

# **Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy**

**Research Paper 94/131**

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The Treaty on European Union formally came into force on 1 November 1993 and with it the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This paper sets out the structure of the CFSP and developments within it since 1993. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's existing foreign and security pillar and concludes with a discussion of possible reforms at the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. The paper complements Research Paper 93/27, *The Maastricht Debate: The Common Foreign and Security Policy*, March 1993.

A parallel paper, *European Defence Co-operation*, will examine moves towards a Common European Defence Policy.

**Tom Dodd**  
**International Affairs and Defence Section**

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## Introduction

The European Union comprises three 'pillars': the European Community; justice and home affairs; and foreign and security policy. Within the last, the objective of the Union is to "assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence"<sup>1</sup>. It is important to make a distinction between a common European security policy, which formally came into existence in November 1993 and which, perhaps, emerged *de facto* during the 1980s, and a common European defence. The Common Provisions of the TEU speak of the "implementation of a common foreign and security policy" but the framing of a common defence policy is seen only as "eventual" which "might *in time* lead to a common defence"<sup>2</sup>.

Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) itself there are four main actors. As it is an intergovernmental process, the main body is the Foreign Affairs Council, composed of national foreign ministers, acting within guidance provided by the European Council, meetings of heads of state or government, which take place at least twice a year. The Commission and the European Parliament are given supporting roles. Despite its complexity, the TEU failed to define strictly the relationship between these bodies. This has created a tension within the CFSP which has already produced an inter-institutional dispute over its financing and may provoke further disagreements in the future.

## I The role of the European Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers

Within the CFSP, the European Council has the role of issuing general directions for the harmonization and implementation of EC foreign and security policy, including guidelines for matters of possible joint action. Meeting at least twice a year, the European Council operates by consensus only and defines subjects for joint action to be taken up by the Council of Foreign Ministers<sup>3</sup>. The Council of Ministers is charged, in as far as is possible, with reaching a common position "on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action"<sup>4</sup>. On the advice of the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council can decide that some matters should be ones for joint action<sup>5</sup>. The Foreign

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<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on European Union* (TEU), Article B, Cm 1934

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*

<sup>3</sup> Article J.3 (1)

<sup>4</sup> Article J.2 (1)

<sup>5</sup> Article J.3 (1)

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Affairs Council is also empowered to agree by unanimity that certain decisions within a joint action can be decided by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). In short, any single Member State can insist that there is no majority voting on a particular subject and that all decisions connected with a joint action are taken by consensus. However, once the Council has decided that a particular area should be subject to QMV, then all Member States are bound by the decision. This is, however, subject to a number of provisos including a demonstrable change of circumstances which has an effect on the areas subject to joint action, major difficulties on behalf of a Member State in implementation and national action in an emergency<sup>6</sup>.

European Political Co-operation (EPC), the less formalized mechanism for harmonizing the foreign policy of EC Members which preceded the CFSP, utilized consensus only and often resulted in agreements of the lowest common denominator. Conscious of this, the drafters of the TEU included a Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy<sup>7</sup>. This states that "The Conference agrees that, with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member states will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision". It is unclear to what extent this declaration has legal standing. In effect, it may only mean that a single or minority of Member States should, as an act of good faith, only veto a common position when they feel that their essential national foreign and security interests are threatened. However, the addition of this Declaration may have been unnecessary. Given the strict limitations placed on the use of QMV within the CFSP, it is perhaps not surprising that it appears that it has not yet been used. Furthermore, given the concerns over the protection of national sovereignty in foreign affairs, it is by no means certain that it will be used often in the future.

As the European Council and Council of Foreign Ministers only meet on a periodic basis, the latter, albeit, more frequently, the day to day running of the CFSP is conducted by three sub-actors, the CFSP unit in the Council Secretariat, the Political Committee (POCOM) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The Maastricht Declaration on Practical Arrangements in the Field of Common Foreign and Security Policy<sup>8</sup> left definition of the Council CFSP machinery for later discussion. A new framework was agreed by October 1993<sup>9</sup>.

The CFSP unit within the Council of Ministers Secretariat was based on the old EPC Secretariat. It is staffed by a seconded senior diplomat as Director-General and 12 diplomats from the Member States, together with 12 support staff<sup>10</sup>. The Director-General of the unit

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<sup>6</sup> Article J.3

<sup>7</sup> Cm 1934, p. 130

<sup>8</sup> *ibid*

<sup>9</sup> See *Declaration on Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union*, Brussels, 29 October 1993, Annex II, for details

<sup>10</sup> HC Deb 14/2/94 c 556w

is a former British Ambassador to Vienna, Brian Crowe, an appointment which may reflect Britain's role in developing EPC and the CFSP. He plays a key role in harmonizing the relationships within the CFSP between Council, Commission and Parliament<sup>11</sup>. A Political Committee of Political Directors in the foreign offices of each Member State meets to prepare each Council meeting. It also provides a more immediate means of inter-governmental co-operation, being linked by a special telex system, and co-ordinates the CFSP between Council meetings. The Political Directors "monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative"<sup>12</sup>. The Committee of Permanent Representatives to the Union in Brussels (COREPER) is also involved in co-ordinating the CFSP. In particular, it reviews POCOM conclusions or recommendations before they are sent to the Council. The Council also possesses a number of working groups, some discussing geographical areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia, etc, and others considering policy areas, such as human rights, the CSCE and the UN. Many have recently been reorganized as a result of merging EPC with Council groups<sup>13</sup>.

## II The role and influence of the Commission

The Commission has an important, albeit subsidiary, role in the CFSP. A formal link existed between the Member States, in the guise of EPC, and the Commission from 1972. Without military instruments at its immediate disposal, the Council is largely dependent on the economic power of the European Community to give voice to its actions in foreign and security policy. For example, given the Commission's role in external trade policy and resources of development and other aid, Commission involvement in European foreign policy has long been necessary to provide the Twelve with some carrots and sticks. The requirement for co-ordination and consistency between the Council and Commission was recognized in Article C of the Common Provisions on the European Union, with particular reference to external relations. The second paragraph of Article C stated: "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers". The Commission's involvement was more succinctly defined in Article J. 9 which declared, "The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy". As with the Member States, the Commission can "refer any question relating to the CFSP to the Council and may submit proposals to the Council"<sup>14</sup>. Again like any Member State, the Commission can convene a Council meeting within 48 hours or earlier in an

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<sup>11</sup> *The Independent* 16/2/94

<sup>12</sup> Article J. (5)

<sup>13</sup> P. Willaert, 'What future for CFSP', *Courier* 145, May 1994

<sup>14</sup> Article J. 8 (3)

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emergency<sup>15</sup>. In effect, for the purposes of the CFSP, the Commission acts as an extra Member of the Union but, significantly, without any voting powers.

The Commission has sought to provide support for its role in the CFSP through internal changes. In January 1993, with the appointment of a new Commission, the portfolios of the seventeen Commissioners were reorganized. A new Commissioner, Hans van den Broek, a former Dutch foreign minister, was charged with responsibility for external political relations, including the political aspect of enlargement, and the CFSP. As a consequence of these changes, the 23 Directorates-General were also reordered. This led to the creation of a new Directorate General for External Political Relations (DG1A) with around 125 staff<sup>16</sup>. DG1A has developed a system of desk officers, charged with responsibility for relations with particular countries.

The division of EU external policy between political affairs (van den Broek) and trade (Sir Leon Brittan) led to a dispute between them over who should lead EU policy towards eastern Europe and over which Commissioner would control EU offices abroad<sup>17</sup>. Perhaps as a consequence, Jacques Santer, the incoming President of the Commission, has decided to reshuffle the Commission's external portfolios in order to achieve better co-ordination of the Union's aid, trade and diplomatic instruments. From January 1995, responsibilities will be as follows: Jacques Santer will have overall responsibility for the CFSP; Hans van den Broek will retain operational responsibility for the CFSP as well as external relations with Central and Eastern Europe (including all aspects of enlargement) and with the states of the former Soviet Union; Manuel Marin will be responsible for external relations with the southern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Latin America and parts of the Far East; Sir Leon Brittan will cover foreign trade and external relations with the OECD and parts of Asia; and Joao de Deus Pinheiro will be charged with external relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Compared to its important role in certain areas of internal EU policy, the Commission has a limited role in the CFSP. However, the establishment of DG1A offers at least the basis for a European foreign ministry should future IGCs decide to follow a more federalist path for EU external policy.

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<sup>15</sup> Article J. 8 (4)

<sup>16</sup> HC Deb 14/2/94 c556w

<sup>17</sup> *The Guardian* 3/11/94

### III The role and influence of the European Parliament

The EP was granted a consultative role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy under Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union. This gives the Presidency of the Council and the Commission the task of keeping Parliament informed about the CFSP and requires the Presidency both to consult the Parliament and to ensure that its views are taken into consideration. In fulfilment of these requirements, the Commissioner for External Political Affairs makes statements to and can be questioned by the Parliament in plenary session. The latter also applies to Ministerial representatives of the Presidency-in-office<sup>18</sup>.

A key voice for the EP's views is the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policies, one of 20 Committees in the Parliament. It has two sub-committees, one on security and disarmament and the other on human rights. (The Foreign Affairs Committee was called the Political Affairs Committee until 1992.) There is also a separate Committee on External Economic Relations. Since the CFSP came into operation, in keeping with Article J.7, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has issued recommendations for joint action with regard to, for example, the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and on elections in Russia and South Africa.

As in the past with EPC, one of the avenues by which the EP can seek to influence the CFSP is via Committee reports. These can be initiated either by individual MEPs or by the Committees themselves. Committees can hold public hearings, cross-examine Commission and Council witnesses and request testimony from other organizations<sup>19</sup>. In addition, motions on foreign policy are debated during EP plenary sessions.

The EP also has two powers which relate to Union external policy. Under Articles 228 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome, both modified at Maastricht, the EP must approve all EC association and co-operation agreements with third states or groups of states. The Council has recently been forced to delay ratifying a customs agreement with Turkey, negotiated over the last ten years, due to opposition from the EP. The EP has been critical of Turkey's human rights record and, particularly after a number Kurdish MPs of the Turkish parliament were sentenced to prison for allegedly supporting the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party, was widely expected to veto the agreement<sup>20</sup>. (Separately under Article O of the TEU, the EP must approve, by absolute majority, treaties of accession of new members.) The EP also has

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<sup>18</sup> See *Declaration on Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union*, Brussels, 29 October 1994, Annex III, for further details

<sup>19</sup> Jacobs (et al), *The European Parliament*, 2nd ed, pp. 113-115 and, for example, *Prag Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on developments in East-West Relations and the impact on relations between the US and Europe in the field of security*

<sup>20</sup> *The Guardian* 15/12/94

varying degrees of influence over individual items in the EC budget, including EC external funding, and can veto the budget as a whole<sup>21</sup>.

The EP's influence over EC foreign policy is thus limited. However, the fact that it must be consulted on the general thrust of policy and can question the Council and the Commission may give it more powers of oversight over external policy than enjoyed by some national parliaments over their respective executives. Certainly, by raising particular issues, the EP may be able to influence the European foreign policy agenda, but under existing Treaty provisions, can largely be ignored by the Council and Commission. In the short term, the powers given to the Presidency may provide room for EP influence over the CFSP to grow. Certain holders of the Presidency may decide to interpret Article J.7 liberally and cultivate MEPs, perhaps in an effort to create coalitions on particular issues in order to attempt to overcome the opposition of other Member states. If precedents are established, then consultation might be extended further.

## IV Paying for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Council and the European Parliament are currently in dispute over the financing of the CFSP. The confusion arises from the contradictory nature of Article J.11 of the TEU. This states that the EC budget would pay for the (small) administrative costs of the CFSP but that operational costs would either, by unanimous consent of the Council, be charged to the EU budget, in which case the EP would be involved, or be charged to the Member States themselves on a scale to be determined<sup>22</sup>. The additional difficulty with this arrangement is that it cuts across the pillared structure of the Union in that the CFSP intergovernmental pillar is seeking funding for operations from the EC pillar.

In order to pay for the joint action of monitoring of the Russian elections in December 1993, the Council used funds from the Community aid budget. This led to protests in the EP where some MEPs threatened to block the entire future EC budget if usual EC budgetary procedures were not allowed to apply to all CFSP funding<sup>23</sup>. In October 1993, the *Willocks Report on the Financing of the CFSP* put the EP's position. It called, *inter alia*, for CFSP actions to be funded from the EC budget in such a way as to require EP approval for each individual budget line. This is unacceptable to the Council since it would undermine the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP pillar.

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<sup>21</sup> Jacobs, Chapter 12

<sup>22</sup> Article J.11 (2)

<sup>23</sup> *The Independent* 3/2/94 and *The Economist* 4/2/94

In June 1994, the Council was presented with a report on future funding of the CFSP which did little to add to the position in the Treaty<sup>24</sup>. It agreed that CFSP administrative expenditure could be met from the EC budget and stated that operational expenditure might be found either from national contributions or from the Council or Commission sections of the EC budget<sup>25</sup>. In contrast, the costs of the inaugural conference for the European Stability Pact, a joint action under the CFSP, were paid for entirely by France<sup>26</sup>. The draft 1995 EC budget contains some ECU65m for the CFSP (around £45m). Some ECU14m is intended to cover commitments entered into before 1994, ECU1m is to cover appropriations for 1994 and ECU25m for CFSP implementation for 1995. Most of the latter is allocated to fund the EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia (see below). The remaining ECU25m covers administrative costs<sup>27</sup>. Separately, the Council has agreed that costs of CFSP actions, which it is agreed should be funded by national governments, should be allocated on a basis of national shares of EU GNP. The difficulty with these arrangements is firstly that the EC budget will only contain a very small contingency fund for use in emergencies and that the national governments have not created such funds. In short, there is no money immediately available for any sizeable and rapid joint action. Secondly, the institutional clash between Parliament and Council, created by the Treaty, remains unresolved.

## V Joint actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy

On the instructions of the European Council at Maastricht in December 1991, EC foreign ministers began to co-operate on planning the substance of the CFSP. A separate Ad Hoc Working Group on Security, comprising officials from EC foreign and defence ministries, was established to study the specific aims of the security policy. Of particular concern were areas for joint action<sup>28</sup>. Further elaboration of the CFSP took place at the Copenhagen Council in June 1993, two European Councils held in Brussels in October and December 1993, at the Corfu Council in June 1994, and the Essen Council in December 1994.

The Copenhagen Summit focused on Bosnia, the development of new security co-operation with the states of eastern Europe and proposals for a European Stability Pact<sup>29</sup>. At the Brussels Extraordinary Council of October 1993, held in advance of the TEU coming into force, the European Council considered a report presented by the General Affairs Council on implementation of the TEU. This included extensive elaboration of the modalities of the

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<sup>24</sup> HC Deb 22/6/94 c 182w

<sup>25</sup> Source: FCO

<sup>26</sup> *The Financial Times* 22/11/94

<sup>27</sup> *Draft Budget for the European Communities for FY 1995*, Com 94(400) B7-01

<sup>28</sup> Details of the initial two reports submitted to the European Council by these two groups are given in pp. 9-10, RP 93/27 *The Maastricht Debate: The Common Foreign Security Policy*, March 1993.

<sup>29</sup> *Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions*, pp. 15-16 and Annex II

CFSP. In its Conclusions, the European Council asked the Foreign Affairs Council "as a matter of priority", to define the conditions and procedures for joint action in a number of areas. These included: the promotion of stability and peace in Europe (including work on the Stability Pact), the search for peace and humanitarian action in Bosnia, support for the Middle East Peace process; backing for democratization in South Africa, and also in Russia in advance of the December 1993 elections<sup>30</sup>. In a separate annex<sup>31</sup>, the Council announced its first joint action under the CFSP with regard to assisting the flow of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. CFSP action at the Brussels European Council in December 1993 focused on establishing the guidelines for the European Stability Pact (see below). A further set of guidelines were also agreed for joint action with regard to the Middle East peace process<sup>32</sup>. The Foreign Affairs Council subsequently adopted a joint action on support for the peace process in April 1994.

The *Corfu Presidency Conclusions* included declarations on a number of regions of the world including Bosnia, North Korea, Latin America and Rwanda. It offered further support for the Middle East peace process and the newly democratic South Africa. The Council also issued guidelines for two further joint actions. The first was directed towards Ukraine, including guidelines for joint action to support, *inter alia*, democracy, economic reform and denuclearization<sup>33</sup> and the second towards achieving an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the 1995 NPT review conference<sup>34</sup>.

The *Essen Presidency Conclusions* included statements on a number of geographical and policy areas including the former Yugoslavia<sup>35</sup>, human rights, the CSCE, Asia, Latin America, Africa, the NPT Treaty and the smuggling of nuclear materials<sup>36</sup>. However, particular attention was given to central and eastern Europe<sup>37</sup> and to the Mediterranean<sup>38</sup>.

Despite the creation of elaborate mechanisms for joint actions, these have only been used in full on seven occasions to date. Two other positions of significance have been adopted under the CFSP. The table below gives details: -

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<sup>30</sup> *Extraordinary Brussels Presidency Conclusions*, pp. 2-3

<sup>31</sup> Annex I, p. 11-12

<sup>32</sup> *Brussels Presidency Conclusions*, pp. 19-21

<sup>33</sup> *Corfu Presidency Conclusions*, p. 19

<sup>34</sup> op cit, p.22 and RP 94/88, *The Extension of The Non-Proliferation Treaty*, October 1994, p. 10

<sup>35</sup> *Essen Presidency Conclusions*, p. 3 and separate declaration

<sup>36</sup> op cit, pp. 16-18

<sup>37</sup> op cit, pp. 12-14 and Annex IV

<sup>38</sup> op cit, pp 14-15 and Annex V

**Possible Area for Joint Action  
Set by European Council**

**Action by Foreign Affairs  
Council**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| CSCE   | Guidelines on Budapest CSCE Review, October-December 1994                             |
| Disarmament and arms control in Europe   | No action yet   |
| Nuclear non-proliferation  | Joint Action on NPT at NPT Review Conference in 1995                                  |
| Economic aspects of security, in particular technology transfer and arms exports | Joint Action on dual use goods in co-operation with Commission                        |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina   | Joint Action on humanitarian relief   |
| Promotion of Peace and Stability in Europe                                       | Joint Action on the European Stability Pact   |
| Russia   | Joint Action sent observers to December 1993 parliamentary elections                  |
| South Africa   | Joint Action sent election observers to South African elections in April 1994         |
| Middle East Peace Process  | Joint action on diplomatic support, and financial assistance to Palestinian authority |
| Ukraine  | Common position on support for economic and political reform, denuclearization, etc.  |

**A. Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The high hopes of 1991 when many in the EU believed that an independent EU initiative could bring the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to an end, had already dissipated by 1992. In August of that year, the EC abandoned its independent negotiating efforts and set up a joint EC/UN peace mission. Intervention in Bosnia was subsequently further internationalized with the involvement of NATO from July 1993 and greater national roles for Russia and the USA.

Following the entry into force of the CFSP in November 1993, the first joint action agreed was in relation to the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. The European Council asked the Foreign Affairs Council to adopt detailed provisions for joint action within given guidelines. These included, *inter alia*, more funding for relief, the restoration of aid routes to Sarajevo, the reinforcement of UNPROFOR forces to ensure the passage of aid and "the use of all appropriate means to support the convoying of humanitarian aid"<sup>39</sup>. This tough language did not alter the situation on the ground, where European forces under UN command continued to negotiate the passage of supplies with local warlords. Subsequent discussions were held by EU Members, with Denmark and Ireland as observers, within the WEU, which was selected as the defence arm of the EU at Maastricht. At the WEU ministerial Council held in November, the WEU Secretary-General, Willem Van Eekelen, suggested that forces under WEU military command should be charged with clearing the aid routes, by force if necessary<sup>40</sup>. The proposal was rejected. The WEU simply did not have the command and control facilities available to co-ordinate such an operation. In short, the joint action made little difference to EU policy towards Bosnia.

Efforts at gaining a negotiated peace are now centred on the Contact Group, established in spring 1994, which in theory co-ordinates international responses to the Bosnian conflict. The latter comprises national representatives from France, Britain, Germany, Russia and the USA, as well as the EU Troika<sup>41</sup>. The EU continues to support the Contact Group's proposals for a ceasefire and the allocation of 51 per cent of Bosnia to the Bosnian Serbs and the remainder to the Bosnian Croat-Muslim Confederation<sup>42</sup>. The Essen European Council produced a Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia. This, *inter alia*, expressed full support for the work of UNPROFOR and backed the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group. It noted that although the territorial allocations "can be adjusted by mutual agreement between the parties" the integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina should be preserved but, at the same time, allowing "equitable and balanced arrangements for the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities". Perhaps emphasizing differences with US policy on the Bosnian arms embargo, the Declaration also called for strict enforcement of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. EU Members with troops serving in UNPROFOR also decided not to withdraw their forces, at least in the short-term.

The EU has established an administration in Mostar which is intended to assist reconstruction and reconciliation between Croats and Muslims. Headed by an EU official, Hans Koschnik, it is to last for up to two years<sup>43</sup>. At the request of the EU, the WEU has contributed a small police mission to the administration. The mission is not engaged in policing as such but in training and integrating the police forces of the Muslim and Croat communities. A number

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<sup>39</sup> *Brussels Presidency Conclusions*, Annex I

<sup>40</sup> *The European* 25/11/93

<sup>41</sup> *Atlantic News* 18/5/94

<sup>42</sup> HC Deb 7/12/94 c 311

<sup>43</sup> *Corfu Presidency Conclusions*, p. 23

of EC and now EU monitors have operated in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

The EU's diplomatic role in the conflict is therefore limited, whatever the EU's contribution in terms of humanitarian aid and military manpower towards UNPROFOR; around half the troops in UNPROFOR's Bosnia Command come from states of the Fifteen (forces from Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom). Any periodic international successes in the former Yugoslavia have been due, perhaps, to the intervention of NATO and pressure from Moscow and Washington rather than action by Brussels.

## **B. The European Stability Pact**

The European Stability Pact, introduced at the Copenhagen European Council by the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, and further elaborated at the Brussels Council, is the major security policy initiative of the European Union to date<sup>44</sup>. Initially aimed at the countries of central and eastern Europe (CCEE) with the prospect of joining the Union, the Pact will seek to prevent conflict by guaranteeing borders and the rights of ethnic minorities. It will also sponsor separate "round-tables" which will attempt to defuse bilateral disputes and contribute to "good neighbourliness". Those states which violate the Pact may lose their privileged relationship with the Union and reduce the possibility of their gaining EU membership. The inaugural conference for the Pact was held in Paris in May 1994. Besides the eastern European states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Romania), the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the Twelve, the conference was also attended by representatives from Albania, Austria, Belarus, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the USA and the Vatican, as well as from the CSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, UN and WEU. Other CSCE Members were also invited to attend as observers. The conference concluded with agreement on a list of guiding principles and the authorization of two roundtables. The first will address the question of ethnic minorities in the Baltic states. As well as the latter, it will involve the Scandinavian countries, Russia and the USA. The second will cover the other CCEE states and may concentrate, in particular, on the issue of ethnic Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. Discussions have been held in both roundtables. The French sponsors of the Pact hope that they will produce treaties of good neighbourliness ready for signature during 1995, perhaps at a ministerial conference in March<sup>45</sup>. The ratified Pact would then be passed to the CSCE for implementation. The French may have pressed for special EU funds to support measures promoting good neighbourliness and stability at the Essen Council but this move does not appear to have gained support.

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<sup>44</sup> see *Brussels Presidency Conclusions*, p. 18-19 and Summary Report, Annex I pp. 24-28

<sup>45</sup> *The Financial Times* 22/11/94

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Proposals for a stability pact were put forward by France in advance of the Helsinki Summit in June 1992 but were rejected by a number of states including Britain. The EU then, however, decided to adopt the initiative in June 1993. This may be because, by limiting the Pact to prospective EU members, it excludes many of the already or potentially troublesome areas of Europe. Apart from Slovenia, all of the former Yugoslavia is excluded, as well as the Caucasus and, more distantly, the CSCE members from central Asia. As a consequence, the Pact may have greater chances of success. The Pact also brings the prospect of offering some sort of coherence to the various, often rivalrous security institutions with interests in Europe. From a British point of view, the fact that it involves no new institution building is also attractive <sup>46</sup>.

Reactions from eastern Europe to the Pact have been lukewarm. Many hold that quiet diplomacy, for example, the back channel work of the CSCE's Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities, can contribute more to preventive diplomacy than the grand design of the Balladur scheme. All eastern European states appear to believe that their security would be better assisted by more rapid economic integration with the European Union and, more especially, membership of NATO. For some states, such as the Czech Republic, which claim not to have ethnic minority problems or border disputes, the Pact may well be difficult to apply. Poland has also reflected eastern European annoyance at being asked to fulfil human rights criteria beyond internationally agreed standards. Russia also expressed its coolness by not attending some of the Conference's preliminary meetings and has made its preference for other security fora, such as the CSCE and NACC, plain. Only Hungary appears to have been at all enthusiastic, hoping, perhaps, that the Pact might improve the condition of ethnic minorities in Romania and Slovakia <sup>47</sup>. Despite these reservations, it would seem that the eastern Europeans will sign the Pact as at least another step closer to EU membership .

Given the limited aims of the Stability Pact and the fact that it excludes likely areas of conflict, it may well prove successful in helping to preserve peace in eastern Europe. It remains to be seen whether guarantees for the rights of ethnic minorities, probably similar to those already in the Helsinki Final Act, can be enforced and whether the Pact will thus contribute anything to reducing existing inter-ethnic tensions within states. However, the Pact may also have an important internal EU function. It provides the EU with a security policy initiative separate from the divisive, embarrassing and seemingly intractable problem of the war in the former Yugoslavia.

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<sup>46</sup>*The Financial Times* 11/12/93

<sup>47</sup> *The Financial Times* 18/11/93, AN 18/5/94, 27/5/94 and 31/5/94

## VI Common Foreign and Security Policy arrangements with Eastern Europe

As part of the preparations for the eventual accession of certain eastern European countries, the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 authorized the holding of advisory meetings on matters of common interest in each of the three pillars of the new European Union: the EC, the CFSP and co-operation in home and judicial affairs. The Council also approved special "dialogue relating to foreign and security policy matters" with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) with associate status ( Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Every six months, these states would hold one meeting with the foreign ministers of the Troika and one meeting with the Political Directors. The Council Secretariat would also provide them with briefing after each meeting of the General Affairs Council and of the Political Directors. There would also be one meeting per Presidency between the six associates and the Troika at the working group level for each relevant working group. Finally, the Council announced that consultation with the six CCEE would take place in advance of important meetings of the UN General Assembly and the CSCE <sup>48</sup>.

The above initiative was taken further by British and Italian Foreign Ministers in a letter sent to their EU partners in advance of the December 1993 Foreign Affairs Council. As well as calling for closer co-operation with the WEU, the letter also favoured closer links between the six CCEE and the CFSP and Home Affairs pillars of the Union in order "to align their policies and practices more closely with the European Union and to help prepare them for eventual accession"<sup>49</sup>. Anglo-Italian plans for closer links between the CCEE and the CFSP were agreed at the General Affairs Council in March 1994 <sup>50</sup>. They included the possibility of CCEE participation in joint actions and Troika demarches and an annual CCEE summit with the European Council <sup>51</sup>. Since the Corfu Summit in June 1994, these measures have all been put into effect. Practical guidelines were drawn up in October in consultation with the CCEE <sup>52</sup>. EU associates have aligned themselves with certain CFSP declarations and six eastern European leaders (from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) briefly attended the Essen Council. In addition, although none have yet associated themselves with joint actions, it is possible that some of the CCEE may do so in relation to the joint action concerning the NPT review. The Essen Conclusions promised frequent consultation with the CCEE on "foreign and security policy issues of mutual concern" <sup>53</sup>. Enhancements to the consultation process will be outlined at the beginning of each

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<sup>48</sup> *Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions*, p. 19

<sup>49</sup> *The Guardian* 21/12/93

<sup>50</sup> HC Deb 14/3/94 c 475w

<sup>51</sup> *Atlantic News* 9/3/94

<sup>52</sup> *Essen Presidency Conclusions*, p. 17

<sup>53</sup> *ibid*

Presidency<sup>54</sup>. Consultation with the CFSP will form one of the 'structured relationships' preparing the CCEE for eventual accession to the EU.

## VII Strengths and weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Discussion of the effectiveness of the CFSP generally centres on Bosnia. As Mr Hurd has remarked, "Bosnia has been regarded widely as a test for CFSP. Indeed, it is sometimes argued the CFSP has been found to be futile because we have not been able to stop the war."<sup>55</sup> Indeed, the failure may be even more damning since the EC's early involvement in the crisis was heralded as such a success. After the Brioni Accords of June 1991 which ended the confrontation between the Federal Yugoslav government and Slovenia, Jaques Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister and holder of the Presidency exclaimed, "This is the hour of Europe"<sup>56</sup>. Within a year much of eastern Croatia had been devastated by war and a new conflict raged in Bosnia.

Numerous reasons have been put forward for this failure. Above all, a peace settlement is dependent upon the consent of all the warring parties and the failure of independent European action has been shared by the equally limited success of other institutions, such as NATO, the UN and the CSCE. Yet these factors do not disguise the persistent problem which was always visible in European foreign policy making under EPC and still remains under the CFSP: the fact that often deep-seated national differences in foreign and economic policy undermine common EU action. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, EU policy making has been hindered by the differing historical and geographical perspectives of individual Members. For example, traditional German sympathies for Croatia and Greek attachments to Serbia have cut across common positions. Even as war began, the leading EU states, Britain, France and Germany were pushing in opposite directions. While London and Paris wished to preserve a unitary Yugoslav state, Germany did not, resulting in much acrimony before the EC decided to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992<sup>57</sup>. In June 1993, Chancellor Kohl supported President Clinton's policy of lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims in direct opposition to the then policy of Britain and France<sup>58</sup>. At the same time, even despite clarifying its constitutional position on the use of force, for political reasons, Germany has been incapable of sending any troops to join UNPROFOR or even aircraft to join NATO air-operations. Similar problems have been encountered with regard to Greece, although the latter has, perhaps always been a dissonant partner in European foreign policy. Due to Greek opposition, the EU was unable to recognize Macedonia collectively, as is the usual EU

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<sup>54</sup> *ibid*

<sup>55</sup> D. Hurd, 'Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *International Affairs*, July 1994, p. 424

<sup>56</sup> *The Economist* 3/7/93

<sup>57</sup> A. Hartley, 'Reinventing the politics of Europe', *The World Today*, November 1994

<sup>58</sup> *The European* 24/6/93

practice for recognition of new states. As a consequence, in December 1993, the UK and five other EU members recognized Skopje independently<sup>59</sup>. Similarly, Greece is in the process of being taken to the European Court of Justice by the Commission under Article 225 of the Treaty of Rome over its allegedly illegal national trade embargo imposed against Macedonia. A final judgement will be made in 1995.

Others have blamed the EU's limited impact on Bosnia on institutional weaknesses and, in particular, on a lack of political will. Certainly, as with EPC, the CFSP has tended to be reactive. This may, in part, be caused by the limited size of CFSP institutions and the bureaucratic consequences of inter-governmentalism. The CFSP Secretariat may do little more than shuffle paper between the Council, Commission, POCOM and COREPER. CFSP mechanisms may work well when there is a prepared and long-standing agenda, as for example, with the European Stability Pact, but may prove less effective in producing policies in response to rapidly-occurring crises. Despite the procedures for QMV in the CFSP, any substantive decision is and may continue to be taken by consensus. Building consensus between Twelve national governments is often time-consuming. Accelerating collective response times to crises may require the extension of QMV and strengthening the CFSP's core. Moreover, the fact that the CFSP lacks any significant amount of contingency funding may prove a major disincentive to rapid actions. A further weakness of the CFSP is that it has often depended upon the diplomatic resources of the country holding the Presidency. When small states, such as Luxembourg, for example, have been incumbents, they have often been greatly stretched. The creation of the Troika, the support of the Presidency by the previous and next holder of the office, was intended to overcome this weakness. However, the alphabetical rotation of Members through the Presidency has, on occasion, produced clutches of small states. Changes to the rotation, agreed in December 1993 to include the 1995 accessions, will result in a more even balance between large and small states<sup>60</sup>. This is intended to strengthen the Troika and may improve continuity in CFSP decision-making.

On a more general point, it may be easy for national governments to blame EU institutions for their own indecision. In the case of Bosnia, European leaders, fearful of a lack of public support for the number of casualties which might be consequent on large-scale European military action in the former Yugoslavia, have been hesitant to intervene. Perhaps more significantly, with Member states faced by budgetary deficits and a desire to capitalize on a peace dividend resulting from the end of the Cold War, European treasuries may be reluctant to finance the cost of such an intervention<sup>61</sup>. In short, despite the changes brought by the CFSP, European foreign and defence policy is faced with a large discrepancy between declaration and reality. The question is then whether the CFSP and European defence co-

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<sup>59</sup> *The Financial Times* 6/12/93

<sup>60</sup> see *Brussels Presidency Conclusions*, p. 34

<sup>61</sup> *The Guardian* 22/6/93

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operation can become more effective or that "the very notion of a common foreign and security policy was always a utopian chimera" <sup>62</sup>.

Criticism of the CFSP in relation to policy towards the former Yugoslavia may mask an underlying trend towards convergence of external interests. While Members retain historical relationships with countries and regions beyond Europe, the passage of time has weakened the role of European states in their former colonies and spheres of interest. The Commonwealth is now arguably of low value to the FCO, perhaps symbolized by the recent decision to reduce funding for the Commonwealth Institute. Likewise, the recent French decision to loosen its economic ties with its former African colonies, shown by devaluation of the CFA Franc, demonstrates a more Eurocentric foreign policy. German external policy, despite its recently more nationalistic tone, also has its main expression through the CFSP.

Convergence is not merely political but also economic. Increasing levels of intra-Union trade and the impact of the Single European Market have fostered a greater commonality in external economic interests. For example, the Twelve managed to retain a common position throughout the recent GATT negotiations, despite a strong promotion by France of particular national interests. The accession of three new Members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, would seem unlikely to affect this growing cohesion. Although all three possess distinct national perspectives on certain policy issues, all have long experience of active multilateral institutions and are likely to prove constructive contributors to CFSP deliberations<sup>63</sup>.

A wide range of practical co-operation measures takes place between the Twelve. Regular meetings between EU diplomats at all levels may have fed a desire to co-operate in foreign policy in much the same way as, in the past, collaboration between Britain and the USA on bilateral defence fostered the special relationship. Weekly meetings are held between EU ambassadors at the UN and regular meetings are also held between ambassadors in non-EU states. In 1993 EU ambassadors travelled together to Tibet to compile a report on conditions there which was later published <sup>64</sup>. Certain EU member states also share diplomatic facilities in third countries on an *ad hoc* basis. Britain shares embassy buildings with Germany in Belarus and Kazakhstan and with France in Albania. Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and the European Commission are to share premises in Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Iceland and Tanzania. Given pressure on the FCO budget, Britain may well expand this practice. An FCO official was reported as stating, "The co-location of premises and facilities, without compromising the independence of each national embassy, is popular among European partners as they search for ways to meet the requirement for new posts in more and more countries"<sup>65</sup>. Close co-operation also takes place between EU consuls; since the Treaty of

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<sup>62</sup> *ibid*

<sup>63</sup> see RP 94/84, *Enlargement and the European Union (Accessions) Bill*, July 1994, pp. 9-12, for further details

<sup>64</sup> Hurd, p.424

<sup>65</sup> *The European* 6/5/94

Maastricht came into force EU citizens are now able to approach any EU consulate for assistance.

It is also important to note that the CFSP is really only in its infancy, having been in force for little over a year. A distinction should also be drawn between the common positions adopted under CFSP, which in principle do not differ from those achieved under EPC and the, as yet, limited number of joint actions. With the exception of the perhaps overly ambitious joint action on Bosnia of October 1993, other actions may have been more successful. This may be particularly true of the common policies relating to multinational security conferences such as the Budapest CSCE summit and the NPT review conference. At Budapest, many of the reforms agreed to in the CFSP guidelines, such as a code on political-military behaviour, later appeared in the Summit conclusions. Because of the CFSP, the EU is able to operate as a significant bloc at international conferences. Although the EU has only Fifteen full Members (from January 1995), it may be able to double its vote at such gatherings due to the support of EU aspirants from eastern Europe and elsewhere.

States and international organizations beyond the EU's immediate spheres of influence in eastern Europe and the Mediterranean may also see the merit in the CFSP. Many have sought to forge links first with EPC and now the CFSP. Regular dialogue, including meetings at the ministerial Presidency level, is held, *inter alia*, with ASEAN, Canada, Japan and the USA.

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will provide an opportunity to debate the effectiveness of European foreign and defence policy, bearing in mind any lessons derived from the concluded or continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

## VIII The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and beyond

Article N of the TEU contains a provision for a review conference, to be held in 1996, to reconsider certain aspects of the Treaty. In the fields of foreign, defence and security policy, the IGC will review the pillared structure of the TEU<sup>66</sup>; prospects for a Common Defence policy and a Common Defence<sup>67</sup>; and the mechanisms and practice of the Common Foreign and Security Policy<sup>68</sup>. The review will also consider the question of qualified majority voting and, in this context, its application in the CFSP.

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<sup>66</sup> Article B

<sup>67</sup> Article J.4 (6)

<sup>68</sup> Article J.10

Formal preparation for the IGC will begin in mid-1995 with the creation of a 'reflection group'. The group, composed of 15 national representatives with the participation of the European Parliament, will plan the IGC. Although HMG has stated that "It is too early to say what changes to the Treaty on European Union we will press for",<sup>69</sup> initial bilateral discussions have begun between leading Members such as Britain, France and Germany. In speeches and the press EU leaders are also setting out their stalls. It would seem likely, though, that attempts will be made at the IGC to strengthen European foreign policy decision-making and implementation. Discussions may centre on whether this requires further integration of the various European security institutions or heightened intergovernmental and inter-institutional co-operation. A number of differing opinions have been expressed.

Willy Claes, now Secretary-General of NATO, but formerly a long-standing Belgian foreign minister, has put forward proposals for a more integrated CFSP. These may reflect the views of more federalist EU Members. Mr Claes has called for the creation of a common foreign policy authority, merging the CFSP Secretariat with parts of the Commission. This new body would be responsible for CFSP planning and the policy implementation in areas such as peacekeeping, international environment policy and non-nuclear disarmament<sup>70</sup>. This would remove "the unnatural division between foreign policy as such and questions of international economic security"<sup>71</sup>. He has also called for the introduction of various areas for possible joint action dropped during the 1991 IGC, such as industrial and technological co-operation in the armaments field, as well as new topics, such as humanitarian intervention, transatlantic relations, peacekeeping, and relations with Asia. Joint actions in these areas would be potentially subject to QMV.

Italy has also backed the prospect of a more integrated CFSP. In an interview, Antonio Martino, the Italian Foreign Minister, declared that ultimately the CFSP should be handled by common institutions in place of the intergovernmental structure agreed at Maastricht. He added, "The European nation states are too small to wield much influence in today's world"<sup>72</sup>.

The European Parliament has indicated that it desires a greater role in European foreign policy. In return for approving the accession treaties of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the EP secured its participation in the negotiations leading up to the IGC<sup>73</sup>. The *Verde I Aldea Report on Shaping the European Community's Common Foreign Policy*, published in October 1992, outlines some of the EP's thinking. It regarded the present allocation of foreign policy responsibilities between the institutions as "transitional" and

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<sup>69</sup> HC Deb 15/3/94 c 584w

<sup>70</sup> W. Claes, 'Europe: an Unfinished Symphony', *The World Today*, March 1994

<sup>71</sup> *Atlantic News* 3/5/94

<sup>72</sup> *The Times* 7/6/94

<sup>73</sup> *The Daily Telegraph* 4/5/94

"leading ultimately to the full democratization of the process of defining and implementing the common foreign policy"<sup>74</sup>. Recommendations included the opening of more common embassies for Member states, where appropriate, the possibility of a joint European seat on the UN Security Council and the presentation by the incoming Presidency of its foreign policy programme for the next six months. In February 1992, the then Portuguese Presidency examined options for establishing common EU embassies in the former Soviet Union. These ranged from merely sharing buildings and facilities to more ambitious designs for missions with multinational staff and senior posts rotating between the Twelve. Due to a variety of reasons, such as trade and political rivalries, legal difficulties and the problems of intelligence gathering, consensus was not reached. However, the discussions did prompt action at bilateral level and the proposals may be returned to in the future<sup>75</sup>.

In February 1994, the Parliament voted to approve the De Gucht report of the Institutional Affairs Committee on future relations between the EU, WEU and NATO. The Report calls for the full integration of the WEU into the EU once the Brussels Treaty expires in 1998. The WEU Secretariat would then be absorbed into a new Directorate-General of Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence. The merger could presage a new pact between the EU and NATO. In the debate, Joao de Deus Pinheiro (then Commissioner responsible for relations with the EP but from January 1995 one of the external affairs Commissioners) declared that a single institutional structure was needed for EU foreign policy. He added that the EP should be more closely associated with the CFSP<sup>76</sup>. Although the influence of the EP alone is likely to be limited in the IGC, certain Member States and the Commission may attempt to secure Parliamentary support on specific changes to existing arrangements in an attempt to include them in the draft treaty.

Britain, which has been influential in European foreign policy since its inception, has indicated that it favours limited changes to CFSP structures and improved mechanisms for intergovernmental and inter-institutional co-operation. Mr Hurd recently commented on the future of the CFSP, "The danger is that we allow ourselves to be sidetracked from the real business of foreign policy co-operation by becoming embroiled in bureaucratic wrangles over minutiae: process not policy. There is the danger too, that CFSP will develop into a complex and cumbersome system bogged down by bureaucracy and doctrine"<sup>77</sup>. HMG favours development of the CFSP "by consent, not by coercion, and with the flexibility to act and react quickly and imaginatively without the legal and procedural constraints of Community practice"<sup>78</sup>. It is thus keen to maintain Commission (and presumably also EP) distance from the workings of the CFSP. The UK's main proposal for reform is for a strengthened CFSP Secretariat to include a small forward-planning unit which might, for example, provide

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<sup>74</sup> *Report*, p. 6

<sup>75</sup> *The European* 6/5/94

<sup>76</sup> *Atlantic News* 25/2/94

<sup>77</sup> D. Hurd, 'Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *International Affairs*, July 1994, p. 427

<sup>78</sup> *op cit*, p. 428

contingencies for the Council to consider in reaction to a particular event. This would contribute to "a flexibility which allows ministers to respond to fast-moving events ... CFSP should lead from common analyses through common policy to common actions" <sup>79</sup>. France is reported as supporting the main thrust of British proposals for the CFSP<sup>80</sup>. Niels Ersboll, Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat, has also supported a pragmatic approach to the implementation of the CFSP within the Maastricht structure. However, he has found it hard to understand why "even the modest opening in the Treaty to the use of majority voting in day-to-day implementation of decisions within unanimously adopted joint action should still be regarded as a taboo"<sup>81</sup>.

Some idea of German thinking for the future of the CFSP was given in a document written by senior politicians of the CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus and published in September 1994. The document, which contained numerous proposals on the future of the EU, has been endorsed by Chancellor Kohl. It drew attention to the declining ability of nation states to guarantee their own security and pointed to the lack of a US guarantee in security disputes. In this light, it emphasized the need for the Union to be able to take collective action in foreign and security matters, particularly with regard to stabilisation of the CCEE, transatlantic relations, and relations with Russia, Turkey and the Mediterranean. On an institutional level, the document suggested the creation of a common foreign and security planning cell with direct access to national decision-makers.<sup>82</sup>

Given the difficulties faced by the CFSP since Maastricht and the obstacles to advancing co-operation in the spheres of foreign affairs and defence where the protection and promotion of national sovereignty is paramount, the 1996 IGC may make only incremental changes to the common European foreign and defence policies. During a seminar on European foreign policy held in Brussels in April 1994, Poul Christoffersen, a leading official in the Council of Ministers Secretariat, stated that the IGC would be unlikely to lead to institutional reform and that the Union was more likely to have a common currency before the realization of a full common foreign and security policy <sup>83</sup>.

Looking beyond the arguments over widening or deepening the Union, which look likely to dominate the IGC, more fundamental geo-strategic questions may need to be considered. Firstly, given that Finland will join the Union in 1995, the EU will have a joint border with Russia for the first time. Any further enlargement of the Union to include Poland and Slovakia will bring an extension of this border in a strategically more sensitive area, as well as new frontiers with such potentially unstable states as Ukraine. Events in Moscow may thus

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<sup>79</sup> op cit, p. 427

<sup>80</sup> *The Independent* 23/11/93

<sup>81</sup> N. Ersboll, 'Immediate Priorities for the EU', *International Affairs*, July 1994

<sup>82</sup> (see RP 94/115 *The Intergovernmental Conference; Background and Preparations*, November 1994)

<sup>83</sup> *Atlantic News* 3/5/94

become of even more pressing concern to the CFSP after the year 2000. A further facet of enlargement is the impact on the CFSP of the differing national perspectives and instincts which future waves of applicants will bring to Union. Although it may prove relatively easy to accommodate say, Hungary and Poland, within an institutional structure, forging consensus may prove more difficult. The Fifteen have by and large become socialized into a habit of compromise through long experience of active multilateral institutions. In contrast, after decades of Soviet domination, some of the CCEE are diplomatic neophytes. In addition, they will bring their particular national perspectives to CFSP deliberations. For example, longstanding tension between Hungary and Romania is likely to remain long after they join the Union.

Secondly, dealing with Russia may take place within the context of increasing US disengagement from Europe. Recent transatlantic policy differences over Bosnia and the election of a Republican-dominated Congress may have accelerated trans-atlantic drift. In the short term, this may raise the importance of the CFSP in dealing with regional conflicts around the EU's periphery. Europe may need to prepare to meet its security needs increasingly on its own in a continent which, in many respects, is more insecure than during the period of superpower confrontation. In the longer-term, economic differences between the EU and the USA may spill over into the diplomatic realm, leading to policy differences in other more distant parts of the world. In order to maximize the continent's influence on the world stage, CFSP institutions and mechanisms may need further reform. Member states may face difficult choices in the years ahead.

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