



Northern Ireland: political developments January to June 2010

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This Note should be read in conjunction with Library Standard Note 5350 *The Hillsborough Agreement*, published March 2010, which explains in detail the agreement reached on the devolution of policing and justice. This duly took place on 12 April 2010 and David Ford, the leader of the Alliance Party, became Policing and Justice Minister. New arrangements need to be agreed by May 2012. In the general election of May 2010, the DUP leader, Peter Robinson, lost his seat, as did the UUP leader Reg Empey. Lady Sylvia Hermon became an independent. The SDLP retained its three seats, and Sinn Fein its five seats. The Saville inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday was published on 15 June 2010.

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1 Background

The Northern Ireland Assembly was first elected in July 1998. Devolution, however, was suspended on 14 October 2002 under the terms of the *Northern Ireland Act 2000*. Following a number of attempts to do so, devolution was restored on 8 May 2007 after emergency legislation was passed in the House of Commons giving effect to a settlement reached between Sinn Fein and the DUP on 26 March 2007.

At the most recent Assembly elections, held on 7 March 2007, no single party won a majority of seats. The DUP, with 36 seats, and Sinn Fein, with 28 seats, returned the greatest number of MLAs. The four-party executive formed following the election, using the d'Hondt system¹, is headed by First Minister Peter Robinson, of the DUP, and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, of Sinn Fein.

In November 2008 the First and Deputy First Ministers announced that they had come to an agreement that would facilitate the devolution of policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland. Despite this, a great deal of work, including gaining cross-community support for a financial package for the transfer, remained to be done. The *Northern Ireland Act 2009* added to the options contained within the *Northern Ireland Act 1998* for the method of appointing the Minister to head the department.

The *Department of Justice Bill* passed all its stages in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 30 November.² The Bill is of a preparatory nature, establishing a Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to oversee policing and justice and setting out the arrangements for the appointment of a minister to head that department.

On 11 January 2010 Peter Robinson stood down as First Minister for six weeks to resolve the standards of conduct issues relating to himself and his wife Iris. Mr Robinson subsequently resumed his role as First Minister on 4 February, announcing that, following a 'comprehensive' examination, Paul Maguire QC had found no evidence to suggest that he had broken the ministerial code.³

2 Devolution of policing and justice

Following a period of controversy over the devolution of policing and justice, on 12 January 2010, there were all party talks with the Northern Ireland Secretary at Stormont, with some indications of optimism as to a resolution.⁴ The question of abolishing the Parades Commission continued to be a barrier to resolution and on 25 January Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen held talks in Northern Ireland in an effort to save the talks.⁵ After three days the two Prime Ministers left the talks, which continued with the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Irish Foreign Minister present. Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen had announced that if agreement was not reached by Friday 29 January then they would set out their own proposals. However, the talks were allowed to continue through and past this deadline.⁶ Following ten days of intense negotiation, it was announced just before midnight on 4

¹ An explanation of the d'Hondt system is available on the Northern Ireland Assembly website at <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/d'hondt.htm>

² "NI justice bill passes last stage", 1 December 2009 *BBC News*

³ "Peter Robinson back as Northern Ireland first minister", 4 February 2010 *BBC News*

⁴ "Back devolution, unionists urged" 13 January 2010, *BBC News*

⁵ "Late night policing and justice talks 'hard going' 26 January 2010 *BBC News*

⁶ "The road to a deal on devolution has been long and hard, strewn with crises, stand-offs and compromise", 6 February 2010 *Belfast Telegraph*

February that the DUP and Sinn Fein had reached an agreement, with Peter Robinson stating that it had gained unanimous support from the DUP's Assembly Members.⁷

3 Decommissioning

On 3 March 2010 the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning presented a six month report to the Government, which confirmed that since September 2009 decommissioning events had been carried out with the Ulster Defence Association, the Official Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, the UDA South East Antrim Group and the Shoukri Paramilitary Element. The report stated that in all cases the IICD were informed that the weapons decommissioned constituted all those under the control of the particular organisation. As noted in the report's conclusion, the mandate of the IICD was terminated with effect from 9 February and it will now complete its final report before standing down.⁸

On 26 May the Independent Monitoring Commission presented its 23rd report.⁹ It warned of the continuing threat posed by dissident republicans. The Northern Ireland Secretary made the following written ministerial statement:

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr Owen Paterson): I have received the 23rd report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC). This report has been made under articles 4 and 7 of the international agreement that established the Commission and it reports on levels of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. I have considered the content of the report and I am today bringing it before Parliament. I have placed copies in the Library of the House.

The IMC reported on the continued and significant threat posed by dissident republicans and concluded that they remain highly active and dangerous. During the six months under review, RIRA were responsible for a ruthless and intensive campaign of violence; they committed and publicly claimed one murder and tried, but failed, to murder many others.

The IMC notes the positive progress on decommissioning by both loyalist and republican paramilitaries prior to the end of the amnesty in February this year. This, combined with the ending of the remit of the IICD by the two Governments, marks an extremely important change, and is a tribute to the great work carried out by the Commission.

The Commission also notes that the devolution of policing and justice means that the criminal justice system is accountable to the people of Northern Ireland and as such offers a potent response to paramilitaries by encouraging greater public support and confidence.¹⁰

4 The Hillsborough Agreement

Under the agreement made at Hillsborough on 4 February 2010, the First Minister and deputy First Minister tabled a joint resolution for a cross-community vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 9 March. Further detail is given in Library Standard Note 5350 *The Hillsborough Agreement*, published March 2010.

⁷ "Dramatic midnight briefing signals a done deal", 5 February 2010 *Belfast Telegraph*

⁸ The IICD report is at http://www.nio.gov.uk/iicd_report.pdf

⁹ <http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/23.%20Twenty-Third%20Report.pdf>

¹⁰ HC Deb 26 May 2010 c7WS

The motion was agreed by parallel consent. As expected, the UUP voted against the proposals. Their leader, Sir Reg Empey, defended this decision:

As a democratic political party pledged to make power-sharing work in an inclusive manner for all the people of Northern Ireland, we exercise our rights, refusing to bow to the blackmail and bullying to which we have been subjected in recent weeks.”¹¹

Out of the 105 votes cast in the Assembly, a total of 88 supported the move, with 17 Ulster Unionists voting against.

Once agreed to, three motions were put before the House of Commons on 22 March to approve three statutory instruments relating to Northern Ireland devolution. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Shaun Woodward emphasised that the process marked full devolution to Northern Ireland:

Mr. Woodward: Today's business will enable the completion of devolution in Northern Ireland through the transfer of policing and justice powers to Stormont. The three orders before the House will give effect to the historic vote at Stormont on 9 March. The vast majority of the Northern Ireland Assembly voted to request the transfer of those powers, which was hoped for from the time of the Belfast agreement and envisaged in the St. Andrews agreement. An agreement on a timetable was reached at Hillsborough castle earlier this year....

The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Amendment of Schedule 3) Order 2010 is the key document. It provides for policing and justice matters, which until now have been reserved, to be transferred so that the Assembly can legislate on them without having to seek consent. The matters being transferred reflect the Assembly's request of 9 March. Some matters, such as national security, will remain excepted; some will remain reserved, one of which is parading. The Hillsborough castle agreement, however, envisages that responsibility for parading will transfer after a cross-community vote, once the proposed new and improved framework has been agreed and finalised.

Also reserved is the special provision for 50:50 recruitment to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. We are confident that we shall reach our target of 30 per cent. Catholic composition by March of next year, and we are committed to returning to Parliament and ending the provision at whatever point in the year it becomes clear that we will reach that target. National security remains excepted under the order. It remains just that-national security-and it will remain the responsibility of UK Ministers, accountable to this House.¹²

He received support from all the party leaders, even Lady Hermon, whose party, the UUP, had voted against the devolution at Stormont. The orders were also passed without a vote in the Lords on 24 March 2010.

Devolution of policing and justice took place on 12 April. 2010, the day that the House of Commons was dissolved for the general election on 6 May 2010. The Alliance Party leader, David Ford, was selected as the Minister, on a cross community vote in the Assembly. He did not secure the support of SDLP and UUP MLAs however. As set out in the *Northern Ireland Act 2009*, the Department of Justice will dissolve on 1 May 2012 unless the Assembly has resolved on a cross-community basis to continue the current model for appointing the Justice Minister or passed an Act to put in place alternative arrangements.

¹¹ “Decision on policing is broadly welcomed” 10 March 2010 *Belfast Telegraph*

¹² HC Deb 22 March 2010 c41

5 General election May 2010

Library Research Paper 10/36 [General Election: preliminary analysis](#) has a summary in section 5.3.

- The DUP won eight seats, down one on 2005, following the loss of Peter Robinson, the DUP leader's Belfast East seat. The DUP vote share was 8.7% points down on its 33.7% share in 2005.
- Sinn Fein polled more votes than any other party in Northern Ireland, increasing their share of the vote to 25.5%, higher than at any general election since 1983 when Sinn Fein first contested general elections in Northern Ireland. They came second in terms of seats won, with 5.
- The SDLP vote share fell by 1.0% points, but they were unchanged in total seat numbers.

Michelle Gildernew won for SF by just four votes in her Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency and an election petition is underway.¹³ The SDLP retained their 3 seats. The UUP formed an electoral alliance with the Conservative party under the title Ulster Conservatives and Unionists, but they lost all their seats. Lady Sylvia Hermon stood as an independent, since she did not agree with the alliance, and retained her seat. Once again, the results confirmed the presence of a separate party system in Northern Ireland, even though both the leaders of the main unionist parties, Reg Empey and Peter Robinson, both lost their seats. For the first time, Northern Ireland Westminster seats were counted overnight on election night. A bomb had to be defused outside the counting centre at Londonderry on 6 May.¹⁴

At Westminster, Nigel Dodds will lead for the DUP on reform, constitutional agenda and foreign affairs. The Alliance Party gained their first seat at Westminster, with Naomi Long.

5.1 New Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Owen Paterson was appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 12 May 2010. He had acted as the Conservative shadow minister for Northern Ireland since 2007. Hugo Swire became Minister of State.

5.2 Allowances for SF MPs

The question of allowances given to SF members who not attend Westminster has been raised. There are two separate types of allowances. Firstly, Members who do not take the oath are not allowed parliamentary pay, but may claim for allowances, following a Commons resolution on 18 December 2001. In addition, following another Commons resolution on 8 February 2006, Sinn Fein were granted access to funds analogous to Short Money. See [Library Standard Note 1667 Sinn Fein, allowances and access to Commons facilities](#) for background. In response to a question from Ian Paisley to the Leader of the House, Sir George Young, on 10 June said:

Sir George Young: I understand the concern, but it was a unanimous decision of the last Parliament that decisions on the salaries and allowances of Members of Parliament should be taken no longer by the House, but by an independent organisation. That is where the responsibility rests. As I said a moment ago, there is a

¹³ See a copy of the petition lodged on 1 June at the High Court http://www.eoni.org.uk/election_petition.pdf

¹⁴ "Bomb alert hits Northern Ireland count" 7 May 2010 *Belfast Telegraph*

debate on Government policy on IPSA on Wednesday, and that may provide the hon. Gentleman with an opportunity to raise the issue again.¹⁵

However, the allowances paid to Sinn Fein under the 8 February motion are not the responsibility of IPSA, but continue as with the Short Money, to be determined by a resolution of the House.¹⁶ In April 2009 Owen Paterson, then Opposition spokesperson on Northern Ireland suggested that it was completely unacceptable for SF members to claim allowances, given their non attendance in Parliament.¹⁷

6 Saville inquiry

6.1 Plans for publication

On 22 March 2010 the then Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward made a written ministerial statement on plans for the publication of the Saville report, which made clear that selected officials were consulted on national security issues before release:

I am responsible for publication of the Tribunal's report, once it is delivered to me. I am advised that I have a duty, as a public authority under the Human Rights Act, to act in a way that is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). To fulfil this duty, I need to take steps to satisfy myself that publication of the report will not breach Article 2 of the Convention by putting the lives or safety of individuals at risk. I am advised that these obligations must be met by me personally, in my capacity as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Although the Inquiry is also a public authority under the Human Rights Act, I am not entitled to rely on the Inquiry to satisfy my Article 2 obligations and I have a duty to assess this myself. I also have a duty to satisfy myself that publication will not put national security at risk, for example by disclosing details of sources of confidential information.¹⁸

On 26 May 2010, the new Northern Ireland Secretary, Owen Paterson, announced that the report would be published on 15 June and the Prime Minister would make a statement. He also promised a full day's debate on the report in the autumn.¹⁹ On 7 June Owen Patterson, issued a press release on arrangements for its publication:

Commenting on the arrangements, the Secretary of State said: "This will be a huge report not just in size but in its significance for all those directly involved. I am doing everything in my power to ensure that it is published in a way that fully recognises that.

"The previous administration discussed with the families and soldiers a process that would allow them the opportunity to have advanced sight of the report. Having now held my own discussion with the families and soldiers' representatives I have decided to build on those arrangements.

"I have not seen the report and will not do so until 24 hours before publication. To anybody who might want to speculate on the contents I would urge them wait until next Tuesday when they will be able to comment on the actual report".

6.2 Publication of the Saville inquiry 15 June 2010

Relatives of those killed and injured were given first sight of the report in Londonderry:

¹⁵ HC Deb 10 June 2010 c478

¹⁶ See Sir George Young HC Deb 17 June 2010 c1034

¹⁷ "Tories in pledge over SF expenses" 8 April 2009 *BBC News*

¹⁸ HC Deb 22 March 2010 WMS

¹⁹ HC Deb 26 May 2010 WMS

²⁰ "Advanced sight arrangements for the Saville Inquiry" 7 June 2010 *Northern Ireland Office*

A total of 56 relatives and injured survivors – two from each family – are being given access to the report in a secure area at the city's Guildhall.

They will process in silence through the square in front of the building at 10am before being taken inside to read the report.

A small group of lawyers who represented the families at Lord Saville's inquiry have already begun reading through the 5,000-page report.²¹

The Prime Minister, David Cameron gave a statement in the Commons at 3.30pm on 15 June when the content of the report was made public for the first time. He set out the conclusions as follows:

But the conclusions of this report are absolutely clear: there is no doubt; there is nothing equivocal; there are no ambiguities. What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong.

Lord Saville concludes that the soldiers of Support Company who went into the Bogside

"did so as a result of an order... which should have not been given"

by their commander. He finds that

"on balance the first shot in the vicinity of the march was fired by the British Army"

and that

"none of the casualties shot by soldiers of Support Company was armed with a firearm".

He also finds that

"there was some firing by republican paramilitaries... but... none of this firing provided any justification for the shooting of civilian casualties",

and that

"in no case was any warning given before soldiers opened fire".

Lord Saville also finds that Support Company

"reacted by losing their self-control... forgetting or ignoring their instructions and training"

and acted with

"a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline".

He finds that

"despite the contrary evidence given by the soldiers... none of them fired in response to attacks or threatened attacks by nail or petrol bombers"

and that many of the soldiers

"knowingly put forward false accounts in order to seek to justify their firing".

²¹ "Bloody Sunday families await Saville publication"

What is more, Lord Saville says that some of those killed or injured were clearly fleeing or going to the assistance of others who were dying. The report refers to one person who was shot while

"crawling... away from the soldiers"

and mentions another who was shot, in all probability,

"when he was lying mortally wounded on the ground".

And the report refers to a father who was

"hit and injured by Army gunfire after he had gone to... tend his son".

For those looking for statements of innocence, Saville says:

"The immediate responsibility for the deaths and injuries on Bloody Sunday lies with those members of Support Company whose unjustifiable firing was the cause of those deaths and injuries",

and, crucially, that

"none of the casualties was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury, or indeed was doing anything else that could on any view justify their shooting".

For those people who were looking for the report to use terms like murder and unlawful killing, I remind the House that these judgments are not matters for a tribunal, or for us as politicians, to determine.

These are shocking conclusions to read and shocking words to have to say, but we do not defend the British Army by defending the indefensible. We do not honour all those who have served with distinction in keeping the peace and upholding the rule of law in Northern Ireland by hiding from the truth. So there is no point in trying to soften, or equivocate about, what is in this report. It is clear from the tribunal's authoritative conclusions that the events of Bloody Sunday were in no way justified.

I know that some people wonder whether, nearly 40 years on from an event, a Prime Minister needs to issue an apology. For someone of my generation, Bloody Sunday and the early 1970s are something that we feel we have learnt about rather than lived through. But what happened should never, ever have happened. The families of those who died should not have had to live with the pain and hurt of that day, and with a lifetime of loss. Some members of our armed forces acted wrongly. The Government are ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces, and for that, on behalf of the Government-indeed, on behalf of our country-I am deeply sorry.

Just as the report is clear that the actions of that day were unjustifiable, so too it is clear in some of its other findings. Those looking for premeditation, those looking for a plan, those even looking for a conspiracy involving senior politicians or senior members of the armed forces, will not find it in this report. Indeed, Lord Saville finds no evidence that the events of Bloody Sunday were premeditated. He concludes that the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments, and the Army, neither tolerated nor encouraged

"the use of unjustified lethal force".

He makes no suggestion of a Government cover-up, and he credits the United Kingdom Government with working towards a peaceful political settlement in Northern Ireland.

The report also specifically deals with the actions of key individuals in the Army, in politics and beyond, including Major-General Ford, Brigadier MacLellan and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilford. In each case, the tribunal's findings are clear. The report does the same for Martin McGuinness. It specifically finds that he was present and probably armed with a "sub-machine-gun", but concludes

"we are sure that he did not engage in any activity that provided any of the soldiers with any justification for opening fire".

While in no way justifying the events of 30 January 1972, we should acknowledge the background to the events of Bloody Sunday. Since 1969, the security situation in Northern Ireland had been declining significantly. Three days before Bloody Sunday, two officers in the Royal Ulster Constabulary—one a Catholic—were shot by the IRA in Londonderry, the first police officers killed in the city during the troubles. A third of the city of Derry had become a no-go area for the RUC and the Army, and in the end 1972 was to prove Northern Ireland's bloodiest year by far, with nearly 500 people killed.²²

The report has almost 5,000 pages and is ten volumes long. It is available online at the Inquiry website <http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/> and is a House of Commons paper.²³ A single summary volume is also available, containing the principal conclusions and overall assessment.²⁴ However, there is no executive summary.

In response to Mr Cameron's statement, Harriet Harman referred to prosecutions and immunity issues. Mr Cameron said:

The right hon. and learned Lady raised the question of prosecution. She is right, of course, to say that these are decisions for the Director of Public Prosecutions to take in Northern Ireland and that should be entirely independent. On the issue of immunity, I am informed by the Advocate-General that the evidence given to the inquiry is subject to the undertaking given by the Attorney-General in February 1999

"that evidence given by witnesses to the Inquiry would not be used to the prejudice of that person in any criminal proceedings except proceedings where the witness is charged with giving false evidence."

I think that is the right position²⁵

A number of speakers in the questions that followed referred to the issue of further inquiries into past atrocities. Mr Cameron indicated that his Government did not fully support the Eames-Bradley report proposals, particularly in respect of universal recognition payments. He said:

I think that it is right to use, as far as is possible, the Historical Enquiries Team to deal with the problems of the past and to avoid having more open-ended, highly costly inquiries, but of course we should look at each case on its merits.²⁶

A debate has been promised for the autumn 2010. Mr Cameron said that the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and Defence would report back to him on the issues raised by the report.

²² HC Deb 15 June 2010 c739-40

²³ HC 29 2010-11

²⁴ HC 30 2010-11

²⁵ HC Deb 15 June 2010 c743

²⁶ HC Deb 15 June 2010 c744

The results of the original Widgery Tribunal Report were announced as a Statement by the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, on 19 April 1972 and questions from the Floor of the House followed, but there was no formal debate.

6.3 Issues arising out of the Saville inquiry

Prosecutions

On 29 February 1999 the Attorney General, John Morris QC MP responded to a request from the Saville Inquiry that he should give an undertaking to witnesses making evidence available to the Inquiry as to the status of that evidence in the following terms:-

“An undertaking in respect of any person who provides evidence to the Inquiry, that no evidence he or she may give before the Inquiry relating to the events of Sunday 30 January 1972, whether orally or by written statement, nor any written statement made preparatory to giving evidence, nor any document produced by that person to the Inquiry, will be used to the prejudice of that person in any criminal proceedings (or for that purpose of investigating or deciding whether to bring such proceedings) except proceedings where he or she is charged with having given false evidence in the course of this Inquiry or with having conspired with, aided, abetted, counsel procured, suborned or incited any other person to do so.”

As noted above, witnesses were not offered general immunity, simply immunity from self incrimination, which excluded perjury. The question of prosecution for perjury is being considered by the Northern Ireland DPP, according to a press statement issued on 16 June:

“The Public Prosecution Service (PPS) has now received a copy of the Saville Report which refers to certain witnesses providing evidence to the Inquiry which was knowingly untrue. It is noted that some evidence was given to the Inquiry sitting in London. The PPS will consider in consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service where jurisdiction lies in regard to any possible offences that arise.”²⁷

Prosecutions are the responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland. There has been media speculation that the decision is likely to be difficult, given the length of time which has elapsed since Bloody Sunday. The initial press notice from the DPP on 15 June noted that:

“The Director of Public Prosecutions, together with the Chief Constable, will consider the Report to determine the nature and extent of any police enquiries and investigations which may be required to enable informed decisions as to prosecution to be taken. The undertaking given by the Attorney General in 1999 to witnesses who provided evidence to the Inquiry will also require to be considered.

“It is not practical, at this stage, to say when such decisions will be taken other than to indicate that the matter will be considered as expeditiously as possible.”²⁸

Further Inquiries

There are a number of other inquiries which have begun or have been suggested in relation to alleged security service collusion in deaths in Northern Ireland: There are already inquiries into the deaths of Robert Hamill and Billy Wright under the *Inquiries Act 2005* and Rosemary

²⁷ PPS to consult with DPS on perjury jurisdiction” 16 June 2010
<http://www.ppsni.gov.uk/Site/1/Documents/PPS%20Press%20Office/PPS%20to%20Consult%20with%20the%20CPS%20on%20Perjury%20Jurisdiction.pdf>

²⁸ PPS statement following publication of Saville report
<http://www.ppsni.gov.uk/Site/1/Documents/PPS%20Press%20Office/PPS%20Statement%20Following%20Publication%20of%20Saville%20Report.pdf>

Nelson under section 44 of the *Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998*. A proposed inquiry into the death of Pat Finucane has not yet been established as his relatives consider that the *Inquiries Act 2005* powers are inadequate, arguing that the legislation would give ministers an undue degree of control over the inquiry, in particular, allowing ministers to keep certain information secret. Further details are given in Standard Note 2599 *Investigatory Inquiries and the Inquiries Act 2005*. The Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee have already drawn attention to the potential costs of such inquiries and the police time taken up in investigating the past.²⁹

The Eames Bradley report *Report of the Consultative Group on the Past* was presented to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in January 2009 and recommended a Legacy Commission with a budget of £100m to “deal with the legacy of the past by combining processes of reconciliation, justice and information recovery.” The report received a fairly critical reaction and this Commission has not yet been established.

The Historical Enquiries Team was established in 2005 and operates under the control of the Police Service of Northern Ireland to re-examine all deaths which can be attributed to the security situation between 1968 and 1998. An answer to a FoI request in 2009 gives some details of the number of cases already dealt with.³⁰

²⁹ House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, *Policing and Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland: the cost of policing the past*, HC 333 2007-08, P5

³⁰ http://www.psni.police.uk/historical_enquiries_team.pdf