

Sanctions against Iraq

Research Paper 94/105

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This paper looks at the history of economic sanctions against Iraq in light of the recent build-up of Iraqi troops on the border with Kuwait and discusses the main issues involved in the eventual lifting of sanctions. Previous papers on the situation in the Gulf include Background Paper 257 *The Conflict Over Kuwait*, Background Paper 261 *The Conflict Over Kuwait: An Update* and Research Paper 93/5 *Allied Attacks on Iraq: Legal Context*.

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Introduction

On 7 October 1994, Allied aerial reconnaissance photographs detected an Iraqi military build-up on the border with Kuwait. The timing of the Iraqi troop build-up was no coincidence. In the week beginning on 10 October 1994, Rolf Ekeus, head of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was due to report to the UN Security Council on Iraq's compliance with long-term weapons monitoring. The elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes was one of the principle preconditions laid down in UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 for the lifting of sanctions. Iraq had recently insisted that it had fulfilled its obligations under UNSCR 687 sufficiently to enable the Security Council to allow the gradual lifting of sanctions and maintained that the presentation of Rolf Ekeus' report should pave the way for this easing of sanctions. Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council went as far as issuing a statement implying that Baghdad might cease all co-operation with the UN weapons inspectors unless sanctions were eased¹. The latest troop movements were interpreted by many at the United Nations as an attempt to attract attention for the lifting of sanctions, a move which has not paid off. During an extraordinary meeting on 8 October, the UN Security Council made it clear to the Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Tareq Aziz, that the world body would not allow itself to be 'hijacked' by such an act of aggression.

The main belief among Gulf commentators is that Iraq's action is sabre-rattling intended to ease sanctions and assuage domestic unrest. As a military endeavour, Gulf analysts believe that it makes little practical sense, since the Iraqi army is not thought to be in a position of sufficient strength to launch a second invasion of Kuwait. Many believe that Saddam Hussein is trying to prove to the Iraqi people that he still has the ability to force a reaction from the international community, an undisputed fact given the scale of international reaction and subsequent troop deployment in the Gulf area. Another motive mooted by some is the desire to remove large numbers of senior military officers from Baghdad to prevent any overthrow attempt from within the military establishment. One Iraqi dissident in exile maintained that this last move was rooted in Saddam Hussein's perception of domestic danger: by moving units of the Republican Guard to the border, Saddam Hussein was seeking to lessen the risk of them being involved in any possible insurrection². According to Allied military intelligence sources, the Iraqi army is riddled with dissent and morale has collapsed due to the hardships prevailing in the country as a result of sanctions. The extent of the problem became clearer on 25 August 1994 when the Iraqi government announced that army deserters, or anyone found sheltering them, would lose an ear and have an 'X' branded on their forehead.

¹ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 5 October 1994

² *Independent*, 10 October 1994

I. The history of sanctions against Iraq

While economic sanctions historically have had limited political success, it appeared from the outset that Iraq was uniquely placed to be influenced by this type of enforcement measure: it was a one-product economy that had recently emerged from eight years of war against Iran; the movement of its principal export commodity, oil, was relatively easy to track and interdict; Iraq imported between 60-70% of its basic food requirements; with the possible exception, in the early stages of the crisis, of Jordan, it could not count on support from any of its immediate neighbours to circumvent sanctions; and there was an unprecedented show of solidarity on the part of the international community³. Given all these factors, Iraq was deemed to be more vulnerable to economic coercion than other target states. In a revised edition of *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, a number of US economists predicted that sanctions would cause Iraq's Gross National Product (GNP) to fall by 48%, noting that the average decline for other successful sanctions has only been 2.4% of GNP⁴.

Sanctions were introduced against Iraq on 6 August 1990 in response to its non-compliance with the mandatory demand made by the United Nations Security Council that it immediately withdraw from Kuwait. UN Security Council resolution 661, which imposed comprehensive, mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq, is a rare example of the imposition by the Security Council of enforcement measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter and constituted the most wide-ranging economic sanctions ever imposed by the United Nations⁵. UN Security Council Resolution 661 decides that all States:

³ UN Security Council Resolution 661 received a very high degree of support, with compliance reaching well over 80%.

⁴ Military Review, January 1992

⁵ This was only the third occasion in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council had imposed mandatory economic sanctions. The other occasions concerned sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and the imposition of an arms embargo against South Africa in 1977.

The objectives of UNSCR 661 appeared to be twofold. The principal purpose was to secure Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 660 and to enforce the principles of international law. The second objective was to coordinate and consolidate the sanctions already adopted unilaterally by several states (including the United States and the European Community) in the days following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and before 6 August 1990. Sanctions have been widely employed in the past as an instrument of foreign policy, most notably by the United States. Such unilateral resort to sanctions for specific foreign policy objectives has, however, been a source of tension as a result of concerns about the extra-territorial application of national legislation. Against this background, there was a perceived need for the Security Council to require under Article 41 that all UN members legislate to common effect⁶.

In the period leading up to the authorization of the use of force, the Security Council adopted further Resolutions to further tighten the economic measures against Iraq. One of these was the authorization of member states with maritime forces in the Gulf to take the necessary measures to prevent breach of the sanctions. This was authorized in UN Security Council resolution 665 of 25 August 1990, which called upon:

"..those member states co-operating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the

⁶ J. P. Carver, "The Gulf Crisis: Does Article 41 have a future?". Unpublished paper delivered to the British branch of the International Law Association on 16 January 1991, in *The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and their Economic Consequences*, *Cambridge International Documents Series*, Volume 2, Grotius Publications Ltd, 1991

Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661."⁷

Others include UN Security Council Resolution 666, which established a system to permit food imports to Iraq and Kuwait in humanitarian circumstances. This resolution emphasises that the economic sanctions are enforcement measures which are very much under the control of the Security Council. UN Security Council 670 extended the measures which states were required to take by imposing a duty to prevent aircraft bound for Iraq or Kuwait from overflying their territory.

II. Temporal scope of sanctions

Paragraph 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 661 states that the Security Council decides "to take the following measures to secure the compliance of Iraq with the demand for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to their pre-invasion position." The Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, albeit by compulsion rather than choice, was complete in late February/early March 1991 with the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. It may have been expected, therefore, that UN Security Council 686 of 2 March 1991 regarding the "suspension of offensive combat operations", would have marked the lifting of sanctions. However, under the terms of paragraph 22 of UN Security Council resolution 687, the comprehensive cease-fire resolution adopted on 3 April 1991, the Security Council determined that sanctions were to remain in place against Iraq until the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission and Fund and the destruction or removal of all Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic weapons. Sanctions were therefore continued beyond the conclusion of the "territorial" dimension of the conflict in order to "encourage" Iraqi compliance with the terms of UNSCR 687. In a recent written answer to a parliamentary question, Douglas Hogg confirmed that "...Sanctions are imposed on Iraq in order to ensure that the regime meets its international obligations."⁸

The UN Security Council reviews sanctions against Iraq every 60 days in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has been routinely renewing them because of Baghdad's continued non-compliance with UN resolutions. The international community has repeatedly stressed that Iraq must comply fully and unconditionally with all the obligations of the ceasefire resolution (687) before sanctions are lifted. Instances of Iraq's failure to comply with the obligations of 687 include a reluctance to identify and destroy its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes; harassment of UN officials and threats

⁷ *S/RES 665* (1990), p.1

⁸ HC Deb, 13 July 1994, c. 682W

to UN surveillance flights; grave human rights abuses of its Kurdish and Shia minorities⁹; tardiness in repatriating Kuwaiti and third country detainees; failure to return Kuwaiti military equipment and private property; small-scale provocations across the redrawn Kuwaiti border; and a refusal to recognise the sovereignty of Kuwait and the international Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary.

III. Conditions imposed for the lifting of sanctions

A. Weapons monitoring

The priority of the cease-fire resolution was the elimination of Iraq's ability to threaten or attack its neighbours, particularly with nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and long-range missiles. Following the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait it became apparent that Iraq had accumulated a far more formidable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems than had previously been realised. UN Security Council Resolution 687, the formal cease-fire resolution, established a "UN Special Commission", now generally known as UNSCOM mandated with the task of ensuring Iraqi compliance with the following stipulations of UN Security Council Resolution 687:

⁹ In his interim report of 18 November 1993, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Max Van Der Stoel, confirmed that Iraq is continuing its policy of repression against both the Kurds in the north and the Shias in the south. One of the most disturbing recent events has been evidence that Saddam Hussein has been draining the marshlands in the south and burning Shia villages.

The UN monitors found their efforts repeatedly frustrated by an attempt by the Iraqi authorities to conceal documentation. During the sixth nuclear inspection of Iraq, for example, the UN/IAEA team reported "conclusive evidence" that Iraq, despite its claims to the contrary, had a "complex, comprehensive nuclear weapons development programme" and that it had made "continued attempts to conceal the true extent" of that programme¹⁰.

B. Recent progress

The work of the "Chemical Destruction Group" (CDG) was finally completed in mid-June 1994, thereby fulfilling an important part of UNSCOM's mandate. Since September 1992, UN teams have been systematically destroying thousands of chemical warheads for artillery shells, missiles and bombs at Iraq's main chemical manufacturing facility at Muthanna. The CDG has destroyed nearly 30,000 warheads, some 350,000 litres of chemical agents and some 1.5 million litres of raw materials. The munitions comprised 3,000 to 4,000 aerial bombs, nearly 13,000 155mm artillery shells and 7,000 122mm rockets filled with nearly 300 tons of mustard gas and nerve agent¹¹. At the sanctions review meeting in mid-September 1994, however, US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reminded the Security Council that there were still significant material gaps in Iraq's accounting of its chemical weapons precursors¹². In a report to the US Congress in June 1994, President Clinton also reported that the United States believed that the IAEA had "effectively disbanded the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, at least for the short term."¹³

C. The root cause of current Iraqi discontent

Paragraph 22 of UNSCR 687 states that the oil embargo would have "no further force or effect" if Iraq was disarmed of its most dangerous weapons and no longer had the capability to manufacture them. Over the past eighteen months, Iraq has shown signs of altering its attitude towards some of the requirements laid down in UNSCR 687, evidenced by its recent acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 715, which provides for long-term monitoring of its weapons of mass destruction programmes¹⁴. As a result, there was a great deal of interest in the report due to be presented during the week commencing 10 October by Rolf Ekeus to the UN Security Council.

¹⁰ *UN Chronicle*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, December 1991

¹¹ *Arms Control and Disarmament Quarterly Review*, No. 34, July 1994

¹² *Middle East International*, 23 September 1994

¹³ *Financial Times*, 11 October 1994

¹⁴ Saddam Hussein attempted to 'depersonalise' animosity with the United States once Clinton assumed office and there was evidence of a more conciliatory approach.

Ekeus' report duly notes Iraq's contribution to and the co-operation in the construction works required to establish the monitoring system and concludes: "If Iraq extends to the operation of ongoing monitoring and verification the same level of co-operation that it has to date in its establishment there can be cause for optimism."¹⁵.

D. Other preconditions for any easing of sanctions

Despite the progress that has been achieved, however, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, insist that Iraq must also comply with other requirements of UN Resolutions, primarily recognising the sovereignty of Kuwait and the inviolability of the UN-demarcated Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary¹⁶.

US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said of recent Iraqi compliance with UN weapons monitoring:

"...this acceptance (of UN Security Council Resolution 715) comes in the context of continued Iraqi rejection of other Security Council resolutions, especially its refusal to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and borders. Defiance is thus combined with a guise of compliance. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the only reason the Iraqi regime is beginning to cooperate with UNSCOM is to secure the lifting of oil sanctions. Once the oil starts flowing again, Washington must assume that Saddam will renege on long-term monitoring and begin rebuilding its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs."¹⁷

Anthony Lake went on to assert before sanctions are to be lifted, there should be a high degree of confidence that Iraq has not only complied fully with the technical requirements of the WMD provisions, but that it will continue to comply indefinitely. It is precisely this confidence which is lacking as to Iraq's broader intentions. Other areas of particular concern include the cessation of internal repression and the repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country detainees.

Before the latest show of Iraqi strength, there were signs within the Security Council that allied resolve on maintaining the sanctions was beginning to fragment. This split first became apparent in the sanctions review meeting in March 1993, when Russia, France and China wanted to issue a statement reflecting Iraq's co-operation with UN Resolutions. France and Russia expressed their support for a formal Security Council debate on easing sanctions if Iraq complied with a six month monitoring test period. Iraq subsequently sought to exploit the diplomatic advantage of these differences by raising the prospect of post-sanctions

¹⁵ *The Guardian*, 11 October 1994

¹⁶ The Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary was approved by the UN Security Council on 20 May 1993 and reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 775 and 833

¹⁷ *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, No.2, March/April 1994

reconstruction contracts. International oil companies have held talks with the Iraqi government about rebuilding the oil sector, notably Total and Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine, both of France.¹⁸ At the beginning of April 1994, a mission from the Arab-Italian Chamber of Commerce also visited Iraq, with representatives of Italian firms such as Fiat and Tecnimont. The Chamber subsequently called for the Italian government to exert all its efforts at the United Nations to lift the oil embargo. Russia has also been exploring the prospects for the resumption of trade and technical co-operation once sanctions are lifted.

IV. Effect of sanctions on the economy and public health in Iraq

Initially there was little independent evidence available to the UN Security Council and the Sanctions Committee as to the effect of sanctions on Iraq. In the interim, however, a limited number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have sporadically been allowed access to provide humanitarian relief for the Iraqi people, which has resulted in an increasing amount of information concerning the internal consequences of sanctions.

A report in a June 1994 edition of the *Middle East Economic Digest* outlined the extent to which sanctions have taken their toll on the Iraqi economy. Reports from Iraq suggest that there has been a disastrous collapse in living standards over the past four years. The chief yardstick for measuring the extent of economic collapse is the national currency: before Iraq invaded Kuwait, one Iraqi dinar constituted 1 US \$. Now, however, in official exchange houses the rate of exchange is \$1 = ID 500 and on the black market the rate is \$1 = ID 600-700¹⁹.

Government rations meet about half the necessary food requirements and to make up the difference people are reportedly selling their belongings to pay black market prices. There have also been several instances of food riots and street demonstrations in areas previously considered bastions of support for Saddam Hussein's ruling Sunni minority. On 25 September 1994 the government reduced rations, blaming a bad harvest and continuing UN sanctions, which has doubled the price of some basic foods. It has been asserted by UN officials that the new rationing system would reduce a person's daily intake of calories and protein by as much as half²⁰. The government raised civil service and armed forces salaries to try to make up the shortfall, but it represents a very modest rise at the present rates of exchange.

The collapse of the Iraqi economy, combined with the shortage of food and the breakdown of essential health services, have had a deleterious effect on public health in Iraq. The question of human suffering in Iraq is an emotive one and becomes more involved the longer sanctions are in place. On 16 April 1994 Iraq urged the international community to persuade

¹⁸ *Middle East Economic Digest*, 24 June 1994

¹⁹ *Middle East Economic Digest*, 7 October 1994

²⁰ *ibid.*

the UN Security Council to lift or at least ease sanctions to avert an imminent health crisis. Iraqi Health Minister Umeed Madhat Mubarak maintained that Iraq is facing an acute shortage and sometimes complete absence of life-saving drugs for heart diseases, antibiotics and all spare parts for medical equipment. Mubarak claimed that sanctions have so far killed over 430,000 people since their imposition and communicable diseases such as cholera, malaria, typhoid fever, measles, whooping cough and mumps, which had practically been eradicated prior to 1990, still constituted a threat to public health²¹. A more recent statement by the Iraqi trade minister estimated that more than one million people had died since the imposition of sanctions.²² This claim cannot be confirmed but humanitarian organisations say that lack of food, medicine and supplies has caused widespread suffering, malnutrition and many deaths.

There are also many people suffering from waterborne diseases, mainly in the north and the south after electric power stations, water purification installations and drainage networks were destroyed during the Gulf conflict. Since many people have no running water in their homes, they have been forced to drink river water. A report by the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) warned in August of an imminent epidemic of typhoid and hepatitis. The report said that patients were already dying of heat-related disease due to lack of electric-powered air conditioning and hospitals were unable to cope with the increasing numbers because of a shortage of medicines, intravenous fluids and medical equipment. In September 1993 Kurdish officials and Western aid workers said that the health system across northern Iraq was on the brink of collapse. Operations put patients' lives at risk because hospital staff have to re-use surgical equipment and cannot sterilise the operating theatres. The Kurds remain in particular danger as a result of Iraq's internal blockade, receiving only 7-10% of their basic food needs from rations. Many in the north live in near famine conditions and are dependent on massive aid from outside for their survival.

The question as to whether the decline in public health in Iraq is a direct result of UN sanctions is debatable, since the trade embargo imposed on Iraq shortly after its invasion of Kuwait does not include medical and other humanitarian supplies. Paragraph 3(c) of UN Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) states:

"(The Security Council decides that all States shall prevent)... The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories *but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait...*"²³

²¹ Reuters, 17 April 1994

²² Reuters, 8 October 1994

²³ S/RES/ 661 (1990), p.2 - author's italics

In addition, Iraq is enabled through UN Security Council Resolutions 706 (15 August 1991) and 712 (19 September 1991) to sell up to \$1.6 billion of its oil in order to "finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines, materials and supplies for essential civilian needs"²⁴ and meet various obligations stemming from the Gulf War. Under this scheme, just under \$1 billion would be available for the purchase of food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies and the rest would go towards a Gulf War reparations fund and to meet other expenses resulting from the war. Iraq rejected the plan as an infringement of its sovereignty, since it requires close UN monitoring of both the oil sales and the purchase and distribution of civilian goods. Iraq maintained that the arrangements for the limited sales were onerous and too stringent and that the total amount of the sale was too small to help the millions of Iraqis suffering under UN economic sanctions²⁵.

Iraq reiterated its refusal of the food-for-oil formula in January 1994. The special UN investigator into human rights abuses in Iraq said on 28 February 1994 that Saddam Hussein's refusal to sell oil to buy food is causing hunger for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis most of whom receive rations to cover only 50% of their basic needs.²⁶ Mr. Van der Stoel rejected the Iraqi government's claim that UN sanctions are causing hunger in Iraq and stressed that if it did not accept the food-for-oil formula, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis will continue to suffer from a shortage of food and medical supplies, with disastrous consequences for their health (*ibid.*). This is the view held by the United States. In his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake maintained, "It should be clear that Saddam Hussein, not the international community, is responsible for their (the Iraqi people's) suffering."²⁷

On 2 October 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 778, which calls on states holding frozen Iraqi assets to seize a proportion of these (up to \$200m in each case) and transfer the money to a specific UN account (the 'escrow' account) to pay for humanitarian supplies and compensation for war victims. Since these programmes were instituted in response to problems Iraq itself created, the United Nations believes that it is therefore appropriate to use Iraqi funds to pay for their operations. Liable to confiscation are the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales that had not yet been forwarded to Baghdad when the Security Council first imposed economic sanctions. The Security Council regards the planned seizures as a temporary measure until Iraq agrees to the scheme drawn up by UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712.

²⁴ S/RES/712 (1991), p.2

²⁵ *Associated Press*, 6 October 1993

²⁶ *Associated Press*, 28 February 1994

²⁷ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994

A report by Dr. Eric Hoskins which was commissioned by Unicef in 1993, however, does blame UN sanctions for the worsening poverty, hunger and disease threatening most of Iraq's population. Dr. Hoskins' report maintained that "The greatest threat to the health and well-being of the Iraqi people remains the difficult economic conditions created by nearly three years of internationally-mandated sanctions and by the infrastructural damage wrought by the 1991 military conflict."²⁸ The report concluded: "Sanctions, unless applied in a manner which safeguards the civilian population, may threaten the more vulnerable members of society - especially children and women. Indeed, it may be that one fundamental contradiction remains: that politically-motivated sanctions cannot be implemented in a manner which spares the vulnerable".²⁹ His conclusion has been supported by Oxfam, which is one of the few non-governmental organisations still working in Iraq. An Oxfam spokesman maintained, "We can testify to the continuing suffering of the Iraqi people and are clear that sanctions are impeding the rebuilding of key humanitarian sectors of the economy in ways that perpetuate this suffering."³⁰ Unicef dismissed the report's findings on the impact of sanctions as incorrect and it therefore remained unpublished.

²⁸ *Scotsman on Sunday*, 18 July 1993

²⁹ *Independent*, 24 June 1993

³⁰ *ibid.*

V. Conclusion

The latest military build-up has only served to prolong sanctions against Iraq. As a result of the differences regarding precisely what Iraq must do to trigger the easing of sanctions, one consequence of the recent situation near the border with Kuwait may be a clearer outline of all the obligations impinging on Iraq. Paragraph 21 of UN Security Council Resolution 687 states that the Security Council will review "the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq", as well as the implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions. An unequivocal description of these "policies and practices may help prevent any future exploitation on the part of Iraq of varying interpretations within the Security Council of the key preconditions for the lifting of sanctions.

VI. Main UN Security Council resolutions regarding sanctions against Iraq

UNSCR 661 (6 August 1990):

Imposes mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Full text in Annex I.

UNSCR 665 (25 August 1990):

Calls upon "...those member states co-operating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661."

UNSCR 670 (25 September 1990):

Extended the measures which states were required to take by imposing a duty to prevent aircraft bound for Iraq or Kuwait from overflying their territory.

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UNSCR 686 (2 March 1991):

Demands that Iraq "Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq."

UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991):

Cease-fire resolution, full text in Annex II.

UNSCR 688 (5 April 1991):

Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to international peace and security in the region and demands that Iraq immediately ends this repression.

UNSCR 706 (15 August 1991):

Stipulated the terms for the limited sales of Iraqi oil and oil products, so that essential civilian needs could be met under strict conditions and with close UN monitoring. The sum to be produced by Iraq's limited oil exports was not to exceed \$1.6 billion.

UNSCR 712 (19 September 1991):

Confirmed the ceiling of \$1.6 billion and stipulated the terms for implementing UNSCR 706.

UNSCR 715 (11 October 1991):

Sets up the terms for verification and monitoring of Iraq's weapons programmes.

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Annex I

Annex II

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