



The Security Council's “no-fly zone” resolution on Libya

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Section International Affairs and Defence Section

This note looks at the development of a consensus on the United Nations Security Council for a resolution permitting military intervention in Libya. It reproduces the resolution.

- From 28 February to 17 March, David Cameron was relatively consistent in his calls for a no-fly zone
- French president Nicolas Sarkozy became very vocal in his support for military action, and designated the rebels' Transitional Council the legitimate rulers of Libya
- The US administration at first appeared divided and reluctant on the question, but in the end supported a stronger resolution than that proposed by France and the UK
- Support of the Arab League was decisive in persuading the US and others to support military action
- On 17 March the Security Council voted 10 in favour with 5 abstentions for the resolution. Russia, China, India, Brazil and German abstained
- On 18 March, Qaddafi announced a ceasefire but there was little immediate sign of one being implemented in Libya

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1 How the Resolution was won

Despite some apparent uncertainties, the United Kingdom government has consistently pressed for the imposition of a no-fly zone. In a statement to the House of Commons, David Cameron said on 28 February that he had asked military staff to consider the options for intervention:

...we do not in any way rule out the use of military assets. We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context, I have asked the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone.¹

In the same statement, Mr Cameron floated the idea of arming the rebels.

David Cameron's initial enthusiasm for a military response to the Qaddafi regime's likely success in crushing the rebellion looked exposed, as the Obama administration (particularly in the person of the defence secretary Robert Gates) registered its doubts.

On 1 March, Hillary Clinton said: "Nothing is off the table so long as the Libyan government continues to threaten and kill Libyans."² US defence secretary Robert gates, however, criticised "loose talk" about no-fly zones, stressing that a no-fly zone would require serious military action and could cause significant casualties. Some commentators thought that the US military was not in favour.

The French government showed that it was still not enthusiastic about military intervention. A spokesman said of a no-fly zone: "It's not a priority. The priority is humanitarian aid, it's no longer diplomacy."³ Germany, too, expressed its firm opposition to any military intervention.

Comments from Downing Street hinted that the government was backing away from its earlier enthusiasm, suggesting that the UK remained focussed on diplomatic efforts with international partners. Mr Cameron, however, persisted with his suggestion that a no-fly zone was necessary.

Around 4 March, the French government started to issue stronger statements in favour of military action, although divisions in Paris were still apparent.

The news came out on 7 March that French and British missions to the United Nations were drafting a Security Council Resolution that was said to propose simply a no-fly zone.

In the US, some influential voices, including former presidential candidates John Kerry and John McCain, were increasingly supporting the French and British position that some form of military intervention was necessary.

David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy sent a joint letter to the Council of the European Union urging support for a Security Council Resolution authorising "a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks, working with Allies and partners, especially those in the region."⁴

¹ HC Deb 28 February 2011, c25

² "UK and US weigh up Libya no-fly zone", *Financial Times*, 1 March 2011

³ "Alarm over Libya no-fly zone", *Financial Times*, 2 March 2011

⁴ "[Full text of letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy](#)", *Guardian*, 10 March 2011

On 11 March, the French government increased the distance between its position and that of its allies by recognising the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya. President Sarkozy also called for air strikes against Qaddafi's military.

In a decisive development, the Arab League announced on March 12 that it supported the imposition of a no-fly zone. The Omani foreign minister announced at a press conference that all the members of the group had supported the decision, which aimed to protect civilians in Libya. Amr Moussa, Arab League secretary general, said that he would encourage members of the league to participate in the action.⁵

The US government had, from the start of the crisis, made clear that a Security Council resolution would be necessary to allow an intervention to take place. After a meeting of the G8 in Paris on 14 March, where the question of a no-fly zone was discussed, Foreign Secretary William Hague said that while a UN Security Council resolution would be the "cleanest and simplest" way of getting a legal basis for military intervention, there was an entitlement to intervene under international law "in cases of great, overwhelming humanitarian need".⁶ This approach to the issue of legality had also been hinted at in the letter from Mr Sarkozy and Mr Cameron to the European Council.

By 16 March, the Obama administration was clearly moving towards supporting a Security Council resolution, but also suggesting that a no-fly zone alone was not enough. Hillary Clinton said:

We are moving as rapidly as we can in New York to see whether we can get additional authorisation for the international community to look at a broad range of actions, not just a no-fly zone but other actions as well.⁷

A White House spokesman went further, suggesting that a no-fly zone would not, by itself, do the required job:

There are other options that need to be considered so that we can be sure that the actions we are taking with our international partners will do the most possible to put pressure on Gaddafi and to ultimately get him to leave power.⁸

Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN, was also reported to have argued in negotiations that a no-fly zone would possibly lead to unavoidable further military action, and that that should therefore be permitted in any resolution of the Security Council.⁹

In the evening of 17 March, UK time, the Security Council approved the resolution tabled by Britain, France and Lebanon, with 10 votes in favour with five abstentions (Russia, China, Germany, Brazil and India).

As well as calling for the imposition of a "no-fly zone", the resolution authorises member states to:

take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi.¹⁰

⁵ "Arab states seek Libya no-fly zone", *al-Jazeera*, 12 March 2011

⁶ "G8 leaders consider Libya no-fly zone", *BBC News Online*, 14 March 2011

⁷ "Cameron rift with Obama over Libya; Britain presses for UN action without US support", *Times*, 17 March 2011

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ "Cameron frustrated with Obama's refusal to act", *Independent*, 17 March 2011

The fact that the resolution authorises action “notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970” has been taken by the government, after legal advice, to mean that arming the rebels could be legal, despite the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1970. The government undertook to make the legal advice available to Parliament before debating the matter on 21 March.

Ed Miliband, for the Labour Party, welcomed the UN resolution.

After the vote, UK Representative Sir Mark Lyall Grant said:

The situation in Libya is clear. A violent, discredited regime which has lost all legitimacy is using weapons of war against civilians.

Qadhafi’s regime has ignored this Council’s demand, in resolution 1970, that it stop the violence against the Libyan people.

It is now preparing for a violent assault on a city of one million people that has a history dating back 2,500 years. It has begun airstrikes in anticipation of what we expect to be a brutal attack using air, land and sea forces. Qadhafi has publicly promised no mercy and no pity.

We have also seen reports today of a grotesque offer of amnesty. This from a regime which has advertised its determination to continue persecuting and killing those Libyans who want only to take control of their own future.

The international community has come together in deploring the actions of the Qadhafi regime and demanding that the regime end this violence against the Libyan people.

International opinion has looked to the Security Council to act. The Arab League has been particularly clear in its demands, including for the imposition of a No-Fly Zone.

That is why the United Kingdom, in close cooperation with Lebanon and France has pressed for the early adoption of this resolution. My government welcomes the fact that the Council has acted swiftly and comprehensively in response to the appalling situation in Libya and to the appeal of the Arab League.

Mr President,

Resolution 1973:

Demands that Col Qadhafi implement an immediate ceasefire;

It imposes a No-Fly Zone to prevent the Qadhafi regime using air power against the Libyan people;

It authorises member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. It rules out a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory;

It imposes a range of additional measures, including significant action to tighten enforcement of the arms embargo and to deny the regime access to funds.

We, along with partners in the Arab world and in NATO, are now ready to shoulder our responsibilities in implementing resolution 1973.

Mr President,

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1973, article 4

The central purpose of this resolution is clear: to end the violence, to protect civilians, and to allow the people of Libya to determine their own future, free from the tyranny of the Qadhafi regime.

The Libyan population want the same rights and freedoms that people across the Middle East and North Africa are demanding, and that are enshrined in the values of the United Nations Charter. Today's resolution puts the weight of the Security Council squarely behind the Libyan people in defence of those values.¹¹

2 Qaddafi announces a ceasefire

In response to the resolution, Colonel Qaddafi announced a ceasefire "to protect civilians".¹² There were reports, however, that fighting continued unabated. It was also reported that Libyan state television had made no mention of the ceasefire. UK shadow foreign secretary said that the Qaddafi regime needed to be judged by its deeds and not its words.¹³

3 The Obama policy

Some have accused the Obama administration of weakness and indecision over the problems in Libya. There are reports that Prime Minister David Cameron was frustrated at the lack of a strong stand from Washington.¹⁴ Some interpreted his call in the House of Commons for leadership in the UN as a veiled attack on the US:

Of course there are a wide range of views in the UN; I urge all to take the right steps so that we show some leadership on this issue and make sure that we can get rid of this regime.¹⁵

There appeared to be divisions between members of the administration as to how to respond to the crisis, and it was reported that the military was very reluctant to get into another conflict at a time when high demands were being placed on American soldiers and airmen in Afghanistan. Added to this must be the reports that the administration is having second thoughts about the wisdom of a complete military withdrawal from Iraq: reports in March suggested that the United States is recommending to Iraqi officials that as many as 20,000 US troops should stay in the country.¹⁶ Such a commitment, when Obama was elected partly on a promise to end the Iraq war, would be controversial as well as a significant drain on resources.

Some commentators, such as the BBC's Mark Mardell, have said that Obama's refusal to take a strong leading role in organising response to the crisis has in fact made it easier for the international community to act as such. Obama stressed from the start that regional actors would need to be involved. After his famous Cairo speech which aimed to reset US relations with the Muslim world,¹⁷ the president did not wish to be acting unilaterally in the same way as his predecessor.

The support of the Arab League was a turning point, and Obama's approach may have been what made that possible. The support of the league was mentioned in the comments of many

¹¹ FCO, [UK Explanation of Vote delivered by Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the UK Mission to the UN, on Security Council Resolution on Libya](#), 17 March 2011

¹² "Libya 'to halt military action'", *BBC News Online*, 18 March 2011

¹³ "West moves towards Libya action", *BBC News Online*, 18 March 2011

¹⁴ "Cameron frustrated with Obama's refusal to act over no-fly zone", *Independent*, 17 March 2011

¹⁵ HC Deb 16 March 2011, c291

¹⁶ "Iraq: US wants to leave 20,000 troops- official", *Stratfor*, 18 March 2011

¹⁷ White House, [Remarks by the President on a new beginning](#), Cairo University, Egypt, 4 June 2009

of the representatives of members of the Security Council in explaining why they had decided to back the resolution.¹⁸

The approach of the Obama administration may have facilitated unity between the west and the Arab world and, in doing so, made the United Nations the centre of decision-making in a way that it had not been for some time. On the other hand, it may have delayed action to prevent the Qaddafi regime from crushing the rebels. Determined action taken a week earlier, when it became clear that the superior firepower of the government forces would prove decisive, could perhaps have saved many lives. The day after the resolution was passed, reports emerged that fighting around Misrata and Benghazi was continuing despite the commitment by Qaddafi to a ceasefire, raising fears that the new tactic was to hold off military intervention as long as possible while finishing the job.

4 Resolution¹⁹

The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

“Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

“Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

“Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and *reaffirming* that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

“Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

“Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and *urging* these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

“Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

“Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, [“Security Council approves ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya, authorising ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians by vote of 10 in favour, with 5 abstentions”](#) Press release, 17 March 2011

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, [“Security Council approves ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya, authorising ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians by vote of 10 in favour, with 5 abstentions”](#) Press release, 17 March 2011

“*Recalling* the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Taking note* of the final communiqué of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High-Level Committee on Libya,

“*Taking note also* of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Taking note further* of the Secretary-General’s call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate ceasefire,

“*Recalling* its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and *stressing* that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

“*Reiterating its concern* at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, *welcoming* the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and *calling on* the international community to support those efforts,

“*Deploring* the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

“*Considering* that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

“*Expressing concern* also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Welcoming* the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdul Ilah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Determining* that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. *Demands* the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

“2. *Stresses* the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and *notes* the decisions of the Secretary-General to

send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High-Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

“3. *Demands* that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

“Protection of civilians

“4. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and *requests* the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

“5. *Recognizes* the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

“No-fly zone

“6. *Decides* to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

“7. *Decides further* that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorization conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

“8. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and *requests* the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

“9. *Calls upon* all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary overflight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

“10. *Requests* the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8

above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

“11. *Decides* that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

“12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

“Enforcement of the arms embargo

“13. *Decides that* paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, *calls upon* all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

“14. *Requests* Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and *further requests* the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

“15. *Requires* any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

“16. *Deplores* the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and *calls upon* all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“Ban on flights

“17. *Decides* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

“18. *Decides that* all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

“Asset freeze

“19. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

“20. *Affirms* its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“21. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

“Designations

“22. *Decides* that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *decides further* that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

“23. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

“Panel of Experts

“24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

“25. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

“26. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

“27. *Decides* that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

“28. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011);

“29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Libya: United Nations Security Council proposed designations

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
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Annex I: Travel Ban

1	QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI	Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.	
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<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
2	Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI	Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.	

Annex II: Asset Freeze

1	Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar	Position: Director, External Security Organisation	
2	Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis	Position: Defence Minister	Title: Major General DOB: --/--/1952. POB: Jalo, Libya
3	Matuq, Mohammed	Position: Secretary for Utilities	DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Khoms
4	Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1970. POB: Tripoli, Libya
5	Qadhafi, Saadi	Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations	DOB: 25/05/1973. POB: Tripoli, Libya
6	Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1982. POB: Tripoli, Libya
7	Al-Senussi, Abdullah	Colonel Position: Director Intelligence	Title: Colonel DOB: --/--/1949. POB: Sudan

Entities

1	Central Bank of Libya	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	
2	Libyan Investment Authority	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22nd Floor, Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103
3	Libyan Foreign Bank	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.	

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
4	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya
5	Libyan National Corporation	Oil Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Bashir Saadwi Street, Tripoli, Tarabulus, Libya