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The International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Bill [HL]

[Bill 110 of 2006-7]

In June 2006 the British Government agreed to allow Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, to be imprisoned in the UK should he be convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special Court of Sierra Leone.

Because the Special Court was not established by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, it is not covered by the sentence enforcement agreement provisions in the *International Criminal Court Act 2001*.

This Bill amends the *International Criminal Court Act 2001* so that a sentence enforcement agreement may be agreed with the Special Court and implemented.

The Bill was introduced first in the House of Lords, where it passed all its stages without amendment before being passed on to the House of Commons.

Jon Lunn and Michael Attenborough

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Summary of main points

On 15 June 2006 the British Government made public its agreement to allow Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, to be imprisoned in the UK should he be convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Because the Special Court was not established by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, it is not covered by the sentence enforcement agreement provisions in the *International Criminal Court Act 2001*.

This Bill amends the *International Criminal Court Act 2001* so that a sentence enforcement agreement may be agreed with the Special Court and implemented. While it is not specifically designed with regard to Charles Taylor, he is the only defendant before the Special Court for whom such a request has been made.

The Bill is largely uncontroversial, given that none of the main political parties in Parliament have so far made any objections to what is being proposed by the Government.

The Bill applies only to England and Wales. It was introduced first in the House of Lords, where it passed all its stages without amendment before being passed on to the House of Commons.

Charles Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes against humanity during Sierra Leone's 10-year civil war in June 2003, when he was still President of Liberia. In July 2003 he fled Liberia, having been granted political asylum in Nigeria. In early March 2006 his successor, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, formally requested Taylor's extradition to Liberia so that he could be handed over to the Special Court. An attempted escape to Cameroon was foiled and on 29 March 2006 he was placed in the custody of the Special Court in Freetown. Concerns about regional security led to an agreement that he should be tried at a specially convened Trial Chamber of the Special Court at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It was also agreed that, if convicted, it would not be safe for him to be imprisoned in Freetown. However, having agreed to host the trial, the Government of the Netherlands was not prepared to allow Taylor to serve his sentence there. This led to the British offer. On 20 June 2006 he was transferred to The Hague.

The trial of Charles Taylor is due to start on 4 June 2007. A verdict is anticipated in 2009.

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I Introduction

In July 2003, facing mounting insurgencies and unrest, the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, agreed to step down and leave the country following an offer of political asylum by Nigeria. He subsequently resided in the eastern town of Calabar, near the border with Cameroon. In the previous month he had been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 10-year civil war (1990-2000) there.

International and regional human rights organisations protested at the failure of the international community to ensure that Taylor was handed over to the Special Court. In the years that followed, they were similarly critical of Nigeria's apparent unwillingness to do so, arguing that Taylor remained a threat to West Africa's peace and security. However, on the completion of Liberia's democratic transition, which involved the country's first free and fair elections, his successor as President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, visited Abuja on 3 March 2006 and formally requested the extradition of Taylor to Liberia, from where he would then be surrendered to the Special Court. On 25 March 2006 President Obasanjo agreed to the request. On 28 March Taylor was caught trying to escape to Cameroon by Nigerian officials. He was placed in the custody of the Special Court of Sierra Leone in Freetown on the following day.

However, concerns were soon raised about whether trying Taylor and subsequently imprisoning him in Freetown might be a threat to regional security. The concern about the trial was addressed by an offer from the Netherlands to allow Charles Taylor to be tried at a specially convened Trial Chamber at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. However, having agreed to host the trial, the Government of the Netherlands was not prepared to allow Taylor also to serve any sentence there. Denmark, Austria and Sweden reportedly also refused a UN request that he be imprisoned there if found guilty.¹ The concern about his imprisonment was addressed by a British offer to allow Charles Taylor to serve any term of imprisonment in the UK. With these issues resolved, following a further resolution by the United Nations Security Council and an order by the President of the Special Court ordering a change in venue, Charles Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 20 June 2006.²

The British offer was formally set out in a Written Statement by the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, on 15 June 2006.³

Since 29 March, former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, has been in detention at the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown, indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed during Sierra Leone's brutal civil war.

Regional leaders and the wider international community judge his continued presence there to pose a considerable and immediate threat to regional security.

¹ *BBC News Online*, "Denmark refuses to host Taylor", 25 April 2006

Available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2006/0425refuses.htm>

² UN Security Council Resolution 1688 of 16 June 2006. Available at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/392/20/PDF/N0639220.pdf?OpenElement>

³ HC Deb 15 June 2006 c69-70WS

An attempt to free him by force, for example, even if unsuccessful, could jeopardise the fragile security of Sierra Leone, Liberia and neighbouring states.

It is for this reason that regional leaders and the international community have supported the proposal to hold the trial outside the region, as is provided for in the agreement establishing the Court.

The Government of the Netherlands has agreed that it would allow the trial to take place before the Special Court for Sierra Leone sitting in The Hague. If acquitted, former President Taylor would be free to leave the Netherlands. If convicted, he would serve any sentence imposed by the Court.

The Dutch offer is conditional upon a State agreeing now to allow former President Taylor, if convicted and should circumstances require, to serve his sentence in that State. Once that condition is met, the proposal to transfer the trial could be discussed again by the UN Security Council, where a draft Resolution establishing a legal basis for transfer is already in circulation.

At the request of the UN Secretary-General, I have therefore agreed that, subject to parliamentary legislative approval, the United Kingdom would allow former President Taylor, if convicted and should circumstances require, to enter the UK to serve any sentence imposed by the Court. This is entirely without prejudice to the eventual location or outcome of the trial. Former President Taylor's right to a fair trial must be respected.

Were the Court to acquit former President Taylor, we would not be required to allow him to come to the UK. Were he to be convicted, and subsequently released after serving a sentence, the expectation at this stage is that former President Taylor would leave or face removal from the UK.

By offering these assurances, we are removing one potential obstacle to allowing the trial to proceed. We are also demonstrating the UK's absolute determination to see the alleged perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes held to account.

The UK has a strong international reputation as one of the world's leading advocates for international justice. We played a key role in negotiating the establishment of the International Criminal Court as well as the establishment of other international criminal tribunals relating to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone itself.

Agreeing to allow former President Taylor, if convicted and should circumstances require, to serve his sentence in the UK sends a strong signal of our willingness to combat impunity by assisting in bringing those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide to justice.

Former President Taylor's handover to the Special Court in Freetown was an historic day for the people of Sierra Leone and West Africa. The international community must not fail them by asking them to run the risk associated with his continued presence in Freetown. It is for that reason that we have decided to take this step.

The UK has been a key player in efforts to support Sierra Leone, Liberia and the wider region, as it seeks to bring an end to the cycle of destruction and violence which it has suffered for so long.

We were also instrumental in bringing peace to Sierra Leone, and have supported Sierra Leone as it has built on that peace, and worked to put the years of war decisively in the past. Our action today will help to close the chapter of conflict, by allowing the trial of former President Taylor to go ahead, which will determine the truth regarding his alleged involvement in Sierra Leone's vicious civil war.

II Why the need for UK Legislation?

Under the *International Criminal Court Act 2001*, the UK is able to sign bilateral sentence enforcement agreements only with international criminal tribunals formally established by the UN Security Council. Unlike the international tribunals established for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, the Special Court was not established by the Security Council. At the time the ICC Act was passed, this was the only way foreseen by which an international criminal tribunal might be established. However, since then a number of what are called 'hybrid' tribunals have been established. These tribunals have been set up following a formal agreement between the UN and a national government. Accordingly, these tribunals have both an 'international' and a 'national' character.

In order for the UK to enter into a sentence enforcement agreement with the Special Court, Section 77 of the *International Criminal Court Act* needs to be amended.

As it stands, Section 77 states [the key passages are in bold]:⁴

77 Application of provisions in relation to other International Tribunals

(1) Section 23 (provisions as to state or diplomatic immunity) applies in relation to proceedings under-

(a) the United Nations (International Tribunal) (Former Yugoslavia) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/716), or

(b) the United Nations (International Tribunal) (Rwanda) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/1296),

as it applies in relation to proceedings under Part 2 of this Act, with the following adaptations.

(2) The adaptations are-

(a) in subsection (1) omit the words "by reason of a connection with a state party to the ICC Statute";

(b) omit subsections (2), (3) and (5);

(c) in subsection (4)-

(i) for the reference to the ICC substitute a reference to the relevant International Tribunal, and

(ii) omit the words "or (2)".

(3) The provisions of sections 42 to 48 (enforcement of sentences of imprisonment) apply, with any necessary modifications, in relation to a sentence of imprisonment imposed by either of the International Tribunals to which the Orders mentioned in subsection (1) above apply as they apply in relation to a sentence of the ICC.

(4) The power conferred by section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 (c. 45) (power to give effect by Order in Council to measures not involving the use of

⁴ Full text available at: <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2001/10017--e.htm#42>

armed force) includes power to make in relation to any other tribunal of a similar character that may be established by resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations provision corresponding to that made in relation to the ICC by the provisions of this Act mentioned in subsection (1) or (3) above.

Sections 42 to 48 of the *International Criminal Court Act*, on the enforcement of sentences of imprisonment, read as follows:⁵

42 Detention in the United Kingdom in pursuance of ICC sentence

(1) This section applies where-

- (a) the United Kingdom is designated by the ICC as the state in which a person ("the prisoner") is to serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the ICC, and
- (b) the Secretary of State informs the ICC that the designation is accepted.

(2) Where the Secretary of State is minded that the prisoner should be detained in Scotland-

- (a) he shall consult the Scottish Ministers, and
- (b) if the Scottish Ministers agree that the prisoner should be detained in Scotland, they shall issue a warrant authorising the bringing of the prisoner to Scotland.

(3) Where subsection (2) does not apply or the Scottish Ministers do not agree, the Secretary of State shall issue a warrant authorising-

- (a) the bringing of the prisoner to England and Wales or Northern Ireland,
- (b) the detention of the prisoner there in accordance with the sentence of the ICC, and
- (c) the taking of the prisoner to a specified place where he is to be detained.

The provisions of the warrant may be varied by the Secretary of State, and shall be so varied to give effect to any variation of the ICC's sentence.

(4) A prisoner subject to a warrant authorising his detention in England and Wales or Northern Ireland shall be treated for all purposes, subject to subsection (5) and Schedule 7, as if he were subject to a sentence of imprisonment imposed in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction by a court in the part of the United Kingdom in which he is to be detained.

(5) The following enactments do not apply to a person detained in pursuance of a sentence of the ICC-

⁵ Full text available at: <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2001/10017--e.htm#42>

- (a) the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47),
- (b) Schedule 1 to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43) (transfer of prisoners within the British Islands).

As to transfer of such a person within the United Kingdom, see sections 44 and 45 below.

(6) Schedule 7 excludes the operation of certain statutory provisions in relation to a person detained in England and Wales or Northern Ireland in pursuance of a sentence of the ICC.

43

Temporary return or transfer of custody to another state

(1) This section applies where the Secretary of State receives a request from the ICC-

- (a) for the temporary return of the prisoner to the custody of the ICC for the purposes of any proceedings, or
- (b) for the transfer of the prisoner to the custody of another state in pursuance of a change in designation of state of enforcement.

(2) If the prisoner is detained in Scotland, the Secretary of State shall transmit the request to the Scottish Ministers.

(3) The relevant Minister shall-

- (a) issue a warrant authorising the prisoner's temporary return or transfer in accordance with the request,
- (b) make the necessary arrangements with the ICC or, as the case may be, the other state, and
- (c) give such directions as to the custody, surrender and (where appropriate) return of the prisoner as appear to him appropriate to give effect to the arrangements.

(4) Where the prisoner is temporarily returned to the custody of the ICC, the warrant authorising his detention in any part of the United Kingdom shall continue to have effect so as to apply to him again on his return.

(5) In this section "the relevant Minister" means-

- (a) in relation to a person detained in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, and
- (b) in relation to a person detained in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.

44

Transfer to another part of the United Kingdom: transfer of ICC sentence

(1) The relevant Minister may make an order for the transfer of the prisoner to another part of the United Kingdom to serve the whole or part of the remainder of the ICC sentence there.

(2) No such order shall be made-

(a) for the transfer of the prisoner to Scotland without the agreement of the Scottish Ministers, or

(b) for the transfer of the prisoner from Scotland without the agreement of the Secretary of State.

(3) An order under this section shall be subject to such conditions (if any) as the relevant Minister may impose from time to time.

(4) If an order is made under this section the warrant authorising the prisoner's detention in the part of the United Kingdom from which he is transferred-

(a) shall continue to have effect, and

(b) shall have effect as if it were a warrant authorising his detention in the part of the United Kingdom to which he is transferred.

(5) A prisoner transferred under this section to England and Wales or Northern Ireland shall be treated for all purposes, subject as mentioned in section 42(4), as if he were serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction by a court in the part of the United Kingdom to which he is transferred.

(6) In this section "the relevant Minister" means-

(a) in relation to a person detained in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, and

(b) in relation to a person detained in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.

45

Transfer to another part of the United Kingdom: transfer for temporary purposes

(1) This section applies where it appears to the relevant Minister-

(a) that the prisoner should be transferred to another part of the United Kingdom for the purpose of attending criminal proceedings against him there, or

(b) that the attendance of the prisoner at a place in another part of the United Kingdom is desirable in the interests of justice, or for the purposes of any public inquiry.

(2) The relevant Minister may make an order for the transfer of the prisoner to that part of the United Kingdom.

(3) No such order shall be made-

(a) for the transfer of the prisoner to Scotland without the agreement of the Scottish Ministers, or

(b) for the transfer of the prisoner from Scotland without the

agreement of the Secretary of State.

(4) An order under this section shall be subject to such conditions (if any) as the relevant Minister thinks fit to impose.

Any such conditions may be varied or removed at any time.

(5) Where an order is made under this section-

(a) the warrant authorising the prisoner's detention in the part of the United Kingdom from which he is transferred shall continue to have effect, and

(b) he shall be returned to that part of the United Kingdom when the purposes for which the order is made are fulfilled.

(6) In this section "the relevant Minister" means-

(a) in relation to a person detained in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, and

(b) in relation to a person detained in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.

46

Domestic sentence current at end of term of ICC sentence

(1) Where a person who completes a term of imprisonment imposed by the ICC-

(a) is still subject to a domestic sentence of imprisonment, whether imposed before or during his imprisonment in pursuance of the sentence of the ICC, and

(b) has been transferred to another part of the United Kingdom under section 44 or 45,

he shall be treated as if he had been transferred from the part of the United Kingdom in which the domestic sentence was imposed, by order under Schedule 1 to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43), on a restricted transfer subject to such conditions as the relevant Minister may consider appropriate.

(2) In subsection (1)-

(a) a "domestic sentence" means a sentence imposed by a court in the United Kingdom, and

(b) "the relevant Minister" means-

(i) where the domestic sentence was imposed in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, and

(ii) where the domestic sentence was imposed in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.

47

Custody of prisoner in transit, &c

(1) The following provisions of this section apply in relation to times when the prisoner is subject to a warrant under any provision of this Part, or any corresponding provision of an Act of the Scottish

Parliament, but is not in legal custody under the Prison Act 1952 (c. 52), the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 (c. 45) or the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953 (c.18(N.I.)).

(2) The prisoner shall be deemed to be in the legal custody of the relevant Minister at any time when, being-

- (a) in the United Kingdom, or
- (b) on board a British ship, a British aircraft or a British hovercraft, he is being taken to or from any place or is being kept in custody.

(3) The relevant Minister may, from time to time, designate a person as a person who is for the time being authorised to take the prisoner to or from any place or to keep the prisoner in custody.

(4) A person so authorised has all the powers, authority, protection and privileges-

- (a) of a constable in the part of the United Kingdom in which that person is for the time being, or
- (b) if he is outside the United Kingdom, of a constable in the part of the United Kingdom to or from which the prisoner is to be taken.

(5) If the prisoner escapes or is unlawfully at large, he may be arrested without warrant by a constable and taken to any place to which he may be taken under the warrant referred to in subsection (1).

In this subsection "constable", in relation to any part of the United Kingdom, means-

- (a) a person who is a constable in that or any other part of the United Kingdom, or
- (b) a person who, at the place in question, has under any enactment (including subsection (4)) the powers of a constable in that or any other part of the United Kingdom.

(6) In this section "the relevant Minister" means-

- (a) in relation to a person who is, or is to be, detained in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, and
- (b) in relation to a person who is, or is to be, detained in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers.

48 Interpretation of ss. 42 to 47

(1) Any reference in sections 42 to 47 to a person being detained in a part of the United Kingdom is to his being subject to a warrant authorising his detention there.

(2) References to such a warrant include, unless the context otherwise requires, a warrant issued under an Act of the Scottish

Parliament authorising his detention in Scotland.

III Clauses of the Bill

The International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Bill has two clauses.

Clause 1 is the only substantive clause. It amends Section 77 of the *International Criminal Court Act 2001* by inserting:

77A The Special Court for Sierra Leone

- (1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone provision –
 - (a) having effect in England in Wales, and
 - (b) corresponding to that made in relation to the ICC by sections 42-48 (enforcement of sentences of imprisonment), with any necessary modifications.
- (2) An Order in Council made under this section must be laid before Parliament after it is made.

Clause 2 reiterates that the Act will extend only to England and Wales. Section 77 of the *International Criminal Court Act 2001* extends to the whole of the UK. According to the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill:

Because the Sewel Convention provides that Westminster will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament, if amendments were introduced that related to such matters, the consent of the Scottish Parliament would be sought for them.⁶

However, according to Lord Triesman, Minister of State for Africa at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, it has been decided that that “it was sufficient for the territorial extent of the Bill to be limited to England and Wales.”⁷

It also confirms the short title as the *International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Act 2007*.

IV Discussion of the Bill

The Bill is largely uncontroversial, given that none of the main political parties in Parliament has so far made any objections to what is being proposed by the Government. International human rights organisations, including those based in the UK, welcomed the June 2006 announcement by the Foreign Secretary.

⁶ International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Bill [HL], Explanatory Notes, para 8

⁷ HL Deb 1 May 2007 c966

A. Media Coverage

There was some media coverage prior to the publication of the Bill. The following article in *The Sunday Telegraph* refers to allegedly leaked official documents in which concerns were raised about the cost to the UK and security implications of offering to imprison Charles Taylor:

A pledge by Britain to imprison the former African dictator Charles Taylor, on trial for war crimes, was thrown into doubt last night as a leaked memo highlighted the potential costs.

The notorious former president of Liberia faces a lifetime in jail if he is found guilty at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The sentence will be served in Britain if emergency legislation is passed by Parliament this week. But in a leaked government briefing document prepared for ministers, concern centres on cost and safety issues.

The memo states: "A possible objection to the Bill relates to the potential cost of imprisoning Taylor in the UK. Some may argue that, with the UK prison system heavily loaded and given the other demands on the UK taxpayer, it is not appropriate to commit government funds to imprison foreign nationals." It says the cost of keeping an inmate in high security detention is "in the region of pounds 44,000" a year [...]

[...] The memo also raises the issue of risk. It says Taylor might choose to remain in Britain after his release, claiming asylum, and that this "might represent a danger to the public or a drain on public resources".

Advising ministers on how best to present the Bill, the memo concludes: "Overall, the argument will be that the Government does not enter into such commitments lightly but that, by making this relatively modest financial contribution, the UK will be making a major contribution to the cause of international justice."

The move comes at a time when Britain faces an unprecedented crisis in both the prison and immigration services and following the debacle over the release of foreign prisoners facing deportation [...]

[...] The Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, agreed last summer that Britain would allow Taylor to be kept in a British jail after other European countries, among them Sweden, Denmark and Austria, refused and no African country was deemed suitable.⁸

B. Parliamentary Consideration

The question of the cost to the UK of imprisoning Charles Taylor was first raised in the House of Commons in June 2006, shortly after the announcement by the Foreign Secretary:

⁸ "Britain will pay high price for jailing dictator, ministers warned", *Sunday Telegraph*, 15 April 2007

Mr. Clifton-Brown: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the written statement of 15 June 2006, *Official Report*, columns 69-70WS, on Sierra Leone, who will bear the costs if Charles Taylor is sent to prison in the United Kingdom.

Dr. Howells: If Charles Taylor were convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and imprisoned in the United Kingdom, the UK would meet the cost. This is in line with established policy for commitments arising from sentence enforcement agreements with international criminal tribunals. It is judged preferable for the UK to meet directly the costs associated with prisoners held in the UK system than to take on the more general, and possibly greater, financial commitment that would arise if all sentence enforcement costs, relating to imprisonment in any state of those convicted by an international criminal tribunal, were added to the tribunal running costs, to which the UK contributes.⁹

The Explanatory Notes that accompany the Bill comment on the financial effects of the Bill as follows:

11. On the assumption that anybody is imprisoned in England and Wales as a result of the change made by the Bill, the annual cost per inmate is estimated to be £44,000.¹⁰

Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Explanatory Notes add that it is envisaged that the Bill will have no public service manpower effects and no impact on businesses, charities or voluntary organisations.

1. The Bill in the House of Lords

The Government introduced the Bill first in the House of Lords as Bill 60 of Session 2006-7. It had its First Reading on 18 April 2007.

a. *Second Reading*

During the Second Reading in the House of Lords on 1 May 2007, no opposition to the Bill was expressed. However, a number of issues were raised by speakers.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick asked whether the Bill would also apply to the tribunal currently being established in Cambodia, which, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was not established by a resolution of the UN Security Council.¹¹

Lord Avebury, for the Liberal Democrats, raised some concerns about the operations of the Special Court and questioned whether the threat to regional security was really so

⁹ HC Deb 26 June c182-3W

¹⁰ International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Bill [HL], Explanatory Notes, para 11

¹¹ HL Deb 1 May 2007 c967. The tribunal in Cambodia was also set up following a formal agreement between the UN and the Government of Cambodia. Accordingly, it is also a hybrid tribunal – that is, it has both an international and national character. The only other example of a hybrid tribunal of this kind is the one that has operated in East Timor. For a fuller discussion of such tribunals, see E. Skinnider, “Experiences and Lessons from ‘Hybrid’ Tribunals”, Paper produced for Symposium on the ICC, Beijing, February 2007, p. 6. Available at: <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/ICC/ExperiencesfromInternationalSpecialCourts.pdf>

large as to justify holding the trial of Charles Taylor at The Hague. He referred to a 'Civil Society *Amicus Curiae* Brief regarding the Change of Venue of Taylor Trial', that has been submitted to the Special Court. Dated 9 March 2007, this challenged the decision to switch the location of the trial to The Hague on a number of grounds.¹²

Lord Avebury said:

Mr Taylor was not said to present any threat to regional stability when he was resident in Nigeria for three years before he was renditioned by President Obasanjo in March 2006, and, as far as I am aware, there were no demonstrations or activities in the seven weeks he was in Freetown before being moved to The Hague on 20 June. I have not been able to find any evidence of the supposed threat, and none was published by the UN.¹³

Lord Avebury also referred to the potential for "conflict between the rules of the ICC and those of the SCSL" and to disadvantages being experienced by defence counsel. He also noted that the Special Court has no funds for the period beyond June 2007 – the month in which the trial of Charles Taylor is currently scheduled to start.¹⁴

In concluding, he added:

[...] if the international community had not unthinkingly accepted the proposition that Mr Taylors's presence in a Sierra Leone courtroom or jail somehow represented a threat to the security of the whole region, the Bill would not have come before your Lordships today. In agreeing to the Bill, we should at least recognise that that assumption itself impairs the possibility that Mr Taylor will receive a completely fair trial and that removing the delivery of justice on African crime to Europe will delay Africa's acquisition of the capacity to deal with the legal aftermath of its several internal conflicts.¹⁵

Lord Howell of Guildford, for the Conservatives, asked whether the Bill was "setting any kind of precedent?"¹⁶ He also asked for confirmation that the Bill was not "hybrid", in that it "deals with a situation rather than person."¹⁷ In addition, he also sought confirmation that there would definitely be no other requests for the UK to imprison others convicted by the Special Court. He went on to ask whether the possibility of 'burden sharing'

¹² Special Court for Sierra Leone, 'Civil Society *Amicus Curiae* Brief regarding the Change of Venue of Taylor Trial', 9 March 2007. A copy is available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request. The Brief is discussed in more detail later in the Paper.

¹³ HL Deb 1 May 2007, c971. Global Witness published a report in 2005 that argued that Charles Taylor presented an ongoing threat to regional security from exile in Nigeria. The issue, following his transfer to Freetown in March 2006, became whether he might be able to continue with activities that threatened to destabilise the region despite being in the custody of the Special Court. See Global Witness, *A Time for Justice*, June 2005

Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/2005/06taylor_gw.pdf

¹⁴ HL Deb 1 May 2007 c971-2

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, c972

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, c973

¹⁷ *Ibid.* Hybrid bills are public bills which are considered to affect specific private or local interests, in a manner different from the private or local interests of other persons or bodies of the same class. They are subject to special procedures allowing the people affected to object. See the 2007 *Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide to the Proceedings of the House of Lords*, 7.206-13

Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldcomp/compos.htm>

among ICC Member States had been discussed with regard to the annual cost to the UK of imprisoning Charles Taylor.¹⁸

He raised two other questions:

If a decision were taken for early release – I have absolutely no grounds for believing that such a thing could arise – who exactly would take that decision? I presume that it would be the court, but the court might not exist some years ahead, so would some residual capacity handle that matter? We must also ask what happens when the sentence comes to an end. Could the person concerned [...] claim political asylum if and when he was released from prison at the end of his sentence? Is that likely? Has that been thought about?¹⁹

Replying, Lord Triesman declared that, overall, ‘hybrid’ tribunals such as the Special Court had been “a success”. With regard to the Cambodia tribunal, he stated that “it is absolutely not our intention to imprison any individuals convicted in that trial.” With regard to other trials before the Special Court, he said that “we have no expectation” that requests will be made to imprison in the UK any other defendants who may be convicted. But he added that the Bill “does not totally exclude the possibility.”²⁰ He went on to acknowledge that issues of “financial security” were important. He confirmed that the UK had just made a further payment of £2 million to the Special Court and expressed confidence that, “with our contribution we are beginning to see the kinds of provision that will be necessary to give it the financial stability that has been sought.”²¹

Lord Triesman disagreed with Lord Avebury over whether the decision to move Charles Taylor to The Hague for trial was justified:

The decision to arrange the move was certainly not taken unthinkingly; on the contrary, we pondered every detail of it long and hard, because we foresaw the question coming up of whether a trial conducted locally would have more impact on the people who had been directly affected.²²

He went on:

The trigger to get Charles Taylor out of Nigeria and to Freetown was the request of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf [the President of Liberia].²³

On certain issues raised by Lord Howell of Guildford, Lord Triesman said:

[...] if we had named Charles Taylor, we would have been right in the territory of hybrid Bills, and thus in all the difficulties that such Bills can create. I can confirm completely that this is not a hybrid Bill [...].²⁴

¹⁸ HL Deb 1 May 2007 c973

¹⁹ *ibid.*, c974

²⁰ *ibid.*, c975

²¹ *ibid.*, c976

²² *ibid.*, c976

²³ *ibid.*, c977

²⁴ *ibid.*, c975

[...] We have not asked to share costs, principally because others are sharing the burdens in response to other trials [...] I think it wholly unlikely that there will be an early release, but my understanding is that the international court system will make that determination. However, that can certainly be clarified [...] Any decision on asylum would plainly be made in the light of circumstances at the time, but if Taylor were to be convicted by the special court and if he served his sentence in the UK and was then released, I would expect him to leave the United Kingdom or face immediate removal.²⁵

The Bill passed its Second Reading without a vote and was committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

b. Committee of the Whole House

No amendments were set down to the Bill and no Member of the Lords indicated that they wished to speak in Committee. The order of commitment was discharged on 15 May 2007.²⁶

c. Third Reading

The Bill passed its Third Reading in the Lords without further debate on 22 May 2007 and was then passed onto the House of Commons.²⁷

V The Special Court for Sierra Leone

The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations following a formal agreement between them in January 2002, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000. Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000 spoke of the establishment of “an independent special court”. This preference partly reflected what analysts have called “tribunal fatigue” – there had been growing concern about the high costs, slow progress and remoteness of *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).²⁸

While it is classified as an international judicial institution, it was agreed that by the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone that the Special Court should have both an international and a national character. Its jurisdiction includes both international and

²⁵ HL Deb 1 May 2007 c977-8

²⁶ HL Deb 15 May 2007 c129

²⁷ HL Deb 22 May 2007 c573

²⁸ E. Skinnider, “Experiences and Lessons from ‘Hybrid’ Tribunals”, Paper produced for Symposium on the ICC, Beijing, February 2007, p. 6. Available at:

<http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/ICC/ExperiencesfromInternationalSpecialCourts.pdf>

The establishment of a permanent ICC, with the power to investigate and prosecute individuals alleged to have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity from 1 July 2002 (the date on which the Rome Statute came into force) is intended to reduce the need for *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals in future.

Sierra Leonean law.²⁹ It was hoped that this ‘hybridity’ would help to ensure that Sierra Leoneans, including victims of human rights violations, would feel stronger ‘ownership’ of the Special Court than their equivalents had felt about the ICTR and ICTY. In turn, this would strengthen both its effectiveness and legitimacy. As part of efforts to ensure that the Special Court would not be too expensive, it was also agreed that it would be funded by voluntary contributions from Member States. The ICTR and ICTY have been funded by mandatory contributions.

The Special Court was mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone after 30 November 1996.³⁰ It was hoped that the focus on ‘greatest responsibility’ and the decision not to cover the period of the entire civil war, which began in earnest in 1991, would ensure that the Special Court tried a limited number of high-ranking individuals and finished its work quickly. It was envisaged that the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission would provide a degree of restorative justice for the vast majority of victims of human rights violations during the civil war by calling a wider range of alleged perpetrators to appear before it and by producing a credible account of the root causes of the conflict.

The following ‘basic facts’ about the Special Court of Sierra Leone are taken from a pamphlet produced by the Special Court:

Who has been indicted so far?

Currently, 11 people stand indicted: Charles Taylor, Johnny Paul Koroma, Issa Sesay, Alex Tamba Brima, Morris Kallon, Moinina Fofana, Augustine Gbao, Samuel Hinga Norman, Allieu Kondewa, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu. They are charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international humanitarian law. Specifically, the crimes include murder, rape, extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, sexual slavery, conscription of children into an armed force, forced marriage and attacks on United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance workers, among others. Indictments against two other accused, Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, were withdrawn after the deaths of those two men.

What is to happen to the indictees?

All but one of the indictees - Johnny Paul Koroma - are in the custody of the Special Court in Freetown. Although individually charged, they have been grouped into four separate trials.

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) trial consisting of Kallon, Gbao and Sesay began on 5 July 2004. The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) trial consisting of Norman, Fofana and Kondewa commenced on 3 June 2004. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) trial began in March 2005. Charles Taylor was transferred to the Special Court in March 2006 and his trial is pending. All ten individuals have pleaded not guilty and are provided with defence representation paid for by the Registry of the Special Court. The Defence teams are comprised of both Sierra Leonean and international lawyers. If the indictees are found guilty,

²⁹ A. Cassese, “Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, Submitted by the Independent Expert, 12 December 2006, p. 8. Available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request.

³⁰ For the full text of the Statute of the Special Court, see: <http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html>

they may be sentenced to prison terms and/or have their property and possessions taken from them. The Judges cannot impose the death penalty.³¹

Trials began in 2004. Each individual is being tried before 11 judges, two of whom currently are Sierra Leone nationals. The trials of six of the indictees have been completed and the first verdicts are expected later in 2007. The Special Court has produced a 'completion strategy', which includes plans to leave a positive legacy for Sierra Leone after it has wound down its work. It is now due to finish in 2009.³²

It should be noted that, since the publication of the above leaflet, another detainee has died in custody. Sam Hinga Norman died in February 2007 while recovering from medical treatment in Dakar, Senegal. As a result, the Special Court is now trying a total of nine people. Norman was a popular figure with large sections of the Sierra Leonean population. In January 2007 he had urged people to support one of the opposition parties in the elections in August 2006, rather than the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party, of which he had been a powerful leader.³³ The Special Court launched an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his death, which to our knowledge has not yet reported. However, an autopsy announced that Norman died of natural causes.³⁴

The British Government, along with the US, Canada and the Netherlands, has been a strong supporter of the Special Court, including in terms of providing voluntary contributions. The UK is a member of the Management Committee of the Special Court.

The performance of the Special Court has been subject to criticism on various grounds. Criticism has revolved mainly around the following four issues: the difficulty of obtaining sufficient voluntary contributions from States; excessive cost; the slowness of the judicial process; and alleged failures to generate a genuine sense of 'ownership' on the part of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. In addition, there were concerns in some quarters about the negative impact of the Special Court on the credibility and effectiveness of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission during the period (2003-2005) when both were operating at the same time.³⁵

The budget for the Special Court for 2007 has increased by comparison with previous years, with approximately \$33 million required. This will meet additional costs involved in establishing the Court at The Hague. However, it is expected that the budgets for 2008

³¹ 'Basic Facts' pamphlet. Available on 31 May 2007 at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/about.html>

³² *Third Annual Report (January 2005-January 2006) of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*. Available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/specialcourtannualreport2005-2006.pdf>. The Completion Strategy is available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/completionstrategy.pdf>

³³ For a fuller discussion of the current situation in Sierra Leone, see Library Standard Note 4272, 2 March 2007, *Sierra Leone as Elections Approach*

³⁴ <http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-032807.pdf>

³⁵ See, for example, International Crisis Group, "The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promise and Pitfalls of a 'New Model'", *Africa Briefing No. 16*, 4 August 2003
Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1803&l=1>

Also see the report by the Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation, *Searching for Truth in Sierra Leone: An Initial Study of the Performance and Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, 2 March 2003. Available at: <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/32427>

and 2009 will be significantly lower.³⁶ Although definitive figures do not appear to be available, it seems likely that the Special Court will have cost well over \$100 million by the end of 2007.³⁷ However, there have been regular reports of the Special Court suffering from shortages of funds.³⁸

During the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Avebury referred to a report on the Special Court by Antonio Cassese. Cassese was appointed by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as an Independent Expert with a mandate to review the efficiency of the Special Court. His report was submitted in December 2006 and makes a range of recommendations. The report is not yet an official UN Document and is not currently available on the UN website. However, it is in the public domain and a copy can be obtained on request from the House of Commons Library.³⁹

It should be noted that Chapter VI of the Cassese Report discusses 'Problems relating to the Taylor Trial in The Hague'.⁴⁰

The 'Civil Society *Amicus Curiae* Brief regarding the Change of Venue of Taylor Trial' – as discussed above – directly addresses the issue of 'ownership'. It argues that, by deciding to transfer the trial to The Hague without adequate consultation with civil society in Sierra Leone, the trial will lose much of its impact and relevance within the region. Specifically, the Brief claims:

[...] the people, in whose name the Court is said to be rendering justice, are being denied the opportunity to monitor and participate in the process.⁴¹

The Brief quotes a spokesperson for Human Rights Watch, who expressed the following concern in mid 2006:

Now that Taylor is in The Hague, there is a real risk that his trial will feel distant and less meaningful to the people most affected by the crimes.⁴²

However, there is no prospect of the Special Court changing its mind and deciding that the Taylor trial should take place in Freetown after all.

³⁶ UN Press Release, "Press conference by Prosecutor for Special Court for Sierra Leone", 30 January 2007. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070130_Rapp.doc.htm

³⁷ As a point of comparison, the cost of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was about \$4.1 million.

³⁸ For the most recent such report, see: "Cash crisis hits war-crimes trial", *The Times*, 31 May 2007

³⁹ A. Cassese, "Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone", Submitted by the Independent Expert, 12 December 2006. Available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*

⁴¹ Special Court for Sierra Leone, 'Civil Society Amicus Curiae Brief regarding the Change of Venue of Taylor Trial', 9 March 2007

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 6. Original source is: Human Rights Watch, "Charles Taylor: Hague Trial must be accessible to West Africans", Press Release, 21 June 2006. The organisation was not opposing the change of venue *per se*. The spokesperson went on to say, "The Court will need to ensure that the trial is accessible to people in Sierra Leone and across West Africa."

Available at: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/20/liberi13590.htm>

VI The Case against Charles Taylor

Below is an extract from the Special Court's web page on the case against Charles Taylor:

Charles Taylor was indicted on 7 March 2003 on 17 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The indictment was amended on 16 March 2006 to 11 counts. He was taken into custody by the Special Court on 29 March 2006. His initial appearance took place on 3 April 2006 before Justice Richard Lussick. Following a resolution by the United Nations Security Council and an order by the President of the Special Court ordering a change in venue, Charles Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 20 June 2006. Status Conferences took place on 21 July 2006 and 22 September 2006. The next Status Conference is scheduled for 26 January.⁴³ A tentative date for the start of the trial has been set for 4 June 2007.

This start date has now been confirmed, following the rejection of an appeal by the defence to delay it to September. Speaking earlier in the year, the Prosecutor for the Special Court, Stephen Rapp, said that he expects that the trial will be completed in 12 to 18 months, with a verdict taking a further three months. If there is an appeal, he envisages it taking six to seven months.⁴⁴

Below is a summary of the charges against Charles Taylor:⁴⁵

The Accused

Charles Ghankay Taylor, the former President of Liberia, was indicted on 7 March 2003 on a 17-count indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (commonly known as war crimes), and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The indictment was ordered kept under seal. The Prosecutor unsealed the indictment on 4 June 2003, during Taylor's first trip out of Liberia since the signing of the indictment.

On 16 March 2006 a Judge of the Special Court approved an amended indictment reducing the number of counts to 11.

The Charges

Charles Taylor faces an 11-count indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

*1 = Crimes Against Humanity

*2 = Violation of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (war crimes)

*3 = Other serious violation of international humanitarian law

Terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments

⁴³ The third pre-trial Status Conference did take place on that day. Copies of the transcripts of the three Conferences are available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/Taylor-transcripts.html>

⁴⁴ UN Press Release, "Press conference by Prosecutor for Special Court for Sierra Leone", 30 January 2007. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070130_Rapp.doc.htm

⁴⁵ Available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/Taylorcasesummary.html>

1. Acts of terrorism. *2

Unlawful killings

2. Murder *1

3. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder *2

Sexual violence

4. Rape *1

5. Sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence *1

6. Outrages upon personal dignity *2

Physical violence

7. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment *2

8. Other inhumane acts *1

Use of child soldiers

9. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities *3

Abductions and forced labour

10. Enslavement *1

Looting

11. Pillage *2

The amended indictment is available in full at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-75.pdf>

VII Charles Taylor – A Brief Biography

For brief biographical information about Charles Taylor, see the following CNN profile from 2003:

Charles Taylor: A wanted man

(CNN) --Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor -- known as "Pappy" to his band of child soldiers -- is a wanted man in West Africa.

Taylor, who has been accused by human rights groups of masterminding regional conflicts, was indicted in June by a U.N.-backed war crimes court in neighboring Sierra Leone on charges he armed and trained rebels in exchange for diamonds. During the country's 10 years of civil war, an estimated 50,000 people died.

According to Amnesty International, Sierra Leone's civil war "was characterized by some of the worst abuses known: widespread deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians, torture, including rape and deliberate amputation of limbs, and abduction and forced recruitment of large numbers of people, including children." [...]

Taylor was born in 1948 -- the third of 15 children of Americo-Liberian parents, descendants of the freed American slaves who established the Liberian republic in the 19th century.

His father sent him to the United States, where he obtained a degree in economics from Bentley College in Massachusetts.

He became involved in radical Liberian student politics. Influenced by Marxist and Pan-African ideas, he once advocated burning down the Liberian Embassy in Washington. He earned cash in his spare time working on a production line at a toy factory.

He became a teacher and was part of dictator Samuel Doe's government in 1980 before being exiled to the United States.

In the United States he was jailed for allegedly stealing \$900,000 in Liberian government funds -- only to escape from a Massachusetts prison, along with four petty criminals, in 1985 after a year in captivity.

In 1989, he returned to West Africa and launched a revolt from the Ivory Coast against Doe, an ethnic Krahn who had taken power in a military coup.

Taylor's campaign turned into an ethnic conflict, with seven factions fighting for control of the country and its resources -- particularly iron ore, timber and rubber.

Taylor's forces included children, often dressed in costumes and blond wigs. Often under the influence of drugs, they were noted for their brutality.

An estimated 200,000 people were killed in that phase of the war, and more than 1 million were forced from their homes.

The United Nations, United States, African Union and Economic Community of West African States mediated a peace of sorts in 1996.

Taylor's faction emerged from the fighting as the dominant force, and when special elections were held in 1997, he and his National Patriotic Party won an overwhelming victory.⁴⁶

VIII Further Reading

Africa Research Bulletin, "Sierra Leone: Special Court criticised", Vol. 44, No. 3, April 2007 [Available on request]

Amnesty International, "Special Court for Sierra Leone: Issues for Consideration Regarding the Location of the Trial of Charles Taylor", 5 April 2006

[Available at:

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2006/0405location.htm>]

Antonio Cassese, "Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone", 12 December 2006 [Available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request]

Laura Dickinson, "The Promise of Hybrid Courts", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 2, April 2003), pp. 295-310 [Available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request]

Global Witness, *A Time for Justice*, June 2005

[Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/2005/06taylor_gw.pdf]

Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and R. Hazelton, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000

[Available at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/heartmatter.html>]

Institute of War and Peace Reporting, "Turf War over Taylor Trial", 23 March 2007

[Available at:

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2007/0323turfwar.htm>]

⁴⁶ "Charles Taylor: A wanted man", *CNN.com*, 4 December 2003

Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/10/liberia.taylor/index.html>

International Crisis Group, "The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promise and Pitfalls of a 'New Model'", *Africa Briefing No. 16*, 4 August 2003

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International Development Select Committee, *Minutes of Evidence on the Operation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*, HC 548, 2002-3, 1 May 2003. [Available at:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmintdev/548/3031801.htm>]

Inter Press Service, "Mixed Feelings over Charles Taylor's Transfer to The Hague", 20 June 2006

[Available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/2006/0620mixedfeelings.htm>]

Tim Kelsall, "Politics, Anti-Politics, International Justice: Language and Power in the Special Court for Sierra Leone", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2006

[Available at: <http://ejournals.ebsco.com/direct.asp?ArticleID=44C692E9548D39B589FA>]

E. Skinnider, "Experiences and Lessons from 'Hybrid' Tribunals", Paper produced for Symposium on the ICC, Beijing, February 2007, p. 6

[Available at:

<http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/ICC/ExperiencesfromInternationalSpecialCourts.pdf>]

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Official Website

[Available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org/>]

Special Court for Sierra Leone, 'Civil Society *Amicus Curiae* Brief regarding the Change of Venue of Taylor Trial', 9 March 2007

[Available from Jon Lunn, House of Commons Library, on request]