

Towards the IGC: Developing a Common Defence Policy

Research Paper 95/45

6 April 1995



This paper briefly examines the history of European defence co-operation since the onset of the Cold War, before outlining defence arrangements under the Treaty of Maastricht and subsequent developments in the Western European Union, NATO and the national policies of Germany, France and Britain. It concludes with an examination of the prospects for European defence at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

Tom Dodd
International Affairs and Defence Section

House of Commons Library

Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their personal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public.

Contents

	Page
I The History of European Defence Co-operation	1
II Maastricht and Defence	3
III The Western European Union 1991-1994	4
A. Changes to WEU Political Structures	4
B. Changes to WEU Military Structures	6
IV Tensions in European Defence Co-operation: The Eurocorps	7
V Changes in German Defence Policy	9
VI Changes in French Defence Policy	12
VII The European Defence and Security Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces	14
VIII Anglo-French Defence Co-operation	16
IX The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Future of the WEU	19
A. Developments in the WEU: the Noordwijk Declaration and Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy	20
B. British Policy: Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference	22

(ii)

C. French Policy	25
D. Commission-linked Proposals	26
X The Future of European Defence	26
A. A Possible Outcome of the IGC	26
B. The WEU and the Atlantic Alliance: the Changing Transatlantic Relationship	28
Sources	31

I The History of European Defence Co-operation

The end of the Cold War, the creation of a European Union, a partial US withdrawal from Europe and divisions within the Atlantic Alliance have accelerated moves to establish new forms of European defence co-operation. However, such moves are not novel and were presaged by a number of initiatives over the last half century which may hold lessons for the builders of a Common European Defence Policy.

Although NATO came to form the foundation stone of European security, it was predated by earlier, purely European moves to establish a European collective security organization. In 1948, at the onset of western confrontation with the Soviet Union and with the USA's commitment to Western Europe still in doubt, the UK, France and the three Benelux countries committed themselves to mutual collective security under the Brussels Treaty. To effect this, they established a defence organization, the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), and a putative integrated command structure. The first and only head of the BTO's Commanders-in-Chief Committee was Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of El Alamein¹. The BTO was not, however, intended only as a European defence alliance but also had two subsidiary political aims. Firstly, it was directed against a possible revival of German aggression. Secondly, and more importantly, the Brussels Treaty sought to persuade the USA that the western Europeans could be reliable partners in defence and thus to entice Washington into making a formal commitment to uphold their security. Thus, following the signature of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the BTO was quickly supplanted and its headquarters and planning for the defence of western Europe absorbed within NATO.

Despite the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance, debate on a purely European defence continued. Between 1950 and 1954 plans for a European Defence Community within the Atlantic Alliance, in effect a European pillar, nearly reached fruition. The heightened state of the Cold War following the start of the Korean War persuaded Washington and, more grudgingly, European NATO members that West Germany would need to make a contribution to the defence of Europe. However, particularly in order to allay French fears of revived German militarism, a way had to be found of rearming Germans without rearming Germany. Under the Pleven Plan of 1950, a solution was offered of a European defence union, parallel to moves towards European economic and political union. Following negotiations, a treaty establishing a European Defence Community (EDC) was signed by the Benelux countries, France, Germany and Italy in May 1952. The Treaty included provisions for the creation of a European Army with a common defence budget and common procurement policy. The Army would be composed of national units of divisional size. It would be subject to the control of a Defence Commission and a European Defence Council, the latter using qualified majority voting. Britain, although indicating that it would not join the EDC, looked favourably on its creation and British armed forces prepared to co-operate with EDC forces. The USA was also supportive of the EDC.

¹ Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of El Alamein, 'The Western European Union and its Defence Organization', reprinted in *RUSI Journal*, August 1993

Second thoughts among the signatories helped to draw out the process of ratification of the EDC Treaty. By August 1954 ratification had been completed in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, the prospects for an EDC collapsed with rejection of the Treaty in the French National Assembly in that month, largely due to Communist and Gaullist opposition. Politically, the demise of the EDC effectively ended any possibility of closer European defence co-operation for the next thirty years. The states of Europe concentrated on economic union and the Treaty of Rome excluded any provisions related to defence. In particular, Article 223 of the Treaty specifically excluded defence procurement and defence industries from the Common Market. The defence of Europe was firmly fixed in the transatlantic context. The Treaty of Brussels was later modified in 1954 and a newly renamed Western European Union strengthened in order to allow for German and Italian membership and German rearmament. This paved the way for German membership of NATO. The WEU quickly returned to being an institutional backwater of symbolic rather than practical value.

De Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958. Despite having been an opponent of the EDC, he now backed plans, put forward in 1960 by his defence minister, Fouchet, for a common European foreign and defence policy. However, the Fouchet Plans failed, largely due to fears of other EEC states that they were really a formula for French control of European defence and would alienate Washington. In the meantime, President Kennedy had sought a greater European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance through the formation of a European pillar of NATO. However, Kennedy's idea was undermined by France's gradual withdrawal from the integrated command structure, formally completed in 1966, and subsequent Western disagreement over the Vietnam War. The only end product was the formation of EUROGROUP in 1967 on a British initiative. The latter sought to improve the co-ordination of NATO's European members (excluding France). It convened before NATO Council meetings and spawned a number of other sub-bodies promoting co-operation between European NATO Members.

During the 1970s, debate was revived on the need to strengthen the European contribution to the Alliance and also to provide a security and defence dimension to European Political Co-operation (EPC), the EC's embryonic foreign policy. With the difficulties of discussing defence and security matters within EPC, due to the neutrality of Ireland and suspicions of Atlanticist members, in 1984 a decision was taken to reactivate the WEU. The subsequent Rome Declaration spoke of the necessity of making "better use of the WEU framework not only to contribute to the security of Western Europe" but also to promote "the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance"². The direction of the revived WEU was placed on firmer foundations with the adoption of the *Platform on European Security* (the Platform Document) in 1987 and the admission of Portugal and Spain as members. Although not explicit, the Document established the WEU's dual role as a forum for EC members to discuss defence and security matters and also as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This duality has formed the basis of the WEU's subsequent role in European defence co-operation. In 1987-88, the WEU played a limited co-ordinating role in the Iran-Iraq War when international shipping was threatened in the Gulf. A similar military and, more significantly,

² Rome Declaration, Para 3 (4)

additional political co-ordinating role, was played by the WEU during the Gulf War. From 1991, the organization was drawn into discussion of the Yugoslav crisis before assuming new responsibilities with regard to the European Union under the Treaty of Maastricht.

II Maastricht and Defence

The Treaty of Maastricht formalized the discussion of defence matters, however tentatively, in EU institutions for the first time. Article B of the Common Provisions established an 'arch' structure of a European Union, which was supported by various 'pillars', one of which was for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The new Union was set five broad objectives, the second of which concerned foreign and security policy. It read: -

- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including *the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence* (emphasis added)

The Treaty sought to reconcile those states, such as France and Spain, which envisaged an independent European defence with those, such as Britain and the Netherlands, which desired the continued dominance of NATO. The decision was therefore taken to appease the 'Continental' school of European security, on the one hand, and the Atlanticist group, on the other, by expressing the Union's new defence identity not through a new EU institution but via the existing WEU, using the formula provided by the Platform Document. The WEU would simultaneously be the agent for the EU's defence identity and become the newly strengthened European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The move was consistent with the view of the Bush administration which, at the end of the Cold War, was eager for Europe to do more for its own defence but at the same time was unwilling to reduce its political influence in European security.

Suitable wording for the above was included in article J.4, Title V of the Treaty³. J. 4 (1) repeats the wording of the Common Provisions of foreign security and defence policy. J. 4 (2) asks the WEU, which is "an integral part of the Union" to "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". However, J. 4 (4) states that "the policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Members States and shall respect the obligations of certain Members States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework".

The EU's request in Article J. 4 was answered by the WEU in a declaration made in the margins of the Maastricht European Council (and appended to the Treaty text). Paragraph

³ Cm 2485

1 of Declaration No. 1 states that "WEU Member states agree to strengthen the role of the WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance". Subsections of the WEU Declaration referred to relations with the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, it stated twin objectives of building up the "WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union"⁴ and developing "the WEU as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance"⁵. Other sections of Title V were echoed in the WEU declarations. Importantly, both Title V and the Declaration included statements that would not prevent "the closer co-operation between two or more Members States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance"⁶.

Even though they precluded no options, the new Treaty arrangements were arguably very limited in scope. A common defence policy was "eventual". More significantly, there was no commitment to the more contentious common defence. Indeed, the very vagueness of the Treaty on defence perhaps helped to create some of the difficulties outlined in Section IV.

III The Western European Union 1991-1994

Between 1991 and 1994, the WEU largely carried out the development of its political and military structures set out in the Maastricht Declarations. The most significant changes were made in the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 and the Kirchberg Declaration of May 1994.

A. Changes to WEU Political Structures

At Maastricht the nine Members of the WEU (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Spain) invited the remaining states of the EC to join the organization either as full members, associates or observers. Greece opted for full membership while Denmark and Ireland desired to become observers. The WEU also offered associate membership or observer status to non-EC European NATO members. Iceland, Norway and Turkey all indicated their wish to become associate members of the WEU. These varying forms of membership quickly came into practice *de facto*, although not *de jure*, with the WEU candidate member and WEU associates and observers attending Council and other meetings. In March 1995, the nine full WEU Members completed ratification of the additional protocol to the Brussels Treaty allowing for Greek membership of the WEU. As a consequence, the varying statuses of WEU associates and observers have now formally come into effect⁷. In the Kirchberg Declaration associate members were given additional rights. They will now be able to nominate forces answerable to the WEU, to send liaison officers to the Planning Cell⁸ and will be connected to the WEUCOM telex network.

⁴ WEU Declaration No. 1, Para 3

⁵ WEU Declaration No. 1, Para 4

⁶ J.4 (5) and WEU Declaration No. 1, Para 2 (6)

⁷ AN 10/3/95

⁸ see Section III B

As part of wider European economic and military-political initiatives to strengthen European security, the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 established a Forum for (Security) Consultation (FSC) to bring together WEU members and the states of eastern Europe. The latter include the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), the Baltic Three (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); and the Balkan Two (Bulgaria and Romania). The FSC discussed all aspects of European security, including among other things, developments in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), disarmament and events in the former Yugoslavia. It met at ministerial, ambassadorial and sub-group level.

The FSC arrangements were supplanted from November 1993 when the WEU Council requested that the WEU Permanent Council and representatives from the FSC states discuss the possibility of an enhanced mutual relationship⁹. Discussions concluded with the offer, made in the Kirchberg Declaration of May 1994, of 'associate partner' status to the FSC states. Associate Partners are now able to attend WEU Council meetings but lack voting rights. They will, however, be excluded from meetings where the WEU is acting as the defence component of the EU or European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They will be able to send liaison officers to the WEU Planning Cell, can join WEU humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and take part in exercises for such eventualities, subject to the veto of the majority of WEU members or half the Members including the Presidency. None of these measures required amendment of the Treaty of Brussels. All of the FSC states acquired *de facto* associate partnership status in May 1994 although this will not happen *de jure* until all nine associate partners have signed Europe Agreements with the EU. These developments are consistent with NATO's Partnership for Peace and also EU plans for closer links between the states of eastern Europe and the CFSP. In a separate move which reflected a new area of concern to European security, the Kirchberg Declaration announced the formation of a Mediterranean Group of experts from WEU Members and Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania and Tunisia to discuss security in the region.

The NATO EUROGROUP was formally dissolved on 1 January 1994 and the majority of its activities were transferred to the WEU¹⁰. In line with the Maastricht Declaration, the WEU Secretariat moved from London to Brussels in 1993 which improved liaison with NATO and the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The WEU Secretariat has a staff of 60. (In contrast, the NATO Secretariat and central International Military Staff combined employ over 1,000 personnel.) In its role as European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, weekly meetings of the WEU Permanent Council are now held on the day before meetings of the NATO Permanent Council with the chairman of the WEU Council meeting passing on a summary of its proceedings to the chairman of the NATO Council. Likewise, ministerial WEU Council meetings are now held before ministerial NATO Council meetings. The ambassadors of the states with varying forms of WEU membership (full, observer, associate and associate partner) meet every two weeks. Steps have also been taken to improve co-operation between the WEU and EU Council Secretariats with arrangements for consultations and exchanges of information being implemented.

⁹ HC Deb 2/2/94 c 749w

¹⁰ *Atlantic News (AN)* 10/12/93

The WEU Maastricht Declaration No 1 also called for "enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency". In May 1993, under the umbrella of the WEU, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) assumed the activities and responsibilities of the Independent European Programme Group¹¹. It has also absorbed some of the armaments functions of EUROGROUP. WEAG is supported by an Armaments Secretariat within the WEU Secretariat. In WEU terms, WEAG is somewhat anomalous in that it has thirteen members, including the ten full WEU members as well as Denmark, Norway and Turkey. At Maastricht, some WEU members, led by France, had hoped for the creation of a fully-fledged European Armaments Agency. This initiative did not receive sufficient support within the WEU and by taking over the IEPG, WEAG will continue its somewhat limited work in, for example, harmonizing defence equipment requirements and procurement standards and running the EUCLID technological research programmes¹². Despite this, work continues within WEAG on the creation of a European Armaments Agency. A separate informal group of experts from WEU/WEAG and EU Member states is also studying the options for a European Armaments Policy.

B. Changes to WEU Military Structures

In tandem with changes to its civil structure, WEU military bodies have also developed since Maastricht. In June 1992 in the Petersberg Declaration the WEU offered to undertake peacekeeping and humanitarian missions on behalf of the UN and CSCE. Under UN auspices, the WEU is now operating a number of small military operations in the Balkans. The WEU was the first organization to offer to enforce UN sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia in the Adriatic in advance of NATO in July 1992. After difficulties were encountered in co-ordinating two separate blockading forces, the WEU task force was effectively placed under NATO command in 1993¹³. There is, however, a small WEU-controlled force of patrol boats enforcing UN sanctions along the Danube¹⁴. A WEU police mission has been established in the Bosnian town of Mostar which is being administered by the EU. The mission is not engaged in policing as such but in training and integrating the police forces of the Muslim and Croat communities¹⁵. Over summer 1994, there was some discussion within the WEU of possible involvement in humanitarian actions in Rwanda but this did not happen¹⁶.

The WEU established a small military Planning Cell in Brussels under a three-star general in October 1992, in line with a decision taken at Petersberg. The Cell, with a staff of 40, draws up contingency plans for joint WEU operations in the areas of peacekeeping,

¹¹ AN 25/5/93 The IEPG was created in Rome in 1976. It aimed to allow more effective use to be made of research, development and procurement budgets, to increase standardization and interoperability of weapons in order to facilitate co-operation and to ensure the maintenance of a sound industrial and technological base for European defence.

¹² EUCLID stands for European Cooperative Long-term Initiative in Defence. This includes a selection of research projects into areas of defence-related technology. 40 individual projects were approved in 1993 (WEU Assembly Doc. 1431). This may now have increased to around 50 (WEU Secretariat).

¹³ *Associated Press* 15/6/93

¹⁴ *AP* 9/6/93

¹⁵ FCO

¹⁶ HC Deb 5/7/94 c 135w and *Reuters* 17/10/94

humanitarian relief and crisis management (so-called Petersberg missions). The Cell has no forces at its immediate disposal and, although meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of WEU Members are held at least twice a year, no strictly European supreme command or central staff exists. However, a number of European military units have now been dedicated for possible use under WEU auspices and are known as Forces Available to WEU (FAWEU). These include the NATO-dedicated UK-Dutch Amphibious force, the NATO Multinational Airborne Division (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and UK) and the Eurocorps. Since there is no integrated WEU command structure, the participation of any of the latter forces in any WEU operation might not begin until authority had been received from national capitals. The WEU held its first military exercise in the Mediterranean in November 1993 which involved units from Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain as well as from WEU candidate members. The designation of other European naval, army and air forces to the WEU, including a new EuroCorps South, composed of forces from France, Italy and Spain, has been under discussion.

IV Tensions in European Defence Co-operation: The Eurocorps

The decision at Maastricht to give the WEU the dual role as both the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and also the agent for the putative EU defence policy was intended to defuse the differences between the Atlanticist and 'Continental' schools of European security. Instead, tensions remained, with France continuing to promote its concept of a more independent European defence via the WEU and the Eurocorps. Since 1993, however, far greater efforts have been made to achieve greater consistency and transparency between NATO and the WEU which may have helped to reduce some of the mutual suspicion between the differing schools of European defence.

In the summer of 1992, the WEU appeared to 'outwit' NATO by offering its services to the CSCE and UN for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations before a similar offer by NATO. Likewise, a WEU task force began to enforce UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro before a similar NATO force. Indeed until they were merged in 1993, separate WEU and NATO naval forces effectively duplicated each other. In a separate move, at a meeting held with the Polish foreign minister in November 1993 the French and German foreign ministers attempted to accelerate moves to expand the WEU. Without consultation with other Members, they appear to have suggested that the Visegrad countries should be offered rapid associate membership of the organization¹⁷. This would have preempted NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. After the opposition of the UK and other WEU members to what they regarded as a precipitous move, the Franco-German proposal for enhanced WEU links with the states of eastern Europe was put to the WEU Permanent Council. The latter suggested the creation of Associate Partner status which was formally agreed to at the May 1994 WEU Council meeting, three months after the launch of Partnership for Peace at the NATO Brussels Summit of January 1994. More serious friction occurred between NATO and the WEU and within the WEU over the status of the Eurocorps.

¹⁷ AN 16/11/93

A Franco-German proposal for a new combined formation was raised during the Maastricht IGC in October 1991. This was based on the experience of the Franco-German brigade, which was created in 1988. The Eurocorps was formally launched at a Franco-German summit held at La Rochelle in May 1992. Originally the Corps was to have included the joint brigade, a French armoured division and a German division, the latter doublehatted with NATO. It has since expanded to include a Belgian division and a Luxembourg battalion, both doublehatted with NATO, and a Spanish brigade, which in time was intended to become a division. With some 50,000 men, the Corps is intended to become fully operational by October 1995. The Corps' badge displays a sword imposed upon the European 12-starred blue flag. The Corps is the sort of multinational defence sub-group allowed for under Article J.4 (5) of Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht.

Britain, the Netherlands and the USA were originally strongly opposed to the Eurocorps fearing that it might become a military organization rivalling NATO. Although this may have been the intention of some in France, Germany argued that the Corps would have lesser, multiple aims: it would be a political expression of Franco-German amity; a symbol of Europe's resolve to do more for its own defence; and, more importantly, a means of luring France back towards NATO. France had, of course, left NATO's integrated command structure in 1966. Critics of the Eurocorps also argued that it would be militarily ineffective. This was in part because they felt that differing French and German (NATO) doctrines and equipment would be difficult to integrate. Furthermore, language would pose a barrier. The latter criticism appeared to have been borne out when, shortly after joining, Belgium threatened to withdraw from the Corps if Flemish was not given a status equal to French and German¹⁸. In short, London and other capitals saw the Corps, at best, as a senseless distraction from the needs of European defence and, at worst, a divisive challenge to the Atlantic Alliance.

The Corps no longer seems to excite such controversy. This may be for a number of reasons. Firstly, in January 1993, NATO's Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), the US General Shalikashvili, the French Chief of Staff, Admiral Lanxade, and the German Chief of Staff, General Naumann, agreed that the Corps could come under NATO *operational command* if Article Five of the Atlantic Treaty were to be invoked i.e if a NATO member were to be attacked. This is an advance on previous arrangements for French troops participating in the defence of the Alliance which stated only that they would merely come under NATO *operational control*¹⁹. The secret Shalikashvili-Lanxade-Naumann agreement cleared the way for Belgian, Luxembourgish and Spanish participation in the Corps. Secondly, the military utility of the Eurocorps may have improved. The decision of the German constitutional court in July 1994 to sanction German military expeditions outside the NATO area removes one of the major barriers to the Corps' use in missions outside western Europe. Furthermore, it is possible that the Corps has developed a more pragmatic policy towards language. Although French and German are used in the Corps HQ in practice, English, the most common language, may be used in field operations. The language dispute with Belgium has also been resolved by declaring that Flemish be allowed as a language of

¹⁸ *The Daily Telegraph* 11/11/93

¹⁹ A. Menon, 'From Independence to Co-operation: France, NATO and European Security', *International Affairs*, January 1995, p. 26

record, although not of operations, within the Corps. More generally, France's more co-operative policy towards NATO may have reduced concerns that the Eurocorps will cut across existing defence structures (see Section VI). The German commander of the Eurocorps has stated, "The European Corps is the expression of the commitment of the participating nations to jointly reinforce European responsibility in the field of security and defence. It should not be considered as the nucleus of a European army. There is no intention to set up a distinctive military organization alongside NATO's military structure"²⁰.

V Changes in German Defence Policy

Germany is a key component of any effective European Security and Defence Identity. Although Britain and France possess well-equipped armed forces their actual capabilities are restricted by their limited financial resources and large existing defence commitments. 18,000 British troops are still serving in Northern Ireland and over 40,000 French troops, often France's most capable units, man various colonial and ex-colonial outposts. In contrast, with some 370,000 personnel, Germany deploys the largest armed forces in the European Union, with no standing foreign commitments. Furthermore, despite the costs of reunification and recession, Germany can marshal greater financial resources than either Britain or France.

Although some have feared a revival of German militarism after German reunification, some believe that denazification and institutional reform after the Second World War have generated strong pacifist and non-interventionist feelings amongst Germans. These place psychological and thus political limitations on the use of German arms. As one commentator has remarked, "History still sits heavily on German shoulders, and soldiers"²¹. In 1993, 111,000 Germans called up for military service opted to undertake non-military service. This was almost double the figure for 1990²². History also led to the addition of two articles to the German constitution, the *Grundgesetz* or Basic Law, which, until the end of the Cold War, were strictly interpreted as preventing German military action outside the NATO area. These were Article 24, which allowed the Federal Republic to enter mutual collective security organizations, and Article 48a, added to the Basic Law in 1956 when the Federal Republic joined NATO, which declared that the Republic could build up armed forces for defence purposes but only in accordance with the Basic Law.

Both articles are ambiguous but do not, on a literal reading, rule out the participation of the *Bundeswehr* in military operations under the auspices of the United Nations. From the late 1980s, the CDU-led government gradually expanded German involvement in UN operations by exploiting their ambiguity. In 1988, German security personnel were involved in a UN peacekeeping operation for the first time when a contingent of German paramilitary border police joined a UN force overseeing the transition to independence in Namibia²³. In 1990,

²⁰ H. Willman, 'The European Corps - Political Dimension and Military Aims', *RUSI Journal* August 1994, p. 29

²¹ *The Guardian* 6/7/93

²² *IISS The Military Balance 1994-95*, p. 38

²³ *The European* 14/10/93

despite domestic opposition and after some delay, Bonn dispatched military aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles to eastern Turkey and warships to the Mediterranean in order to show solidarity with allies and to relieve other allied units for operations in the Gulf War. In 1992, the door on intervention was widened further when a *Bundeswehr* medical unit was sent to the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia. In October 1993, a German soldier was killed in Cambodia, the first to die on a German military operation abroad since 1945²⁴. In further moves, from July 1992, the *Bundesmarine* joined patrols of the UN-authorized NATO/WEU blockade of Serbia and Montenegro; in April 1993, the first of 1,400 *Bundeswehr* personnel arrived in Somalia as part of UNOSOM II, evoking memories for some of a previous German military desert expedition; and German aircrew on NATO AWACs aircraft began to help police part of the No Fly Zone over Bosnia. The legality of all these operations was questioned before the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court by the Social Democratic Party²⁵. The SPD had supported an amendment of the *Grundgesetz* which would sanction German participation in UN *peacekeeping* operations only. The government desired to join, in addition, *peacemaking* missions. Since the passage of an amendment requires a two-thirds majority of the *Bundestag* and as consensus was lacking between the major parties, constitutional change to allow a wider German military role appeared unlikely.

The Court reached a final decision in July 1994, after a series of interim judgements. It stated that the *Bundeswehr* could take part in both peacekeeping or peacemaking operations either as part of NATO or WEU forces under UN mandate or directly under UN auspices as long as the *Bundestag* gave prior approval. The judgement was significant for two further reasons. Firstly, it made no distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking operations and also required only a simple majority of the *Bundestag* to authorize such missions. Secondly, the Court had allowed such operations on the basis of the existing constitution without suggesting an amendment²⁶. Following parliamentary approval, German aircrew on NATO AWACs aircraft are now permitted to fly on aircraft using neutral Austrian and Hungarian airspace to monitor the No Fly zone over Bosnia and *Bundesmarine* ships can now stop and search ships as part of the UN-sanctioned blockade against Serbia and Montenegro. Previously, German personnel could perform neither task as the areas concerned were deemed to be outside the NATO area and such actions would have been illegal²⁷.

Despite the considerable latitude now given to the German government to use the *Bundeswehr* in roles other than national defence, German sensitivities mean that it may continue to use considerable caution in exercising its new freedom. In early December 1994, the Germany government was asked to respond to a NATO request for the *Bundeswehr* to allocate units to a possible intervention force, intended to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia²⁸. After much internal debate, it took three weeks for the government to reply. Furthermore, the designated contingent is largely non-offensive, being composed of logistical, medical, patrol and reconnaissance units, but does include Tornado aircraft equipped with missiles intended to destroy enemy radar. This raises the prospect of the *Luftwaffe*

²⁴ AP 15/10/93

²⁵ *The Independent* 20/4/94

²⁶ *The Financial Times* 13/7/94 and C. Bluth, 'Germany: defining the national interest', *World Today*, March 1995

²⁷ *The Times* 16/7/94

²⁸ AN 21/12/94

undertaking its first offensive operations since 1945 but, notably, no combat troops were included in the German contribution. The German government has yet to approach the *Bundestag* to seek approval for its dispatch²⁹.

Besides doubts as to the political ability of the German government to deploy the *Bundeswehr* outside NATO, there is also some question as to the latter's military capability to mount such operations. During the Cold War, the German armed forces were specifically structured for national defence and lack much of the training and equipment required to launch operations outside Germany³⁰. In addition, the indecision caused by uncertainty over the post-Cold War role of the *Bundeswehr*, coupled with steep cuts in the defence budget, may have had a deleterious affect on the German armed forces' effectiveness. Between 1990 and 1994 German defence spending fell faster than that of any other country in Europe³¹. The 1994 *Bundestag* Ombudsman's report on the *Bundeswehr* pointed to low morale and equipment shortages³². A high proportion of the remaining defence expenditure has had to be allotted to integrating the former East German *Volksarmee* into the *Bundeswehr*, rationalizing the command and base structure, and refurbishing bases which have been retained in the eastern *Länder*³³.

Despite the success of integrating the armed forces of the two Germanies (the last Russian troops left German soil in August 1994) the Parliamentary Ombudsman pointed to the need to provide the *Bundeswehr* with a sense of purpose and direction without a Soviet threat. The German Defence Minister, Volker Ruhe, attempted to do so in April 1994 with the publication of the first German Defence White Paper since 1985. Politically, it stressed Germany's desire for regional stability and both strong European and Atlantic defence and security ties. Militarily, it subdivided the *Bundeswehr's* role into three: rapid reaction forces, territorial defence and military support³⁴. Germany intends to field five army brigades, plus the German contribution to the Franco-German brigade, six Luftwaffe wings and two naval task forces in a rapid reaction role³⁵. One commentator declared, "The release on 5 April [1994] of the *White Book on the Security of the German Federal Republic and on the Situation and the Future of the Bundeswehr* marked a watershed in the history of the Bundeswehr. Its advocacy of a complete reorganization of the German armed forces amounts to the establishment of a new type of army characterized by a core of crisis-reaction forces, integration into multinational structures and a two-tier conscript army"³⁶. The *Bundeswehr* has since taken steps to implement this new policy. The *Bundesmarine* has ordered a troop transport and floating HQ to support operations overseas³⁷. This will be the largest ship in German naval

²⁹ *The Daily Telegraph* 22/12/94

³⁰ For its operations in Somalia, the *Bundeswehr* was forced to borrow desert clothing and other equipment from French and US stocks.

³¹ *The Economist* 16/4/94

³² *The Financial Times* 9/3/94

³³ The *Bundeswehr* has now been cut from a combined West and East German total of nearly 700,000 personnel in 1990 to below the figure of 370,000 agreed in the Conventional Forces in Europe I A (CFE IA) Treaty.

³⁴ *The Economist* 16/4/94

³⁵ *Jane's Defence Weekly* 14/5/94

³⁶ *International Defense Review*, May 1994

³⁷ *The Financial Times* 27/9/94

service since the Second World War. Germany has also recently signed an agreement with Britain to co-operate in training for peacekeeping³⁸.

However, Ruhe's plans are undermined by continuing ambiguities about Germany's ability to act abroad and manpower difficulties. In order to fund defence procurement, such as Germany's contribution to Eurofighter 2000, *Bundeswehr* manpower will be cut to 338,000 and conscription reduced from 12 to 10 months by 1996³⁹. As a consequence of these reductions, only seven German Army (*Bundesheer*) brigades will be kept at full strength⁴⁰. Moreover, professional officers and NCOs apart, in 1995 the *Bundeswehr* retained only 38,000 volunteer servicemen as opposed to 155,000 conscripts⁴¹. This would suggest that the German MOD may have difficulty in manning its proposed rapid reaction units for foreign service⁴².

Having finally regained its full sovereignty after reunification, Germany is playing an increasingly important political role in European military and security institutions. However, with the prospect of further future reductions in the defence budget and continuing domestic political and psychological limitations on the use of arms, there may be a growing disparity between Germany's growing foreign and security policy commitments and its ability to bear many of the associated military responsibilities. This would imply that, at least in the short term, any stronger European defence identity may largely depend on the military capabilities of Britain and France.

VI Changes in French Defence Policy

Changes in German defence policy have been mirrored by perhaps less radical, but no less important changes in French defence policy since the late 1980s which have seen a partial reversal of Gaullism. From the late 1950s, French foreign policy sought to maximize French influence by exploiting areas of movement between the rival superpower blocks. Thus, while leaving the NATO military command structure in 1966, France remained a member of the Atlantic Alliance and, although resistant to Soviet influence around the world, Paris attempted to develop special bilateral relationships with the states of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. France also followed a national and autarkic defence procurement policy which, for example, entailed adopting ammunition of a different calibre from that of NATO and, more centrally, developing a nuclear deterrent entirely independent of any other state. The Franco-German axis, established in 1963, also provided a means of maximizing French influence. Since German sovereignty was limited by the Yalta settlement, France was able to act in the security arena, in a sense, on Germany's behalf. Based on masterful equivocation, the careful manipulations of French foreign policy were undermined by the

³⁸ *The Guardian* 9/3/95

³⁹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 15/3/95

⁴⁰ D. Gates, 'The False Alternative: Europe's Security Dilemma', *Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper* 60, p. 38

⁴¹ *IISS The Military Balance 1994-95*, p. 38

⁴² *International Defense Review*, May 1994

collapse of bipolarity in the late 1980s. Paris was surprised by the rapid democratic revolutions which occurred in eastern Europe in 1989 and, at first, was resistant to German reunification. It then found, for example, that with the initial exception of Poland, its bilateral security overtures to the new democracies to the east were not as welcome as links to NATO. Germany finally regained its sovereignty and became less dependent on its French ally to articulate its foreign interests. NATO also moved far more rapidly than Paris had expected to restructure its strategy and forces to face the new era. As a result, "National independence, therefore, came increasingly to smack of national isolation"⁴³.

The first indications of a new French response to the new shape of international relations came during the Gulf War (1990-1991). After some last minute indecision, France supported the Allied war effort, placing a light armoured division under US command. French intelligence on Iraq also proved important to the success of the coalition campaign. Moreover, US military aircraft were allowed to land and refuel in France for the first time since 1967. Despite these signs of renewed co-operation with the USA, to Anglo-American consternation, France continued to advance its proposal for an independent European defence during 1991 and 1992, basing itself on the WEU and the Eurocorps. Due to German pressure and experience of the Bosnian imbroglio, French attitudes towards NATO then began to alter.

The first sign of this revised position came in January 1993 when SACEUR and the French and German Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Corps could come under NATO operational command if Article Five of the Washington Treaty were to be invoked⁴⁴. In April 1993 with the beginning of western air operations to police the No Fly Zone over Bosnia, French aircraft in the theatre were subordinated to NATO military command for the first time since 1962. In the same month, a French officer participated in a meeting of the NATO Military Committee. Although France had maintained observer status with this body, this was the first occasion that a French officer had taken part in a meeting since the 1960s⁴⁵. French staff officers continue to attend NATO military meetings discussing the military situation in the Former Yugoslav theatre⁴⁶.

The reform of French strategy culminated in the publication of a Defence White Paper in February 1994, the first such document since 1972. The White Paper stated that Britain and Germany were France's key partners in defence. Regarding Britain, it remarked that the "level of our co-operation must be raised" as the two countries possessed "relatively important capacity for external action" and "the will to use it" . Perhaps most significantly, it acknowledged the USA as the "only military giant" and saw NATO as "the principal organ of defence" and called for "the strengthening the WEU's role as complementary to NATO"⁴⁷. Such wording could easily come from a British defence white paper. In addition, France will continue to attend meetings of NATO's Military Committee and subordinate bodies on a case-by-case basis. In September a French defence minister attended an (informal) NATO Council meeting for the first time since the 1960s. However, whatever the changes, French defence policy may remain equivocal. Although Paris is now prepared to co-operate with

⁴³ Menon, p. 25

⁴⁴ AN 21/1/93

⁴⁵ *Le Monde* 14/5/93

⁴⁶ M. Meimeth, France gets closer to NATO', *The World Today*, May 1994 and Menon, *op.cit.*

⁴⁷ *The Financial Times* 24/2/94 and *Le Monde* 25/2/94

NATO (and the USA) on a pragmatic basis, it is unwilling to formalize these links. Domestically, the principles of Gaullism advocated by, for example, Charles Pasqua, the French interior minister, remain strong. Paris has indicated that it will definitely not rejoin the NATO integrated command structure. As the French defence minister has declared, "The decision that was made in 1966 is not questioned"⁴⁸. Yet despite France's unchanging stance on this point, the prospects for French military co-operation with NATO were advanced by the NATO Brussels summit of January 1994 which is described in the next section.

VII The European Defence and Security Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces

Although the Brussels summit was dominated by the question of NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace initiative, attention on these measures perhaps overshadowed changes in NATO attitudes towards European security which were just as significant. For the first time, the concluding declaration contained a strong endorsement of the newly fashionable term, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), i.e. the Maastricht arrangements for European defence⁴⁹. The recognition of ESDI further dispelled the tension which had existed over the status of the Eurocorps and possible rivalry between NATO and the WEU.

The election of President Clinton in November 1992 had an impact on European security policy both in Washington and in the capitals of Europe. Clinton's mandate, to concentrate on domestic policy, led to a corresponding downgrading of the importance of foreign policy and the reduction of America's defence establishment. The latter has resulted in a cut in the number of US military personnel based in Europe from about 320,000 in 1989 to 100,000 in 1995. Although the restructuring of the US armed forces began under the Bush administration, it was accompanied by a new, if perhaps vaguely defined, Clintonian policy of 'multilateralism'. In essence, this holds that US political and military involvement overseas is best exercised through multinational institutions where US allies can take a greater role, but Washington can still exercise a degree of political direction. Thus, with US backing, its allies might act semi-independently of Washington in attempting to resolve regional disputes. Such thinking prompted new US warmth towards ESDI.

In part, multilateralism draws on the long-standing debate on burdensharing which has been an undercurrent in transatlantic politics since the 1950s. During the Cold War, many US politicians and commentators held that Washington was bearing a disproportionate cost of the defence of Europe (and also within other security alliances) and that some European states with relatively low defence spending were 'free loading' on the backs of the US taxpayer. The debate was often reflected in calls for a reduction of US forces in Europe from both the populist right and left. After the end of the Cold War and with a drawdown of US forces underway, the burdensharing debate continues within a new context. It may no longer be the case that European members of NATO spend more on defence and the USA spends less

⁴⁸ AP 1/10/94

⁴⁹ *Financial Times* 12/2/94

in Europe; but of greater European defence co-operation strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and thereby discouraging further US disengagement from the continent.

The vehicle for ESDI is the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), also sanctioned at the Brussels Summit. A CJTF could be composed of forces from NATO, the WEU, such as the Eurocorps, and even forces from eastern European aspirants to those organizations brought together for a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission. Such forces, in the words of the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, would be "separable but not separate" from the Atlantic Alliance. Should NATO (and more particularly the USA) not wish to respond to a UN or CSCE request for military forces, then NATO infrastructure might be used to back WEU forces⁵⁰. To this end, a CJTF planning unit was established under an Italian general at SHAPE and CJTF HQs were to be set up within NATO major subordinate commands. In the event of a crisis, these HQs could detach and assume command of units allotted from different states and security organizations. The fact that NATO (and Washington) had now recognized the importance of an independent European defence identity may have been sufficient to win French support for the principle of CJTF.

The CJTF concept would also help resolve some of the weaknesses of European defence co-operation. Europe is largely deficient in the intelligence and logistical back-up necessary for large-scale operations. Such capability is held only by the USA. For example, initial deployments of British troops both to Bosnia and Rwanda relied on the use of US transport aircraft. The WEU has made some efforts to improve European capability in these areas of deficiency. For example, the WEU Satellite Interpretation Centre in Spain seeks to pool member state intelligence. However, the centre has no satellites of its own and at the moment must depend on civil satellite imagery, apparently inferior to military technology⁵¹. A CJTF would allow WEU forces to access US logistical and intelligence capabilities for a military operation. Furthermore a CJTF would also impose some discipline over Europe's disparate forces. Outside NATO, Europe's armed forces are poorly co-ordinated. Although WEU exercises and multi-lateral defence co-operation in the Eurocorps may promote force integration, the problem remains that the equipment and doctrine of countries such as France and Spain which are outside the NATO command structure are as yet not wholly compatible with those of WEU members which are within NATO⁵². Planning for and operations in a CJTF would compel all parties to the task force to arrange certain levels of joint doctrine, supply, etc thus increasing commonality in Europe's armed forces.

CJTFs were thus seen as being an ideal way of reconciling differing concepts of European defence. Collective NATO assets, bi-national or multinational units, such the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force and the Eurocorps, and, potentially, eastern European forces might be incorporated seamlessly into a humanitarian or peace keeping operation comparable to that in the former Yugoslavia. In practice, however, the modalities of military co-operation

⁵⁰ AN 15/12/93

⁵¹ *International Defense Review*, May 1994. This is set to change with planned launch of the Helios military satellite this summer.

⁵² During the Gulf War, for example, one reason why French ground forces may have been allocated a role on the extreme allied left flank was because of the difficulties of integrating French units, unfamiliar with NATO doctrine, with British and American formations.

between the armed forces of different security organization and those of the states of eastern Europe are complex. There is the overriding question of which body or group would have authority over a CJTF. Primarily due to French opposition, the command and control of CJTFs have yet to be resolved. Paris opposes formalizing any command structure where French forces are placed under solely NATO CJTF command, since this might suggest French reintegration into the NATO command structure by the back door, something which Paris is staunchly opposed to. Indeed, in French minds, it might also entail subordinating the WEU directly to American control, which would run counter to a truly independent European military capability and is something which Paris would find difficult to contemplate⁵³. Instead, France favours more *ad hoc* structures. The difficulty with this position is that the WEU planning cell, which has a staff of 40 personnel, would find difficulties in orchestrating even a small-scale military operation. Britain is firmly in favour of incorporating CJTFs within NATO command, although more recently it appears to have conceded the need to augment the WEU Planning Cell and Secretariat as long as this does not lead to any expensive duplication with NATO structures (see Section IX B).

CJTFs may then have become a point of contention between rival Atlanticist and Continental schools of European defence to replace the EuroCorps. Thus, while endorsing the 'separable but not separate concept', the WEU Kirchberg declaration also stated that "modalities for making these (NATO forces) available should preserve WEU's own planning procedures and capabilities"⁵⁴. In the mean time, although there has been some speculation that CJTF HQs might be located at High Wycombe (AFNORTHWEST), at Bielefeld in Germany (HQ of the ARRC) or Brunsum in the Netherlands (AFCENT), negotiation on CJTF appears to have bogged down⁵⁵. The final communique of the last NATO Council meeting, held in Brussels in December, was merely able to encourage progress in developing the CJTF concept rather than to report any results achieved. The Permanent Council is to submit a report on CJTF to the next Council in the summer⁵⁶.

VIII Anglo-French Defence Co-operation

Closer French links to NATO and the new framework for co-operation offered by the Brussels summit have helped to prompt a shift in British policy towards European defence. *The Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994* was notable in giving a pragmatic but much more enthusiastic account of Britain's view of European defence than in the past. Whereas, in the *SDE 93* ESDI had merited a few paragraphs,⁵⁷ in *SDE 94* a full two-page description was provided⁵⁸. Shortly after the NATO summit, Britain had taken the initiative in calling the first ever trilateral meeting between the defence ministers of France, Germany and the UK⁵⁹.

⁵³ A. Dumoulin, 'Les forces combinées interarmées', *Defense Nationale*, November 1994

⁵⁴ Kirchberg Declaration, Para??

⁵⁵ E. Foster, 'The CJTF Concept: A Case of Arrested Development', *RUSI Newsbrief*, September 1994

⁵⁶ *Brussels Council Declaration*, Paras 14 and 15

⁵⁷ *SDE 93*, pp. 16-17

⁵⁸ *SDE 94*, pp. 15-16

⁵⁹ *The Financial Times* 25/1/94

Although such trilateral co-operation appears set to be intensified, London's efforts seem to have concentrated on France. Both Britain and France are the only two EU members which possess all-round defence capabilities and extensive and recent experience of military operations. It might not be an exaggeration to suggest that Anglo-French security and military relations are at their best since before Suez. This new amity was perhaps signified by the publication of a joint leaflet celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale* in April 1994, an occasion which in itself would not appear to have great significance⁶⁰.

The closer defence and security relationship between Britain and France has been due partly to the mutual experience of the Bosnian conflict where UNPROFOR is effectively under joint Anglo-French command.⁶¹ Other practical measures have been taken with the twinning of British and French rapid reaction units in 1993. Thus, for example, the 11th French Airborne Division is linked with the British 5th Airborne Brigade, the 4th French Airmobile Division with the 24th Airmobile Brigade and the 9th French Marine Division with the 3rd RM Commando Brigade⁶². This led to a formal agreement in August 1994 between the British Army and the French rapid reaction force for more frequent bilateral exercises. Joint contingency planning was also to be greatly increased⁶³.

The variety of initiatives for closer Anglo-French defence co-operation culminated at the binational summit held in Chartres in November 1994 which was dominated by bilateral defence and European security issues. The leaders of both countries announced the creation of a Franco-British Euro Air Group. This will consist of a small headquarters which might plan for and orchestrate the deployment of RAF and French aircraft outside the NATO area, for example in support of a humanitarian mission. Aircraft allocated to the Group will also be used to help in the joint training of rapid reaction forces. The Group's HQ will be based at High Wycombe, the home of RAF Strike Command, initially under a French general. Significantly, the Group will be outside the NATO integrated command structure, although RAF High Wycombe is also the HQ of the NATO Command Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST) allowing for possible liaison⁶⁴. A committee has also been examining closer naval co-operation⁶⁵.

In addition to closer military co-operation, advances have also been made in collaboration in defence procurement. France is a partner in the tri-national Common New Generation Frigate Programme (also known as Project Horizon) with Britain and Italy. Discussions between British and French manufacturers have also taken place on designing high performance aircraft for the twenty-first century⁶⁶. More importantly, at the November summit, Britain announced its decision in principle to restart government funding of the

⁶⁰ *The Independent* 19/4/94

⁶¹ The overall commander of UNPROFOR is French and his immediate chief of staff British, the UN Commander in Bosnia is a Briton and of three sector commanders in the country, one is British and another French.

⁶² *The Sunday Telegraph* 10/10/93

⁶³ *The Daily Telegraph* 28/9/94

⁶⁴ *The Guardian* 19/11/94

⁶⁵ *AN* 26/10/94

⁶⁶ *Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW)*20/6/93

Future Large Aircraft (FLA) project, subject to certain cost and design criteria⁶⁷. Commentators, including the rapporteurs of the WEU Assembly, have long called for the formation of a European strategic airlift force. Certainly, if the FLA proceeds to production, it is possible to envisage FLAs being allocated to a possibly expanded Combined European Air Group. In February 1995, a joint meeting of the British and French Air Systems Operational Requirements staffs was held in London to discuss areas of mutual interest and to identify where possibilities existed for harmonizing future procurement⁶⁸. In the same month, the MOD asked to join the Franco-German Multi-Role Armoured Vehicles (MRAV) project⁶⁹.

Another area of Anglo-French collaboration, that in nuclear weapons, has been a constantly recurring theme. Paris was disappointed when, in October 1993, Britain decided to cancel its requirement for a nuclear Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM), opting instead to use Trident for the sub-strategic role. The French MOD had hoped that the UK might co-operate with its existing project for such a missile, an improved ASMP (Air Sol Moyenne Portée) thus reducing mutual costs⁷⁰. However, discussion of nuclear policy has continued. An Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established in 1992⁷¹. Discussions on joint SSBN patrols, possibly as part of some form of deterrent dedicated to the WEU, have taken place⁷². Actually formulating a European nuclear doctrine might prove difficult considering traditional French desires to preserve the *force de frappe*. However, practicalities, such as joint patrolling, might be more easy to achieve. NATO nuclear submarines may already be informed of their French counterparts' positions and vice-versa in order to avoid misidentification or collision. Allocating SSBN deployment zones might be no more than a formalization of existing arrangements. Bi-lateral discussions have also taken place on co-operation on nuclear submarine design and technology but these have been limited by the restrictions placed on Britain by the terms of its nuclear technology co-operation agreements with the USA⁷³. As one French official remarked on nuclear co-operation, "With the British, it is always the same - the courtship is fine, but we never get into bed"⁷⁴.

⁶⁷ *The Financial Times* 10/2/95

⁶⁸ MOD PR 20/2/95

⁶⁹ *The Times* 22/2/95 Many have seen this, and the FLA decision in particular, as evidence of new government warmth towards European defence procurement. Even though the government, in line with developments in WEAG, may now be prepared to consider a European Armaments Agency to run certain multinational European projects, the MOD's new onus would appear to be more on international collaboration in order to reduce equipment costs. This might be either transatlantic or European in nature (see 'A Minister for Europe', *Flight International* 15/3/95 and *The Financial Times* 27/2/95).

⁷⁰ *The Financial Times* 26/10/93

⁷¹ *The Sunday Telegraph* 6/11/94

⁷² *The Observer* 12/6/94 and M. Clarke, 'British and French Nuclear Forces after the Cold War', *Arms Control*, April 1993

⁷³ *JDW* 14/9/91

⁷⁴ *The Financial Times* 26/10/93

IX The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Future of the WEU

Between 1991 and 1994 the WEU was absorbed in implementing the political and institutional changes agreed at Maastricht. The organization and its Member governments have now turned to preparing for further innovations in European defence policy which may occur as a consequence of the forthcoming EU Intergovernmental Conference.

The convening of a review conference in 1996 is provided for by Article N of the Treaty on European Union. In the realm of defence, the review will include an examination of the pillared structure of the Treaty; the relationship between the EU and WEU; and prospects for a Common Defence policy and a Common Defence⁷⁵. The WEU Declaration No1 made at Maastricht promised a review of its provisions in 1996. A WEU Summit may be held in advance of the IGC to finalize the WEU's contribution to the Conference⁷⁶. Within the EU, the formal run up to the IGC is to begin in June 1995 with the convening of the Reflection Group of 15 representatives of the Member states and two MEPs. The Group will examine, *inter alia*, the provisions of the Treaty relating to defence referred to above. A report will be presented to the December 1995 European Council⁷⁷. Planning has already begun in the WEU. In May 1994, the WEU Council instructed the WEU Permanent Council to begin "work on the formulation of a common European defence policy" ⁷⁸. A report containing the Permanent Council's preliminary conclusions was presented to the November Council meeting, held at Noordwijk in the Netherlands.

On 1 January 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union and in accordance with the WEU Maastricht Declaration were offered membership of the WEU. All three countries have opted to acquire the minimal observer status and will participate in discussions on the formulation of a Common Defence Policy both in the EU and WEU⁷⁹. To recap, the wider WEU now includes 27 states with varying forms of membership. These include: ten full Members which are also Members of the EU (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Spain); 5 observer members which are also EU Members (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); 3 associate members which are not EU Members but are NATO Members (Iceland, Norway and Turkey); and nine associate partners (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia).

⁷⁵ Under Article B and Article J.4. See RP 95/27 *Towards the IGC: the Emerging Agenda* and RP 94/115 *The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: background and preparations* for general details on the IGC.

⁷⁶ AN 15/2/95

⁷⁷ For further details see RP 94/115, *The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Background and Preparations*, November 1994 and RP 95/27, *Towards the IGC: The Emerging Agenda*, February 1995

⁷⁸ WEU *Kirchberg Declaration*, I/Para 5

⁷⁹ see RP 94/84, *Enlargement and the European Union (Accessions) Bill*, July 1994, pp. 9-12 for brief details of these countries attitudes to European defence co-operation.

A. Developments in the WEU: the Noordwijk Declaration and Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy

The Noordwijk Council of November 1994 was significant for a number of reasons. Important was the attendance for the first time of representatives of the nine associate partners at the meeting. More notably, it took place shortly after the US decision to withdraw its naval vessels from enforcing the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government which the concluding Declaration noted "with regret". Although the differences between Washington and its European allies on Bosnia have now, at least for the present, retreated from public view, the disagreement may have prompted further European efforts to increase both the level and effectiveness of their mutual co-operation in defence. Amongst a number of measures, the Council adopted a French proposal to draft a White Paper on European security to be undertaken by all 27 WEU states. This would attempt to find a common analysis of the security problems facing Europe, inclusive of the Mediterranean region, and agree on a common statement of how they might be resolved. The first part of the White Paper, identifying risks and threats to European security, is to be completed by the May Council. The second part, dealing with protection against these threats, may be completed by the end of the year⁸⁰. The Council also decided that the WEU's procedures and mechanisms, in particular in relation to crisis management, needed to be improved.

The Council also endorsed a number of initiatives in WEAG. WEAG will establish a Research Cell within its Armaments Secretariat to co-ordinate the conduct of the EUCLID programme. Study will also continue on principles and options for a European Armaments Agency and European Armaments Policy, although the Council noted that the preconditions for the establishment of an Agency do not currently exist. As a final act, the Council appointed Jose Cutileiro of Portugal as the new Secretary General of the WEU. Cutileiro was the candidate supported by Britain and secured the post in competition with Enrique Baron Crespo, a Spanish Socialist MEP and former President of the EP, and Giovanni Jannuzzi, Italy's ambassador to NATO⁸¹. However, the most significant outcome of the Council was the endorsement of a report produced by the Permanent Council entitled *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy* (CEDP). Subject to further elaboration, the report will form a basis of the Comprehensive European Defence Policy Statement which may be concluded in advance of the conclusion of the 1996 IGC.

The CEDP document contained a number of recommendations and considerations which would need to be brought into effect before a CEDP could commence. The Document was divided into two halves. The first part is a description and consolidation of existing WEU practice and relationships with other bodies; and the second is a prescriptive construction of a Common European Defence Policy. The Document began by defining the purpose of a CEDP. This included a definition of the four levels of European responsibilities and interests in the field of defence. These are: responsibility for national defence and security;

⁸⁰ AN 10/3/95

⁸¹ AN 28/10/94

responsibility for the projection of the security and stability of Western Europe to the rest of the continent; an interest in promoting stability in the southern Mediterranean countries; and a share of the wider responsibility for the promotion of international security, stability and democratic values⁸². The Document then reviewed the role of the WEU as both the defence component of the European Union and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance before examining the relationship of the WEU and EU. Here it called for studies conducted by the CFSP Working Group on Security into the implications of security situations in regions neighbouring the EU (Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Maghreb and Middle East) to be complemented by parallel WEU military analyses. The section on the relationship between the WEU and NATO reinforced the need for co-operation, complementarity and transparency between the two bodies and noted the potential of the CJTF concept, calling for it to be developed and implemented "soon"⁸³. The first part of the CEDP document concluded with a description of ties between the WEU and CSCE and the WEU and Central and Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean countries.

The second part of the CEDP Document is entitled 'The construction of a common European defence policy'. It recommended closer political liaison between the political and military bodies of the WEU and their counterparts in NATO, raising the prospect of joint NATO/WEU Council meetings. It called for a strengthening of the WEU's operational capabilities, *inter alia*, in areas of inter-operability of forces, contingency planning, strategic mobility, the question of European anti-missile defence and the mechanisms for burdensharing. Notably, it called for stronger capabilities in the field of defence intelligence in the light of pending decisions on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre and the possible creation of an independent European satellite system. The Document continued to recommend improved contingency planning for Petersberg-type operations and raised the possibility of the WEU offering the assistance of its Planning Cell to the EU in the event of the development of a new EU capacity for the analysis and forecasting of crises. In order to improve decision-making and the command and control of possible WEU missions, the Document recommended a strengthening of the support given by the Secretariat and Planning Cell to the Council and the creation of a politico-military working group. The former might take the form of the creation of a new situation centre and intelligence section.

The Document underlined the importance of national approval for the involvement of forces but added that a Common Defence Policy presupposed "in the operational sense, the readiness of participating nations to share in practice the responsibilities in the execution of operational tasks"⁸⁴. It added that a number of mechanisms would need to be in place before the start of an operation and would need to be examined further. These included a possible preordained rotation of national units; the pooling of capabilities; a scheme for timely, sufficient and equitable funding; and finally task specialization. The Document concluded with a list of the issues which would need to be addressed in fulfilment of the aim of establishing a European Armaments Agency and the formulation of a European Armaments Policy. These include, *inter alia*, the promotion of the harmonization of requirements and the standardization of equipment; a reduction in duplication in national weapons research;

⁸² *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*, Para 2

⁸³ CEDP Document, Para 17

⁸⁴ CEDP Document, Para 34

conditions and measures for a more competitive approach to European procurement; and, finally, the possible harmonization of extra-European export controls taking into account related developments in the CFSP.

B. British Policy: Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference

Since the autumn of 1994, British ministers and diplomats have made a series of speeches on or referring to European defence, which collectively have signalled much broader British support for a Common Defence Policy, albeit still within the context of the Atlantic Alliance. The revised British position is not as dramatic as it may seem and draws upon work within the FCO and MOD, reflected for example in *SDE 94*, and only more clearly elaborated orally over the last six months⁸⁵. Speeches were made by the Foreign Secretary and diplomats in October 1994 in London and Brussels⁸⁶, followed by a speech by the Defence Secretary in January 1995, also in Brussels⁸⁷, and a further statement by Mr Hurd in February in Berlin⁸⁸. Mr Hurd's calls in October 1994 for defence "co-operation in practice, putting our military assets, our men, women, equipment at the service of European defence, linked inextricably, as the Treaty of Maastricht provides, with the Atlantic Alliance", culminated in the codification of HMG's position in a *Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference*, which was dispatched to all other EU Members in early March 1995⁸⁹.

The government's new emphasis on enunciating its policy on European defence co-operation may have both practical and diplomatic purposes and British views on European defence co-operation may fit into the wider context of the government's approach to the IGC. The key note of Mr Hurd's speech of October 1994 was "flexibility". This concept may have become the cornerstone for HMG's policy towards 1996. London has rejected the concept of a hard core Europe put forward by politicians in France and Germany in favour of a looser idea of a multi-track, multi-speed Europe. Some of the tracks of European co-operation would be based on inter-governmentalism and others would use the mechanisms of the Treaty of Rome. Within these streams the states of Europe would be able to proceed at different speeds. Thus, Britain would not participate in certain areas of social policy but could play a leading role in other policy areas. With strong diplomatic and military assets, Britain could continue to take a leading role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in a possible Common Defence Policy. In this sense, British initiatives in defence co-operation may be part of a preemptive policy towards the 1996 IGC.

⁸⁵ *The Times* 28/10/94

⁸⁶ Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Franco-British Council, London, 24/10/94 and by Roland Smith, Deputy Ambassador to NATO, 27/10/94, quoted in *The Times* 28/10/94

⁸⁷ Speech by Secretary of State for Defence on European defence and security to Belgium Royal Institute of International Relations, 30/1/95

⁸⁸ Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin: 'The Future of Europe', 28/2/95

⁸⁹ Deposited Paper 3S/ 1224

In the run up to the 1991 IGC, HMG, the British government found itself reacting to the proposals of other EU members. In the approach to the next IGC, the government seems determined to produce a range of policy initiatives in areas which best coincide with its European policy of stronger intergovernmentalism in place of federalism. In addition, by producing a comprehensive document on a European Defence Policy at this early stage, HMG may hope to place a strong Atlanticist stamp on whatever defence arrangements finally emerge from the IGC. It may therefore hope to preempt proposals on European defence produced by more federalist Members.

In practical terms, although the *Memorandum* refers to HMG's continued confidence in a US commitment to European security, it may reflect the realization that the USA is no longer prepared to or in fact even capable of undertaking every form of military operation in Europe. As a consequence, "European nations should develop arrangements for the future that will ensure that, consistent with our NATO obligations, Europe collectively is able to shoulder more effectively its share of the burden in promoting security and stability on the European continent, on its periphery and beyond"⁹⁰. In a further section, the *Memorandum* comments that there could be circumstances in which European countries might "need to be ready and able to take the lead, or to act on their own"⁹¹. The *Memorandum* continues that, as agreed at Maastricht, the WEU will form the basis for European military actions. Although it does not lay down strict criteria for which operations should be undertaken by the WEU and which by NATO, the *Memorandum* states that NATO should remain responsible for the defence of NATO territory under Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. The WEU should concentrate on so-called Petersberg Missions in the fields of crisis management, peacekeeping, including the monitoring of embargoes and sanctions, and humanitarian and rescue operations. The *Memorandum* places emphasis on the need for the WEU to have the necessary capacity to organize, mount and control such operations. To this end, the *Memorandum* refers to the need for better politico-military advice to be given to the Council in a crisis, better handling of intelligence and the creation of a situation centre. British military personnel may be loaned to the WEU to assist with the development of the latter two. Despite, the initiatives to strengthen the WEU, the Government stresses that the organization should not duplicate existing NATO structures. Instead, WEU-led operations would be backed by existing NATO structures and resources under the CJTF concept.

Institutionally, the *Memorandum* reinforces HMG's stance that defence is an overridingly national responsibility and that, although closer European defence co-operation should be encouraged, it should only proceed on an intergovernmental basis. Significantly, the Government rejects any suggestion of merging the WEU into the European Union as a fourth pillar, both on the grounds of the need to guard national sovereignty and because the existing variegated defence commitments of the Fifteen make integration problematic. The *Memorandum* speaks of governments' need to preserve their freedom to act in defence of their own national interests. In particular, it points out that Britain and France retain overseas defence commitments beyond the EU. More importantly, the *Memorandum* refers to differing relationships of the Fifteen to NATO and WEU (eleven are members of NATO (Britain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

⁹⁰ *Memorandum*, Para 4

⁹¹ *Memorandum*, Para 12

Portugal and Spain) while ten (excluding Denmark) are WEU members. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are WEU observers. Although, Austria, Finland and Sweden have all developed links with NATO and joined Partnership for Peace, it is unlikely that they will join NATO. Practical defence arrangements should, the government maintains, take note of this "variable geometry" and states should only join military operations on a case-by-case basis.

The key political element in HMG's proposals is the creation of an 18-nation WEU Summit of Heads of State and Government which would meet "back-on-back" with European Council meetings. Importantly, this would include full WEU members, WEU observers and WEU associates (Iceland, Norway and Turkey). The creation of such a body would have practical and political consequences. On the one hand, by involving the WEU observers at the highest level of European defence decision-making without requiring them to alter their neutral statuses, it could be seen as an integrationist measure. On the other hand, by including the WEU Associates, which are unlikely to become EU members until after the year 2000, the establishment of such a body might prevent the WEU being absorbed by the EU. As one French academic commented, an 18-nation WEU summit would ensure an "absolutely watertight and permanent division between the EU and all things military"⁹². Perhaps supporting this position, the *Memorandum* also stressed that the European Commission and European Parliament would not be involved in these new defence arrangements which would leave the roles of the existing WEU Secretariat and Parliamentary Assembly unaffected. However, the European Council might make proposals to the WEU Summit and WEU/EU links could be improved by inviting the WEU Secretary General to attend European Council meetings when CFSP matters were being discussed.

Overall, Britain's revised position on European defence co-operation marks little more than a consolidation of existing practice. The WEU Secretary General has already attended sessions of EU Foreign Affairs Councils and European states have already undertaken Petersberg-type missions, for example, in Rwanda. Indeed, UNPROFOR in Bosnia is largely a European military operation, commanded and, in the main, manned by European military personnel. Many of the proposals in the *Memorandum* were presented to the WEU in November 1994 in the *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*. Significantly, the Government makes no reference to the wording of Article B of the Common Provision of Maastricht. The *Memorandum* proposal is for "future European defence arrangements ... based on the WEU, acting in a reinforced partnership with the European Union". At no point does it speak of a "Common Defence Policy", nor importantly, is there any mention at all of the possibility of an "eventual Common Defence".

⁹² *The Financial Times* 16/3/95

C. French Policy

In announcing France's programme for its EU Presidency, Alain Lamassoure, the French European Affairs minister, called for "further and faster" progress on external matters. He declared, "Europe will only be able to take care of Europe the day it has the instruments of a common foreign and defence policy"⁹³. In a subsequent speech to the French National Assembly in December, Edouard Balladur, the French Prime Minister, was more pragmatic in his aspirations for European defence co-operation. He spoke of the creation of a European Army being an illusion at present. Furthermore, although emphasizing the need for Europe to live up to the responsibilities of its own defence and take initiatives independent of the USA, he also underlined the necessity of maintaining the transatlantic link, declaring "I would like to see the continuation of Atlantic solidarity, just as strong as in the past, but with a better balance between the shores of the ocean"⁹⁴. More recent speeches have continued this pragmatic line. In March, opening the Conference on the European Stability Pact⁹⁵, Balladur was more enthusiastic in his call for a Common European Defence but the substance of his remarks on defence were not significantly different from British proposals. He spoke of the need for a European "capacity to act" in defence which was "at least as essential" as an effective transatlantic defence relationship. European defence would be based on the WEU including multinational forces, modelled on the Eurocorps, with sufficient logistical support. He implied that WEU planning and intelligence provision would need to be improved to assist humanitarian and peacekeeping missions⁹⁶. Significantly, Balladur did not call for the integration of the WEU into the EU.

Reactions to the British *Memorandum*, described in the previous section, at the informal EU Foreign Affairs Council, held at Carcassonne in the second half of March 1995, were generally favourable. France greeted the *Memorandum* particularly warmly⁹⁷. As the other leading defence power in Europe and also current holder of the EU Presidency, France is in a strong position to influence the debate on new European defence and security arrangements, and as seen above, has consistently called for deeper European defence co-operation. Britain and France are thus broadly united in seeking ways to improve practical co-operation in defence, on the need to retain strong transatlantic links and in a firm belief that defence in Europe must remain on an intergovernmental basis. Where they differ, however, is in their view of the longer-term. Whereas London appears confident of a broad US military and political commitment to European security, Paris maintains that, in the light of US changing interests and priorities, this commitment will weaken. It has pointed, for example, to demonstrable differences between US and European interests over Bosnia to illustrate this argument. For this reason, Europe should develop defence capabilities independent of the Americans which, the French feel, cannot ultimately be relied upon. In this sense, the various forms of bilateral and multilateral defence co-operation in Europe, such as the Eurocorps or the new joint Belgium-Dutch Naval Command, and political and

⁹³ *The Times* 23/11/94

⁹⁴ Speech by M. Balladur to French National Assembly, 7/12/94

⁹⁵ see RP 94/131, *Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, December 1994, pp. 11-13

⁹⁶ *The Financial Times* 21/3/95 and *Le Monde* 21/3/95

⁹⁷ *The Daily Telegraph* 21/3/95

command arrangements in the WEU form the building blocks for a future Common Defence⁹⁸. Mr Balladur noted in his speech to the French National Assembly that the creation of a European Army should be one of the long-term aims of the EU.

D. Commission-linked Proposals

In December 1994, the Commission received *European Security Policy in the Run-up to 2000: Ways and means of achieving real credibility*, a report produced by a group of security specialists and former senior Commission officials under the sponsorship of Hans van den Broek, the Commissioner in charge of the CFSP. Although this has not been endorsed by the Commission, it may present some of the ideas which the Commission may seek to promote informally at the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. The report called for the creation of a European intervention force, based upon the Eurocorps, and the drafting of an agreement, in consultation with the USA, on the division of defence responsibilities between NATO and the WEU. More significantly, the report also supported the creation of a new central body responsible for foreign, security and defence policy which would include officials from the Council, Commission and WEU. This body would have a non-exclusive right of initiative in these policy areas and would be led by a political leader appointed by the Members of the EU. Generally, decision-making would take place by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), although the latter would be weighted to reflect the political and military status of different Members. QMV would also be used for approving the principle of a military intervention but not its practical organization⁹⁹.

X The Future of European Defence

A. A Possible Outcome of the IGC

The shape and direction of European defence co-operation will be an important subject at the approaching IGC. However, it is possible that it will be one of the less contentious areas of debate. European defence policy is largely discussed in the WEU. Thus, most deliberations on this issue can take place separately, although in parallel, to discussions in the Reflection Group and the subsequent Conference itself. A consensus on the short-term character of a European defence policy does appear to be emerging between Britain and France. Given the disproportionate influence of the latter in European defence, broad agreement between them is likely to be the leading influence on the statement on a Common European Defence Policy which the WEU may produce by 1996. Drafting of the statement may be completed before the conclusion of IGC. Thus, the WEU Council to be held in the margins of the European Council at the end of the IGC, may prove little more than a formality. By this stage, agreement may already have been reached within the WEU on many of the institutional

⁹⁸ In March 1995, the Belgian and Dutch Defence Ministers signed an agreement to place all their large surface vessels under a joint bi-national command by 1996 (AN 31/3/095).

⁹⁹ *European Security Policy in the Run-up to 2000: Ways and means of achieving real credibility*, 19/12/94

arrangements for links to the EU. Practical arrangements for a CEDP may also have been concluded and many initiatives may have been put into effect before the IGC concludes. On this point, it was notable that the recent informal EU Foreign Ministers Council, held at Carcassonne, discussed NATO enlargement and the future relationship between NATO and Russia with contributions being made from the three WEU observers who are not NATO members. Despite some apparent US annoyance, their inclusion is perhaps in keeping with the concept of a strengthened European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance¹⁰⁰.

Although a Common Defence Policy may be declared in any new EU Treaty, the WEU is unlikely to become the fourth pillar of the Union. Although the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, and Belgian leaders have spoken in favour of merging the WEU and EU, questions of sovereignty may continue to hamper institutional linkage between the two and formal integration does not appear to be supported by the majority of Member states¹⁰¹. More significantly, practical grounds may also impede a WEU/EU merger. As the British *Memorandum* points out, full membership of the EU and of the WEU is incongruent. The EU Members which are WEU observers, Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, seem unlikely to become full WEU members. Furthermore, in the case of Denmark, the *Decision of the Heads of Government, meeting within the European Union, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union* agreed at the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992, stated unequivocally that Copenhagen would not take part in the elaboration or implementation of decisions of the Union which have defence implications¹⁰². In addition, if the WEU assumes more of NATO's operational role in Europe it may become desirable to admit the NATO but non-EU states of Norway, Iceland and, more significantly, Turkey as full WEU members. This would increase the mismatch between EU and WEU full membership.

It is possible though that the WEU may become a 'shadow' pillar of the Union as part of a Common European Defence Policy which at the same time will be linked to NATO. Liaison with the EU may be achieved by holding back-to-back or joint meetings at Heads of Government, Council and working group level. Co-operation already exists between the WEU and CFSP Secretariats and consultations are held and information exchanged between the Commission and the WEU. This liaison may well be stepped up. The above political arrangements would then probably, as set out at Maastricht, leave open the possibility of integration of the WEU into the EU and the establishment of a Common Defence at some stage in the future.

There is some legal argument over whether the WEU will be subject to a further review in 1998 or in 2004 when the Treaty of Brussels or modified Treaty which founded the organization 'expire', fifty years after their signature. The WEU Declaration No 1, made at Maastricht, refers to the 1996 Council report being made "with a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII"¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ *The Daily Telegraph* 21/3/95

¹⁰¹ AN 10/3/95

¹⁰² RP 93/3, *The Maastricht Debate: Clarifications, "Opt-Outs" and Amendments*, January 1993, p. 5

¹⁰³ WEU Declaration No. 1, Para 2 (6)

Article XII of the modified Treaty states that 50 years after it comes into force, any signatory can withdraw from the Treaty if it gives a year's notice. This may not affect the WEU in any way. The Atlantic Treaty includes a similar 'denunciation' clause which allowed signatories to withdraw after a year's notice twenty years from the completion of ratification of the Treaty. This article has so far had no effect on the organization. Although the coming into force of a denunciation clause may provide the pretext for the treaty to be reaffirmed, the FCO does not anticipate any necessary amendment to the Treaty of Brussels as a consequence of Article XII coming into force.

B. The WEU and the Atlantic Alliance: the Changing Transatlantic Relationship

In the longer term, however, due to changing US attitudes to European security and their affect on NATO, a further review of European defence arrangements may become necessary. This may lead to a possible further reordering of the respective strengths of the North American and European pillars of the Atlantic Alliance with the former playing a progressively reduced role in European defence.

US policy towards Europe since the Cold War has led not only to declining forces there but also to waning interest in the continent. From 1993, continued argument between London and Paris (and most other European states) and the USA over the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and the lifting of the UN arms embargo, imposed on the Bosnian Moslems, has weakened the Alliance's cohesion and credibility. The problem of transatlantic drift is not just due to perhaps poor foreign policy making in the White House, what one commentator has characterized as "sloppiness and the dissonance between its actions and its declarations"¹⁰⁴, but may be caused by more deep-rooted demographic and political changes in the USA. America is becoming less European as its centre of political and economic power shifts from the north-east to the west and south. The traditional east coast foreign policy elite has lost influence and has not been directly replaced. Instead conflicting interest groups contest the direction of US foreign policy. Simplistically, these might be divided into multilateralists and unilateralists or neo-isolationists. The former favour continued US global engagement, preferably through multilateral institutions such as NATO and the UN. The latter favour a policy of foreign policy action only on the basis of supreme national interest and US control of any military operations.

Change was reflected in the November 1994 Congressional elections which saw a Republican landslide and the election of many neo-isolationists. It was in an attempt to assuage this opinion that President Clinton announced the unilateral US withdrawal from the enforcement of the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian Moslems. Following the debacle of US military action in Somalia, which many Americans blame entirely on the UN, the prospect of US ground forces becoming involved in foreign adventures beyond the western hemisphere would now seem to decline. If Congress passes legislation to restrict US funding and participation in UN peacekeeping operations, then many of the missions envisaged for CJTFs

¹⁰⁴ L. Miller, 'The Clinton Years: reinventing US foreign policy', *International Affairs*, October 1994

may not take place. Besides political restrictions, reductions in the size of the US armed forces may mean that Washington may in the future offer only limited military assistance to Europe in certain scenarios. Certainly, without a significant increase in the US defence budget, the number of US military personnel in Europe may fall below 100,000 which many Atlanticists see as a litmus test of US support for the continent. Furthermore, Pentagon strategy is directed towards fighting two regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, but there are serious doubts as to whether it can do so. There are already predictions of shortages in such areas as air transport, something upon which the Europeans have traditionally depended for their military operations. US logistical support is envisaged as key element of backing for WEU operations within CJTFs. In short, the USA may no longer prove as constant an ally to Europe as during the Cold War.

US disengagement from Europe has had an impact on NATO which Britain continues to regard as the "bedrock of our common defence against threats to our territorial integrity and that of our Allies"¹⁰⁵. Germany and other European governments share similar views. The difficulty with this position is that NATO, without the unity imposed by the need to prepare to deter and potentially resist a threat from the Soviet Union, may now be less coherent than during the Cold War.

NATO has sought to ensure its survival by recognizing the changing military balance within the Alliance, and thus agreeing to a strengthened European pillar, centred on the WEU, and, at the same time, by becoming a more political organization. It is engaging in crisis management and peacekeeping operations and reaching out to its former enemies to the East via, for example, Partnership for Peace. Yet NATO's first foray into peacekeeping in support of UN operations in the former Yugoslav theatre has not been entirely successful and has weakened the Alliance unity. NATO has also conceded that it will expand its membership to include newly democratic states of eastern Europe. However, despite stringent criteria for eligibility, enlargement, by bringing in new members unaccustomed to close military co-operation, may further weaken the organization, particularly as a military body. Recent attempts by Willy Claes, the NATO Secretary-General, to present Islamic fundamentalism as a new, unifying threat to NATO have been criticized as being unrealistic¹⁰⁶. The key elements which NATO has provided and continues to provide are established mechanisms for collective political decision-making between North America and western Europe and, when agreement is reached, the use and delivery of force¹⁰⁷. These mechanisms remain in place despite vacillations on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet as disagreements over Bosnia have shown, they may only function fully when Alliance Members are united by perception of a serious and common threat.

Perhaps in reaction to transatlantic drift and NATO's troubles, since 1994, a number of politicians and commentators, including the Dutch Prime Minister, the German Defence Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, have called for the creation of an Atlantic Community, to refocus political, cultural, economic and security links between Europe and

¹⁰⁵ *Memorandum*, Para 8

¹⁰⁶ *The Observer* 12/2/95

¹⁰⁷ *The Guardian* 7/12/94

North America¹⁰⁸. It remains to be seen to what extent this concept can be translated into practical and effective forms of co-operation. In itself, however, the promotion of a new transatlantic compact may be an admission that NATO is far from solid. Above all, it remains to be seen whether such an initiative will counter a continued US emotional and military withdrawal from Europe. This is not to say that US forces will no longer assist with or participate in European military operations since both the USA and Europe have common security interests with regard to Russia and the Middle East, for example. With the prospect of US forces and US logistical and intelligence assets being less available, Europe may need to develop the embryonic structures of the WEU to replace them.

However, European taxpayers may prove unwilling to pay the costs of duplication. A more radical solution might be offered by adapting some of the ideas put forward by Lord Carver. This would be for NATO to be truly Europeanized. That is for the WEU to take over the integrated command structure of NATO's Allied Command Europe, and its various logistical and intelligence facilities. Allied Command Atlantic might then be Americanized. Military co-ordination between the two commands could be achieved via NATO's Military Committee and its International Military Staff. US forces might remain in Europe and European forces be assigned to the Atlantic Command using arrangements similar to those which link French forces to NATO. The Atlantic Treaty would also remain in force to bind North America and Europe in collective security¹⁰⁹. Such a scenario would appear to be a distant prospect. However, whatever the outcome of the next intergovernmental conference, the defence of Europe will continue to be a subject of debate into the next century.

TD/JML

¹⁰⁸ see Malcolm Rifkind, 'Need for an Atlantic Community to better reflect US-European relations', *NATO Review*, March 1995

¹⁰⁹ see Lord Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945* (1992), pp. 175-176

Sources

Reports, Documents and Speeches

Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994

Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, 2 March 1995.

Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin: 'The Future of Europe', 28 February 1995.

Speech by Secretary of State for Defence on European defence and security to Belgium Royal Institute of International Relations, 30 January 1995.

First Report of High-Level Group of Experts on the CFSP, *European Security Policy 2000: Ways and means to establish credibility*, Brussels 19 December 1994 (summary also included).

Western European Union, *Noordwijk Declaration*, November 1994 and *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy* (from WEU Assembly Doc. 1443)

Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Franco-British Council, London, 24 October 1994.

Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations, Assembly of Western European Union, *The Western European Union* WEU Assembly Doc. 1431, October 1994.

Books and Articles

Y. Boyer, P. Lellouche & J. Roper (ed), *Franco-British Defence Co-operation: A New Entente Cordiale*.

Lord Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945* (1992).

M. Clarke & R. Hague (ed), *European Defence Co-operation: America, Britain and NATO*.

E. Foster 'The Franco-German Corps: A 'Theological' Debate?', *RUSI Journal* August 1992.

E. Foster, 'Marking Time: The European Corps', *RUSI Newsbrief*, August 1993.

Research Paper 95/45

- E. Foster, 'The CJTF Concept: A Case of Arrested Development', *RUSI Newsbrief*, September 1994.
- E. Foster, 'Europe in NATO: the Debate Continues' *RUSI Newsbrief*, October 1994.
- E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: a History*.
- D. Gates, 'The False Alternative: Europe's Security Dilemma', *Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 60*.
- E. Jones, 'After the Summit: Military Realities', *RUSI Journal*, February 1994.
- J. Lanxade, 'French Defence Policy After the White Paper', *RUSI Journal*, April 1994.
- M. Meimeth, 'France gets closer to NATO', *The World Today*, May 1994.
- A. Menon, 'From Independence to Co-operation: France, NATO and European Security', *International Affairs*, January 1995.
- H. van Mierlo, 'The WEU and NATO: prospects for a more balanced relationship', *NATO Review*, March 1995.
- B. Montgomery, 'The Western Union and its Defence Organization', *RUSI Journal*, August 1993.
- J. Myers, 'The Western European Union: Pillar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC?', *London Defence Studies 16*.
- G. Robin, 'Un concept en quete de substance: la defense europeenne', *Defense Nationale*, March 1995.
- T. Taylor, 'European Defence Co-operation', *Chatham House Papers 24*.
- D. Weigall & P. Sirk, *The Origins & Development of the European Community*.
- H. Willman, 'The European Corps - Political Dimension and Military Aims', *RUSI Journal*, August 1994.

Papers available in the same subject area

European Communities

Research Paper

- | | | |
|---------------|--|------------|
| 95/36 | Progress in the Implementation of Subsidiarity | |
| 95/27 | Towards the IGC: The Emerging Agenda | |
| 94/131 | Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy | |
| 94/115 | The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Background | and |
| | Preparations | |

International Affairs

Research Paper

- | | | |
|--------------|--|--|
| 95/41 | Russia's Chechen War Continues | |
| 95/31 | Cyprus and the United Nations | |
| 95/17 | The Inhumane Weapons Convention and the Question of | |
| | Anti-personnel Land Mines | |
| 95/4 | Russia and the Chechens | |