, and President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, fell out, with Adan insisting that there should be elections without delay. It was eventually agreed at a summit in Kampala, Uganda, in June 2011 that elections should be postponed until August 2012 and that a 'road map' should be established to ensure that all necessary steps were taken in the run-up to these elections, including agreement of a Constitution. The deal is officially known as the Kampala Accord. Adan insisted that Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as Farmajo), with whom he had clashed, should resign as part of the deal. He was quickly replaced by the former Planning Minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali.²⁷

However, opponents of Adan rallied in parliament and subsequently succeeded in removing him from office, replacing him with Madobe Nunow Mohamed. President Ahmed has since sought to get him officially reinstated, but to date has been unable to do so.²⁸

Meanwhile, the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) has continued to try and push forward with a viable political process. In September 2011, a 'Consultative Meeting on Ending the Transition' by August 2012 was held in Mogadishu. Those there, which included the TFG, Puntland, leaders of the semi-autonomous region of Galmudug, agreed a road map

²² "Are Kenyans seeking a buffer zone in Somalia?", *BBC News Online*, 28 October 2011

²³ ICG, "[The Kenyan military intervention in Somalia](#)", Africa Report No. 184, 15 February 2012, pp. 1 and 6

²⁴ "Somalia al-Shabab militant base of Baidoa captured", *BBC News Online*, 22 February 2012

²⁵ "Foreign Islamist fighters said fleeing southern Somalia port city", *Somalia Report*, 25 February 2012

²⁶ "Al Shabaab sets the agenda", *Africa Confidential*, 7 October 2011

²⁷ "Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2011/549, 30 August 2011

²⁸ "Somali MP's reject president's request to rescind removal of Speaker", *Somaliland Times*, 31 December 2011

document.²⁹ A 'constitutional conference' subsequently took place in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, between 21-23 December 2011 at which it was agreed that a final draft of the new Constitution will be completed in April 2012. A National Constituent Assembly will be nominated to draft this Constitution.³⁰ A bicameral Parliament will also be created which will selected for its first four-year term on the same "clan distribution formula" used for the current TFP, but the formula will then be abolished for subsequent elections. These agreements are known as the 'Garowe Principles'.³¹

Between 15 and 17 February 2012, UNPOS convened a follow-up meeting involving the same participants, at which further flesh was put on the bone of the Garowe Principles.

It was agreed that Somalia would become a federal state; that Somalia will have a parliamentary, rather than presidential system of government; that the electoral system will be a proportional one; that the lower house of the new legislature will consist of 225 members (half the size of the current TFP); that the upper house will consist of 54 Somali elders; that an Interim Independent Election Commission should oversee the process of nomination for both the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament; that women will comprise 30% of parliamentarians and that they will be selected by civil society and "respected women".

This deal is known as 'The Garowe II Principles'. The full text of the deal can be accessed [here](#). A further consultative meeting is scheduled to take place in Mogadishu in March 2012. It will focus on "fundamental rights and freedoms".

UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon welcomed the outcome of Garowe II, reserving particular praise for the decision to include a quota of 30% women in key institutions.³² *Somalia Report* was more cautious, arguing:

The players are the current TFG president, speaker of the house, and prime minister along with the presidents of Puntland and Galmudug, the pro-government Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa militia, and the UN's Augustine Mahiga. These seven men range from democratically elected politicians to bureaucrats are the de facto rulers of Somalia. Putting time, money and energy into willing players is not a bad thing but it is sure to provoke an angry response from the hundreds of other politicians and clan leaders shut out.³³

Somalia Report also claimed that the main driver of the process is President Farole of Puntland, asserting that the Garowe process was "pretending that Somaliland doesn't exist."³⁴ A significant minority of the members of the TFP are strongly opposed to the Garowe process, although they now face the possibility, following the recent London Conference on Somalia (see below), that the international community might take action against them if they prove to be 'spoilers'. Over the last month or so, several new political parties have been

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ "Somalia meets over Federal Constitution", *East African*, 3 January 2012

³¹ "Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

³² "Ban welcomes political deal reached at Somali constitutional conference", UN News Service, 19 February 2012

³³ "Garowe II – the road ahead", *Somalia Report*, 18 February 2012. Mahiga is head of UNPOS and the UN Secretary-General's special representative to Somalia. The speaker to which the report refers is in fact the one that the TFP deposed, Sharif Hasan Sheikh Adan. The UN has refused to recognise his deposition.

³⁴ Ibid

formed. Whether viable or not, the new political process is already leading Somali politicians to adjust their strategies for power and influence.³⁵

There are only six months to go until the new, August 2012, deadline. Many consider that the process is, like many that have gone before, unrealistic and unviable; this is not just because of the tight timeline but also because it presupposes meaningful and sustained political co-operation amongst Somalis – which is precisely what has always been so elusive in the past.³⁶ But the UN Secretary-General has been sounding optimistic, stating that “[...] the prospects for positive change appear greater than they have been for many years.”³⁷

1.4 Somaliland and Puntland: renewed tension and conflict

The US and its allies have continued to increase their support for Somaliland (but without going so far as to recognise it as an independent state), and Puntland³⁸ – those ‘Somali lands’ where viable governments do currently exist, although several new regional polities have also emerged over the last year or so, such as Galmudug, some with rival claims over territory. For example, in September 2011, Karkar region declared its secession from Puntland, Earlier in the year there were also further clashes between pro-Puntland and pro-Somaliland forces over the disputed regions of Ceyn, Sool and Sanaag. After several flashpoints during 2011, in mid January 2012 clashes again broke out between Somaliland forces and armed clan-based militias in Buhodle, the capital of Ceyn region.³⁹ There have been further clashes since then. The UK Government has called on Somaliland and Puntland to resolve their border dispute “as speedily as possible”.⁴⁰

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised the Somaliland authorities for forcibly returning 15 refugees and 5 asylum seekers to Ethiopia, where they faced possible persecution.⁴¹ In the same month, the Committee to Protect Journalists also expressed concern about the brief detention of 21 journalists from Horn Cable TV, which had been shut down on the grounds that the station was spreading propaganda against President Ahmad Silanyo. The station has since reopened.⁴²

Meanwhile, adding to these political and security tensions, Al-Shabaab sympathisers continue to launch occasional attacks in Somaliland and Puntland.

Somaliland has not taken part in the UN Political Office in Somalia-led ‘road map’ negotiations. By contrast, Puntland has been playing a very active role. However, Somaliland did attend the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012 (see below).

³⁵ “Somalia: ex-Islamic Court officials said form new party”, *Somalia Report*, 20 February 2012

³⁶ “Somalia ‘faces constitutional limbo’ over political road map”, *IRIN News*, 22 February 2012

³⁷ “Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia”, S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

³⁸ UK aid has gone towards anti-piracy measures in Puntland. “Strengthening the UK’s relationship with the Puntland State of Somalia”, FCO press release, 18 October 2011

³⁹ Also sometimes spelt Buuhoodle. Ceyn region is a predominantly Darod area and many there view Somaliland as run by the Isaaq clan. “Fighting erupts in North region”, *Shabelle Media Network*, 16 January 2012

⁴⁰ HC Deb 1 February 2012 c805-6

⁴¹ “Authorities deport 15 refugees, 5 asylum seekers to Ethiopia”, Human Rights Watch, press release, 4 January 2012

⁴² “NGO condemns ‘mass arrests’ of journalists by Somaliland’s authority”, *Somaliland Times*, 27 January 2012

In a recent parliamentary answer, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell stated that 60% of the UK's total development aid to Somalia currently goes to Somaliland.⁴³

1.5 A new international push on Somalia?

Strengthening AMISOM

In the dying days of 2011, 900 additional troops for AMISOM from Djibouti arrived in Somalia, taking the size of AMISOM towards 11,000.⁴⁴ With a promise of a further battalion from Burundi and additional Ugandan troops, it was finally getting close to reaching its mandate of 12,000 troops.

However, discussions between the UN and the AU began in late 2011 about boosting the mandate and strength of AMISOM beyond that figure, so that it can expand the areas of the country under its control. A new 'strategic concept' has been agreed. It "aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against al-Shabaab [...]".⁴⁵ A maximum option, increasing AMISOM to 35,000 troops, was rejected as infeasible, as was the minimum option of increasing the mission to 15,700. In the end, a slightly enhanced number of troops, 17,731, was agreed, plus what is described as a "set of enablers and force multipliers", which means logistical support – including a maritime interdiction capacity.⁴⁶ The AU endorsed the new strategic concept on 5 January 2012. The UN Security Council also did so later in the month, although final approval for the new mandate and troop ceiling did not come until 22 February, just before the London Conference took place (see below), when [Resolution 2036](#) was passed. The Resolution authorises AMISOM to "take all necessary measures as appropriate [...] in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia." Operational planning is currently under way.⁴⁷

In December 2011, the Kenyan forces already operating in Somalia formally asked to be 'rehatted' as part of AMISOM. The UN Security Council has approved this. However, harmonising their roles and mandates with those of AMISOM is not an entirely straightforward matter, so this has not really happened on the ground yet and may not for some time yet. The planned strength of the Kenyan contingent, which will remain in the south, is 4,700 personnel. British paratroopers have been training Sierra Leonean soldiers that are due to join AMISOM on the ground during 2012.⁴⁸ Nigeria is reportedly also willing to contribute in future. It is noteworthy that Ethiopia has not to date asked for its forces in Somalia to be 'rehatted' in the same way as Kenya's.

The AU has also asked that AMISOM is in future funded from UN assessed contributions, rather than voluntary contributions as at present. This would improve its financial position, with knock-on benefits in terms of equipment and capabilities. Its budget is set to double to around US \$500 million in 2012.⁴⁹ Ideally, the AU would like AMISOM to be rehatted as a UN

⁴³ HC Deb 1 February 2012 c810

⁴⁴ "AMISOM takes on regional, continental character, as Kenya heightens attacks", *East African*, 27 December 2011

⁴⁵ "Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

⁴⁶ "Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

⁴⁷ "Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

⁴⁸ "Paratroopers train Sierra Leone soldiers", *Times*, 26 November 2011

⁴⁹ "Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up", *The East African*, 16 January 2012

peacekeeping operation in Mogadishu and its environs,⁵⁰ but there appears to be no appetite for this on the UN Security Council.⁵¹ The EU has been a strong backer of AMISOM, paying the salaries of its troops.⁵²

The London Conference

The UK's increasingly active diplomatic role on Somalia reflects the fact that the Government has decided that the situation there "directly threatens British interests" through kidnapping, piracy and the radicalisation of young British people, not least men of Somali origin.⁵³ In 2010, the head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, said that it was inevitable that the UK would see a terrorist operation on its soil that draws its inspiration from al-Shabaab. Some speculate that it could involve a 'lone wolf' attack, which could be difficult for the security services to anticipate and prevent.⁵⁴ In recent months, there have been a series of media stories about Britons who have gone to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab, with most estimates of the number having done so in the range of 40-50.⁵⁵ One, Jermaine Grant, is currently facing trial in Kenya.⁵⁶ At least two others are believed to be on the run in Kenya at present.⁵⁷ According to *Africa Confidential*, plans to attack Olympic and other targets in London were found on the laptop of an al-Qaida commander killed in Somalia in June 2011 by a US drone attack.⁵⁸ There has certainly been fundraising for al-Shabaab in the UK.⁵⁹

In November 2011, the Government announced that it would be holding a [conference on Somalia](#) in February 2012. It took place in London on 23 February.

On 2 February, in the build up to the conference, the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, made the first visit to Mogadishu by a British foreign minister since 1992. During the visit he announced that the UK's senior representative for Somalia, Matt Baugh, would become the British Ambassador to Somalia – albeit one based in Nairobi, Kenya, until the security situation permitted being based in Mogadishu.⁶⁰ Mr Hague's visit followed that of the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, in January.

On 4 February, Mr Hague published the following [article](#) in the *Huffington Post*:

Why the international community has to come together to help Somalia

In September 1992 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd visited Mogadishu. He could not have known that it would be 20 years before any of his successors set foot in the country again. Shortly after his visit Britain's Embassy was shut and Somalia plunged deeper into the vortex of suffering and violence that has consumed it ever since. Today, it is the world's worst failed state, one that is staggering back onto its feet.

⁵⁰ Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council, 2 December 2011, para. 14

⁵¹ "Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia", S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

⁵² "In 'failed state' Somalia, instability is lucrative for some", *Reuters*, 20 February 2012

⁵³ "Young men who reject Britain to join jihad in a distant land", *Times*, 28 January 2012

⁵⁴ "Somali camps train Britons in terror", *Sunday Times*, 19 February 2012

⁵⁵ "Young men who reject Britain to join jihad in a distant land", *Times*, 28 January 2012

⁵⁶ "Al-Shabaab: armed, violent and recruiting young Britons to its ranks", *Guardian*, 22 February 2012

⁵⁷ "UK terror suspects elude Kenyan police", *Sunday Times*, 26 February 2012

⁵⁸ "Somalia: the war goes regional", *Africa Confidential*, 6 January 2012

⁵⁹ "Somali camps train Britons in terror", *Sunday Times*, 19 February 2012. Some fear that an increased crackdown on funding for al-Shabaab could affect the flow of remittances (estimated to be worth US \$2 billion a year) into the country, on which many Somalis rely. The Somali money transfer company, Dahabshiil, has its operations centre in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. See: "'lifeline' US-Somalia remittances on hold", *BBC News Online*, 10 February 2012; "What role for the diaspora in Somalia's future?", *Guardian* (Poverty Matters Blog), 20 February 2012

⁶⁰ "William Hague pledges UK's commitment to future of Somalia", *Daily Telegraph*, 2 February 2012

This week I visited Somalia's capital. Mogadishu is a city where people until recently were surviving, not really living. As its Mayor said to me, a 20-year-old Somali has never known anything other than violence and war. The road I took from the airport to the city is flanked by derelict and bullet-ridden houses that used to be homes, and torn roads that used to lead somewhere but have been savaged by fighting.

[...] During my visit I met the President, members of Somalia civil society and the Mayor of Mogadishu. I wanted to hear their views and their view of the world. I was struck by their resilience and their desire to move on and to experience peace and some semblance of normality.

Our presence was greeted with enthusiasm, as was the visit of Andrew Mitchell, International Development Secretary, to other parts to Somalia last week. I took with me Britain's newly-appointed Ambassador to Somalia and I pledged that we will re-open an Embassy in Mogadishu as soon as local circumstances permit. We are making active preparations for this.

I left Somalia more convinced than ever that we have a responsibility to do our utmost to stem the decline of Somalia. Its people deserve a better future, and our own security requires their country to become more stable.

In three weeks' time Britain will host a Conference on Somalia in London. It will bring together 50 countries and organisations to try to agree a new international and Somalian strategy to turn around the failed state that is Somalia today.

There are two reasons why the time is right for this effort.

The first is that the African Union troops in Somalia have made some important progress, wresting nearly all of Mogadishu from the control of insurgents, and making other security gains.

Second, the mandate of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government expires in August. This gives an opening to launch a new and broader political process embracing all Somalis, with a greater emphasis on supporting regional governance as well as stronger and more representative government from the centre.

This sense of a moment of opportunity was shared by the Somali leaders and citizens that I met, who welcomed Britain's engagement.

The London Conference will aim to agree practical steps to support a new political process, as well as assistance to Somalia's regions, funding for the African Union Mission, more effective arrangements to tackle piracy and terrorism, and increased humanitarian coordination. It will be different from previous conferences because it will put the needs of Somalis front and centre, not just our own security, and it will attempt to address the root causes of the conflict rather than just the symptoms.

[...] By devoting diplomatic time and effort into Somalia today, we are investing in our own security and prosperity in years to come. Britain is committed to playing its part not only with the London Conference, but for the years to come.

The Foreign Secretary subsequently amplified on many of these points in a [speech](#) given at a British Government consultation on Somalia, held at Chatham House on 8 February, in which representatives of the Somali diaspora took part.⁶¹

⁶¹ Chatham House subsequently published a [report](#) on the meeting. One non-Somali participant noted just how internally divided the Somali diaspora had appeared at the meeting. Laura Hammond, "What role for the diaspora in Somalia's future?", *Guardian* [Poverty Matters blog], 20 February 2012

The UK Government invited Somaliland to attend the London Conference, taking care to emphasise that it would especially value its contributions on development, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy issues.⁶² After a period of reflection and despite significant internal opposition to the idea of attending, the Somaliland Government indicated that President Silanyo would attend.

During the run up to the London Conference, Somalis hostile to the initiative denounced it as another attempt to “colonize” Somalia, pointing to proposals like the one tabled by some stakeholders for the establishment of international oversight of the finance ministry.⁶³ Other Somalis may well be more open to such initiatives. One was reported as saying a few days before the Conference took place: “Cash that ends up with the leaders is not cash for Somalia.”⁶⁴ There has been an estimate that 96% of direct bilateral assistance to the TFG in 2009-10 simply disappeared.⁶⁵

Many expert ‘Somalia watchers’ were sceptical about the prospects for the London Conference before it took place. One, Alex de Waal, argued:

This is all very laudable, except for one thing: It won’t work [...] The international community’s insistence on establishing a government – almost any government – in Somalia is based on a faulty understanding of what has gone wrong there [...] Instead of gathering Somalia’s discredited politicians and promising them more help, Cameron should support what already functions well in Somalia: the vibrant middle class and Somaliland.⁶⁶

Simon Tisdall, writing in the *Guardian*, feared that the TFG was likely to be replaced by another corrupt, unaccountable and ineffective type of temporary authority, saying: “This scenario may make sense to Whitehall mandarins. But in the semi-anarchic Somali context it is fantasy politics.”, adding that there is a real prospect of “permanent partition”.⁶⁷ Others have noted that there are rising hopes that Somalia may have significant oil reserves, both in Puntland and off the coast, wondering how far this has contributed to the renewed international push on Somalia -- including on the part of the UK.⁶⁸ However, the International Crisis Group was less cynical, calling the Conference an “opportunity that should not be missed.”⁶⁹

The Conference took place at Lancaster House and involved 55 delegations from Somalia and the international community. In its Communiqué, the Conference (amongst other things):

- Agreed that the mandate of the Transitional Federal Institutions ends in August 2012
- Endorsed the Garowe Principles, including Garowe II, and undertook to “incentivise progress and act against spoilers to the peace process”

⁶² “UK envoy briefs Somaliland on objectives of London conference”, *Somaliland Times*, 21 January 2012

⁶³ “Kenyan writer warns of ‘fierce resistance’ to UK plan on Somalia”, *The Nation*, 12 February 2012

⁶⁴ “In ‘failed state’ Somalia, instability is lucrative for some”, *Reuters*, 20 February 2012

⁶⁵ Richard Dowden, “By robbing the rich, Somali pirates have helped the poor”, *Times*, 4 February 2012

⁶⁶ “Getting Somalia right this time”, *New York Times*, 22 February 2012. A recent study by a US-based group called the Independent Institute concluded that: “Far from chaos and economic collapse, we found that Somalia is generally doing better than when it had a state”. “Somalia: far from a failed state?”, *BBC News Online*, 20 February 2012

⁶⁷ “Fantasy politics could presage disintegration of Somalia”, *Guardian*, 23 February 2012

⁶⁸ “Why defeat of al-Shabaab could mean an oil bonanza for western firms in Somalia”, *Observer*, 26 February 2012; “Revealed: UK leads dash for oil in war-torn African state”, *Observer*, 26 February 2012

⁶⁹ ICG, “Somalia: an opportunity that should not be missed”, Africa Briefing No. 87, 22 February 2012

- Emphasized the importance of tackling corruption and promoting financial and transparency and accountability, including through establishing a Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB) initially comprising the TFG and some donors, including the UK⁷⁰
- Established a new Stability Fund for Somalia to help create jobs, agree local peace deals and set up basic services in areas where there is less fighting
- Welcomed the expansion of AMISOM's troop ceiling and mandate under UNSCR 2036 of 22 February 2012

The Communiqué also addressed piracy, terrorism, international coordination through the International Contact Group and humanitarian issues. The [full text](#) of the Communiqué can be found in an Appendix to this briefing. Further materials relating to the Conference, including some of the speeches that were made, amongst them the opening speech of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, can be found [here](#).⁷¹

Mr Cameron called the Conference a “turning point”.⁷² Sally Healy, an expert on the Horn of Africa, said that the non-prescriptive character of the Communiqué created “an opportunity for Somalis to occupy a political space and come up with their own political processes.”⁷³ But others were less positive. Barbara Stocking, head of Oxfam, said that the political process which the London Conference has endorsed is not wide or inclusive enough.

There was a separate meeting before the Conference on humanitarian issues that was co-chaired by the UN and the United Arab Emirates. A set of conclusions were reached (see below).

Before and during the Conference, there were reports that the UK Ministry of Defence has been considering the feasibility of undertaking airstrikes against al-Shabaab.⁷⁴ At the Conference itself, the Somali Prime Minister said that airstrikes were welcome provided civilians were not harmed. However, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, made it clear that there are no UK plans to undertake airstrikes.

President Silanyo of Somaliland used his [speech](#) to the London Conference to emphasize that Somaliland's independence remained non-negotiable, called for a “bottom-up” approach to state-building in Somalia and said that an “internationally recognised Somaliland will be even better placed to contribute to a stable and peaceful Somalia.” Following the Conference, the President of the TFG, Sheikh Ahmed, said that he hoped to begin “unconditional talks” with his Somaliland counterpart in the near future.⁷⁵

Turkey, which has become increasingly active on the issue of Somalia, is due to hold an international conference on the country in June 2012. It is expected to have a strong focus on promoting reconstruction and economic development.

⁷⁰ Initial members of the JFMB are “the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, or any future successor government of Somalia”, the UK; France, the EU and the World Bank.

⁷¹ William Hague also published an article in a Kenyan newspaper after the Conference. “International community firmly behind peace and security efforts”, *The Nation*, 25 February 2012

⁷² “Cameron hails meeting on Somalia as a ‘turning point’”, *Financial Times*, 24 February 2012

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Al-Shabaab: armed, violent and recruiting young Britons to its ranks”, *Guardian*, 22 February 2012

⁷⁵ “Somali president said to hold ‘unconditional talks’ with Somaliland”, *BBC Monitoring Africa*, 26 February 2012

Other developments

In late January, a US Navy Seals military operation launched from Djibouti successfully secured the release of two aid workers, one Danish and one American, from their kidnappers.⁷⁶

US and French special forces have reportedly been active on the ground in Somalia. The US is also launching drone attacks from Djibouti, and possibly also from Ethiopia. In late January, al-Shabaab suffered a blow when one of its most senior commanders, Bilal al-Berjawi, also known to be a member of al-Qaida, was killed by a drone.⁷⁷ It is also reportedly making satellite imagery of al-Shabaab movements available to the Kenyan military.⁷⁸

The UN Political Office in Somalia moved to Mogadishu from Nairobi on 24 January.⁷⁹ This followed a visit to Mogadishu by UN Secretary-General, Ban ki-Moon, in December 2011.

2 The famine in Somalia

In December 2010, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia described the humanitarian situation as one of “[chronic catastrophe](#)”. During the second half of 2011, that catastrophe became acute. Famine struck the Horn of Africa, including Somalia. One experienced analyst of Somalia called it “a calamity that could join the ranks of the Rwanda genocide and the Darfur crisis in terms of scale and human suffering.”⁸⁰

According to the UN, the Horn of Africa experienced the most severe food crisis in the world since Somalia’s 1991/92 famine. At its height, six out of the eight regions of southern Somalia were declared to be in a state of famine, whilst large parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti also suffered from severe food insecurity as a result of drought and high food prices.

A [Key Figures on Somalia](#) factsheet published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), published on 27 October, set out the dire situation at the time:

- 4 million people, or 53% of the Somalia population, are in crisis countrywide based on August FSNAU figures - an increase from 3.7 million people in July. (FSNAU/FEWSNET)
- Of the 4 million in crisis, 3 million people are in the southern regions of Somalia, a 7% increase from 2.8% million that were in crisis in July. (FSNAU/FEWSNET)
- 750,000 people are in famine, a 46% increase from 350,000 in July (FSNAU/FEWSNET)
- Famine has now been declared in Bay region of Somalia, the sixth area along with southern Bakool, parts of Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor and IDPs in Mogadishu. (FSNAU/FEWSNET)
- Emergency conditions will persist well into the first quarter of 2012. (FSNAU/FEWSNET).⁸¹

⁷⁶ “Navy seals free hostages”, *Daily Telegraph*, 30 January 2012

⁷⁷ “US drone strike in Somalia kills al-Qaeda agent raised in Britain”, *Daily Telegraph*, 23 January 2012

⁷⁸ “Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up”, *The East African*, 16 January 2012

⁷⁹ “Special Report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia”, S/2012/74, 31 January 2012

⁸⁰ K. Menkhaus, “A diplomatic surge to stop Somalia’s famine”, *Enough Project briefing*, September 2011

⁸¹ These figures are taken from a [summary](#) of the factsheet. See also [Somalia Famine & Drought Situation Report No. 20, 1 Nov 2011](#)

Insecurity has limited humanitarian access in southern Somalia, with al-Shabaab being blamed for this situation by most of the international community. It has banned some international agencies from operating on the ground. Most recently, the Red Cross was banned.⁸² It should be noted that some pro-TFG militias and politicians have been accused of being involved in the diversion of food aid.⁸³ The TFG itself has also proved an impediment to efficient food distribution due to bureaucracy and corruption. Until the rains began and the Kenyan incursion took place, insecurity accelerated the movement of Somalis into neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia. The flow of refugees into the Dadaab refugee camps, close to the border, and to cities including the capital, Nairobi compounded existing food security problems.

As well as high levels of acute malnutrition caused by food shortages, the weakened population became vulnerable to water-borne and communicable diseases such as cholera, measles and malaria, particularly in the overcrowded refugee camps. Security and access to clean water and education were all adversely affected as a result of the food crisis. Although there are no definitive figures, tens of thousands of Somalis died in the famine.

By the end of 2011, the situation had improved. In early February 2012, Mark Bowden, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, announced that famine conditions had ended, thanks to a good harvest and the humanitarian assistance that had been provided. Nonetheless, a serious food crisis remains, with over 2 million people still reliant on emergency support.⁸⁴ Jose Graziano da Silva, the head of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has said that:

The crisis is not over. It can only be resolved with a combination of rains and continued, co-ordinated, long-term actions that build up the resilience of the local populations and link relief with development.⁸⁵

In mid February, humanitarian agencies expressed concern that a new military offensive in the Afgooye Corridor risked “harming civilians and undermining efforts to recover from famine”, with thousands of people reportedly fleeing the area. According to Oxfam, the Corridor was one of the regions affected by the famine and has only recently shown signs of recovery.⁸⁶

Below is an [assessment](#) for the period through to June 2012, published by USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network:

- Famine has ended in southern Somalia. However, nearly a third of the population remain in crisis, unable to fully meet essential food and non-food needs. As of February 3, 2.34 million people remain in crisis, with 73 percent (1.7 million people) living in the southern regions, where humanitarian access remains very limited.
- Improvements in food security outcomes are expected through March, largely due to a significantly above-average Deyr harvest, which followed very good rains, and substantial multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance over recent months.

⁸² “Red Cross banned over unsafe food charge”, *Morning Star*, 31 January 2012

⁸³ M. Bryden, “Somalia’s famine is not just a catastrophe, it’s a crime”, *Enough Project briefing*, October 2011

⁸⁴ “Famine conditions in Somalia have ended, UN says”, *BBC News Online*, 3 February 2012

⁸⁵ *Ibid*

⁸⁶ “New Somalia fighting forces thousands of civilians to flee”, Oxfam International press release, 17 February 2012

- However, some deterioration is likely between April and June due to typical seasonal factors, insecurity, and an assumption that no major assistance flows will reach populations in crisis.
- In the worst-case scenario, late and below average Gu rains, a significant escalation of insecurity in most parts of South, Sool/Sanaag and central region, and disease outbreaks will offset recent improvements, though a return to Famine would not be expected during the scenario period.

For the most recent report on the food security situation, see the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [report](#) covering the period 2-8 February 2012.

2.1 Donor response

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has summarised the [Consolidated Appeal for Somalia \(CAP\) 2012](#) as follows:

The focus of the strategy and supporting projects in the 2012 Consolidated Appeal will be on reducing malnutrition rates, preventing further displacement by assisting people where they live before they are forced to move, and assisting people who are on the move or stranded. In areas where access remains difficult, the humanitarian community will capitalize on innovative programming such as cash-based and integrated food security activities to improve the lives of those in need. Interventions will help ensure that not only will life-saving assistance be provided, but also resilience will be built, thereby reducing dependence on humanitarian aid and ensuring households can withstand future shocks. The strategy of using partners and other networks to assist populations in areas where access remains challenging will continue. In accessible areas of Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia, the increased international presence is expected to continue, thus improving operational coordination. The positive engagement of new partners will also continue in 2012, and more linkages and partnerships will be established, particularly with those that have comparative advantages working in the south.

The 2012 consolidated appeal process brought together hundreds of humanitarian actors who carefully reviewed needs assessments and developed streamlined and coordinated cluster response plans targeting those most in need. The Somalia 2012 Consolidated Appeal includes 350 projects from 148 organizations coordinated by nine clusters plus Enabling Programmes. The appeal requires US\$1.5 billion to respond to the most urgent life-saving needs of four million people.

According to the UN OCHA [Financial Tracking Service](#), 9% of the CAP 2012 has so far been raised.

Difficulties in accessing large areas of southern Somalia due to security problems have meant that humanitarian needs have been difficult to identify. Donors have shown a growing degree of responsiveness to the situation: contributions increased significantly from July 2011 onwards.⁸⁷ However, Oxfam and Save the Children published a [report](#) in January 2012 arguing that “thousands of lives and millions of pounds” had been lost due to the “late response” to the food crisis.

Developed country governments, most notably the US, have been the most significant donors. However, there has also been an unprecedented response from ‘non-traditional’ donors from the Gulf and other Muslim countries.

⁸⁷ UN OCHA [Humanitarian Funding Analysis, Somalia, August 2011](#)

A 28 January [factsheet](#) summarises the UK Government's response to the food crisis in the Horn of Africa. Contributions by donor are set out [here](#) by the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. The Tracking Service also provides broader information about UK and other donor [commitments for 2012](#) to date in response to all the current emergencies around the world. On the day of the London Conference on Somalia, the UK Department for International Development issued a [press release](#) setting out a new package of support to Somali refugees for the period through to 2015. The UK is also to the fore in relation to the new [Stability Fund](#) agreed at the Conference.

Delivery of aid has been conducted predominantly by UN agencies, in particular the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and UNICEF. Major NGOs involved in aid delivery have included Oxfam, Save the Children and Horn Relief: there has also been some success in delivering food and medicine to Somalia via the Kuwait and Iran Red Crescent Societies.

UN Security Council Resolution 2036 of 22 February 2012 banned all trade in charcoal from Somalia, which has caused deforestation and environmental damage in the country. Al-Shabaab has also raised funds through the charcoal trade.⁸⁸

As stated earlier, a separate meeting on humanitarian issues took place at the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February. It was co-chaired by the UN and the UAE. The meeting agreed the following [Conclusions](#):

The participants welcomed the initiative to convene a humanitarian meeting, which brought the international community together to address the ongoing and protracted humanitarian situation in Somalia.

We welcomed the 3 February announcement by the United Nations that famine conditions in Somalia have ended. However, we emphasised our grave concern that 2.34 million people remain in crisis, including 1.35 million internally displaced persons, and that the number of Somali refugees in the region has risen to nearly 1 million. There were particular concerns around vulnerable women and children in Somalia, with 325,000 children acutely malnourished, rising levels of sexual and gender based violence, and continuing child rights abuses. We noted that the humanitarian situation and protection environment remains extremely fragile, especially in the south.

We reaffirmed the importance of responding to early warning with early action, and that humanitarian efforts should be guided by principles of humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality to ensure assistance and protection reaches those who need it, when they need it. We welcomed the efforts of all actors engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Somali people, including national and local authorities, the United Nations and its member states (particularly regional governments), civil society (including from the diaspora) and non-governmental organisations. We agreed that effective coordination by all aid providers remains paramount to maximise the coverage of needs.

We emphasised the importance of preserving the distinction between humanitarian objectives and political and security objectives, and that blurring the lines between those objectives jeopardises the delivery of vital assistance to the Somali people. In this regard, we called on all parties in Somalia to ensure that humanitarian actors are given full, safe and unhindered access to those in need, and that they can access aid in safety.

⁸⁸ "UN to bolster Somalia peacekeeping troops by 5,700", *BBC News Online*, 22 February 2012

We agreed on the need for the Somali authorities and international community to continue providing timely and sustained support to help alleviate the suffering of the Somali people. We noted that emergency assistance should be provided in a way that is supportive of the recovery and development of the Somali people, and creates the conditions for lasting solutions for the displaced, including voluntary return. We agreed to deepen ongoing efforts, led by the United Nations, to strengthen coordination.

Participants also agreed that, in addition to meeting immediate humanitarian needs, the international community should focus on helping the Somali people build their resilience to future shocks, by committing more multi-year support for livelihoods and basic social services. We agreed on the need for the United Nations to work with others to develop a strategy for this work, drawing on recent and ongoing efforts by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries to improve the mitigation of drought emergencies.

We reaffirmed the importance of all parties to the conflict complying with international law, including International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in particular that armed actors should take all necessary measures to prevent civilian casualties, and ensure that military action does not hinder humanitarian access. We agreed on the need to enhance monitoring and reporting systems for violations of IHL in Somalia.

We expressed our concern at the plight of refugees in neighbouring countries, including many women and children, and our gratitude and continued support to refugee-hosting countries. We agreed on the need for the international community to work in collaboration with governments in the region to identify durable solutions for Somali refugees that respect international laws. We welcomed the commitment by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to take a renewed lead in building consensus for durable solutions.

Appendix 1: London Conference on Somalia – Communiqué

23 February 2012

1. The London Conference on Somalia took place at Lancaster House on 23rd February 2012, attended by fifty-five delegations from Somalia and the international community.
2. We met at a key moment in Somalia's history. Somalia is emerging from the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. African and Somali troops have pushed Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other areas. The transitional institutions come to an end in August 2012, and the people of Somalia want clarity on what will follow. The situation remains precarious, and in urgent need of support from the international community.
3. Decisions on Somalia's future rest with the Somali people. The Somali political leadership must be accountable to the people. The international community's role is to facilitate Somalia's progress and development: our strength is in unity and coordinated support to Somalia. We noted the importance of listening to and working with Somalis inside and outside Somalia, and welcomed their engagement in the run-up to this Conference.
4. The Conference focussed on the underlying causes of instability, as well as the symptoms (famine, refugees, piracy, and terrorism). We, the international community, agreed: to inject new momentum into the political process; to strengthen AMISOM and help Somalia develop its own security forces; to help build stability at local level; and to step up action to tackle pirates and terrorists.

Political

5. We agreed that the Transitional Federal Institutions' mandate ends in August 2012. There must be no further extensions. We welcomed the agreements that chart the way towards more representative government: the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord, and the Roadmap. We welcomed the progress represented by the Garowe Principles, endorsed the priority of convening a Constituent Assembly, and emphasised that the Assembly must be representative of the views of the Somali people of all regions and constituencies, and that women must be part of the political process. In line with Garowe II, we agreed to incentivise progress and act against spoilers to the peace process, and that we would consider proposals in this regard before the Istanbul Conference in June.
6. The Conference recognised the need for the international community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG or its replacement may agree to establish in order to clarify their future relations.
7. We condemned terrorism and violent extremism, whether perpetrated by Somalis or foreigners. We called on all those willing to reject violence to join the Djibouti peace process. We agreed to develop a defectors' programme to support those who leave armed groups.
8. We emphasised the urgency of Somalia funding its own public services, and using its assets for the benefit of the people, as well as tackling corruption. We welcomed the progress that has been made in establishing a Joint Financial Management Board to increase transparency and accountability in the collection and efficient use of public revenues, as well as international development aid, and which will help strengthen Somali public financial management institutions. A declaration by the initial members of the JFMB is at Annex A.
9. Respect for human rights must be at the heart of the peace process. We called for action to address in particular the grave human rights violations and abuses that women and

children face. We emphasised that journalists must be able to operate freely and without fear. Civilians must be protected. We called on the Somali authorities to take measures to uphold human rights and end the culture of impunity. We agreed to step up international efforts including through the UN human rights architecture.

Security and Justice

10. We agreed that security and justice were essential both to a successful political process and to development. Better security could only be achieved sustainably in parallel with better justice and the rule of law.

11. We expressed gratitude to those countries whose troops had served as peacekeepers and paid tribute to the achievements and sacrifices of AMISOM and other forces. We welcomed joint planning by the UN and African Union and reiterated the importance of effective command and control. We welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2036, which expands AMISOM's mandate and raises the troop ceiling. We encouraged AMISOM to ensure the protection of civilians. We encouraged partners, especially new donors, to contribute to funding for AMISOM, including through the EU.

12. We agreed that, over time, Somalis should take over responsibility for providing their own security and develop their own justice systems to deal with the threats to their security and improve access to justice. We noted that Somalis themselves must decide what security and justice arrangements they need.

13. We acknowledged the good work underway in supporting the Somali security and justice sectors. We agreed that we would build an international framework of partners in order to bring much needed coordination and focus to those efforts, underpinned by a set of principles at annex B, and working closely with the UN's Joint Security Committee.

Piracy

14. We reiterated our determination to eradicate piracy, noting that the problem requires a comprehensive approach on land as well as at sea. We expressed our concern that hostages in Somalia are being held longer and with more use of violence. We welcomed the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We also welcomed the success of international military efforts, and remain committed to such efforts with robust rules of engagement and sufficient force generation. We agreed that piracy cannot be solved by military means alone, and reiterated the importance of supporting communities to tackle the underlying causes of piracy, and improving the effective use of Somali coastal waters through regional maritime capacity-building measures. We welcomed those initiatives underway and agreed to coordinate and support such initiatives better. We called for full implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the adoption of an Exclusive Economic Zone. We look forward to reviewing progress including at the Piracy Conference in the UAE in June.

15. We welcomed the efforts of partners in industry against piracy, and called for greater take-up of Best Management Practice on ships. We welcomed current work on international guidance on the use of private armed security companies.

16. There will be no impunity for piracy. We called for greater development of judicial capacity to prosecute and detain those behind piracy both in Somalia and in the wider region and recognised the need to strengthen capacity in regional states. We welcomed new arrangements, which enable some states and naval operations to transfer suspected pirates captured at sea for trial by partners across the Indian Ocean region, and if convicted, to transfer them to prisons in Puntland and Somaliland which meet international standards. We noted the intention to consider further the possibility of creating courts in Somalia specialised in dealing with piracy.

17. We reiterated our determination to prosecute the kingpins of piracy. Recognising work already undertaken, we agreed to enhance coordination on illegal financial flows and to coordinate intelligence gathering and investigations. We noted the establishment of a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre in the Seychelles.

Terrorism

18. Terrorism poses a serious threat to security in Somalia itself, to the region, and internationally. It has inflicted great suffering on the Somali population. We agreed to work together with greater determination, and with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and international humanitarian law, to build capacity to disrupt terrorism in the region, and to address the root causes of terrorism. We agreed on the importance of disrupting terrorists' travel to and from Somalia, and on the importance of disrupting terrorist finances, and called on countries in the region to implement the Financial Action Task Force's recommendations on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. We noted that effective intelligence gathering and investigation, and support to the Somali criminal justice system, were critical to the fight against terrorism. We agreed to work with the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and other international and regional bodies to deliver this important work.

Stability and Recovery

19. We welcomed the success in some areas of Somalia in establishing local areas of stability, and agreed to increase support to build legitimate and peaceful authorities, and improve services to people living in these areas. We acknowledged the importance of creating the conditions inside Somalia for durable solutions for the displaced, that respect international laws. We agreed that such efforts should promote local and regional cohesion, and converge with the national political process.

20. We considered the implementation of the Mogadishu Recovery and Stabilisation Plan important. We agreed to expand programmes to newly-recovered areas. We would focus support on enabling the delivery of immediate and sustainable benefits to ordinary Somali people: safety and security, economic opportunities and basic services. We would promote effective and accountable local administrations, and support the resolution of disputes.

21. We agreed that all support to local areas of stability should be in accordance with the New Deal for engagement in fragile states recently adopted in Busan, and build on the stabilisation strategies prepared by both IGAD and the Transitional Federal Government. We endorsed a set of principles to guide international support to local areas of stability in Somalia (Annex C). We agreed to continue funding local stability through existing programmes, and noted the establishment of a new Stability Fund to which a number of us will contribute.

22. We agreed that Somalia's long-term reconstruction and economic development depended on a vibrant private sector, and that both aid and diaspora finance could develop Somalia's considerable potential in livestock, fisheries and other sectors. We noted that stability was a prerequisite for most sustainable investments in infrastructure such as electricity, roads and water systems. We looked forward to further discussion on all these issues at the Istanbul Conference.

Humanitarian

23. The Conference was preceded by a separate meeting on humanitarian issues co-chaired by the United Nations and the United Arab Emirates. Notwithstanding the end of the famine, participants expressed concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and committed to providing humanitarian aid based solely on need. They agreed a [set of conclusions on humanitarian issues](#) and linking relief with longer-term recovery.

International coordination

24. We agreed to carry forward work agreed at London through the International Contact Group on Somalia (ICG), and welcomed the ICG's decision in Djibouti to look at restructuring to become more effective. We recommended that the ICG establish working groups on the political process, security and justice, and stability and development. We noted that, within the ICG, a core group of engaged countries would drive progress in support of UN, AU and IGAD efforts.

25. We welcomed the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in facilitating progress in Somalia. We also welcomed the role of IGAD and the African Union, and the support of the League of Arab States, the European Union, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. We encouraged effective coordination between UN entities working on Somalia. While recognising the still challenging security situation in Somalia, we welcomed UNPOS' relocation to Mogadishu and agreed that we would aim to spend more time on the ground in Somalia in order to work more closely with Somalis on the challenging tasks ahead.

Conclusion

26. We expressed the hope that a new era of Somali politics, supported by the international community, will bring peace to Somalia. We are determined to place the interests of the Somali people at the heart of all our actions. We looked forward to the day when the situation in Somalia would have made sufficient progress for an international conference to be held there. In the meantime, we will redouble our efforts to support the people of Somalia in their search for a better future for their country.

- Annex A - [Joint Financial Management Board declaration](#)
- Annex B - [Principles for support to security and justice sectors](#)
- Annex C - [Stability principles](#)

Appendix 2: Text of UN Security Resolution 2036 (2012), 22 February 2012

The Security Council,

Recalling all previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia, in particular resolution 2010 (2011), as well as other relevant Presidential Statements and resolutions on protection of civilians in armed conflict, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and *reiterating* its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia,

Reiterating its full support for the Djibouti Peace Process and the Transitional Federal Charter which provide the framework for reaching a lasting political solution in Somalia, *reiterating* its support for the Kampala Accord and the Roadmap to End the Transition (the "Roadmap"), and *stressing* the need for reconciliation, dialogue and broad-based, inclusive and representative Somali institutions,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Transitional Federal Institutions to implement the Roadmap, *welcoming* the progress to date, including the commitment shown by the Garowe Principles, but *expressing concern* that many of the deadlines for the completion of the tasks in the Roadmap have been missed which may delay the full implementation of the Roadmap,

Urging the Transitional Federal Institutions and all Roadmap signatories to redouble their efforts to fully implement the Roadmap with the support of United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the international community, and *noting* that future support to the Transitional Federal Institutions for the remainder of the transitional period, would be contingent upon progress in completing the tasks in the Roadmap,

Stressing the need for the Transitional Federal Government, with the support of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and as a matter of urgency, to build an enhanced level of security in areas secured by AMISOM and the Somali security forces, and to build sustainable administrative structures in these areas,

Noting that the transitional period in Somalia will end on 20 August 2012, *emphasising* that any further extension of the transitional period would be untenable and *calling upon* Somali parties to agree inclusive and representative post-transitional arrangements, in line with the Djibouti Agreement,

Stressing the need for further efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency and increase mutual accountability in Somalia, and in this regard *welcoming* initiatives aimed at the more transparent and accountable management of Somali assets and internal and external financial resources to maximise public revenues for the benefit of the Somali people,

Stressing the need for a comprehensive strategy in Somalia to address the political, economic, humanitarian and security problems in Somalia and the problem of piracy, including hostage taking, off the coast of Somalia through the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders, *reiterating* their full support to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Augustine P. Mahiga in this regard, and for their work with the African Union and international and regional partners,

Recognising that peace and stability in Somalia depend on reconciliation and effective governance across the whole of Somalia and *urging* all Somali parties to renounce violence and to work together to build peace and stability,

Welcoming the London Conference on Somalia, to be held on 23 February 2012, where coordinated international action to address the political, security, justice, stability, and piracy problems in Somalia, as well as humanitarian issues, will be further enhanced, and *welcoming* the upcoming Istanbul Conference on Somalia,

Expressing grave concern at the dire humanitarian situation in Somalia, and its impact on the people of Somalia, in particular on women and children, and *calling on* all parties to ensure full and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in

need of assistance across Somalia, consistent with humanitarian, human rights and refugee law,

Reiterating its condemnation of all attacks on the Transitional Federal Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations personnel and facilities, and the civilian population by armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, and *stressing* that Somali armed opposition groups and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, constitute a terrorist threat to Somalia, and the international community,

Noting the announcement that Al Shabaab has joined Al Qaeda, *stressing* that there should be no place for terrorism or violent extremism in Somalia and *reiterating* its call upon all opposition groups to lay down their arms,

Commending the contribution of AMISOM to lasting peace and stability in Somalia and efforts to bring stability and security to Mogadishu, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi and Uganda, and for the newly deployed troops from the Government of Djibouti and *recognising* the significant sacrifices made by AMISOM forces,

Welcoming the willingness of the Government of Kenya for Kenyan forces to be incorporated into AMISOM and so to contribute to the implementation of AMISOM's mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007) and this resolution, *stressing* the importance of the prompt deployment of new AMISOM forces to reach its mandated level, and *calling* on other African Union Member States to consider contributing troops and provide support to AMISOM,

Welcoming the work of the joint African Union and United Nations Technical Assessment Mission on AMISOM, *noting* the agreement by the African Union Peace and Security Council on a AMISOM Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012, and *welcoming* the Secretary-General's Special Report on Somalia(S/2012/74),

Recalling its authorisation in paragraph 1 of resolution 2010 (2011) that the Member States of the African Union maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 October 2012, and that AMISOM is authorised to take all necessary measures to carry out its existing mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007),

Recalling paragraph 5 of resolution 2010 (2011) and noting its intention to review the force level of AMISOM when the mission reaches its mandated level of 12,000,

Expressing concern that charcoal exports from Somalia are a significant revenue source for Al Shabaab and also exacerbate the humanitarian crisis,

Recalling its resolutions 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), and 2020 (2011) *expressing* its grave concern at the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, *recognising* that the ongoing instability in Somalia contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *stressing* the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy, and hostage taking, and its underlying causes by the international community and the Transitional Federal Institutions and *welcoming* the efforts of the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, States and international and regional organisations,

Stressing the need to investigate, prosecute, and to imprison when duly convicted pirates and those who illicitly finance, plan, organise, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks,

Welcoming the relocation of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia and an UNPOS office to Mogadishu and *encouraging* the United Nations to take further steps to achieve a more permanent and full relocation to Somalia, in particular Mogadishu, consistent with the security conditions, as outlined in the Secretary-General's reports (S/2010/447) and (S/2009/210),

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that in addition to the tasks set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007) AMISOM shall include establishing a presence in the four sectors set out in the AMISOM strategic Concept of 5 January, and AMISOM shall be authorised to take all

necessary measures as appropriate in those sectors in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, *further decides* that AMISOM shall act in compliance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, in performance of this mandate and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia;

2. *Requests* the African Union to increase AMISOM's force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, comprised of troops and personnel of formed police units;

3. *Reiterates* that regional organisations have the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for the work of their organisations, including through contributions by their members and support from partners, *welcomes* the valuable financial support provided by the African Union's partners to AMISOM, including through bilateral support programmes and the African Peace Facility of the European Union, and calls upon all partners, in particular new donors, to support AMISOM through the provision of equipment, technical assistance, funding for troop stipends, and uncaveated funding to AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM;

4. *Decides* to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 of resolution 2010 (2011), and as described in the Secretary-General's letters (S/2009/60) and (S/2011 /591) to the Security Council, from a maximum of 12,000 uniformed personnel to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, until 31 October 2012, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010);

5. *Recalls* its request to the Secretary-General in paragraphs 10 and 12 of resolution 1863 (2009) related to transparency and proper accountability for resources provided to AMISOM, and *requests* that equal attention to resource transparency, accountability, and internal controls be applied to the additional UN support measures authorised to be provided to AMISOM and its troop contributing countries in this resolution and the annex of this resolution;

6. *Decides* on an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of the mission, to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM to include the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as described in paragraphs 28 through 36 and 43 of the Secretary-General's Special Report on Somalia (S/2012/74) and as set out in the annex to this resolution;

7. *Stresses* the importance of stabilising areas secured by AMISOM and the Somali security forces, *calls upon* all Somali stakeholders, with the support of the UN, the African Union and the international community, to promote reconciliation, law and order, the delivery of basic services and strengthen governance at district, regional, state and federal levels, including by supporting the delivery of Stabilisation Plans developed by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Transitional Federal Government;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning, deployment and management of AMISOM, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, including on the implementation of the AMISOM Strategic Concept and the AMISOM Concept of Operations;

9. *Reiterates* its request to the United Nations to work with the African Union to develop a guard force of an appropriate size, within AMISOM's mandated troop levels, to provide security, escort and protection services to personnel from the international community, including the United Nations, as appropriate and without further delay;

10. *Welcomes* the intention of new troop contributing countries to contribute to AMISOM and *stresses* that all new troops shall be integrated fully into the AMISOM command and control structures, and shall operate in accordance with AMISOM's mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007) and this resolution;

11. *Stresses* that coordinated action by all contributors is critical for the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and calls on other African Union Member

States to consider contributing troops to AMISOM in order to help create the conditions when Somalia can be responsible for its own security;

12. *Recognizes* the importance of strengthening the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilization, and *calls upon* the African Union and donors to continue to work together to further enhance the effectiveness of African peacekeeping;

13. *Recalls* paragraph 13 of resolution 2010 (2011);

14. *Emphasises* that the development of the Somali security forces is vital to ensure Somalia's long term security and stability, *requests* AMISOM to continue to expand its efforts to help develop the capacity and effectiveness of the Somali security forces, *urges* Member States, regional, and international organisations to work with in coordination with AMISOM to provide coordinated assistance, training and support and *welcomes* in this regard the training of Somalia security forces through the bilateral support programmes of Member States and the European Union Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM);

15. *Notes* the important role an effective police presence can play in the stabilisation of Mogadishu, *stresses* the need to continue to develop an effective Somali police force and *welcomes* the desire of the African Union to develop an operational police component within AMISOM;

16. *Demands* that all parties and armed groups take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and supplies, and further *demands* that all parties ensure full and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance across Somalia, consistent with humanitarian, human rights and refugee law;

17. *Recalling* its resolutions 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, *welcomes* the progress made by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties during its operations, *urges* AMISOM to continue to undertake enhanced efforts in this regard, *commends* AMISOM's commitment to establish a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), as referenced in the Secretary-General's Report on Somalia (S/2011/759) of 9 December 2011, and *calls on* international donors and partners to further support the establishment of a CCTARC;

18. *Welcomes* the endorsement by AMISOM of the 2011 indirect fire policy and *encourages* AMISOM to adapt and implement this policy for all new troops and assets;

19. *Recalls* the Council's decision in resolution 1844 (2008) and *welcomes* the determination by the international community, including the African Union, to take measures against both internal and external actors engaged in actions aimed at undermining the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, including the Roadmap, as well as the efforts of AMISOM and the Somali security forces;

20. *Underlines* its intention to keep the situation on the ground under review and to take into account in its future decisions progress by AMISOM in meeting the following objectives:

(a) Consolidation of security and stability throughout south central Somalia, including key towns, by the Somali security forces and AMISOM, on the basis of clear military objectives integrated into a political strategy;

(b) Effective regional coordination and cooperation on security issues by AMISOM;

(c) Assistance in the development of effective Somali security forces, with integrated units under a clear command and control structure and in coordination with the international community;

21. *Requests* the African Union to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, including on the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 in this resolution and on the new command and control structure and integration of forces under this structure and report to the Council, through the provision of written reports, no later than 30 days after the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter;

22. *Decides* that Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia and that all Member States shall take the necessary

measures to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia; further *decides* that all Member States shall report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (“the Committee”) within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken towards effective implementation of this paragraph; and *requests* the Monitoring Group re-established pursuant to resolution 2002 (2011) to assess the impact of the charcoal ban in its Final Report;

23. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee shall apply to the measures in paragraph 22 above; *decides* that the Monitoring Group’s mandate shall likewise be expanded; and *considers* that such commerce may pose a threat to the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, and therefore that the Committee may designate individuals and entities engaged in such commerce as subject to the targeted measures established by resolution 1844 (2008);

24. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

In accordance with paragraph 6 of this resolution, on an exceptional basis and due to the unique character of AMISOM, the UN logistical support package for AMISOM shall be extended for a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel and 20 AMISOM civilian personnel based in AMISOM headquarters until 31 October 2012, in line with the recommendation in paragraphs 29 and 43 of the Secretary-General’s Special Report on Somalia (S/2012/74), which includes the provision of explosive threat management capacity, level II medical facilities and the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment (COE).

Eligible COE will include standard enablers and multipliers within the land component, and an aviation component of up to a maximum of 9 utility helicopters and 3 attack helicopters.

COE reimbursement should conform to UN rates and practices, including the direct transfer of funds to troop contributing countries (TCCs) as appropriate, and periodic reviews to ensure full operational capability. Letters of Assist (LOAs) should be negotiated with TCCs for equipment not covered under the UN COE framework including the aviation specified above.

As noted in paragraph 29 of the Secretary-General’s Special Report on Somalia (S/2012/74), only equipment deployed by the TCCs and considered owned by TCCs should be reimbursed. Equipment gifted or donated to TCCs, AMISOM, the African Union or where the ownership still remains with the donor are not eligible for reimbursement.