

Bosnia: the 'Sarajevo Formula' Extended

Research Paper 94/62

29 April 1994



This paper outlines the events which led to the NATO decision to authorize air strikes in defence of UN safe areas in Bosnia and examines international diplomatic and military involvement in the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. It complements Research Paper 94/33 (*Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum*).

**Fiona Watson Tom Dodd Richard Ware
International Affairs and Defence Section**

House of Commons Library

Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their personal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public.

Contents

	Page
Introduction - the latest ultimatum	1
I Recent International Action	2
A. The offensive against Gorazde	2
B. NATO Air Strikes	3
C. The European Response	4
D. US Policy	5
E. Russia and the Bosnian Serbs	6
F. The Decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council	8
II The Diplomatic Track	10
A. The European Action Plan	10
B. The Washington Accords	12
C. A <i>modus vivendi</i> for the Krajina Serbs	15
III The United Nations Protection Forces in Former Yugoslavia	16
A. The Organization of UNPROFOR	16
B. UNPROFOR Fact and Figures	17
C. British Forces in Bosnia, Italy and the Adriatic	18
D. Other Forces in UNPROFOR Bosnia Herzegovina Command	20
E. Reinforcement of UNPROFOR	22
IV NATO Operations in the Former Yugoslavia	25
A. Air Forces and Air Strikes	25
B. Naval Forces	28
C. Aid Flights	29
Latest Developments	30
Appendix A	
United Nations Security Council Resolution 913, 22 April 1994	31
Appendix B	
NATO decisions taken on 22 April 1994	34

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Other papers in this subject area include:

Defence

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 93/84 | Defence employment 1991-92: a regional perspective |
| 93/88 | Defence Statistics 1993 |
| 93/91 | Defence reviews: past, present? and future? |
| 93/92 | The crisis of democracy in Russia and some international implications |
| 94/26 | Redefining British Foreign and Defence Policy |

International Affairs

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| 94/60 | South Africa's Elections and New Constitution |
| 94/44 | Hong Kong and Democracy |
| 94/36 | The Antarctic Bill [Bill 14 of 1993/94] |
| 94/34 | Intelligence Services Bill [HL] Bill 49 of 1993-94 |

Introduction - the latest ultimatum

Two months after the successful NATO ultimatum and the imposition of a military exclusion zone in and around Sarajevo, the international community was again called on to adopt a more "muscular" approach in an effort to put an end to the Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde, one of the UN-designated 'safe areas' in Bosnia. On 22 April 1994 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 913 which demands "...the immediate conclusion by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party of a cease-fire agreement, under the auspices of UNPROFOR, in Gorazde and throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to an agreement on cessation of hostilities." (*S/RES/913 (1994)*, p. 2, see Annex I for full text). UN Security Council Resolution 913 condemned the shelling and attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde as defined in Resolution 824 and demanded the withdrawal of these forces and their weapons to a distance to be agreed by UNPROFOR. It also called for an end to provocative action by all parties in and around the safe areas, demanded the immediate release of all UN personnel and unimpeded freedom of movement for UNPROFOR.

Also on 22 April the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorised the NATO Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, Admiral Leighton Smith, to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy artillery and other military targets if three conditions were not met: if there was not an immediate cease-fire, if the Bosnian Serb forces had not pulled back 3km from the centre of Gorazde by 0001 GMT on 24 April and if all heavy weapons had not been withdrawn from a military exclusion zone of 20km around Gorazde by 0001 GMT on 27 April. The NAC also decided that if there were an attack by heavy weapons against any of the other UN-designated safe areas (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla or Zepa) from any range, or if in the judgement of NATO and UN military commanders there were any threatening movement or concentration of heavy weaponry within 20km of those areas, they would immediately be designated, individually or collectively, as military exclusion zones along the lines of that in Gorazde.

The first part of this paper deals with the Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde and the international community's response to this. The second part outlines the main diplomatic initiatives the international community can draw on in its effort to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Croatia, the third part sets out the structure of UNPROFOR and the fourth examines NATO forces and operations in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

I Recent International Action

A. The Offensive against Gorazde

Following the combination of diplomacy with a credible military threat in Sarajevo (the 'Sarajevo formula') and the success in building on the momentum this achieved elsewhere, notably in securing a Muslim-Croat rapprochement in central Bosnia, hopes were high of exploiting this relative peace in the rest of Bosnia. These hopes receded on 29 March, however, when the Bosnian Serbs began a new offensive against the Muslim enclave of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia, which has been under siege since July 1992. Gen. Rose, the UN commander in Bosnia, was due to visit Gorazde on 6 April to assess the seriousness of the situation, but his passage was blocked by Bosnian Serbs *en route*. Gorazde, whose pre-offensive population of 35,000 had been swollen by about 30,000 refugees from neighbouring villages recently occupied by the Bosnian Serbs, is one of the last three Muslim pockets in eastern Bosnia, the others being Srebrenica and Zepa.

Since Gorazde became a 'safe area' on 6 May 1993 through United Nations Security Council Resolution 824, the UN had only succeeded in sending 14 observers to the town, despite a call from the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in July 1993 for an additional 7,500 troops to patrol the safe areas. This lack of additional troops combined with Bosnian Serb obstruction in allowing any UNPROFOR troops to get through meant that Gorazde had been left without any significant UNPROFOR presence. 800 Ukrainian troops were supposed to arrive in April from Croatia, but their deployment was overtaken by recent events. Indeed, the strategy behind the Bosnian Serb offensive may have been to gain key ground before the additional troops arrived.

The Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde can be seen as a bid to regain the initiative before existing front lines are frozen. Gorazde, which straddles the River Drina, is on the main road from Dubrovnik on the Dalmation coast to Belgrade and its survival under Bosnian government control had caused continual transport and communications problems for the Serbs. The offensive may also have been a pre-emptive measure given the recent Muslim-Croat rapprochement.

There have been recriminations about the length of time it took for the international community to act to try and save Gorazde and also criticism that the continued Serb offensive was, indeed, encouraged by conflicting signals sent out by the western alliance. On 5 April Lt-Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle, the new French UN commander for the whole of the former Yugoslavia who took over from General Cot in March, said that he believed Gorazde was not about to fall to the Serbs. On a visit to UNPROFOR's Sector Southwest in Bosnia (the British

area of responsibility), he said, "We think that in Gorazde the situation is, of course, bad but rather stable. We don't think it's about to fall." (*Times*, 6 April 1994). The United States is also blamed by some for giving the impression to the Bosnian Serbs that they would not use air power to halt any attack on Gorazde.

B. NATO Air Strikes

The continuation of the Bosnian Serb bombardment of Gorazde led to the first NATO air strike on the afternoon of 10 April. Two NATO US F-16 aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb positions on the hills surrounding Gorazde. According to NATO sources, only 25 minutes elapsed between the request for air support by Gen. Rose and approval by Yasushi Akashi, Dr. Boutros-Ghali's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia. NATO made a second air strike in the early afternoon of 11 April after the bombardment had not ceased. The legal basis used to justify this NATO intervention in defence of UNPROFOR troops was UN Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, which decides that states "...acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas ...to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate..." (*S/RES/836*, 4 June 1993, para. 10). A more detailed account of the implications of UN Security Council Resolution 836 is given in Research Paper 94/33 (Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum).

Shortly after the second air strike, NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, maintained:

"For the second time in 24 hours, NATO air forces responded to a request from UNPROFOR commanders and provided close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel in the Gorazde area. Serbs had resumed shelling from the south and the UN personnel trapped in the town were in acute danger. Today's strike was carried out by a single US FA-18A fighter attack jet..We have only first pilot reports, which say that three tanks seem to have been destroyed."

(*Atlantic News*, 13 April 1994)

Russia protested at not having been consulted and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that it was a mistake to take such decisions without prior consultation with Russia. In response to Russian protests, Manfred Wörner asserted, "...close air support has to be very rapid. We have troops under fire. If we want to protect them, we have to strike quickly. I do not see how we could protect the personnel of the United Nations with a delay of several hours...If we had to put in place a consultation procedure that lasted hours, it would never be

Research Paper 94/62

triggered." (*ibid.*).

The Serb reaction to NATO intervention was that the international community had now unequivocally compromised its neutrality and entered the conflict on the side of the Muslims (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 13 April 1994). In a bid to drive a wedge between Russia and the western coalition, Serb leaders severed all relations with the UN, naming Vitaly Churkin, Russia's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, as the only channel of communication. On 11 April Bosnian Serb forces sealed off Sarajevo and took several UNPROFOR troops hostage.

The NATO air strikes did little to slow the Bosnian Serb advance and by 15 April their tanks had occupied the high ground overlooking Gorazde, from where they continued the bombardment of the town. A third air strike was attempted on 16 April, but was aborted when an RAF Naval Sea Harrier was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This illustrated the difficulty of performing air strikes against positions on the high ground surrounding Gorazde and again highlighted the questionable viability of a strategy of air strikes unsupported by large concentrations of troops on the ground.

A cease-fire negotiated in Pale on 17 April which stipulated a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops and artillery from Gorazde and its surroundings and the deployment of a UN interposition force, was breached shortly after its negotiation. On 21 April Bosnian Serb infantry entered Gorazde despite threats of NATO air strikes to force them to withdraw. The hospital and refugee centre were among the targets of the Bosnian Serbs. Reports on the number of dead and injured vary. On 21 April UNHCR doctors in Gorazde said that 47 people had died and 143 were wounded in the past 24 hours, bringing the total of dead to 436 and 1,467 wounded since the offensive began (*Daily Telegraph*, 22 April 1994). A report by the *Associated Press* on 23 April maintained that 715 people had died and 1,970 were wounded.

C. The European Response

The EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 18 April adopted a plan of action based on a French proposal with UK backing. European foreign ministers agreed that it would be wrong to withdraw UN forces at this stage or to lift the arms embargo so that the Bosnian Muslims could defend themselves. Instead, Douglas Hurd and French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, called for a 'convergence of views' on the Bosnian issue between Europe, the US, Russia and the UN (*Le Monde*, 20 April 1994). The rationale behind this, which has been echoed by Presidents Yeltsin and Mitterrand, is that it is impossible to reach a solution to the conflict in Bosnia before a common position has been reached. According to Russia, the aim of a four-way conference would be to get the main outside players in the Bosnian conflict to align their positions and thus prevent the combatants playing one side off against the other.

This view was endorsed by Alain Juppé who maintained that the separate European, Russian and US diplomatic tracks had made it easier for the Bosnian Serbs to play a "double game" (*Agence Europe*, 18/19 April 1994).

The Foreign Affairs Council said that any conference to harmonise positions should be based on the action plan put forward by the European Union in November 1993 and include the Washington Accords between the Croats and Muslims and talks on reaching a *modus vivendi* in the Serb-occupied area of Croatia (*Krajina*). The European Union hopes this conference will have enough weight to bring all the warring factions back to the negotiating table.

D. US Policy

On 19 April the United States called for a more aggressive role for NATO, maintaining that the Bosnian Serbs should pay a higher price for continued violence. The US wanted NATO to be able to intervene not only to protect UNPROFOR troops on the ground in the safe areas, but also in instances when the people in these areas were threatened. The air strikes the US was calling for would no longer therefore be purely *defensive* (i.e. in the form of close air support) in response to attacks against UN troops. They could also be *offensive* in order to dissuade Bosnian Serb operations. The extension of NATO's mandate seemed even more urgent given the Bosnian Serb threat to advance on the other safe areas. President Clinton's additional call for the extension of the approach used in Sarajevo to all of the six UN-designated safe areas echoed some of the concerns expressed at the time of the NATO ultimatum in February. Several commentators criticised the NATO decision to concentrate entirely on the situation in Sarajevo, maintaining that the weapons withdrawn from around Sarajevo could easily be positioned elsewhere.

Support for air strikes has always been stronger in Washington than in Europe. The United States has been a persistent advocate of air power in Bosnia since President Clinton took office in January 1993. In March 1993 this took the form of a "lift and strike" policy (i.e. lift the arms embargo and perform air strikes) which was rejected by the Europeans. Several European countries, in particular France and the United Kingdom who have the largest number of troops on the ground, harbour reservations about extending NATO's mandate, given considerations of troop safety and, in particular, given the recent hostage-taking of UNPROFOR troops in direct retaliation for the air strikes carried out on 10 and 11 April. The Bosnian Serbs have, in turn, warned that US plans to use NATO air power could lead to "total war...a catastrophe not only for this region but for the whole of Europe." (*The Guardian*, 22 April 1994). Several European countries are also wary of alienating Russia, which, although it has criticised Serbian duplicity over Gorazde, still opposes the use of force. Indeed, the Russian presidential spokesman, Vyascheslav Kostikov, blamed NATO air raids for worsening the situation in Bosnia and President Yeltsin said that he remained opposed to the use of air strikes without the agreement of the UN Security Council.

E. Russia and the Bosnian Serbs

Recent events have once again focused attention on the role of Russia in international attempts to resolve the conflicts which have broken out in former Yugoslavia. In the early stages of the conflict in 1991-2 Russia played little part. This was partly because of the upheavals inside Russia and partly because the United Nations was at first only marginally involved in mediation efforts, the main burden falling at that time on the European Community. There was also the fact that, although under a form of communist federal government from the second world war until 1989-90, Yugoslavia had never been in the Warsaw Pact, had successfully resisted Soviet domination and had closer links with western and central Europe and with the Middle East than with the Soviet Union.

Once the United Nations became deeply involved in the Bosnian conflict and the sanction of the UN Security Council was necessary for any use of force by other nations trying to contain the conflict or to pursue humanitarian objectives, it was inevitable that Russia would become more closely involved. It also happened that by the spring of 1993, when the Security Council, with Russian consent, first began to expand the UNPROFOR mandate, to designate "safe areas" and refer to possible NATO air support, the political climate in Russia had changed and a strong lobby sympathetic to greater Serbia had emerged.

The underlying reasons for Russian sympathy with Serbia are complex and the often-cited ethnic and religious affinities between Russians and Serbs play a relatively minor part except for extremists such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The reaction against Marxism-Leninism and Soviet "internationalism" has been very strong in Russia and has led many politicians to espouse older values such as Russian Orthodoxy and panslavism, but this enthusiasm is still limited to relatively peripheral political groups. Besides, if Russia wants a mainly Slav Orthodox ally in the Balkans, Bulgaria looks a better prospect than Serbia.

A more persuasive factor for many Russians is the obvious parallel between the dilemma of Serbia, with its Serbian "kith and kin" left outside its borders by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the similar Russian dilemma. This parallel tempts critics of the Yeltsin presidency to use arguments about Serbia as surrogate criticisms of Yeltsin and his foreign ministry for accepting the independence of the former Soviet republics and not being sufficiently forceful in asserting the interests of the "abandoned" Russian minorities. The Russian government has responded to these criticisms both by taking a harder line on the human rights of Russians in the Baltic and by tilting towards Serbian interests in the diplomatic wrangling over the situation in Bosnia.

There is also strong resistance in the military establishment to the use of NATO military power against the Serbs in Bosnia because this appears to expand NATO's competence

beyond the NATO member states into a region which was non-aligned during the cold war and could be seen as setting precedents for future NATO involvement in conflicts in the former USSR. There is also a general anxiety to emphasise that the Russian Federation is still a "great power" wielding military influence beyond its immediate state borders.

These arguments appeal to many Russian politicians who are not at all sympathetic towards the Bosnian Serb cause as such. On 21 January 1994 the State Duma (the new parliament) adopted its first resolution on the former Yugoslavia, calling on all sides to refrain from the use of force and settle the conflict by political means.

In these circumstances the outcome of the UN/NATO threats of air strikes against Serbian forces around Sarajevo in early February became something of a triumph for Russian diplomacy. Russian pressure was successfully brought to bear on the Serbs, air strikes were averted and the necessity of close consultation with Russia was accepted by the NATO powers. Another, possibly more ambiguous outcome for Russia was that around several hundred Russian peacekeepers serving under UNPROFOR were deployed in Sarajevo, some of them transferred from Croatia and others newly arrived from Russia.

As the Bosnian Serb attacks on civilian targets in Gorazde intensified during April 1994, the issue of NATO air strikes again became very sensitive and divisive inside Russia. Russian diplomats like Vitaly Churkin and Yuly Vorontsov (Russian ambassador at the UN) expressed their frustration with the Bosnian Serbs, but most Russian politicians were still extremely reluctant to countenance more forceful international action. Once again there was a strong Russian government interest in working with NATO governments, behind the scenes at the UN and in Belgrade to avoid any open confrontation by persuading the Serbs to comply with UN demands.

On 25 April the Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev told a press conference in Moscow that NATO air strikes "did not bring any results and will not bring them at present" and he warned that massive strikes could cause the conflict to escalate out of control. He argued against any Russian withdrawal from UNPROFOR (a possibility which had been rumoured the previous week) and offered a small Russian contingent to strengthen the newly arrived UNPROFOR presence in Gorazde (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/1982 B/4).

Vitaly Churkin, in an interview for Russian TV on 24 April gave a graphic description of the difficulties he had faced in trying simultaneously to persuade Bosnian Serb leaders to pull back from Gorazde and to persuade the UN to hold back from air attacks. In the interview he said that he wanted to shake up Russian public opinion and make it clear to the world that "Russia disassociates itself from the nightmares and horrors being created by the Bosnian Serbs in Gorazde". He went on:

"Serbia needs peace. Serbia does not take part in the war, not directly, at least. The people are suffering from the sanctions. So, Serbia should be interested in lifting the sanctions and therefore in putting pressure on the extremists among the Bosnian Serbs in order to stop the conflict. But for the time being, as I see it, I will say the following: for the time being I see no signs of Belgrade's pressure on Bosnian Serb extremists yielding palpable results. This is a tragedy."

(*ibid*, SU/1981 B/8)

F. The Decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council

On 18 April 1994, in response to the continued shelling of Gorazde by the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote to his NATO counterpart Manfred Wörner, to obtain a decision of the North Atlantic Council to authorise the use of air strikes at UN request to protect the UN-designated safe areas, as provided for in UN Security Council resolution 836. On 20 April NATO's Permanent Council agreed in principle to the UN Secretary-General's request. On 22 April the North Atlantic Council issued two sets of decisions concerning Gorazde and the other safe areas. Paragraph 7 of the first set of decisions reads:

"(The North Atlantic Council) agreed that unless:

- (a) Bosnian Serb attacks against the safe area of Gorazde (UN Security Council Resolution 824, paragraph 3) immediately cease;
- (b) Bosnian Serb forces pull back three kilometres from the centre (to be specifically identified forthwith by NATO Military Authorities in consultation with UNPROFOR) of the city by 0001 GMT on 24th April 1994; and
- (c) from 0001 GMT on 24th April 1994 United Nations forces, humanitarian relief convoys and medical assistance teams are free to enter Gorazde unimpeded and medical evacuations are permitted,

CINCSOUTH is authorised to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 20km radius of the centre of Gorazde (but inside the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in accordance with

the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council's decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993."

(*NATO Press Release (94) 31*, 22 April 1994, p. 2)

The second set of decisions set out the ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs. The NAC "agreed that a "military exclusion zone" is established for 20 kilometres around Gorazde, which calls for all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) to be withdrawn by 0001 GMT on 27th April 1994....after 0001 GMT on 27th April 1994, if any Bosnian Serb heavy weapons are within any designated military exclusion zone..., these weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets, as well as their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, will be subject to NATO air strikes.." (*NATO Press Release (94) 32*, 22 April 1994, p.2).

As far as the other safe areas are concerned, the NAC "...agreed that if the safe areas of Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla or Zepa are attacked by heavy weapons from any range or if, in the common judgement of the NATO Military Commanders and UN Military Commanders, there is a concentration or movement of heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometres of these areas (within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina) which threatens those areas they will...without further action of the Council, be designated, individually or collectively, military exclusion zones, and due public notice to governments and to the parties will be given if and when this happens." (*ibid.*). The NAC then gave notice that, *with immediate effect*, any Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas would trigger NATO air strikes (For the full text of both sets of NATO decisions see Annex II).

On 23 April the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia reached an agreement with the Bosnian Serb military and civilian authorities by which a cease-fire was declared around Gorazde with effect from midday on 23 April. It was also agreed that UNPROFOR would deploy a battalion to Gorazde to monitor the cease-fire; Bosnian Serb heavy weapons would be withdrawn outside a 20km radius from the centre of Gorazde by midnight on 26 April at the latest; medical evacuations would be allowed to proceed; all UN and humanitarian personnel should have complete freedom of movement and that negotiations on disengagement should start immediately. Since shortly before the expiry-date of the first deadline, Gorazde has enjoyed a period of relative calm, although the Bosnian Serbs had defied the cease-fire due to come into force at midday on 23 April by continuing the bombardment of the city, which caused about twenty deaths and several injured (*Le Monde*, 26 April 1994).

On 23 April a company of Ukrainians, together with a Nordic medical team and 15 military observers arrived in Gorazde, which was followed on 24 April by a British company from the

1st Duke of Wellington's Regiment and Russian, Egyptian and further Ukrainian elements.

II The Diplomatic Track

There is broad agreement that air strikes are not an end in themselves and that they must be part of a broader political plan and complementary to the diplomatic process. There have been several strands of diplomacy since the demise of the Vance-Owen plan in June 1993. The European Union is particularly keen that the basis of any conference should be formed around the last three main peace initiatives, namely the European Action plan proposed in November 1993, the Washington Accords between the Croats and Muslims and agreements between Croatia and the *Krajina* Serbs.

A. The European Action Plan

On 8 November 1993, France and Germany launched a fresh diplomatic initiative to end the war in Bosnia with a plan to lift sanctions against Serbia gradually in return for their ceding more land to the Bosnian Muslims. The Franco-German plan suggested that the Bosnian Serbs should cede a further 3% of the territory they controlled in central Bosnia to the Muslims. This was the territory on which the September peace initiative, known as the Geneva plan, had foundered. The Geneva plan was based on proposals put forward by President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia for a three-way division of Bosnia which would create a Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposed division of territory had allocated 52.5% to the Bosnian Serbs, 17.5% to the Bosnian Croats and 30% to the Bosnian government. The latter turned down the plan, arguing that it had been offered an insufficient amount of territory with which to create a viable geographical entity.

The Franco-German plan marked the first evidence of a shift in European tactics away from the total isolation of Serbia and more towards incentives for Slobodan Milosevic to end the war. On 29 November, the European Union convened a meeting of the warring factions in Geneva, chaired by Lord Owen for the EU and Thorvald Stoltenberg for the United Nations. This broke the impasse which had meant a two-month hiatus in the negotiations. In the introductory statement to the Geneva meeting on the former Yugoslavia, Belgian foreign minister Willy Claes stated:

"The European Union can no longer stand by and watch these developments without reacting. We prefer to believe that there are chances for peace to which the populations aspire. We have therefore come to Geneva with a plan of action, capable of meeting the current challenges and of paving the way to

a comprehensive solution. It is a matter of combining all the means and all the wishes to allow humanitarian aid to pass through without interference, to reach a territorial solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to find a *modus vivendi* for the territories in Croatia under UNPROFOR mandate. In short, conditions must be created immediately to enable, if not a complete solution, at least the bases for a comprehensive solution."

(S/26834, 29 November 1993)

The negotiations were based on the Franco-German plan: the Bosnian Serbs were asked to cede territorial concessions (3%) to the Muslims so that the Bosnian government can create a viable state, as well as accept a *modus vivendi* with Croatia for the Krajina. This *modus vivendi* consists of an effective cease-fire, the withdrawal of Croatian forces from territories occupied in January 1993 and certain confidence-restoring measures. After these conditions have been fulfilled, the European Union would ask the UN Security Council for the gradual lifting of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Douglas Hurd made it clear, however, that any such move would be envisaged only after concrete action by the Serbs, not just a promise of action (*Reuters*, 3 December 1993). From the Bosnian Croats, the EU asked for co-operation in the *modus vivendi* for the Krajina and a guarantee of Muslim access to the Dalmatian coast and port facilities.

The negotiations were broken off on 2 December after they failed to secure territorial concessions from the Bosnian Serbs. The main Bosnian demand was for the return of the east Bosnian town of Zvornik, together with a swathe of territory connecting it and the Muslim pocket of Srebrenica with the central Muslim-held town of Tuzla. The effect of such a concession would be to sever Serb holdings in north-eastern Bosnia from those in the south-east. There was, therefore, little expectation that the Serbs would agree. There was little progress on the Bosnian-Croat front relating to access to the sea either. The Bosnian government insisted on sovereignty over a small stretch of the Adriatic coastline at Neum, but the Croats would only consider leasing port and coastal facilities at Ploce and Rijeka to the Muslims. President Tudjman maintained that Croatia could not agree to conceding its territory, since this would mean breaking up the Croatian state and national territory (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 1 December 1993).

The spirit of the European Action plan, however, is to use the lever of sanctions, which is one of the main options left to the international community. On 18 April, Malcolm Rifkind told the House of Commons:

"...of course the imposition of economic sanctions is causing a great deal of economic hardship to the Belgrade Government, as well as to the Serbs in general; it is therefore an important weapon, which must be used to its

maximum extent."

(HC Deb, 18 April 1994, c. 645)

B. The Washington Accords

Building on the momentum achieved by Bosnian Serb compliance with the NATO ultimatum and the psychological effect achieved by NATO's shooting down of four Serb light attack aircraft on 28 February, efforts were made to extend the 'peace' around Sarajevo to other trouble spots in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the most obvious ones being in central Bosnia around Mostar where Croats and Muslims, erstwhile allies against the Serbs, had been fighting since May 1993. There are several determining factors underlying the Croat-Muslim rapprochement: the area in central Bosnia around Mostar is heavily interwoven with Croats and Muslims; the Croats were in a precarious position, following increasing Muslim military successes and there had been mounting international pressure on Croatia proper, which had been accused of directly intervening in the Bosnian war. On 1 February 1994 when UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali maintained that there were between 3,000 and 5,000 troops in HV units fighting in Bosnia. Consequently, the UN Security Council voted on 3 February to warn Croatia that it would face "serious measures" if it did not withdraw its troops. It appears that this combination of military reversals and a threatened international embargo led the Tudjman government to reassess Croatia's position.

The final incentive appeared to come from the United States' decision to become more actively involved in the peace-seeking process. President Clinton's special envoy, Charles Redman, visited Zagreb several times to hold talks with President Tudjman. During one of these visits, the Croat daily newspaper *Vecernji list* maintained that there was US pressure on the Croat government to sign a peace agreement with the Bosnian Muslims. It has been maintained that the United States adopted a carrot and stick approach to Croatia: on the one hand, it threatened economic sanctions and on the other, US officials held out the hope of loans from international financial institutions, access to European and international institutions and programmes, Western reconstruction aid and diplomatic support and political backing for Croatia's claims of sovereignty over Serb-held territory in Croatia (*Krajina*). The prospect was also held out of joining NATO's partnership for peace programme. There were, therefore, certain advantages to be gained for the Croatian side: on a programme on Croatian television, President Tudjman stressed that the agreement would restore Croatia to western favour and bring it a number of concrete political and economic rewards (*RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 13, 1 April 1994*).

On 23 February 1994 the Croats and Muslims agreed a cease-fire in central Bosnia. The cease-fire, which came into force on 25 February, provided for the withdrawal or placing under UNPROFOR control of heavy weapons on the front lines by 7 March. A ten km

exclusion zone was imposed for mortars and a 20km exclusion zone was imposed for tanks and artillery. UNPROFOR was then to occupy key positions along the front lines. A mixed commission was to be set up to make sure that roads were kept open for the delivery of humanitarian aid, convoys, commercial traffic and to allow for the free movement of civilians. The cease-fire agreement also covered the liberation of prisoners and the exchange of bodies of both sides, with the help of organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Both sides complied with the deadline and the commander of the UN Sector Southwest, (British) Brigadier John Reith, maintained that the peace process between Croats and Muslims had thereby gained considerable momentum. The two sides solidified the truce on 7 March by signing maps showing agreed demarcation lines separating Croat and Muslim forces across central and southern Bosnia, which, according to UN and local military officers, could become the basis for political borders in the future federation. The Croats and Muslims also agreed to create a demilitarised buffer zone between the two forces under UN supervision.

A series of agreements were signed in Washington by Mate Granic, Croatian foreign minister, Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian prime minister and Kremir Zubak, leader of the Bosnian Croats on 1 March 1994. One document was a preliminary accord to set up a federation of ethnically-based cantons. A second group of documents provided for the broad outlines of a confederation consisting of the Muslim-Croat federation and the Republic of Croatia, as well as of the rules governing transportation and trade between the two countries, including guaranteeing the Muslims access to the Adriatic.

It is hoped that the proposed federation will create a viable state, geographically, politically and economically for the Bosnian Muslims. The federation will have a central government underpinned by a bicameral legislature, one chamber being elected on a proportional basis (thereby consisting of a greater number of Muslims), with the other (regional parliament) consisting of an equal number of Croats and Muslims. The legislature will elect the president and vice-president, each of whom will come from separate communities and serve for alternate one-year terms. Both houses must approve all decisions. The day-to-day administration of the federation will be in the hands of a central government responsible for defence, foreign affairs and international trade. All other powers will be devolved to cantons, which will be responsible for police, education, culture, housing, public services, television and radio. The central government and the cantons will share responsibility for human rights, health, infrastructure and the environment, welfare, immigration and natural resources. Each canton will have its own president, government, legislature and courts (summarized from *S/1994/255*).

As part of the agreement, all refugees will have the right to return freely and will be compensated for any damaged property. The more sensitive part of the agreement rests in the relationship between the federation and the confederation with Croatia, which is hoped will establish a common market for the free movement of goods, a customs union and a

Research Paper 94/62

monetary union. There will also be co-operation in health, culture and education and defence arrangements. These will be agreed by a confederative council formed of equal numbers of Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Croats (*ibid.*).

Although the Bosnian Serbs were missing from the Washington equation it was hoped that the Washington Accord will put further pressure on the Serbs to make peace. US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, maintained, "It helps to create a balance of power (that is) more likely to make the Serbs willing to negotiate seriously." (*Reuters*, 3 March 1994). Both Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic made it clear, however, that the federation, if the Serbs did join, could not be linked to Serbia and Montenegro in a confederal relationship like that with Croatia. The American scheme, which goes a long way towards supplanting the three-way ethnic partition mediated in the Geneva forum, theoretically holds the door open to the Bosnian Serbs eventually to join and one of the major questions concerns the possible role for the Bosnian Serbs in the new arrangement.

The initial Serb reaction, however, was that the agreement would form an "artificial creation" which could unleash a new wave of violence in the former Yugoslavia. Serb leaders suggested that the United States was restoring the Muslim-Croat coalition in an effort to tilt the military balance and step up pressure on the Serbs and stressed that the key question of territorial division between the three sides remains unresolved. There has also been a guarded reaction at the United Nations where the prevailing thought is that it might be a dangerous mistake to isolate the Serbs. Lord Owen, who insisted that the Geneva forum has not been rendered obsolete by intensive US and Russian diplomacy, insisted that "Peace will not come to Bosnia until all three of the constituent peoples can agree a comprehensive peace settlement." (*Reuters*, 2 March 1994).

Following two days of talks on the military aspects of the Washington agreement, the former supreme commander of NATO and newly appointed US envoy to the Balkans, General John Galvin, helped forge a defence agreement between Bosnia's Croats and Muslims leading to the establishment of one Bosnian army, which the US was keen to stress would not provide the means for a new offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. The military agreement, signed on 12 March by Croatian commander Ante Roso and Bosnian army chief Rasim Delic, provides for integrating the Croat and Muslim forces and their commanders into a federal Bosnian army. A Croatian military analyst estimated that this 'marriage of convenience' would consist of 130,000 men (*Associated Press*, 12 March 1993). The two sides reaffirmed their agreement on three points of the Washington accord relative to military issues during the transitional period:

- (i) the present command structure will remain in place;
- (ii) armed forces will disengage and withdraw to a safe distance

which will be determined by a military agreement and;

- (iii) all military formations from foreign countries, except those with consent from Bosnia-Herzegovina and permission from the UN Security Council, will leave the territory of the future federation.

(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 March 1994)

On 13 March the two sides ended their ten days of negotiations by adopting a draft constitution that was hailed by the United States as a building block to an overall Bosnian settlement. With the issue of Serbian territorial holdings and what might happen to them unresolved, it is not yet clear what the agreed federation will look like. Croatian sources said that the federal arrangement provided for divided the federation into nine cantons, five for the mainly Muslim side and four for the Croats. Although some questions remain unresolved, such as the delimitation of territory and the timetable for implementation of the federation and the confederation with Croatia, the final agreements were signed in Washington on 18 March.

C. *A modus vivendi* for the Krajina Serbs

On 4 March, President Tudjman made it clear that he expects swift UN action to roll back Serbs occupying the Krajina. Croatia revived the threat to eject UN peace-keeping troops unless they were allowed to disarm the Serbs and President Tudjman warned that he would not renew the UN mandate on 30 March unless UN troops act to restore Croatia's territorial integrity. President Tudjman's brinkmanship is nothing new, but the context is different now given the Muslim-Croat rapprochement and also given the fact that there has also been confirmation that the Serb warplanes shot down by NATO over Bosnia had come from an airbase in Krajina. So far, the United States has said little in public about its ideas for a settlement of the Krajina issue. However, it is possible that in return for President Tudjman's acquiescence in the Croat-Muslim rapprochement that the US will support the restoration of Croatia's unity and possibly propose autonomy for the Krajina Serbs.

A cease-fire brokered by Russia between the Serbs and the Croat army was signed in Zagreb on 30 March and came into force on 4 April. Under the terms of the cease-fire, both parties had to cease hostilities, provide UNPROFOR with information about their weapons and the location of mine fields, withdraw their mortars and anti-aircraft artillery 10 kilometres from the lines of separation (along which UNPROFOR troops will position themselves) and withdraw their heavy artillery and tanks 20 kilometres by 5 April. Further negotiations will need to focus on the practical aspects of the future political status of Krajina, which will probably involve the restoration of Croatian sovereignty and the establishment of wide-ranging political autonomy for the Serbs.

III The United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia

A. The Organization of UNPROFOR

UNPROFOR has evolved into one of the UN's largest and most complex peacekeeping operations involving national contingents of over 100 military personnel from 22 countries as well as smaller parties of military observers, civilian personnel and staff officers from other states. As of 27 April 1994, UNPROFOR strength totalled some 37,200 soldiers, UN Military Observers (UNMOs), civilian police and civilian personnel (*UNPROFOR Fact Sheet 27/4/94*). UN forces in the former Yugoslavia are divided into three separate commands one each in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. In the case of Croatia and Macedonia, these commands are, in turn, subdivided into sectors. There are other UNPROFOR forces not directly allocated to these commands, including personnel in the Republic of Serbia. The exact size of UNPROFOR has altered and its dispositions remained fluid as operational circumstances have led to expansion and redeployment. Fresh UN troops are being sent to Bosnia and existing forces have also been redeployed from Croatia to Bosnia and within Bosnia itself. During the initial days of the Sarajevo ceasefire following the NATO ultimatum of February, 1,500 UNPROFOR troops were sent from Croatia to the city. Some now appear to have returned to Croatia. Large scale permanent redeployments from Croatia to Bosnia now seem unlikely following the need to police the agreement reached between Serb and Croats in Krajina which came into force in early April. As a consequence of the above changes, the troop numbers given below are only approximate and the force locations may not be entirely accurate.

The contrast between the size of UNPROFOR and the approximately 2 million men and women which the member states of the EU alone have under arms has often been made. This, perhaps, ignores the legal and physical constraints placed on many countries' armed forces. Some states, such as Britain and France have major existing military commitments. In addition, the majority of states contributing to UNPROFOR operate conscription. For political and legal reasons, these states may only be able to send units composed of volunteers to serve abroad in UN service. Although this may make their engagement in Bosnia more acceptable domestically, it may place a physical limit on the number of additional forces which these existing contributors to UNPROFOR can deploy abroad. In addition, there are problems in organizing funding for UN operations as well as the logistical difficulties of sending units to the former Yugoslavia, supporting them while they are there and, particularly in the case of Bosnia, providing them with equipment necessary for operating under potentially hostile conditions.

B. UNPROFOR Facts and Figures

The UNPROFOR Civil Commander and UN Secretary General's Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia is Yasushi Akashi (Japanese)

The overall UNPROFOR Military Commander is Lt. Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle (French, HQ Zagreb)

An UNPROFOR Inspector General, Brig. Gen. Peter Arbenz (Swiss), has been appointed to examine leadership and efficiency.

The UNPROFOR commands are: -

UNPROFOR Croatia Command (HQ Zagreb) Commander Maj. Gen. G. Tayyeb (Jordanian)

UNPROFOR Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Command (HQ Skopje) Commander Brig. Gen. Tryggve Tellefsen (Norwegian)

UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina Command (BHC) (HQ Forward, Sarajevo; Rear, Split) Commander Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose

The senior officers and sectors of UNPROFOR BHC are as follows: -

Civil Affairs Coordinator Viktor Andreev (Russian)

North East Sector (HQ Tuzla) Brig-Gen. Gunnar Ridderstadt (Swedish) (Tuzla, Srebrenica)

Sarajevo Sector Gen. Andre Soubirou (French) (also covers south eastern Bosnia, including Gorazde and Zepa)

South West Sector (HQ Gornji Vakuf) Brig. John Reith (British) (Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Mostar, Vitez)

Forces in the UN safe area of Bihac are under the direct control of UNPROFOR BHC.

Research Paper 94/62

Total UNPROFOR Casualties

83 dead and 877 wounded (50 per cent in accidents, etc. Some casualty figures for national contingents are included sections C and D, below)

UNPROFOR Personnel

UNPROFOR HQ 1,596

Croatian Sectors 13,710

Bosnia Herzegovina Command 18,181 (some 17,614 military)

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1,165

Other UNPROFOR in Former Yugoslavia 2,568 (some in Serbia)

Total UN Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

37,200 (inclusive of 33,074 military personnel, 583 UNMOs, 609 civilian police and 2,934 civilian staff, some locally engaged)

(Source: UNPROFOR Fact Sheet 287/4/94 and press)

C. British Forces in Bosnia, Italy and the Adriatic

The overall joint commander of British forces in Bosnia, Italy and the Adriatic is Gen. Sir John Wilsey, Commander of UK Land Forces (UKLF). He is in charge of the following operations: Operation Hampden (All UK military operations in or connected to UN and NATO operations in the Balkans and Adriatic); Operation Grapple (Land operations in UNPROFOR BHC Command); and Operation Cheshire (RAF aid flights to Sarajevo). There are currently some 6,360 UK personnel deployed on these operations. "The additional monthly cost of the United Kingdom's contribution to operations in the former Yugoslavia and Adriatic is approximately £8,750,000" (HC Deb 26/4/94 c.103w).

A Royal Naval task group and RAF aircraft operate in support of UNPROFOR and also police the UN No Fly Zone over Bosnia under NATO command. There are 2,260-2,400

RN/RM/RFA personnel on board ships either in or assigned to the Adriatic and 650-800 RAF air and ground crew based in Italy (HC Deb 8/3/94 c.200w and *The Soldier* 4/4/94)

There are approximately 3,350 British, largely Army, personnel under the command of Brig. John Reith serving in Bosnia, known as BRITFOR. Brig. Reith also acts as sector commander for all UN forces in south western Bosnia. The numbers of British personnel tend to vary slightly due to differences between establishment figures and actual figures including those on leave, courses, sick, etc. After France, Britain has deployed the second largest national contingent to UNPROFOR, known as BRITFOR. BRITFOR includes a small number of UN Military Observers (UNMOs) who might operate anywhere in Croatia and Bosnia. In addition, a small number of reservists have been called up under Section 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 for service in Operation Hampden. They serve either as public relations or intelligence (language) specialists. An Army medical unit operated in Croatia up until September 1993 (*SDE 1994*, Cm 2550, p. 46-47).

Of BRITFOR some 2,000 troops are based at Bugojno, Vitez, Gornji Vakuf, Tomislavgrad and other smaller garrisons on the aid routes from Split to Central Bosnia. Some 300 troops are based in and around Sarajevo. A further 900 troops, mainly in the support role, are located in Split, Croatia. Up to 150 troops from the Duke of Wellington Regiment (DWR) have been deployed to Gorazde. The Coldstream Bn Group is now reaching the end of its six month roulement. The 2nd Bn Royal Anglian Regiment has been warned for service in Bosnia. It is not clear whether the interchange between the two battalion groups has begun. The DWR Group was deployed from March initially for four months (HC Deb 10/3/94 c 397-408). An announcement on an extension of its tour or replacement has yet to be made. A weekly bulletin on British forces in Operation Hampden is provided by the MOD as Running Deposited Paper 42. British ground forces in Bosnia are currently as follows: -

1st Bn Coldstream Gds CO Lt. Col. Peter Williams (Warrior AIFV)

1st Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment CO Lt. Col. David Santa-Olalla
(Saxon APC)

2 Sqns The Light Dragoons (Scimitar light tanks)

National Support Element (NSE) Large numbers of engineers on road repair and construction duties, signallers, medics, other support troops, etc.

70 locating troop Artillery (five Cymbeline equipments) and 50 Military Observers in Sarajevo

60 SAS troops have been reported

Research Paper 94/62

4 RN Sea King helicopters based at Split are used for casualty evacuation

British Military Losses

Four British soldiers have been killed in Bosnia and a number of others wounded. The dead include the following: -

L/Cpl Wayne John Edwards Royal Welch Fusiliers killed on 13/1/93 at Gornji Vakuf by a sniper

L/Cpl Barney Warburton Royal Engineers killed on 19/3/94 at Stari Vitez by a mine

Cpl Fergus Rennie Parachute Regiment (SAS) died of wounds received in exchange of fire with Serbian forces on 15/4/94 outside Gorazde during Bosnian Serb advance on the town.

Marine Timothy Coates 42 RM Commando, assigned to UNHCR, shot dead on 16/4/94 at Sarajevo road block by Bosnian govt. police whilst wearing civilian clothing and apparently in breach of curfew.

An RN Sea Harrier was shot down by a Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile over Gorazde on 16/4/94. The pilot was later recovered uninjured.

(Sources: *The Soldier*, UK Press, and Running Deposited Paper 42)

D. Other Forces in UNPROFOR Bosnia Herzegovina Command

The national contingents below are listed according to size: -

5,000 French Troops

There are some 3,100 French troops, centred on three battalions, in Sarajevo with some light tanks, 1,200 in the UN safe area of Bihac (Coralici) and support units in Kakanj and Split (600). A French company has been sent to Gorazde. A French general, Gen. Andre Soubirou, is in command of all UN troops in the Sarajevo sector. The French Army operates Puma Helicopters from Split. There are also French units serving in Croatia. At 6,800 men, the overall French contingent is the largest in UNPROFOR. It has also suffered the heaviest casualties with 19 French troops killed and up to 300 wounded,

although 40-50 per cent of these casualties have occurred in accidents (*FT* 12/2/94).

1,800 Dutch Forces

1,200 Dutch troops are based in the UN safe area of Srebrenica. A transport unit is based at Buscovaca and a signals unit at BHC HQ. (*JDW* 19/2/94).

1,500 Malaysian Troops

A composite battalion group is based at Konjic and Makarska.

1,400 Nordic Troops

Danish, Norwegian and Swedish units operate as a composite Nordic battalion group based in Tuzla and have control of Tuzla airport. A Danish unit possesses the only tanks under UN command in Bosnia (Leopard I). Danish troops serve at UNPROFOR HQ and a Nordic Company is also located in Sarajevo. Norwegian helicopters operate from Tuzla. A Norwegian medical unit has now moved to Gorazde. There are also Nordic troops serving in Croatia and Macedonia.

1,350 Spanish Forces

A composite battalion group, which includes light tanks, is based at Jablanica and Medugorje. 10 Spanish troops have been killed in Bosnia to date.

800 Canadian Forces

Canadian forces are based in Visoko and also serve in Sarajevo. There are also Canadian forces serving in Croatia.

700 Ukrainian Forces

Ukrainian forces are based in Sarajevo and 120 troops serve in the UN safe area of Zepa. Some 100 to 200 Ukrainian troops have now moved to Gorazde. (There are now currently some 500 UN troops in the town inclusive of a Norwegian medical unit, a British company, a French company and a small number of Egyptians and Russians.)

Research Paper 94/62

420 Russian Forces

Russian forces are based in and around Sarajevo. There is also a Russian battalion serving in Croatia. 2 Russians have been killed and 15 wounded in UNPROFOR as a whole (*JDW 9/4/94*)

300 Belgian Forces

There is a Belgian transport company serving at Santici and an engineering unit based with French engineers at Kakanj. In March 2 infantry companies were moved from the Belgian battalion serving in Croatia to Bosnia. It seems that nearly all these troops have now been sent back. At least 3 Belgian troops have died in UNPROFOR as a whole.

420 Egyptian Forces

Based in Sarajevo with some now in Gorazde.

Smaller Contingents

There are some 10-15 US staff officers serving with UNPROFOR BHC. (Within UNPROFOR as a whole, there is a US Army hospital in Zagreb as well as some 500 US troops in Macedonia. The US contingent in the latter has been expanded to allow the redeployment of some Nordic troops to Bosnia.) *120 Jordanian* troops are based in Sarajevo and *Slovakian Engineers* have operated in Bosnia, both on deployment from a main base in Croatia. *7 Portuguese* medical personnel are listed.

E. Reinforcement of UNPROFOR

In mid-March the UN called for 10,500 reinforcements to be sent to UNPROFOR BHC. According to the Secretary of State for Defence, UNPROFOR was offered a short-term addition of 4,750 new troops and the redeployment of 2,450 from Croatia. A longer-term addition of 4,000 troops by the summer was also suggested (HC Deb 10/3/94 c 398). At the end of March the reinforcement figure was reduced to 8,250 troops plus 150 observers and 275 police in a draft resolution before the UN Security Council. It is not clear whether this was entirely composed of fresh troops or included redeployments. The USA vetoed this proposal on 30 March on the grounds of cost. As amended, Resolution 908 was passed which extended UNPROFOR's mandate for a further six months but cut the number of UNPROFOR reinforcements to 3,500 plus 150 experts to work on Tuzla airfield. Under the Resolution the

UN Security Council was to re-examine UNPROFOR's troop requirements by end of April. The US government then indicated that it would support the total increase of 10,500 as originally proposed. On 27 April the UN Security Council passed Resolution 914 authorizing a new tranche of 6,550 reinforcements for UNPROFOR as well as 150 military observers and 250 civilian police (*The Independent* 28/4/94). As of 27 April the authorized strength of UNPROFOR was 50,580 inclusive of 44,870 troops, 748 UNMOs, 1,012 civilian police (as opposed to its actual strength of 37,200) (*UNPROFOR Fact Sheet* 27/4/94). In the House on 25 April, Mr Hurd stated:

(HC Deb 25 April 1994, c.29)

The contributors to this reinforcement and the size of their contributions have never been made entirely clear. They do, however, include some 2,500 fresh troops which have arrived in Bosnia within the last month. These include: -

The **British** Duke of Wellington's Battalion Group and Locating Unit (1000 men)

A **French** battalion group (950 men) but the offer was made on the condition that the remaining French battalion was withdrawn from Croatia by May/June. It is not clear whether this will now occur.

190 **Ukrainians** troops

170 **Spanish** troops

100 **Russians** troops

An additional 700 troops have been promised by June. They should include: -

Rest of promised **Ukrainian** battalion, some 365 by end of April.

Research Paper 94/62

Additional 200 **Russian** troops in June.

165 **Swedish** troops are to be moved from Macedonia when they have been relieved by additional US troops and after the Swedish Parliament has given its approval. It is hoped that this will occur in May.

In the longer term, further reinforcement may arrive from the following countries: -

Turkey has had its offer to the UN Secretary General of a Battalion Group of up to 2700 men accepted (1,200 infantry, 500 engineers, 1,000 logistical troops). It is not clear, though, whether an initial tranche of 1,100 troops may be deployed to Croatia to free other units for Bosnia or will be sent direct to Bosnia.

Pakistan has offered up to 3,000 troops. A Pakistani offer has been long standing but has been continuously delayed largely for equipment and logistical reasons. A PQ in February put the arrival of a battalion group in April/May (HC Deb 23/2/93 c.223w). A new estimate suggests that the first Pakistani troops will arrive in July. Germany has now allotted some 140 former East German armoured personnel carriers to the unit which may expedite their deployment (*JDW* 9/4/93).

Bangladesh has also had a long standing offer of a battalion group, some 1,200 troops. This appeared to fade completely but now seems to have been restored. A deployment in July is possible.

400 **Norwegian** troops are possible.

230 **Finnish** troops are possible.

A number of additional deployments are still under discussion between national governments and the UN and within the governments themselves. It has been suggested that additional forces might come from: -

Argentina (200)

The Czech Republic (500)

Certain Islamic countries (up to 1,000). The deployments of all troops from Muslim countries has been complicated by their general desire to be deployed in Muslim areas of Bosnia.

(Sources: UN S/1994/300, *UNPROFOR Fact Sheets*, FCO and UK press)

IV NATO Operations in the Former Yugoslavia

As a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, NATO has subcontracted peacekeeping operations from the UN. These include the policing of the No Fly Zone over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight); the enforcement of UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro by maritime blockade in the Adriatic (Operation Sharp Guard); the provision of close air support to UNPROFOR and aerial reconnaissance over Bosnia (Operation Disciplined Guard); and the aid airlift to Sarajevo (Operation Provide Promise). NATO operations connected with the former Yugoslavia are under the overall command of Admiral Smith, the American Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples.

A. Air Forces and Air Strikes

The overall command of NATO air forces is vested in the American Commander Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). The operational control of day-to-day air missions is allotted to the Italian commander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force at Vicenza in northern Italy. Liaison officers have been exchanged between 5 ATAF and other NATO commands and UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

With the assistance of tankers, NATO air forces maintain a 24-hour combat air patrol over Bosnia. In the event of violations of the No Fly Zone, NATO fighters are guided onto their targets by AWACs planes. If close air support is called for by UNPROFOR BHC forces on the ground a call is passed from the unit under threat to the Command HQ and, with the agreement of UNPROFOR civil and military leaders in Zagreb, to Vicenza. NATO tactical aircraft are then vectored to their targets by NATO AWACs and EC-130 command and control aircraft. If a Forward Air Control unit (FAC) is available control of the air strike is then handed over to it in the immediate vicinity of the threat. Within parameters predetermined by NATO and the UN, air power can also be used in a more wide ranging manner on the suggestion of either the NATO commander Admiral Smith or the UN Commanders Generals Lapresle and Rose and Mr Akashi. All must be in consent before such air strikes can take place. In a recent statement on Bosnia, Mr Hurd referred to this as a "dual key" arrangement. (T. Ripley, 'Bosnia mission stretches airborne eyes and ears',

Research Paper 94/62

International Defense Review, January 1994 and HC Deb 25/4/94 c 21-25).

Not including transport aircraft, there are over 200 fighters, ground attack, reconnaissance and AWACS aircraft from eight nations at the disposal of 5 ATAF for UN-linked operations. These aircraft are mainly based in northern Italy. As of 18 April there had been 1591 violations of the No Fly Zone (S/1994/5,Add.24). Contributions to 5 ATAF are as follows:

Britain

Gioia del Colle (Southern Italy): 8 Tornado F3 fighters, 12 Jaguar ground attack aircraft

Malpensa (Milan): 2 K1 Tristar tankers

On *HMS Ark Royal*: 6 or 7 Sea Harriers

The RAF also operates Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from Sigonella and E-3 AWACS aircraft from Aviano and Trapani. A single RAF Hercules airlifts aid supplies from Ancona to Sarajevo. RAF Canberra aircraft have flown bi-weekly reconnaissance flights over Bosnia from bases in the UK (*Flight International* 27/10/93).

France

Cervia: 10 Mirage 2000 fighters

Istrana: 5 Mirage F-1 reconnaissance and 8 Jaguar ground attack aircraft

Trapani: 1 E-3F AWACS aircraft, C-135 tanker

On *Clemenceau*: 6 Super Etendard 4P aircraft

The Netherlands

Villafranca: 14 F-16 aircraft (8 fighters, 6 ground support) plus 4 F-16s in reserve in Netherlands

Turkey

Ghedi: 10 F-16 aircraft plus 8 in reserve in Turkey

United States

Aviano: 12 USAF F-16 and 8 F-15, 8 USMC F-18 fighters, 12 USAF O/A-10 ground attack aircraft, 3 EC-130 airborne battlefield command and control aircraft

Brindisi: 2 AC-130 gunships (plus 2 on call)

USS Saratoga: 65 aircraft including 14 F-14 fighters, 22 F/A-18 attack fighters, 14 A-6 fighter bombers

Pisa/Sigonella: 10 USAF KC-135 tankers

NATO Airborne Early Warning Force

18 E-3 AWACs aircraft with NATO Crews, operate from Geilenkirchen in Germany, Trapani and Preveza as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). Two RAF E-3 AWACS aircraft operate from RAF Waddington, Aviano and Trapani. Collectively, together with a French AWACs aircraft, this force has two AWACs aircraft permanently on station. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of air activity over Bosnia and Croatia, one flies circuits over the Adriatic while the other operates in Hungarian airspace. US radar planes from the US carrier in the Adriatic have assisted in this task. (Ripley, pp.55-56)

NATO Maritime Patrol Force

On rotation British, Canadian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and US maritime patrol aircraft operate from Sigonella in Italy and Elmas in Greece as part of Operation Sharp Guard.

Other Countries

Spain operates one CASA 212 transport aircraft from Vicenza. It should be pointed out that although not supplying aircraft to UN-linked NATO operations servicemen from a number of NATO countries served with the NAEWF. This is particularly true of Germany which provides up to a third of the total aircrew for this force. The question of the presence of German aircrew on AWACs involved in UN-linked NATO operations is currently before the German constitutional court (*The Independent* 20/4/94). It is possible that the court will continue to support the status quo that is that *Bundeswehr*

Research Paper 94/62

participation in military operations outside the immediate NATO area is permitted as long as a simple majority of the *Bundestag* is in agreement. Although also unable to participate in air strikes in the former Yugoslavia or in the policing of the no fly zone for political reasons, Italy plays an important role in providing logistical support to other NATO contingents. It also furnishes the largest number of maritime patrol aircraft to assist the NATO/WEU Task Force 440 (see below). Canadian, German and Italian aircraft have been involved in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo.

In addition to these contingents, NATO has considerable reserves of aircraft at its disposal including French planes from metropolitan France and British and US aircraft based in the UK and Germany.

B. Naval Forces

NATO naval forces operate in the Adriatic under the overall leadership of COMNAVSOUTH, an Italian admiral, in Naples. The forces are divided into the usually national carrier task groups and the multinational NATO/WEU blockade force monitoring UN sanctions in the southern Adriatic and Straits of Otranto between Italy and Albania. The three carrier task groups have tended to rotate duties with at least one group on station whilst the others are in port for rest and repair or on duty elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Only at times of heightened tension have all groups operated within striking distance of Bosnia.

NATO/WEU Combined Task Force 440 comprises NATO Standing Forces Mediterranean and Atlantic (STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT) as well as ships formerly under command of the separate WEU task force. The latter was merged with the NATO forces in June 1993. TF 440 has a NATO commander and a WEU deputy. The WEU retains a search area separate from NATO forces. The Task Force numbers up to twenty destroyers/frigates and support ships from the Canadian, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish and US navies. The current RN contributions are the destroyer *HMS Birmingham* (STANAVFORLANT) and the frigate *HMS Chatham* (STANAVFORMED). The task force may have a secondary role of deterring the naval forces of the Republic of Serbia from forays into the Adriatic should Belgrade seek to retaliate against NATO shipping in the event of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. In particular, the three carrier groups are potentially at risk from Serbian submarines and fast patrol boats carrying anti-ship missiles. There are, however, doubts as to the serviceability of the former and the design of the latter, under the Iraqi flag, proved lacking during the Gulf War. At least one NATO submarine is assigned to TF 440.

Since the UN embargo began in July 1992, 25,000 merchant ships have been challenged,

2,000 searched while underway and 500 diverted to Italian ports or 'diversion areas' for closer inspection (G. Venturoni, 'The Italian Navy in Allied Adriatic Operations', *NATO's Sixteen Nations* 1/94).

The Royal Naval Task Group comprises *HMS Ark Royal* together with the frigate *HMS Coventry* and the support ships *RFA Fort Austin* and *RFA Olwen*. *RFA Resource* provides accommodation and stores support to BRITFOR in Split.

The USN Task Group is centred on the carrier *USS Saratoga* together with around six cruisers, destroyers, frigates and support vessels. A Marine force, centred on a helicopter carrier *USS Inchon* with two other landing ships, is also deployed with the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean although it is not clear whether it is in the Adriatic. The force has the capacity to land over 3000 Marines. Should the situation in Bosnia deteriorate this force is potentially significant. The *USS Inchon* carries up to 20 transport helicopters which might be used to evacuate UNPROFOR forces in an emergency.

The French Task Group (Operation Babulzard) is centred on the carrier *Clemenceau* and includes at least three destroyers/frigates and support ships. Other French logistical ships are based in Split.

(Source: *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17/2/94 and Running Deposited Paper 42)

C. Aid Flights

Since 1992 over 100,000 tonnes of aid has been flown into Sarajevo in the main by aircraft from Britain, France, Germany and the USA. Other participants in the aid lift have been Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden and some Middle Eastern countries. Transport aircraft have been fired upon on a number of occasions. An Italian transport aircraft was shot down in September 1992 and all four crewmen were killed (*AP* 4/4/94). Other supplies have been airdropped into more inaccessible areas by French, German and US aircraft. In early 1994 sorties averaged 16 per night (J. Boorda, 'Loyal Partner - NATO's Forces in Support of the United Nations', *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 1/94). It is unclear whether the improving weather and greater stability in central Bosnia, allowing easier access for aid convoys, has led to a reduction in such air drops.

Latest Developments

On the morning of 27 April Yasushi Akashi confirmed that the Bosnian Serbs had moved the vast majority of their heavy weaponry outside the 20 km military exclusion zone. Although expressing concern at reports that the evacuating army had been burning villages as they pulled back, Mr. Akashi announced that there would be no immediate air strikes. He did add, however, that air strikes would probably not take place before 28 April to allow reconnaissance flights and overhead photography to determine that there has, in fact, been practical compliance. Gen. Rose endorsed this judgement not to launch air strikes, stressing that the Bosnian Serbs had taken the military threat seriously and had acted accordingly. He went on to emphasize the importance of the diplomatic efforts, maintaining that "the international community is not going to go to war over one broken down tank which is on its way out anyway." (as reported on Radio 4, 27 April 1994).

With the emphasis now being laid on the diplomatic track, all eyes will be on the "contact group" comprising the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, which will be charged with seeking a comprehensive peace agreement. Agreement was reached in London on 25 April between French, US and UK foreign ministers and Russian envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Vitaly Churkin to seek a four-month cessation of hostilities during which time negotiations on a settlement would be held with Serb, Muslim and Croat leaders. Foreign Office officials said that the agreement would ensure that the UN force was increased by the full 10,500 extra troops which Sir Michael Rose had requested in March, with the United State pledging to fulfil its financial role in this.

Appendix A

United Nations Security Council Resolution 913, 22 April 1994

Appendix B

NATO decisions taken on 22 April 1994

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Other papers in this subject area include:

Defence

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 93/84 | Defence employment 1991-92: a regional perspective |
| 93/88 | Defence Statistics 1993 |
| 93/91 | Defence reviews: past, present? and future? |
| 93/92 | The crisis of democracy in Russia and some international implications |
| 94/26 | Redefining British Foreign and Defence Policy |

International Affairs

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| 94/60 | South Africa's Elections and New Constitution |
| 94/44 | Hong Kong and Democracy |
| 94/36 | The Antarctic Bill [Bill 14 of 1993/94] |
| 94/34 | Intelligence Services Bill [HL] Bill 49 of 1993-94 |