

**NATO Enlargement**

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In July at the Madrid Summit the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intends to issue membership invitations to several of its former Warsaw Pact adversaries with their accession planned for 1999. NATO's eastern enlargement will be the most significant change in the organization since its inception. It has many critics, not least in Russia. This paper examines the background to enlargement, the likely candidates, the arguments of its supporters and detractors and its possible longer term impact.

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## I Background

At the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization encountered persistent criticisms that it had become outmoded. Many felt that a primarily military organization, built to deter and potentially to resist an invasion of western Europe, no longer had a role following the establishment of democratic regimes in much of central and eastern Europe in 1989, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, and the demise of the Soviet Union in the same year. Now, less than a decade on, NATO is much changed and is contemplating enlargement to encompass several states which were formally its adversaries. However, the expansion of NATO has proved controversial and many NATO countries have until recently not suggested enlarging the Alliance or endorsed the speed with which it is now likely to occur.

### A. NATO After the Cold War

The leaders of the Atlantic Alliance first acknowledged the need to realign NATO at the Brussels Summit in 1989. Then, at the NATO summit in London in July 1990, the Alliance extended the 'hand of friendship' to eastern Europe and sketched the outline of a new strategy. A formal strategy review was completed by November 1991 and was presented to the Rome Summit in December 1991. The strategy document defined three broad threats to NATO. These were the threat posed by instability along the southern Mediterranean littoral and in the Middle East, particularly through the acquisition by 'rogue' states of weapons of mass destruction; the social, economic and political difficulties created by potential ethnic and territorial conflicts in central and eastern Europe; and, finally, the residual threat posed by a large and then still Communist-controlled armoury. To respond to the new international climate and to meet these threats, the strategy sought *inter alia* to establish a new dialogue with the states of the former Warsaw Pact; to reduce NATO's nuclear and conventional forces while reorganizing remaining units to become more mobile, flexible and multinational; and to realign NATO towards crisis management and conflict prevention. In July 1992, NATO elaborated on the latter role by offering, on a selective basis, to undertake peace-keeping and humanitarian missions on behalf of the UN and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>1</sup> Further significant policy initiatives were announced at the Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994 (see below).

The main element of NATO's strategy was to establish a new relationship with the states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. One difficulty for NATO was that the states of eastern Europe were eager to join western European institutions, including NATO. At that time, the latter step was simply not considered. This was partly on the grounds that such states would need time to prove their democratic and free market credentials, but more

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<sup>1</sup> The CSCE was renamed the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.

important was the belief that such a move would alienate the Soviet Union which, at this stage, possessed a still considerable arsenal, of which much was based in eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Alliance at first sought to solve this conundrum by creating the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in 1991. This body was intended to offer regular political dialogue between East and West at ministerial and ambassadorial levels, and practical co-operation and transparency in areas such as the civilian control of defence forces, staff training, training for peacekeeping, etc. NACC would thus become a means of projecting western European security eastward without actually offering any security guarantees. Initially comprising 25 NATO and former Warsaw Pact states, by 1996 NACC membership had expanded to 40 members with the inclusion of Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, the successor states of the Soviet Union and the two components of Czechoslovakia.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, although not members of NACC, non-aligned and formerly strictly neutral states, such as Austria and Sweden, began contacts with NATO with, for example, visits of defence ministers and military exchanges.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from central and eastern Europe by 1994, NACC did not offer the security which the states of the region sought. The revival of Russian nationalism, the attempted hard-line coup in Moscow in 1993 and the subsequent Russian military and political interventions in the Caucasus, most notably the military reoccupation of Chechnya in December 1994, all heightened the demands of the Visegrad Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic Three (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that they be allowed to join NATO as full members and benefit from application of Article 5, the collective security article, of the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>4</sup> The expansion of NACC membership to include the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where democracy could be said to be only very weakly established, also galled the states of central Europe.

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<sup>2</sup> Finland became a NACC observer. NACC observer status was subsequently offered to all Partner signatories.

<sup>3</sup> G. Von Moltke, 'NATO and Eastern Europe - Co-operation and partnership in security' and H. Von Ondarza, 'Pillar of the New European Security Architecture - the North Atlantic Co-operation Council', *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1993.

<sup>4</sup> The first paragraph of Article 5 reads: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.' The North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Washington, was signed on 4 April 1949 and is the founding document of the Atlantic Alliance.

Attempts by the Visegrad countries to join NATO began to receive public backing from German ministers, in particular, Volker Ruhe, the German Defence Minister, in early 1993. They declared that the Visegrad Four should be allowed to join NATO before they joined the European Union, i.e. before the end of the decade. The German proposal received support both from parts of the US academic community and from within the NATO Secretariat, with the then Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, also backing enlargement. With their closer physical proximity, German politicians were perhaps more conscious of the anxieties of their eastern neighbours than their American, British or French allies. Increasingly close economic ties with the Visegrad countries also may have meant that Germany was less able to resist moral pressure from the eastern Europeans for NATO membership. Britain, France and the US administration were all, at this stage, opposed to NATO expansion, fearing in particular the impact that it would have on relations with Russia and the extent to which it would encourage revanchist forces there.<sup>5</sup>

The prospect of the Visegrad countries receiving NATO membership appeared to improve after an Polish-Russian summit, held in August 1993. At the meeting, President Yeltsin seemed to state that Moscow would not object to Poland eventually gaining NATO membership. Thereafter, Russian officials appeared to backtrack on the Yeltsin-Walesa conversations, declaring that Russia would not, in fact, agree to even a limited NATO enlargement. The Russian position was spelled out in a note to leading NATO states, the USA and UK included, written in late September 1993, which warned against them accepting the Polish application to join NATO too "hastily" and opposed a progressive expansion of NATO eastward towards the Russian border.<sup>6</sup> This episode established a pattern of successive Russian changes in tone towards enlargement. Whilst consistently rejecting the principle of NATO expansion, Russia has vacillated between truculent acceptance and threatening various forms of retaliation if it were to occur.

## **B. The 1994 Brussels Summit and Partnership for Peace**

In a further attempt to reconcile eastern Europe's demands for NATO membership with Russian fears of NATO enlargement, the US government drew up a new proposal for a 'Partnership for Peace' (PFP) which would be open to all European states, inclusive of Russia, which were not already NATO Members. The concept of PFP first emerged at an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers, held at Travemünde in Germany in October 1993 and was subsequently endorsed at the NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994. The Summit also took the momentous decision of agreeing the principle of NATO enlargement. The concluding declaration stated that "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into

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<sup>5</sup> O. Diehl, 'Opening NATO to Eastern Europe', *The World Today*, December 1993.

<sup>6</sup> See RP 93/92 *The Crisis of Democracy in Russia and some international implications*, October 1993, pp. 9-11, for further details.

account political and security developments in the whole of Europe".<sup>7</sup> No timetable for enlargement was mentioned. Separately, the Summit also endorsed two other decisions of far reaching importance. The first reaffirmed the importance of a strong transatlantic partnership but added that it should include room for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The second suggested a means by which a greater European role within the Alliance might be achieved through the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The latter would be forces drawn from European members which could undertake peacekeeping or humanitarian operations with the support of NATO military assets.<sup>8</sup>

PFP offers a series of levels of NATO co-operation to the states of central and eastern Europe if they accept certain principles, *inter alia*, democracy, democratic control of their armed forces and transparency of their force structures and budgets. States which join PFP are given the opportunity to participate in exercises with NATO forces, discussions of doctrine, etc. The aim is to achieve effective levels of inter-operability. In particular, training concentrates on the possibility of Partner involvement in NATO-led humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. Participation by Partners in such scenarios may take place within the context of Combined Joint Task Forces.<sup>9</sup>

The key to PFP is that it involves bilateral agreements between the individual states of central and eastern Europe and NATO. Partners were expected to practise self-differentiation. This means that, without excluding any state, certain NACC members, particularly the Visegrad Four, have been able to choose the full menu of co-operation measures offered at the Brussels Summit, while other states, geographically more distant from NATO, have chosen individual measures or none at all. Importantly, Partner countries are expected to fund their own participation in PFP. Certain former Soviet states have simply not had the funds available to do this. Thus, even though PFP may have replicated many of the forms of military co-operation already existent within NACC, it avoids the inherent problem of NACC; the fact that, in only offering assistance to all, the latter may always have tended towards lowest common denominator actions. Significantly, however, although falling short of providing a security guarantee, the Brussels Summit declaration also stated that NATO would "consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security".<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Heads of State Declaration, Brussels, 11 January 1993, Para 12

<sup>8</sup> In practice, CJTFs would act as cover for the loan of US military assets, such as heavylift and satellite communications, not possessed by other Alliance members.

<sup>9</sup> *Brussels Summit Declaration and the Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, 10-11 January 1993

<sup>10</sup> *Brussels Summit Declaration*, Para 14

There are now 27 NATO Partners, including Russia.<sup>11</sup> A PFP liaison office has been established at NATO HQ and a Partnership Co-ordination Cell has been set up at Mons to which Partners have sent representatives. Partnership status has been a three stage process: signature of the Framework documents; followed by the agreement of a Presentation Document, which sets out the particular Partner's requirements; and finally agreement of Individual Partnership Programmes (IPP) which set out specific menus of co-operation.<sup>12</sup> Initial PFP exercises were held in Poland and the Netherlands in September and October 1994 respectively. Many more such exercises have followed. On land, these have usually involved company and platoon size units, demonstrating and exchanging basic operational and peacekeeping tasks and skills with the intent of improving the ability of Partner and NATO forces to co-operate in multinational peacekeeping operations. Maritime and air exercises have also been held. Programmes of exercises, training and other co-operation initiatives are agreed in annual work plans.

The purpose of Partnership for Peace has been the subject of varying interpretations. Many critics saw it originally as a cheap sop to the NATO aspirants. At little cost to itself, NATO was offering very limited forms of co-operation which, it was argued, were designed to help defer the prospect of enlargement. Some regarded the failure of NATO to offer membership to the states of eastern Europe at the Brussels Summit as an act of appeasement towards Russia comparable with Munich.<sup>13</sup> Subsequently, PFP has been seen as a form of kindergarten for NATO membership, wherein the NATO aspirants can learn the language of North Atlantic co-operation. PFP has also provided, it has been put, a degree of stability for other European states with little chance of NATO membership. Other former neutrals, such as Austria and Sweden, who wish to be associated with, although not to join, the leading European security organization, may also have benefitted. Whatever its purpose, in practical terms, PFP appears to have been welcomed by, and proved genuinely useful to, Partner countries.

Having cautiously welcomed the PFP as putting off the prospect of NATO enlargement, the Russian government soon became concerned at the rush by the eastern European countries to sign the PFP framework document.<sup>14</sup> Subsequently, Yeltsin threatened a "cold peace" if the

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11 Albania, Austria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Although Malta joined PFP, it later indicated its decision to withdraw following the election of a Labour government there in November 1996.

12 NATO Basic Fact Sheet on Partnership for Peace, June 1994.

13 For example, Jonathan Eyal, 'This affair will end in tears: Infatuation with Boris Yeltsin is setting the West on a course of appeasement', *The Independent* 13/1/94

14 *TAS* 15/1/94. Tajikistan is the only NACC member not to have joined Partnership for Peace.

Visegrad states were allowed to join NATO.<sup>15</sup> In turn, NATO sought to persuade Russia to become a fully fledged Partner by offering a parallel document which would establish a "new dialogue" between NATO and Moscow. Although NATO maintained that this would not provide Russia with a veto on NATO enlargement, eastern European NATO aspirants feared that their security would be determined over their heads in bilateral diplomacy. Negotiations over the Document on the Dialogue dragged on throughout 1994. In December, Moscow finally indicated that it would not sign a PFP Presentation Document and subsequent Russian action in Chechnya ended the possibility of progress on this or on the Document. Negotiations resumed in 1995 and, at the May 1995 NATO Council at Noordwijk in the Netherlands, Russia signed both its Individual Partnership Programme and the Document on Dialogue. The latter included new provisions for enhanced co-operation between NATO and Russia including "16 + 1" meetings at which Russian foreign and defence ministers would have regular consultations with their NATO counterparts.<sup>16</sup>

### C. The Process of Enlargement

Following NATO's confirmation at the Brussels summit in January 1994 that it was prepared to accept new democratic members from central and eastern Europe as part of an evolutionary process, a definition of the practicalities and principles of enlargement was put in hand at the NATO Council of December 1994. The Council declaration carefully excluded any timeframe for NATO expansion. The Permanent Council completed its work in September 1995 with the publication of the *Study on NATO Enlargement*.<sup>17</sup> This, in essence, was a check list of military, political and economic reforms necessary for participation in NATO. There are five basic criteria for NATO membership: an established democracy; respect for human rights; a market-based economy; armed forces under full civilian control; and finally good relations with neighbouring states.<sup>18</sup> Ten countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) subsequently submitted discussion papers on membership which formed the basis of bilateral dialogue between them and NATO.<sup>19</sup> Dialogue was subsequently extended to include Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, bringing the total number of potential candidates to 12.

Internal work on enlargement was finalized by the December 1996 NATO Council. The Permanent Council is now to decide which candidates should be invited to join the Alliance. Formal invitations, under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, will be issued at the NATO Summit to be held in Madrid on 8/9 July. The goal is that NATO enlargement should take

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15 *The Independent* 21/2/95

16 *The Economist* 3/6/95

17 DEP/3 2169

18 *The Sunday Telegraph* 1/10/95 and *The European* 5/10/96

19 *Atlantic News (AN)* 1/5/96

place in April 1999, which is the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Treaty.<sup>20</sup>

In parallel with the work on the admission of new Members, another study is proceeding on means of reconciling the rejected applicants. Indeed, one crucial issue to be considered at the Madrid Summit will be how to prevent those states not deemed eligible for membership from feeling excluded and rejected. The study focuses on strengthening the existing Partnership for Peace arrangements, with, on an American initiative, the establishment of a new Atlantic Partnership Council or Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The latter will absorb the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), which duplicates certain PFP functions, and is expected to be established by the end of May.<sup>21</sup> Separately, NATO also aims to formulate a new relationship with Ukraine and, most importantly, with Russia.

Meanwhile, work continues to reform NATO in other areas. Both France and Spain are in the process of joining NATO's Integrated Military Structure.<sup>22</sup> A strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance, via the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, is also under negotiation. NATO command structures are being rationalized, partly to underwrite CJTFs and also as an economy measure. NATO aims to complete negotiations in all policy areas by the time of the Madrid summit, representing the most ambitious reordering of the Alliance since its foundation.

Accession to NATO will require the signature of additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty by each new Member and by the existing Members in line with their particular constitutional provisions.<sup>23</sup> Certain existing Member States could obstruct enlargement if they do not gain sufficient national advantage in other changes to NATO. France has already signalled its desire to play a leading role in a reformed Alliance. It has, in particular, been in dispute with other members over whether Allied Forces Southern Europe, the NATO command in the Mediterranean, should continue to be led by a US Admiral, as at present, or by an officer from a European NATO member. In another sign of assertiveness, France suggested, earlier this year, with German support, that Russian concerns about enlargement should be addressed at a summit of European powers, involving Russia, France, Germany, Britain and the USA. The initiative was rejected by the Americans, who were displeased at an attempt to undermine their traditional prerogatives of Alliance leadership. The suggestion also outraged other, less powerful Members such as Belgium and Italy, who felt excluded.

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20 NATO originally had 12 members: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the USA. Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.

21 AN 26/4/97

22 France left the Integrated Military Structure in 1966. Its relationship with NATO has always been a complex one. Spain has never participated in the IMS.

23 See Section VII on ratification

Although Russia responded positively to the French move, it was stymied by US opposition.<sup>24</sup>

Up until late 1996, the prognosis for enlargement remained unclear. Some NATO members remained unenthusiastic about an accelerated expansion process for many of the reasons set out below. However, President Clinton broke Alliance ranks in October 1996 by announcing the prospect of enlargement by 1999 during his re-election campaign. If enlargement can be completed by then, this will crown the end of Clinton's second presidential term, one which is generally expected to focus on foreign policy. His new, Czech-born Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who has twice fled totalitarianism, once from Hitler and then from Stalin, is a particular apostle of enlargement.<sup>25</sup>

The former British Conservative government supported NATO policy on enlargement. However, unlike officials of other members, such as from Germany, British representatives have stuck closely to the letter of NATO Declarations, that is until recently not encouraging rapid enlargement, and have not given rhetorical commitments to applicant states. In responding to an adjournment debate on NATO enlargement, Sir Nicholas Bonsor, then a Foreign Office minister, stated the new orthodoxy: -

I see no way in which we could not enlarge NATO. I do not believe that it would be right for us in the west to deny the countries of central Europe the right to join an organisation which, had they not been under the boot of Soviet oppression for so many years, they would unquestionably have joined at the outset. We cannot deny them a guarantee for their security that they desire and desperately need. They have all been subjected to the traumas of war, as my hon. Friend so admirably said, and they are fearful of being so condemned again. NATO can offer a valuable cover for them; it is the best assurance for peace in that region, as it has been in ours since its foundation 50 years ago.<sup>26</sup>

The policies on enlargement of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Labour Party, in opposition, were similar to that of the Conservative Party, and it seems that a Labour Government will make little change to the UK's attitude.<sup>27</sup>

Although a timetable for NATO enlargement now appears clear, the process is likely to be fraught with difficulties. Not only do these include the obvious issue of reconciling Russian opposition, but there are also other problems such as internal obstacles within the leading

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24 *The Guardian* 7/2/97

25 See Madeleine Albright, 'Why Bigger is Better', *The Economist* 15/2/97

26 HC Deb 26/2/97 c 274

27 HC Deb 26/2/97 c 271-274

candidate countries; the impact of enlargement on those states whose applications are rejected; and a new realization of the implications of expansion for the existing members.

## II The Candidates

Although dialogue on enlargement has taken place between NATO and 12 central and eastern European states, in practice there are only five with any real prospect of membership in the near future. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have long been seen as the NATO applicants most likely to succeed. All fulfil the requirements for NATO membership, although some doubts could be expressed about poor civil military-relations in Poland.<sup>28</sup> Romania and Slovenia have recently been added to this list, although their chances of success remain less certain. All these states are active participants in Partnership for Peace and in NACC. Although commonly spoken of as joining simultaneously in a 'wave', there is no reason why they should not do so individually. Indeed, one line of thought is that NATO may open negotiations with the first three in July 1997, with a view to them joining by 1999. Invitations to Romania and Slovenia may be issued at the same time, but negotiations on entry may commence later with a similarly delayed accession date.

The Czech, Hungarian and Polish governments have all added to their NATO credentials by dispatching troops to serve in the NATO-commanded Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. Their military contingents remain part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which replaced IFOR in December 1996. Within SFOR, a Czech battalion is part of a British-led force and a Polish battalion serves under US command. Hungary has also sent a small contingent of engineers to Bosnia but since late 1995 has played a more significant role as the forward base for US forces in the Former Yugoslavia. US logistical units use the army base of Kaposvar and the air field of Tazsar in southern Hungary. The drawdown of US forces, which proceeded and followed the transition from IFOR to SFOR, largely took place via the Hungarian route to Germany. In this sense, NATO forces are already active on Hungarian soil.<sup>29</sup>

Although distinct from the three leading contenders in terms of its small size and limited military capability, Slovenia could also join NATO in the first round of enlargement. The country has moved rapidly to democratize and modernize its institutions since the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991. It also finally resolved its outstanding dispute with Italy over the property rights of Italian nationals in Istria in June 1996. Slovene candidature is now strongly backed by the centre-left Prodi government in Italy. NATO membership could also be seen as a reward for the best behaved of the Yugoslav successor states. In contrast, Croatia, which

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<sup>28</sup> The Polish armed forces have traditionally occupied an influential role in Polish political life. The Polish Chief of General Staff, Gen. Wilecki, who was close to President Walesa, was sacked in March by President Kwasniewski, largely for allegedly seeking to obstruct full civilian control of the military (*Jane's Pointer*, May 1997).

<sup>29</sup> In a separate move 3,500 British troops exercised in western Poland in September 1996, the first in a series of annual military manoeuvres, which also indicates the prospect of NATO membership for this state.

also has NATO aspirations, has an uneven record in meeting western democratic standards and is also ruled out due to its past military and current political role in Bosnia. Slovakia was once spoken of as another leading NATO candidate, but has fallen behind in the membership race as the Meciar government has departed from the norms expected of applicants. As a consequence, an added advantage of Slovene membership would be that it would secure a NATO land corridor to Hungary, which, if Slovakia did not accede, would not otherwise have a border with NATO. A Slovene contingent is expected to join SFOR soon.<sup>30</sup>

Of the remaining candidates, the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have all pushed hard for membership and have received support in this intent from NATO's Scandinavian members, Denmark and Norway. Elements of a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion have served as part of a Nordic force in Bosnia. However, a Baltic enlargement is unlikely for several reasons. Although fulfilling many of the economic and political accession criteria, both Estonia and Latvia have large Russian minorities, many of whom have retained Russian citizenship. Expansion to include the Baltic states would also leave the heavily armed Russian enclave of Kaliningrad within NATO's borders. Above all, Baltic membership would be seen as excessively provocative by Moscow, where some politicians have openly talked of pre-emptive invasion if it were to occur. For this reason, some believe that the Baltic states will never enter NATO, although the Organization is keen not to rule out their future accession entirely. As a consequence, any enhanced PFP co-operation will concentrate on the Baltic states in particular. Separately, the USA has begun the negotiation of a bilateral co-operation agreement with the Baltic states which may include some form of security assurance although not a security guarantee.<sup>31</sup>

Romania has also been active in seeking NATO membership but has been held back in its ambitions by the poor state of its democracy and economy. After the 1989 revolution, former Communists occupied both the Presidency and most positions of power in the country. However, Romania's chances of entering NATO have recently improved. Parliamentary and presidential polls in November 1996 heralded the election of a new centre-right president, the former academic Emil Constantinescu, in the place of the incumbent, a one-time ally of Ceaucescu, Ion Iliescu. Victor Ciorbea, the former Mayor of Bucharest, was confirmed as premier and formed a centre right government in December 1996. The elections marked the first peaceful transfer of power in Romania since the interwar period. Importantly, the new government is supported by the ethnic Hungarian party. Hungarians form a substantial minority in the country. Despite the signature of a friendship treaty between Hungary and Romania in 1996, the presence of a Magyar minority in Transylvania may always hold the potential for conflict both internally and with Budapest. Constantinescu has promised to introduce free market reforms, and Romania now stands the chance of shedding its "Balkan" image and entering the Central European mainstream.<sup>32</sup> In a recent poll, over 90 percent of

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30 AN 7/2/97

31 AN 3/4/97

32 *The Economist* 23/11/96 and *The Financial Times* 10/12/96

Romanians favoured membership of the Alliance.<sup>33</sup> France, a historic ally of Romania, strongly backs Romanian inclusion in the first wave of enlargement. This sentiment is shared by other NATO Mediterranean members keen to prevent what they would see as a geographical imbalance between northern and southern members following a purely central European enlargement. It is unclear, however, without any track record of real economic reform, whether Romania will be seen as having fulfilled the enlargement criteria. Some commentators have suggested that to allow Romania to leapfrog the more reformed Baltic States in the membership queue would be iniquitous.<sup>34</sup> As stated above, NATO may offer Romania an invitation to join the Alliance at Madrid but could postpone actual accession for a number of years whilst the Romanian government proves that reforms have been implemented and sustained.

Bulgaria, which has only recently indicated its candidature, suffers from problems similar to those of Romania. With historic links to Russia and with politics also dominated by ex-Communists, the Bulgarian government has until recently not pursued membership with any great vigour. Recent politics in Bulgaria have been unstable and occasionally turbulent. However, here there is also some room for optimism following the victory of reformist parties in general elections held in April this year, but as yet there have been no serious attempts to deal with the country's profound economic problems.<sup>35</sup> The Albanian government has also indicated its desire for NATO membership. Even before the recent anarchy which has seized the country, Albania failed to meet fully any of the five basic enlargement criteria. Macedonia has perhaps one of the better democratic records of the post-Cold War Balkan states but is excluded from NATO on geopolitical grounds: its proximity to Albania and Serbia and a troubled relationship with Greece.

As was pointed out by the Defence Select Committee in its extensive report on NATO enlargement, published in 1995, the states which could most easily be integrated into NATO are Austria, Finland and Sweden.<sup>36</sup> There has been some discussion in Austria on the merits of NATO membership with the coalition government divided between the Christian Democrats in favour and the Social Democrats against.<sup>37</sup> It has been mooted that if Austria were to be surrounded by NATO territory after enlargement, then this might make it easier for it eventually to accede to NATO. However, for the time being all three of the above states appear determined to retain their neutrality, at least as far as collective security commitments under Article 5 are concerned. However, the prospect of future membership can not be ruled out altogether.

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33 *AP* 1/2/97

34 *The Economist* 5/4/97

35 *The Financial Times* 24/4/97

36 Defence Committee Tenth Report, *The Future of NATO: The 1994 Summit and Its Consequences*, HC 747, Sess. 94/95, Para 67

37 *AN* 27/3/97

Ukraine has until recently adopted a position of non-alignment with regard to NATO entry. Ukraine occupies a key position in European security, being the most populous of the successor states of the Soviet Union after Russia. It possesses a large ethnic Russian minority which inhabits much of the industrial east of the country and the strategically important Crimean peninsula. Some Russian nationalists have never recognized the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state. Moscow and Kiev have quarrelled extensively over the division of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet, based at Sevastopol in the Crimea, and over the status of the Crimea itself which only became part of the notionally autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine in 1954.

NATO has recognized the importance of Ukraine by proposing to sign a bilateral Charter with it. This would be analogous to the NATO-Russia Charter and would incorporate similar consultation and co-operation mechanisms. In a visit to Brussels in April 1997, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennadi Udovenko, surprised his NATO counterparts when he arrived to commence negotiation on this document by announcing that he wanted his country to be "fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO". Previously, although joining Partnership for Peace, Ukraine had underlined that it was not a candidate for NATO membership. The Ukrainian strategy had been to develop good bilateral relations with Central European states such as Poland and Hungary and to retain a special relationship with the USA while antagonising Russia as little as possible. NATO enlargement was therefore an unwelcome distraction and Ukraine would prefer to head off any confrontation between Russia and NATO on this issue. It appears, though, that Ukraine may have become concerned at the prospect of becoming part of a potential no-mans-land between a NATO expanded to incorporate Poland to its west and an alienated Russia, linked to Belorussia, to its east and north. Although a formal Ukrainian application for membership has not been forthcoming and, doubtless, given Russian opposition, would not be accepted, pro-NATO noises from Kiev may only further inflame Russian fears about NATO's intentions.<sup>38</sup>

### III Russian Opposition

Even before the Brussels Summit of 1994, Russia voiced its opposition to NATO enlargement. However, this antipathy grew in vehemence thereafter and, although at the Helsinki Summit in March Russia signified its acceptance of the prospect of enlargement, its opposition remains based in a deep sense of grievance.<sup>39</sup>

Less than a decade ago Moscow was the capital of a world superpower. Now it stands at the head of an economically and socially troubled state, which, following the collapse of Soviet power, has been shorn of many lands which had been under Russian control for centuries. Some 25 million ethnic Russians live beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. The once much vaunted Russian war machine is now in disarray, crippled by cash and recruit shortages and low morale. The extent of a general Russian feeling of humiliation should not be underestimated.<sup>40</sup> In many Russian eyes NATO is a Cold War anachronism. While Russia has abandoned its *cordon sanitaire* with the West, disbanded its Cold War alliances and reduced its armed forces, the countervailing Western military alliance, although less potent, remains intact. Russia has favoured a greater role for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as an overarching European security structure, in preference to an expanded NATO. This position was emphasised at the OSCE summit in Lisbon in December 1996. Russia objects in particular to the extension of NATO's military infrastructure into eastern Europe and the possible siting of NATO nuclear weapons on its doorstep. The Russian government has also pointed to verbal assurances given by the Americans, British and French to Soviet leaders, at the time of German reunification in 1989, that NATO would not expand further to the east, although these must be seen in the different strategic context of the time.<sup>41</sup>

From 1994 until the recent change in tone, Russian threatened various forms of retaliation if enlargement were to go ahead. These have included the formation of a new defence alliance with other CIS states as an initial counterpoint to an enlarged NATO. It has even been suggested that this might conceivably be expanded to include Slovakia.<sup>42</sup> Another wilder threat was to resort quickly to the use of nuclear weapons in the case of any future conflict.<sup>43</sup> The then Russian security chief, Gen. Lebed, spoke of unspecified "reprisals" against NATO if enlargement took place. A similar hardline stance has been maintained by the current Russian defence minister, Gen. Rodionov, and foreign minister, Yevgeni Primakov, and is broadly shared by the whole spectrum of Russian politicians. Ex-President Gorbachev has

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39 See reports on Helsinki Summit from USIS, *Washington File*, 24/3/97

40 See RP 97/19, *The New Russia - Five Years on*, February 1997

41 *The Guardian* 15/2/97 and *The Daily Telegraph* 21/3/97

42 *The Times* 15/5/96

43 *The Financial Times* 12/1/97

also used his prominent position in the west to oppose NATO expansion.<sup>44</sup> On a diplomatic level, Russian retaliatory action might have included a refusal to ratify the START II Treaty, which reduces nuclear arsenals on both sides to 3,500 warheads by 2003. The Treaty, which was ratified by the US Senate in January 1996, has been stalled in the Russian Duma for some time. Another tactic could have been a possible rejection of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990, viewed by the many as the cornerstone of European peace. Whatever the rhetoric of Russian hostility, privately Moscow was resigned to NATO enlargement long before the Helsinki Summit if it incorporates only the state of central Europe. Much of its sabre-rattling was intended to head off NATO enlargement into the Baltic and gain maximum concessions in return.

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44 *International Herald Tribune* 18/1/97

#### IV NATO's Inducements to Russia

NATO's attempts to assuage Russian opinion have centred on the drafting of a new 'Charter', setting out a series of standing principles and arrangements governing relations between the Alliance and Moscow. This will be a considerable step beyond the existing 16 + 1 consultations agreed in 1995. Other potential NATO carrots include revision of the CFE Treaty and also a further round of nuclear disarmament.

##### A. A NATO-Russian Charter

The main NATO proposal to calm Russian fears about enlargement is to offer a menu of closer co-operation measures which will be included in a mutually agreed Charter. The leading element of the Charter will be a new NATO-Russian Council, which presumably, like the main NATO ministerial councils, will meet formally at least twice a year. Under the existing 16 + 1 procedures, decisions are taken within NATO and then Russia may be consulted before their implementation. Under the new proposals, Russia would be taken into the NATO decision-making process for all non-Article V (collective security) missions. Thus, for example, in any future peacekeeping mission along the lines of that in Bosnia, in a Combined Joint Task Force, Moscow would be involved in all stages of such a situation, including analysis, force planning, preparation and finally, implementation. To assist with the modalities of these arrangements, the *ad hoc* Russian liaison office at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Mons, which was set up to deal with Russian participation in IFOR and continues in the same role with regard to SFOR, could be placed on a permanent basis. A Russian office might also be opened at NATO HQ itself. Another proposal for co-operation from Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, is the possible formation of a joint NATO (i.e. US)-Russian Brigade which would be intended to be used in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Russia would, however, remain outside the Integrated Military Structure (IMS) and would have no role in traditional 'hard' defence subjects, such as NATO's nuclear strategy, or within NATO forces such as the joint AWACs squadron. NATO would like to conclude negotiations on the new Charter before invitations are issued to new NATO candidates at the time of the Madrid summit.<sup>45</sup> A series of bilateral discussions to this end have taken place between NATO and Russian representatives since January.

It is intended that a Charter will be signed in Paris at the end of May at a summit of NATO leaders.<sup>46</sup> Some commentators view this target as optimistic.<sup>47</sup> Although agreement has

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<sup>45</sup> AN 3/4/97

<sup>46</sup> The decision to hold the summit at Paris is partly an attempt to help smooth France's return to full Alliance membership. *The Irish Times* 10/4/97

<sup>47</sup> *The International Herald Tribune* 19/4/97

apparently been reached on the establishment of a NATO-Russia Council, differences remain on the question of the basing of NATO troops in the new Members. Another crucial sticking point may be the issue of reciprocity. Security experts, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, have demanded that Russia mirror NATO's concessions by allowing NATO officers a presence in the Russian Ministry of Defence and unilateral Russian limits on forces in Kaliningrad and Belarus.<sup>48</sup> There also seems to have been some division within NATO over the extent to which Russia would be drawn into NATO decision-making. Certainly, there appears to have been some alarm in Europe when, in September 1996 in the margins of the informal NATO Council in Bergen, William Perry, the then US Defense Secretary, appeared to offer much of the above to his counterpart, the Russian defence minister, before the Charter concept had been properly fleshed out within NATO. However, Member States now seem broadly in agreement on what a Charter might contain.

Russian representatives have until recently demanded, when acknowledging the prospect of enlargement, that a NATO-Russia Charter be a legally binding Treaty rather than a politically binding document. In their minds the Treaty would have included provisions preventing NATO from basing foreign forces or nuclear weapons in any of the new Member States and an effective Russian veto over any further round of enlargement.<sup>49</sup> NATO has been unwilling to sign a formal bilateral co-operation treaty with Russia for a number of reasons. It has refused to give any formal written commitment not to base nuclear weapons or troops in the new eastern members, although assurances have been made that NATO has no intention, plan or reason to do so. Following a North Atlantic Council meeting on 14 March, the Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana, issued the following unilateral statement: "In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."<sup>50</sup>

Even before such pronouncements, the presence of either permanent NATO forces or nuclear weapons on the territories of any of the new members would have appeared unlikely. With the withdrawal of USAF nuclear weapons based in the UK in October 1996, there are no longer any American nuclear weapons in Europe. In addition, RAF WE177 freefall bombs, some of which have been stored in Germany, will be decommissioned by 1998. France is phasing out its silo-based ballistic missiles. Thus, discounting the French air-launched weapons which are not dedicated to NATO, there will soon be no NATO ground-based nuclear weapons in Europe. There is also the fact of opposition within the candidate states to the location of nuclear weapons on their soil. President Kwasniewski of Poland has stated, "We perceive no security requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on Polish

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48 *The International Herald Tribune* 14/4/97

49 *The Financial Times* 5/2/97

50 NATO PR 97/27

territory".<sup>51</sup> In addition, NATO is unlikely to wish to fund the permanent movement of British, German and US troops from long-established bases in Germany to rundown former Soviet bases in eastern Europe. In normal circumstances the only reason for the deployment of NATO troops in central Europe is likely to be for the purposes of exercises, as already occurs.<sup>52</sup>

NATO has also been resistant to the idea of a treaty because such an instrument would then require ratification by all existing member states. It might then face opposition in certain legislatures, particularly in the US Senate, where Republicans might accuse President Clinton of conceding too much influence to Russia. At the Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin made a significant concession when he agreed to sign a politically rather than legally binding Charter. However, he also stated that he would unilaterally seek Duma approval for this document.<sup>53</sup> Given anti-NATO sentiment in the Duma, this may not prove easy.

## **B. Revision of the CFE Treaty**

Revision of the CFE Treaty offers another means of reconciling Russia to an expanded Alliance. The Treaty, which was signed in November 1990 by the 22 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and came into force in November 1992, has already been the subject of some reinterpretation.

The Treaty limited five categories of military equipment deployed by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The five categories (tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) are known as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE). The limits apply in the 'Atlantic to the Urals' zone (ATTU) which was further divided into various sub-zones. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, referred to as Groups of States Parties in the Treaty, were each allotted equal levels of equipment which were then subdivided between members of the respective alliances. Each Group was assigned a maximum level of 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters. The Treaty also set maximum levels for single state holdings of equipment. It also allowed for an elaborate inspection regime, partly in order to verify that the various stages of equipment reduction have been reached. Reductions of TLE were to be completed by November 1995. A review conference of the CFE Treaty was to be held in April 1996.

Although the CFE Treaty was essentially intended to be an agreement between the two Cold

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51 *The Financial Times* 25/10/96

52 See Section V

53 *The Independent* 22/3/97

War blocs, the Warsaw Pact was already in a state of decay when the agreement was signed, and it was dissolved in July 1991. The Czechoslovak "divorce" led to a subsequent division of TLE between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a reapportionment of Soviet TLE among its successor states in the ATTU. This was agreed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in the Tashkent Declaration of May 1992. (Kazakhstan is not permitted to retain any TLE on the part of its territory covered by the ATTU). The number of States Parties to the CFE Treaty has thus grown to 30.

Generally, the CFE Treaty has been a success with TLE being destroyed or converted to peaceful uses to schedule. However, the Treaty quickly encountered a problem with Russia concerning the so-called 'flank zones'. The Treaty was organized around an East/West military confrontation in central Europe. As a consequence, following the sharing out of CFE quotas among the Soviet successor states, Russia was left with limited assignments of TLE along its southern border where it faces threats to its security both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In response to Russian protests, the flank zones both in Northern and Southern Russia were widened to include areas formerly in the central zone, thus increasing the amounts of TLE in both. This move was agreed in principle in autumn 1995 and was then ratified by the CFE Review Conference in May 1996.

Russia's new concerns about the CFE Treaty relate to the bloc-to-bloc nature of the agreement, which NATO has conceded is no longer appropriate. The CFE Treaty was predicated on military parity between the then two superpower blocs. With Russian withdrawal from eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, there is now a major imbalance of forces in Europe, with NATO enjoying a considerable superiority over Russia. This disparity will grow after any round of NATO enlargement. Once the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are included, NATO in Europe will field three times as many main battle tanks and three times as many artillery pieces as the Russian army west of the Urals, for example.<sup>54</sup>

A revision of the Treaty was agreed at the OSCE summit held in Lisbon in December 1996. Further negotiations opened in Vienna in January and are intended to reassign the bloc totals on a state basis. Russia may use the revision to attempt to impose a limitation on the basing of NATO troops in the new Member States and to allow greater flexibility for its own forces, perhaps by further amending the zonal limitations. Further revision of the flank agreement is of concern to states on the fringes of the Alliance, such as Norway and Turkey, which might be affected, and also to states outside NATO, including the Baltic countries and Ukraine. The CFE revision is, however, subject to a strict mandate. The overall TLE ceilings, for example, will not increase, although given that many state parties' forces are already well below their 1990 totals, further ceiling reductions are possible. In a statement

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54 *The Guardian* 23/1/97

presented to the negotiations in February, NATO made a specific commitment to significant reductions in ground TLE.<sup>55</sup> Cuts may fall, in particular, on states in central Europe.<sup>56</sup> Any agreement may also contain fresh confidence building measures, such as further information provision on NATO exercises in the new eastern members. The negotiations are scheduled to last 18 months, although at the Helsinki Summit Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin promised to accelerate them with the production of a framework agreement intended for early summer 1997.<sup>57</sup>

### C. Nuclear Arms Control and Other Issues

Another US inducement offered to Russia has been further nuclear arms control negotiations. As discussed above, Russian ratification of START II remains blocked by the Duma. At the Helsinki Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reached agreement on commencing negotiations on a new START III. These will begin once START II has come into force which will require President Yeltsin to persuade the Duma to ratify the Treaty. Both leaders have agreed to reduce their arsenals to 2-2,500 warheads each by the year 2007. This will be a more than 65 per cent reduction on the total number of warheads permitted under START I.<sup>58</sup> START III will be a bilateral agreement and the comparatively small nuclear forces of Britain, China and France will not be involved in this next stage of nuclear arms control. In addition, Russia and the USA reaffirmed their commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The Treaty banned the development of ABM systems and has been the subject of disagreement between Moscow and Washington over the development of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems and the extent to which they violate its provisions. Although agreement has been reached over demarcation between ABM and TMD for low velocity TMD systems, negotiations continue to resolve disputes over high velocity weapons. Both Presidents gave their personal support to the successful negotiation of a conclusion to these talks.<sup>59</sup>

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55 FCO

56 *The International Herald Tribune* 21/2/97

57 See *Document Adopted by the State Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on the Scope and Parameters of the Process Commissioned in Paragraph 19 of the Final Document on the First CFE Treaty Review Conference*, December 1996 and 'Joint Statement on European Security', USIS, *Washington File*, 24/3/97

58 'Joint Statement on Parameters of Future Nuclear Reductions', USIS, *Washington File*, 24/3/97

59 'Joint US-Russian Statement on ABM Treaty', USIS, *Washington File*, 24/3/97 It is notable that both leaders also promised to persuade their legislatures to undertake their long delayed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although President Clinton fulfilled his pledge in April, the Convention remains mired in the Duma.

As part of a joint economic statement, the USA promised to improve Russia's relationship with the Group of Seven, with Russia being treated as an equal party at the forthcoming G7 Summit, which is to be held in Denver in June. President Clinton will also assist Russia's attempts to join the Paris Club, the World Trade Organization and the OECD.<sup>60</sup>

#### V Opposition within the Candidates States

Opposition to NATO enlargement can be found not only within Russia but also within some of the leading candidate states themselves. Only in Poland, where in a recent poll nine out of ten respondents favoured joining, can support be said to be overwhelming for NATO membership.<sup>61</sup> Poland has long memories of Russian occupation and is also wary of the Russian province of Kaliningrad, a heavily garrisoned Russian enclave on the Baltic coast. In contrast, less enthusiasm is exhibited by electorates in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the former, the opposition Social Democratic Party has changed its policy from support of unqualified NATO membership to one comparable to that of Norway, where nuclear weapon and NATO bases are excluded in peacetime. Support for NATO membership in the Czech Republic now stands at only 42 per cent.<sup>62</sup> Support for accession has also vacillated in Hungary. A poll held there in late 1995, after the publication of the NATO *Study on Enlargement*, found that support for NATO membership had fallen from a previous figure of 46 per cent in favour to 38 per cent. Over the same time span opposition to membership had increased from 11 to 38 per cent.<sup>63</sup> In early 1997, support for membership had recovered somewhat but still stood at under 50 per cent.<sup>64</sup> Clearly some Czechs and Hungarians, particularly those on the left, having only recently recovered full sovereignty, may be unwilling to surrender it.

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60 'Joint Statement on US-Russia Economic Initiative', USIS, *Washington File*, 24/3/97

61 *The International Herald Tribune* 24/2/96

62 *The Guardian* 23/4/97

63 *The Guardian* 1/2/96

64 *The International Herald Tribune* 24/2/96

## VI The Cost of Enlargement

One factor in the enlargement debate which is perhaps only now receiving the serious consideration which it deserves is that of its financial cost. Given the uncertainties surrounding NATO enlargement, such as the exact number of new members and the atmosphere of European security in the next decade, pricing NATO enlargement is problematic. The central question is the amount of military insurance which the existing members wish and can afford to provide to the new eastern members, given that it has already been decided (under current circumstances) not to station forces from existing members on new NATO territory. Estimates of the costs of enlargement therefore tend to provide ranges from the minimum required to integrate a new member into Alliance military and political structures to a maximum, catering for more extensive and vigorous defence arrangements on a new notional 'front-line' in Central Europe.

Certain fixed costs will arise from enlargement and will fall to existing and new members alike. All the leading candidates have already started to realign their armed forces along NATO lines, but much work remains to be done to extend NATO standard command procedures and military doctrine to them. Although Soviet-style equipment need not be replaced immediately, all the new members will be required as a priority to upgrade their command and control systems to NATO standards. A secondary demand will be the modernization of air defences, particularly the acquisition of modern combat aircraft. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish airforces are all examining the procurement of European or US fighter jets. Eventually all Soviet-style equipment will need to be replaced or converted to western standards at great cost. Moreover, although military cadres in the Czech Republic and Poland are of reasonable quality (although not in Hungary where the armed forces were neglected for political reasons after 1956), the general standard of training is often low.

It has already been agreed that NATO will not normally station either conventional forces of the existing Members or nuclear weapons on the territory of the likely successful applicants. Cost scenarios which tend towards the higher range include figures for the movement of forces from western members to NATO's new members in the event of a crisis. Depending on the size of the force envisaged, infrastructure will need to be prepared to receive troops in the new members; existing NATO forces will need to be trained and designated for rapid reaction; and extra monies will be required to upgrade new member forces equipment to NATO models.

One of the first major US studies of the costs of enlargement was conducted by the RAND Corporation in April 1995. RAND estimated that expansion to include the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) would cost as little as \$10bn over a ten-year period at the minimum level of requirement. The provision of more vigorous security measures could cost up to \$100bn over the same timeframe. A study in autumn 1996, also

by RAND, using a different approach produced similar minimum and maximum figures. In March 1996, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a more wide-ranging report which examined a range of options involving the Visegrad Four ranging from potentially assisting the new members in a border skirmish to stationing forces of the western members permanently on their territory. The studies assumed that costs would be spread over a 15-year period. Assessment of the least cost Option 1, which included substantial re-equipment of new member armed forces, produced a figure of \$61bn. The maximum cost Option 5 indicated a figure of \$125bn. In February 1997, the Clinton Administration published its own enlargement cost estimates, which had been drawn up by the US State Department. These expected a first wave enlargement to cost between \$27-35bn over a thirteen year period.<sup>65</sup> The various cost estimates appear to relate to military costs only. It is expected that the size of the NATO HQ at Brussels may need to double in order to accommodate the delegations of new members and also of NATO Partners to the proposed Atlantic Partnership Council.<sup>66</sup> Enlargement will therefore also incur extra civil expenditure.

Given that the opponent in these reinforcement scenarios is not even stated, these estimates must be treated with caution and have been criticized as being arbitrary. The highest Congressional Budget Office estimate is based on the level of forces required for the defence of West Germany during the Cold War and would seem wildly unrealistic. Yet clearly the unidentified opponent must be seen as being Russia and given the parlous state of its armed forces and the many years of expenditure and reorganization required to restore them to military effectiveness, lower cost enlargement scenarios would seem more plausible. The existing forces of Britain, the USA and the Netherlands, for example, have already been reconfigured for rapid reaction and might require little modification to prepare for movement into Hungary or Poland, should it be required. There are some hopes that the modernization costs of the Polish and other armed forces may be held down by leasing NATO surplus equipment. The US Air Force, for example, has several hundred F-16 fighters in storage potentially available for this purpose.

Even if, for the sake of argument, President Clinton's estimates of \$27-35bn over 13 years were to be accepted, the question remains as to how these costs would be distributed amongst the existing and new membership. The total current annual NATO budget stands at some \$2bn of which \$188m is in the civil budget, \$826m in the military and \$800m in the infrastructure budget which is also known as the Security Investment Programme.<sup>67</sup> Some

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<sup>65</sup> Congressional Research Service, *NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance*, August 1996, 'NATO Expansion Forges Ahead with Little Hill Scrutiny', *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 15 March 1997 and *Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US State Dept. February 1997.

<sup>66</sup> AN 28/3/97

<sup>67</sup> AN 7/3/97

of the costs of enlargement may be covered from within the existing NATO budgets, chiefly from the infrastructure account. There is some room for optimism on this score since NATO is engaged on the second major rationalization of its command structures since the Cold War. This will involve the removal of an entire level of command and the amalgamation of many existing headquarters. As a consequence the total number of HQs may fall from the current 60 to only 20. Some money for enlargement may be freed by this process. However, it would seem inevitable that both the existing members and the new members will need to find fresh sums from already declining national defence budgets to pay for NATO's expansion.

Amongst the existing membership the attribution of extra costs could well become a controversial subject. At the policy level, NATO began to address the financial implications of enlargement in 1995. The *Study on NATO Enlargement* considered the financial aspects of the process in two sections: -

45 g. **Finance** New members will be expected to contribute their share to NATO's commonly funded programmes. They should also be aware that they face substantial financial obligations when joining the Alliance.

and

#### C. Security Investment Programme (SIP)

64. The NATO Security Investment Programme should be used to accelerate the assimilation process of new members. The scope of this will depend upon the terms under which new members will participate. Procedurally and organisationally, the incorporation of new members into the Programme will not present problems although the process may take time. The renewed prioritisation and resource allocation mechanisms are well suited to deal with new requirements resulting from enlargement.

65. Financially, new members would be expected to contribute their share, as from the start, to all new programme activities. with a contribution level based, in a general way, on "ability to pay". Because of the time needed in an investment programme to bring activities to implementation, and because of the limited absorption capacity of new members, financial implications will be limited in the early years. Enlarged participation in the programme should therefore be possible without impact on the implementation of existing commitments and programmes. It is important, however, to get prospective new members involved in the planning and preparatory processes as soon as possible and to ensure that they are fully aware of their prospective liabilities.

#### D. Administration and Budgets

66. Without knowing the number of prospective new members it is only possible to address management issues in a general manner. Enlargement will lead to new activities and a need for increased resources, additional office space will be needed at NATO HQ to accommodate new members and possible increases to the staffs of the IS and IMS. Operating and capital costs in the Civil Budget will grow. New members will be expected to contribute. Cost shares must

be calculated and decisions taken concerning their obligations. Enlargement will also mean increases in the Military Budget, but the actual budgetary consequences will depend in large part on the new members' level of participation.

67. It will be important to ensure that potential new members are fully aware that they face considerable financial obligations when joining the Alliance.

An official NATO study into the costs of enlargement was launched at the December 1996 Council and is intended to be presented to the next NATO ministerial Council at the end of May.

Current budget and programme costs are shared according to complex cost keys.<sup>68</sup> The percentage shares indicated in the cost keys are not based on any mathematical formula, linked to relative levels of GDP, size of armed forces or level of defence budget, but are determined by a curious amalgam of factors. These include the impact of history, the degree of representation in the command structure, the national political importance of NATO membership, etc. Above all, the deciding factor appears to be ability and willingness to pay.<sup>69</sup> The current system is complicated by the as yet still semi-detached membership status of France and Spain. They do not participate fully in NATO military structures and therefore only fund parts of the Military Budget and Infrastructure Budget, although they are likely to contribute in full to all areas of the budget if and when they become fully active members.<sup>70</sup>

Under the current system Britain pays a share of NATO costs disproportionate to its relative GDP. The UK's contribution to both the NATO civil and military budgets is greater than the respective contributions of wealthier European members, France and Germany. Only the USA pays more. Only in the infrastructure budget does the UK rank fourth amongst these countries.<sup>71</sup> Britain's contribution to NATO expenses may reflect its historic leading role in the Alliance and the prominent position of UK officers in NATO headquarters. One of the three NATO subordinate commands, AFNORTHWEST, is located at High Wycombe and is under British command. UK officers also holds the important post of Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, NATO's main deployable land force. The significance subscribed to NATO under successive British governments might also help to explain the relatively high British share of NATO costs. Whatever the reason, if the current budget

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68 *NATO Financial Resources*, November 1996, Annex A

69 *NATO Financial Resources*, Para 5

70 Changes to these keys arising from expanded membership entail prolonged and difficult negotiations. For example, although Spain joined the Alliance in 1982, the consequent changes to the infrastructure budget key were not completed until 1995.

71 NATO Civil Budget percentages: USA 23.35, UK 18.82, France 16.5 and Germany 15.54. Military Budget at 16: USA 24.12, UK 17.58, France 16.5 and Germany 15.54. Infrastructure Budget at 16: USA 23.27, Germany 22.40, France 12.9 and UK 10.19.

proportions were to be extended to fresh expenditure on enlargement, then the UK could face a disproportionate bill.

The US Executive presentation to Congress stressed that the bulk of enlargement costs would not be borne by the USA. The document stated that the new NATO members would pay 48 per cent (\$13-\$18bn), US only 5 per cent (\$1.5-2bn) and other existing members the remaining 47 per cent of the total expansion bill (\$12.5-15.5bn: \$8-10bn for improving reinforcement capabilities and \$4.5-5.5bn for direct enlargement). The US share of the notional 13-year \$35bn bill would come to around \$150m per annum which is less than 0.1 per cent of the annual US defence budget.<sup>72</sup> Using the British share of non-US contributions to the 1994 NATO budget (25.93 per cent) as a guide, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) has deduced that the UK share would be some £3.8bn or about \$300m per year.<sup>73</sup> This is approximately 1 per cent of the annual UK defence budget and twice the level of the US contribution.

It is important to stress, however, that all the cost estimates for expansion relate to the total bill for enlargement and *do not discount relevant current expenditure either by NATO itself, Member States or candidate states*. The British government could argue, for example, with some justification, that its forces are already configured for any rapid deployment onto the territory of the potential Members. The key question is what *additional* expenditure is required and where this is to be found. Certainly some European NATO members may balk at, on the US government figures, carrying a larger share of the burden of enlargement costs than Washington for what some might regard as an enterprise forced along by the USA.<sup>74</sup>

All estimates of the cost of enlargement presume that the successful applicants will make a substantial financial contribution to the expansion bill. Responding on this point in the House in February 1997, the then Foreign Office minister Sir Nicholas Bonsor noted: -

We make it clear to all the countries that wish to join that this is not a one-way street. There is no free guarantee given by existing NATO members. The new countries will be asked and expected to play a full role in NATO operations, and particularly peace-keeping operations. We expect them to increase defence expenditure when necessary, to bring their armed forces up to the level of NATO armed forces and to ensure interoperability.<sup>75</sup>

In this light, both the Polish and Czech Presidents have warned their populations that the price

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<sup>72</sup> AN 7/3/97

<sup>73</sup> BASIC PR 11/3/97 'Britain to pay £200 million a year for NATO expansion'.

<sup>74</sup> Philip Gordon, 'Will Anyone Really Pay to Enlarge NATO - and If So, Who?', *International Herald Tribune*, 30/4/97

<sup>75</sup> HC Deb 26/2/97 c 275-276

of NATO membership may mean increased defence spending. President Kwasniewski has called for the Polish defence budget to be doubled by 2002.<sup>76</sup> However, central European electorates, having faced the austerity demanded for conversion from command to capitalist economies, may prove unwilling to support additional defence expenditure. This may be particularly true in the Czech Republic and Hungary where the armed forces command little public affection. The role of the Czech armed forces in helping to suppress the Prague Spring is not forgotten in the Czech Republic. Moreover, in comparison with NATO members of comparative population, the defence budgets of the leading NATO applicants are small.<sup>77</sup> Although local defence costs are considerably below those within NATO, the aspirants appear to have few spare resources with which to fund their integration into the Alliance.

During the Cold War, on several occasions NATO Members made commitments to increase their defence spending by fixed amounts in response to a perception of a growing threat from the USSR. These commitments were seldom fulfilled. If, and when, NATO agrees a figure for the cost of enlargement, and how such a sum is to be paid for by each current and candidate Member State, it would seem unlikely that the total bill will ever be discharged.

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<sup>76</sup> *The Independent* 30/10/96

<sup>77</sup> The Czech Republic's defence budget is \$1.3bn, that of Hungary only \$520m, and of Poland \$3.4bn. IISS *The Military Balance 1996/97*. Czech Republic and Poland 1997 figures. Hungary 1996 figure.

## VII Opposition within the Existing Membership

Over the past months there has been increasingly vocal criticism of enlargement from within the existing member states. This opposition has been crowned by an intervention from the nonagenarian George Kennan, the father of containment and doyen of Kremlinology, who in an article in *The New York Times* stated that "expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era".<sup>78</sup> Another commentator has declared, "NATO is not some kind of all-purpose talk-shop; it is the most powerful military alliance the world has ever seen. Its expansion *must* mean a substantial shift in the balance of power with unmistakable military implications".<sup>79</sup> The thrust of these arguments is that enlargement will prove counterproductive. It will undermine reformers in Russia and support the rise to power of reactionaries, whether of the Communist left or authoritarian right. A new fault line will be created in Europe with the potential to revive the confrontation of the Cold War.<sup>80</sup>

The critics of enlargement maintain that, with the Russian armed forces in a state of disarray, the states of central Europe face no real threat to their security. They claim, through enlargement Poland, Hungary and other eastern European states could, ironically, find themselves on a new Cold War front-line. Furthermore they add that an unexpanded NATO can quite easily project security eastward without extending its borders in the same manner, they suggest, as NATO provided a degree of protection to the Scandinavian neutrals and to Yugoslavia during the Cold War. Sufficient military co-operation can be achieved with these new democracies via Partnership for Peace and the Combined Joint Task Force concept without integrating them into NATO's command structure. One commentator has postulated that the emergence of old animosities between the new democracies of Central Europe might be prevented by the establishment of regional security pacts, one perhaps covering the Baltic States and the neutral Scandinavian countries, another encompassing the Visegrad countries.<sup>81</sup>

Others suggest that NATO is essentially a defensive alliance and enlargement will only water down its primary military character. The bedrock of NATO is Article 5, the collective security guarantee, which entails that an attack on London equates to an attack on Washington or Berlin. This would bring united Alliance retaliation, including the possible use of nuclear weapons. Is extending this guarantee to Bialystok (Poland) or Debrecen (Hungary) really credible?<sup>82</sup>

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78 See article reproduced in *The International Herald Tribune* 6/2/97

79 *The Financial Times* 22/1/97

80 *The Times* 4/1/97

81 See, for example, Sir John Killick, 'Small is Beautiful: The Case Against NATO Enlargement', *RUSI Journal* August 1996

82 *The Times* 23/10/96 and *The Financial Times* 24/10/96

With greater numbers, it may inevitably prove more difficult to reach consensus in NATO meetings. By incorporating Hungary, for example, traditional central European antagonisms, in this case between Hungary and Romania, and Hungary and Slovakia, might be imported into NATO decision-making. They could then bedevil NATO in its central region just as animosity between Greece and Turkey has weakened the Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1950s. The prospect of the Czech Republic being admitted to the Alliance in 1999 and neighbouring Slovakia being rejected has already worsened relations between the formerly unified states who are currently in dispute over the division of assets on their divorce in 1993.<sup>83</sup>

From a UK perspective, Britain stands to lose influence within NATO as it expands. The professionalism of Britain's armed forces is widely respected in Central Europe, with their performing a small but influential role in, for example, training a Baltic peacekeeping battalion and advising on the reform of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, but the UK government's earlier resistance to rapid enlargement may have put it at a disadvantage in its relations with the candidate members. The latter have developed closer relations with the enlargement enthusiasts, Germany and the USA, which may, for example, pay dividends in terms of arms orders placed in these countries. The relative position of Germany in NATO, in particular, may be strengthened with Bonn confirming its position as the leading European transatlantic interlocutor with the USA.

Others critics, such as Henry Kissinger, although perhaps supportive of the principle of enlargement, have claimed that NATO has paid Russia too high a price for acquiescing to an expansion of the Alliance which it could do little to prevent. The NATO-Russia Charter will allow Moscow too much influence in NATO deliberations and could disable Alliance decision-making in crisis management and deterrence. Indeed, they attest that, by becoming a quasi NATO Member from May, Russia will have in one sense joined the Organization well before any of the approved candidates.<sup>84</sup> In short, most opponents of enlargement see the best way to maintain cordial relations with Russia, and also to preserve the independence of the former Soviet satellites in central Europe, would be for NATO to remain at Sixteen.

NATO enlargement may alter the balance of power in central Europe. However, this may only be a recognition of the geostrategic changes in Europe since the mid-1980s. It could also be argued that there is a major distinction between NATO enlargement into central Europe and any further expansion into eastern Europe. The three leading NATO candidates in central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, are not part of a traditional Russian sphere

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83 *The European* 10/4/97

84 See Henry Kissinger 'New NATO' chips at keystone of US policy', *The Daily Telegraph* 11/4/97

of influence.<sup>85</sup> The presence of Russian forces in these states was only a product of the collapse of German power in 1945. By inclination all are part of the European mainstream. Given that all now meet in most respects the standards expected of western democracies, it would prove very difficult to deny them NATO membership.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, bringing in central Europe is one way in which democracy could be maintained. Friendship treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic are part of the stabilizing effect created by the prospect of NATO (and EU) membership. Hungary has signed bilateral treaties on the rights of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania for the same reasons. In short, without the stability and security offered by NATO membership, anti-democratic forces in Central Europe could reemerge. On a pessimistic scenario, the Central Europeans could form their own rival regional security pacts, dragging in neighbouring Germany and potentially other NATO members. Local arms races could follow and, with NATO undermined, Europe could return to the system of competing alliances of the inter-war period.<sup>87</sup>

Although not officially related, there is also the question of linkage between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Some critics claim that NATO expansion is being pushed forward as a means by some European NATO members to postpone EU enlargement.<sup>88</sup> Some of the existing poorer EU members, who are also NATO members, such as Spain and Portugal, are set to lose many of the financial benefits which they receive from Brussels to the more backward states of the east when or if the latter become EU Member States. Commentators argue that, although NATO membership will provide psychological and security benefits, it is only the economic security offered by EU membership which will truly underwrite democracy in central Europe.<sup>89</sup> Eastern EU enlargement may not take place until 2002 at the earliest. As it stands, under current European defence arrangements, EU members are invited to join the Western European Union (WEU) either as full members or as observers. It is difficult to see how a state could be a full WEU member and not also a member of NATO. This point may need to be returned to in the future, particularly with regard to the Baltic states. Whilst Russia is bitterly opposed to the latter joining NATO, it is not alarmed at the prospect of them gaining EU membership.

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85 Large parts of what now constitutes modern Poland were not part of the Russian Empire but originally incorporated within the Hapsburg realm and Prussia.

86 M.Kaldor & I. Vejvoda, 'Democratisation in Central and East European countries', *International Affairs*, January 1997

87 *The Guardian* 19/2/97 The latter argument has, however, also been used to attack NATO enlargement. Why, it is put, is NATO expanding to include the new and stable democracies of central Europe and not enlarging into the Balkans where war has taken place in the Former Yugoslavia and simmering tensions leave the prospect of further conflicts? *The Independent* 6/2/97

88 See Thomas Friedman, 'NATO Expansion as a Crafty Consolation Prize', *The International Herald Tribune* 24/1/97

89 *The Guardian* 15/2/97



### VIII After Madrid: Negotiation and Ratification

The speed of negotiations with candidate states may be slow once invitations have been offered, although Madeleine Albright has suggested that they could be completed by the end of 1997. Additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty will need to be ratified for each new Member by the existing Members in line with their particular, and sometimes lengthy, constitutional conventions. The Turkish government has already threatened to veto enlargement unless progress is made on its application to join the EU and WEU.<sup>90</sup> Although this threat is probably a negotiating tactic, difficulties could be encountered with ratification in the Turkish Parliament. Any Turkish obstruction of enlargement and possible US or NATO concessions to placate Turkish sentiment could arouse Greek ire on the same issue. There is also the question of whether the Russian Duma chooses to approve the text of the NATO-Russia Charter.

The key to parliamentary ratification of enlargement lies in the US Senate which, under US constitutional provisions, must approve all US foreign treaties by a two-thirds majority. The Senate is unlikely to deal with the instruments of NATO enlargement until the summer or autumn of 1998 which is towards the end of the 105th Congress. Many other NATO parliaments may prove reluctant to commence their ratification processes until a decision has been reached in the US legislature. The US Senate has a reputation for independence in exercising its ratification powers. Most famously, after the First World War a Republican-led Senate failed to ratify US membership of the League of Nations which had been agreed by a Democratic President. This act did much to undermine European security in the inter-war period. Once again, a Democratic President will be seeking the approval from a Republican-dominated chamber of treaty changes of the highest importance to the future of Europe. There is a general consensus that there is support for NATO expansion in the US Senate and amongst the US public in general. However, this support although broad is also fairly shallow, with as yet little awareness of the modalities and implications of enlargement.<sup>91</sup>

A number of factors stand in favour of successful passage through the Senate. Firstly, Congress has a history of broad bi-partisan backing for NATO enlargement. It passed a *NATO Participation Act* in 1994 which supplied surplus military equipment and financial assistance to prospective members. A commitment to NATO expansion featured in Newt Gingrich's Republican Contract with America. Both Houses subsequently backed the *NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act 1996* by 80 per cent majorities. Secondly, there are many millions of American voters of Central European descent, many of them concentrated in electorally significant 'swing' states such as Michigan, Ohio and New Jersey. These votes perhaps explain both Clinton and Dole's backing for NATO expansion in the 1996 Presidential

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90 AN 7/2/97

91 S. Kull, 'The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement', and J. Rosner, 'Will Congress Back Admitting New Members?', *NATO Review*, January 1997

race and also underpin Congressional voting behaviour. It is important to remember that a Senate ratification vote is likely to take place in advance of the November 1998 Congressional elections. Thirdly, any opposition to NATO expansion may well be divided between liberals on the left and arch-conservative on the right making an effective blocking campaign difficult to organize. Finally, once invitations are issued, a momentum behind ratification may develop and enlargement may become unstoppable.

Despite voices expressing confidence in Senate support for enlargement, with invitations still not yet extended to potential new members, debate on ratification is in its formative stages. Many of the issues surrounding enlargement have yet to be given serious consideration, particularly the question of cost and the exact detail of any NATO-Russia Charter. The character of the Senate has also altered in recent years. It is no longer populated by a generation of politicians with experience of the Cold War. Many foreign policy experts, such as the respected Georgia Democrat, Senator Sam Nunn, have retired. Putative Senate backing for expansion could evaporate, particularly if a Republican minority saw partisan political advantage in opposing it. Ratification in the USA can therefore not be regarded as a foregone conclusion.<sup>92</sup>

Ratification procedures are perfunctory in the UK by comparison with the USA but it would seem likely, given the importance of this issue, that any government would provide time for the matter of enlargement to be debated on the floor of the House when accession treaties are laid.<sup>93</sup>

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92 *Ibid*

93 Under the Ponsonby Rule, treaties are laid before the House for a period of 21 days to allow the possibility for them to be debated, although no formal Parliamentary scrutiny is required. The act of ratification, which follows at any stage thereafter, is an executive responsibility.

## IX Conclusion

It seems more or less inevitable that NATO will expand to encompass at least some of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. The latter will continue to invoke memories of Munich and Yalta in support of their applications. Despite latent reservations in Britain and France, enthusiasm for enlargement in the USA and in Germany, the other leading NATO members, will underpin the expansion process.

It is possible that in response to enlargement Russia could adopt a more aggressive approach in foreign policy. Russia could seek closer relations with various anti-western states in the Third World, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, is an expert on the Middle East. Russia might prove more interventionist in the "near abroad", the former areas of the Soviet Union, particularly where they contain minorities of ethnic Russians. All such steps could be seen as enhancing Russian influence but it could be argued that Russia is in no condition to risk any real breakdown in relations with the West. Russia's armed forces are weak, as revealed by an inept performance in Chechnya. The Russian economy is far from strong. Confrontation with the West could lead to the loss of valuable economic assistance channelled via institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Threats of a new Cold War might then be regarded as empty. Much of Russian hectoring over NATO expansion could be viewed as sabre-rattling in order to obtain the best possible terms in any bilateral Charter and also to deter any further wave of membership.

The problem may relate to the longer term and depends on which path of development Russia follows. At some stage in the future Russian military power may return to a level commensurate with its large human and economic resources. In the light of a longstanding Russian sense of inferiority vis-a-vis the West and general feeling of insecurity against all potential 'threats', whether from Europe, the Middle East or Asia, revanchist sentiment could take root. Thus, Cold War tensions may return to haunt Europe. On this point, President Lukashenko of Belarus and President Yeltsin of Russia signed a treaty of union between the two countries in April, committing both countries to closer economic and military ties. The Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, signed a dozen co-operation agreements with Slovakia also in April, which together establish Russia's closest relationship yet with any of its former Warsaw Pact allies.<sup>94</sup>

However, a future generation of Russian leaders will also have to balance their relations with the West against the growing power of China on their eastern borders. As a consequence of Partnership for Peace, the new Charter and other bilateral initiatives, Russia may become more integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Community. NATO may ultimately become a pan-

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94 *The Independent* 29/4/97

European collective security organization with Russia eventually joining as a full member.

In the medium term, however, Russia will continue to look to its security interests in the new border land which is being created between the NATO's future eastern frontier and Russia itself. It is in this region, encompassing the Baltic States, Belorussia, Ukraine and the Caucasus, that conflicts are likely to emerge and where, during and after enlargement, NATO's attention will be required to focus.



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