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Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report

The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 set out the key objectives of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Since then the Portuguese and French Presidencies have been tasked with transforming these aspirations into military reality. Work has concentrated on the identification of military capabilities, the development of EU military institutions, and establishing EU/NATO relations.

This paper provides an update on the progress made over the past ten months in developing the CESDP, and gives an insight into the shape of the policy likely to emerge at the Nice Summit in December 2000.

The background to the CESDP is discussed in Library Research Paper 00/20, *European Defence: From Pörtlach to Helsinki*, 21 February 2000. There have also been recent reports on European defence by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee and the House of Lords European Union Select Committee.

Mark Oakes

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Summary of main points

The European Council at Helsinki in December 1999 effectively launched what is now termed the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP- also referred to as the ESDP). The two main proposals made at Helsinki were the development of rapidly deployable European military capabilities to undertake humanitarian and peacekeeping roles (the headline goal), and the establishment of new EU security institutions. The Portuguese and French Presidencies were tasked with turning the Helsinki proposals into reality.

Key developments over the past ten months have included:

- The establishment of new interim political and military institutions comprising:
 - interim Political and Security Committee.
 - interim Military Committee/Body.
 - Military Staff.

- The development of ties with NATO through:
 - the setting up of joint EU/NATO Committees.
 - meeting of the iPSC with the North Atlantic Committee.
 - meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and EU Parliament.

- Work towards identifying EU military capabilities through:
 - the formulation of a Collective Catalogue of Capabilities.
 - the establishment of a Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20 November 2000.

- Encouragement of the involvement of non-EU European countries in EU-led operations.
- Work towards the development of a civilian crisis-management force of 5,000 police.

The UK Government is committed to the success of the CESDP while the Conservative Party remains highly sceptical of the whole process, regarding it as a danger to the effectiveness of NATO. The US continues to offer cautious encouragement to the CESDP while placing priority on maximising the involvement of NATO in the development of the policy.

This paper provides an update on the progress made over the past ten months in developing the CESDP and provides an analysis of the shape of the policy likely to emerge at the conclusion of the French Presidency at the Nice Summit in December 2000.

N.B This paper does not look in detail at the civilian aspects of crisis management.

CONTENTS

I	Background – The Helsinki Proposals	7
	1. The Headline Goal	7
	2. New Political and Military Bodies	8
	3. Interim bodies	10
II	Developments under the Portuguese and French Presidencies	11
	A. The Headline and Collective Capabilities Goals	13
	1. The Headline Goal	14
	2. Collective Capabilities Catalogue and Conference	17
	B. Institution Building and Decision-making Structure	19
	1. New EU Permanent Political and Military Bodies	19
	2. EU/NATO Relations	25
	3. Involvement of third states in EU military crisis management	29
	4. The WEU and Treaty amendment	31
III	US Reaction	33
IV	Conclusions	35
	Appendix I: Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999	37
	Appendix II: Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting, Sintra, 28 February, 2000.	39
	Appendix III: Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.	45
	Appendix IV: Chart of NATO and the European Pillar	60

I Background – The Helsinki Proposals

The developments in European defence co-operation during 1998 and 1999 culminated in the proposals for a ‘Common European Security and Defence Policy’ (CESDP) made at the Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999 (for details of the events leading up to Helsinki, see Library Research Paper 00/20, *European Defence: From Pörschach to Helsinki*, 21 February 2000). The European Council meeting laid out the European Union’s (EU) defence agenda for the next three years. The two main items on this agenda were, the development of rapidly deployable European military capabilities, known as the ‘Headline Goal’ and, the establishment within the EU of new political and military bodies to provide the political and strategic control of the new military assets.

1. The Headline Goal

Annex IV to the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council states that:

To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks,¹ the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.²

These military capabilities were outlined as follows:

To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.

¹ The Petersberg Tasks refer to limited military operations such as humanitarian intervention, crisis management and peacekeeping. These were agreed at a ministerial meeting of the WEU in Petersberg, near Bonn on 19 June 1992.

² Annex IV of the Helsinki Council Presidency Conclusions - “Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”, 10 and 11 December 1999.

This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.³

This will not be a standing force but instead will represent a European framework for military crisis management that aims to facilitate the more efficient use of existing units and support assets. The Helsinki Council was keen to stress that NATO would remain “the foundation of the collective defence of its members”.⁴ Moreover, the Presidency Conclusions state that the CESDP, “will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army”.⁵

Member States also decided to develop collective capabilities in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. The specific areas for development were identified as:

- to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
- to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
- to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
- to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
- to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.⁶

2. New Political and Military Bodies

The Helsinki proposals include the establishment of three new political and military bodies working to the Council of Ministers. The management of defence will be conducted on an inter-governmental basis with decisions to deploy military forces for EU missions coming from individual Member States rather than from the Commission or European Parliament (EP). The new institutions will operate through the office of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) of the Council, Mr Javier Solana. The new bodies will “ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction” for

³ Annex I to Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions - “Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”.

⁴ Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions - “Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”.

⁵ Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, paragraph 27.

⁶ *ibid*

military operations.⁷ The Annex to the Presidency Conclusions outlines these permanent institutions as follows:

- a) A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence.⁸ In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.
- b) The [European] Military Committee (EMC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.
- c) The [European] Military Staff (EMS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of the EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

Essentially the PSC, which is to meet once a week, will exercise the political control and strategic direction of military operations in a crisis. It will receive advice from the EMC, comprising the Chiefs of Defence, who will in turn give military directives to the military staff. The military staff, made up of representatives of all branches of the member nations' armed forces, will provide expert advice to the EMC and assume the conduct of military operations.

With regard to how these new bodies will relate to NATO institutions, the Conclusions of the Helsinki Council state that:

⁷ Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, paragraph 28.

⁸ Defence Ministers will be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters

- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;⁹

Helsinki also developed the theme of improving the EU's non-military crisis management assets, with plans to "coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States".¹⁰

3. Interim bodies

As the CESDP is still very much a work in progress, it was agreed at Helsinki that the best way to carry the development of an EU military structure forward was to establish the new military bodies initially on an interim basis. These interim bodies were to be up and running by March 2000. The Presidency Conclusions outlined their roles as follows:

- a) - Fully respecting the Treaty provisions, the Council will establish a standing interim political and security committee at senior/ambassadorial level tasked to take forward under the guidance of the Political Committee the follow up of the Helsinki European Council by preparing recommendations on the future functioning of the CESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis in close contacts with the SG/HR.
- b) - An interim body of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence is established to give military advice as required to the interim political and security committee.
- c) - The Council Secretariat will be strengthened by military experts seconded from Member States in order to assist in the work on the CESDP and to form the nucleus of the future Military Staff.

The interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) held its first meeting on 1 March 2000 in Brussels. SG/HR Javier Solana said at the meeting:

Today is a milestone in the development of the European Foreign Common and Security Policy. It marks the first meeting of the European Union's interim Political and Security Committee. This is a first step in the establishment in Brussels of the bodies charged with ensuring the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to the strengthened European Policy on Security and

⁹ Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, paragraph 28.

¹⁰ *ibid*

Defence.¹¹

He added:

Our aim is to equip the Union to respond effectively to international crises using all the tools at its disposal: diplomacy, economic measures, humanitarian assistance and, ultimately, the use of military forces. The ability to integrate these measures will set the EU apart and allow it to play an international role consistent with its responsibilities and the expectations of its citizens.¹²

The interim military body to precede the future EMC held its inaugural meeting in Brussels a few days later on 7 March 2000. Mr Solana commented:

The Helsinki Summit set out a number of essential elements for the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy. As part of that project we welcome, for the first time, a committee of uniformed military officers to the European Union.¹³

On 8 March 2000, the final element of the new military structure was put in place with the appointment by Mr Solana of the British Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting as the Head of the Military Staff seconded by Member States to the Council Secretariat.¹⁴

II Developments under the Portuguese and French Presidencies

The Portuguese Presidency was tasked, along with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward the Helsinki proposals on CESDP as a “matter of priority”.¹⁵ A first progress report was prepared for the Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000 and an overall report was presented to the Feira European Council on 19-20 June 2000 containing “appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary”.¹⁶

Several key decisions were made at Feira regarding CESDP. Firstly, with respect to the headline goal on defence capabilities, the plans for a 60,000-strong rapid crisis intervention force were approved. Secondly, an invitation was made to European member

¹¹ Portuguese Presidency web site: <http://www.portugal.ue-2000.pt/uk/frame.htm>

¹² *ibid*

¹³ EU web site at: <http://ue.eu.int/solana>

Brigadier Messervy-Whiting was born in 1946 and was commissioned into the British Army in 1967. He has served in both NATO HQ and the Military Staff of the WEU (where he was Deputy Director) and was the Defence Adviser to Lord Owen, the then EU Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

¹⁵ Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, paragraph 29.

¹⁶ Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

states of NATO that are not EU members, namely Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, to participate in EU-led operations. Thirdly, overtures were also made to Russia and the Ukraine to participate in EU peacekeeping operations. Fourthly, civilian aspects of crisis management were strengthened through pledges to make up to 5,000 police officers available for deployment to crisis regions.

On his return from Feira, Prime Minister Tony Blair commented:

We also made further progress on European defence. Close working links between the European Union and NATO are being put in place, together with special consultation arrangements with those European allies who are not in the EU. The priority now is on how Europe will deliver on the headline goal that we set ourselves at Helsinki and that will be the focus of work in the next six months. We also adopted targets for the civilian aspects of crisis management, such as the provision of police officers.¹⁷

The Opposition remained highly sceptical of the whole thrust of the CESDP process. William Hague, the Conservative Party leader, asserted:

Was it not a great mistake to continue at the summit down the path of an EU security and defence policy that is increasingly autonomous of NATO? The Prime Minister's assurances on the matter seem to be undermined by the comments of the French Minister responsible for European affairs, who said last week in connection with defence policy:

We don't agree with the "Americanisation" of the world... We are saying that together we can build a new superpower... and its name will be Europe.

Do not such comments suggest that those who say that there is no danger to NATO from the initiative are rather naïve?¹⁸

The Liberal Democrats are supportive of the CESDP. Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrats' Defence and Foreign Affairs spokesman, wrote recently:

The logic of Europe working collectively to make more use of the approximately \$160 billion spent annually on defence is overwhelming. Britain should, in conjunction with its European partners, initiate a co-ordinated European Defence Review to assess the ability of European forces to undertake peace enforcement operations and fulfil the peace support missions of the Petersberg Tasks included in the Amsterdam Treaty.¹⁹

¹⁷ HC Deb 21 June 2000, c340.

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ *The House Magazine*, April 10, 2000.

These key areas of the CESDP developed under the Portuguese Presidency, and recent developments under the French Presidency, are dealt with in detail below:

A. The Headline and Collective Capabilities Goals

Feira reiterated the EU's determination to meet the headline goal targets by 2003, as agreed in Helsinki. Achieving the headline goal involved identifying the EU military capabilities required for the various Petersberg scenarios. At Feira it was decided that this work would be undertaken by a special 'Interim Military Body' that would draw up a 'capabilities catalogue' in consultation with NATO experts. This catalogue would feed into a Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened by the end of 2000 (the date for this meeting has now been set for 20 November 2000 in Brussels). At this conference the EU Member States and other interested countries will pledge military assets to a pool of forces to be used under a CESDP operation. Feira adopted the following guidelines for further work:

- The development of the Headline and collective capabilities goals, which have been agreed at the European Council in Helsinki, should be conducted by the 15, in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of the EU as well as the requirements regarding military efficiency.
- The Interim Military Body, with the political guidance of the IPSC, will propose the elements which will encompass the Headline Goal.
- In order to do this, the Interim Military Body will identify the capabilities necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.
- In elaborating the Headline and collective capabilities goals by drawing on Member States contributions, the IMB, including representatives from capitals, will also call meetings with DSACEUR and NATO experts in order to draw on NATO's military expertise on the requirements of the Headline and collective capabilities goals.
- In this connection, transparency and dialogue between the EU and NATO will in addition be provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the capabilities goal provided for in Appendix 2.
- The Headline Goal requirements agreed by the IMB at CHODs [Chiefs of Defence Staff] level will, after endorsement by the Council, be the basis for the Member States in considering their initial offers of national contributions to the Headline Goal. These contributions will be examined by the Interim Military Body. This process must be concluded before the convening of the Capability Commitment Conference.
- It will be important to ensure coherence, for those Member States concerned, with NATO's defence planning process and the Planning and Review Process.

- In accordance with the determination expressed at Helsinki and Lisbon, once the needs and resources available have been identified, Member States will announce, at the Capability Commitment Conference, their commitments with a view to enabling the EU to fulfil the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities goals. It will be also important to create a review mechanism for measuring progress towards the achievement of those goals.
- The European Union will encourage third countries to contribute through supplementary commitments. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming presidency regarding the Capabilities Commitment Conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the six non-EU European NATO members. The offers of capabilities already made by Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway are welcomed.²⁰

1. The Headline Goal

The Council adopted the report, *Elaboration for the Headline Goals – Food for Thought*, as “a basis for work to be conducted by the competent bodies”.²¹ This report, which was originally presented by the UK to the informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Sintra on 28 February 2000 (see Appendix II), provides a methodology to identify in detail the forces and capabilities required from Member States in order to meet the headline goal and sets out a timetable for the implementation of any proposals. The document identifies six key steps that need to be taken in order to meet the headline goal, with agreement being necessary on the first three steps before progress can be made on the later ones. The steps are:

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| <u>Step 1</u> | An outline of the overall strategic context. |
| <u>Step 2</u> | Articulation of key planning assumptions. |
| <u>Step 3</u> | Selection of planning scenarios that describe illustrative situations for the employment of forces. |
| <u>Step 4</u> | Identification of the force capabilities required to support the scenarios. |
| <u>Step 5</u> | Development of illustrative force packages that have the required capabilities and confirmation of their effectiveness against the planning scenarios. |

²⁰ Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, paragraph G2, Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.

²¹ Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, paragraph G1, Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.

Step 6 Using these different force packages to define the full range of requirements implicit in the headline goal.²²

Once the headline goal is elaborated through this process, it will be necessary to examine what the national contributions should be, and to identify “capability gaps”.²³ The paper highlights the need for capabilities in deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control, and stresses that these objectives will be mutually strengthened (for EU Members States which are also NATO members) with those of the Defence Capabilities Initiative launched at the Alliance’s Washington Summit in April 1999.²⁴

The types of operation to be undertaken could in theory cover the full Petersberg spectrum:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks; and,
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as peace enforcement by some nations).²⁵

These missions remain very broad and somewhat ill defined. For example the latter option of peacemaking could in theory involve deployments similar to that of NATO in Kosovo. It is still not entirely clear what type of mission the EU could or would undertake ‘autonomously’.

The report sticks to the broad figures of the headline goal agreed at Helsinki, i.e. up to 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year. However, it does raise the possibility of the EU sustaining two operations simultaneously:

We should plan to be able to conduct a single corps sized crisis management task, while retaining a limited capability to conduct a small-scale operation, such as a NEO.²⁶ Alternatively, within the overall total of the headline goal, we should be prepared to maintain one longer term operation at less than the maximum level and at the same time be able to conduct another operation of a limited duration. It may be that this requirement will pose the most demanding challenge for the EU member states, given the competing demands for key assets.²⁷

²² *Elaboration of the Headline Goal – ‘Food for thought*, Dep 00/1367, 11 July 2000.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ See Library Research Paper No 00/20, *European Defence: From Pörtlach to Helsinki*, page 22, 21 February 2000.

²⁵ *Elaboration of the Headline Goal – Food for Thought*, page 7, Informal Defence Ministers meeting, Sintra, 28 February 2000.

²⁶ Non-combatant Evacuation Operation.

²⁷ *Elaboration of the Headline Goal – Food for Thought*, page 7, Informal Defence Ministers meeting, Sintra, 28 February 2000.

Richard Hatfield, Policy Director at the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), attempted to provide some further details on the nature of the headline goal in giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee:

This is not a unit; this is a pool of forces, most of which...are forces which would be available for NATO...They will be trained to NATO standards...a bigger part of the answer...will be connecting the development of the headline goal – and the next step is to define it in a bit more detail and break it down – to the NATO force planning system...[O]nce we have defined the headline goal in a bit more detail, a NATO force generation conference which gets all the countries together to work out how a force can be produced...I suspect some countries will have to adapt their force structure.²⁸

The EU report recommends that illustrative planning scenarios be selected against which capabilities and force packages can be tested, and suggests that a series of profiles of the Petersberg Missions and associated scenarios formulated by the WEU are used. Regarding the type of mission that a future European force may be called upon to undertake, the report states that:

the most demanding mission will be a complex peace enforcement task in a joint environment in or around Europe. Forces should also be available and able to respond to crises world wide, albeit at lesser scale.²⁹

Significantly, no geographical limits appear to have been set regarding the conduct of Petersberg missions under a future CESDP. This raises questions about the EU's sphere of influence. Does the EU regard regions such as Africa or the Middle East as areas where an EU force could operate? No clear answer is forthcoming. Several options were provided in evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union recently. Lord Wallace speculated that, "an operation in Rwanda or, heaven knows, Congo or in the further Gulf is about as far as we are talking about."³⁰ However, Dr Malcolm Chalmers of the University of Bradford indicated that:

It is clear, however, that the "in-area" does not include sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia. It is still difficult to see either NATO or the EU playing a significant role in organising collective military operations in these "out-of-area" regions.³¹

²⁸ Defence Committee, European Security and Defence, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxix, para 52.

²⁹ *Elaboration of the Headline Goal – Food for Thought*, page 6, Informal Defence Ministers meeting, Sintra, 28 February 2000.

³⁰ Select Committee on the European Union, *The Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, 25 July 2000, HL 101 1999-2000

³¹ *ibid*

2. Collective Capabilities Catalogue and Conference

The Interim Military Body, which was created on 1 March 2000, completed a preliminary version of a catalogue of forces on 28 July 2000. Although the detailed contents of the catalogue remain classified, the French defence minister, Alain Richard, provided an outline of the structure of the document at an informal meeting of EU defence ministers near Paris on 22 September 2000. He said that the catalogue consists of information on ground, air and sea forces to be committed for at least one year, summarised in a table of about fifty pages. The table includes columns covering the four basic scenarios of the Petersberg missions. Mr Richard stated these scenarios as being:

- Separation by force of the belligerent parties
- Peacekeeping
- Humanitarian aid
- Evacuation of nationals

He suggested that an EU force may have to be larger than the 60,000 set out at Helsinki:

In terms of ground forces, our experts are of the opinion that to be able to deploy 60,000 men in all possible configurations of use, our objective should be greater, probably nearer 80,000 men. This will enable us to cover all possible hypotheses of use, while remaining of course within the framework of our objective of 60,000 men.

For aerial forces, the range of objectives is currently between 300 and 350 fighter planes.³²

He acknowledged the involvement of NATO experts in the formulation of the catalogue:

We expressed our appreciation of the quality of the cooperation with the NATO experts who contributed, in the planned conditions, to the development of this catalogue. During the eight weeks of work by the EU experts, six meetings with their NATO colleagues gave rise to this fruitful exchange.³³

Mr Richard also provided details of the timetable of the forthcoming Capabilities Commitment Conference. Initially, the 15 EU Member States will outline their military bids, which will then be commented on by a meeting of the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) plus the ministers of defence. Bids from other countries will also be heard. He stated:

I will invite our fifteen colleagues from the European States who are not members of the EU to participate in a meeting with the EU defence ministers. The purpose

³² French Embassy in the UK web site – <http://www.ambafrance.org.uk>

³³ *ibid*

of this meeting will be to take note of their possible additional contributions. A specific meeting will be organised the same day between the fifteen EU defence ministers and the European countries who are members of the alliance but not members of the EU.³⁴

He emphasised that the responsibility to meet the headline goal objectives would remain with EU members:

These additional contributions will be welcome, but I would remind you that it is the natural responsibility of members of the EU alone to fulfil the capacity objectives they have set themselves.³⁵

Some countries have already provided indications of the composition of the forces they will pledge at the conference. On 22 September the German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, said that his country will contribute 18,000 personnel, 12,000 of which will come from the army, with the remainder being drawn from the navy and airforce.³⁶ The Belgian Defence Minister, André Flahaut, has proposed providing a mechanised brigade of 3,000 troops, a squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft and a flotilla made up of two frigates, six mine-sweepers and support aircraft. Reportedly, Spain will pledge 6,000 troops, the Dutch 3,000, Austria 2,000 and Portugal 1,000.³⁷

In reality the figure of 50–60,000 troops set by the headline goal under-estimates the true level of troops required to sustain a serious military operation over one year. When taking into account the necessity to rotate troops (for every person deployed there will be one preparing and one recovering) an EU force would need to be three times the size of the headline goal i.e. around 150-180,000 personnel. However, the real problem facing European forces is not numerical (there are some two million military personnel in the EU) but rather having suitably trained troops, in the appropriate state of readiness, armed with the right equipment and with the proper logistical support. These requirements go to the heart of the European capability gaps so starkly exposed during the Kosovo conflict.

In his briefing to European Defence Ministers, Mr Richard stated that a key part of the work of the Capabilities Commitment Conference will be to identify a set of initiatives and national commitments to address capability gaps. He pointed to some recent events that suggest progress has already been made in improving European military capabilities:

Command and control: the staff of the European Corps has acquired a command capacity for the terrestrial component, as is being shown under the command of General Ortuno in Kosovo.

³⁴ French Embassy in the UK web site – <http://www.ambafrance.org.uk>

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ *Agence Europe*, 23 September 2000.

³⁷ *ibid*

In the area of information, I would like to mention the Western European Union's satellite imaging interpretation capacity at Torrejon, which should be transferred to the EU, the Italian radar satellite projects, the Franco-German initiative to endow the European Union with an independent satellite observation capacity, and I hope other contributions.

In the area of strategic transport, six members declared officially this summer at Farnborough their commitment to the Airbus programme for a future transport plane [A400M], in association with our Turkish partners.³⁸

A key area of concern is the level of European defence expenditure. Defence spending in the EU has declined over the past ten years with the majority of EU countries now spending less than 2% of their GDP on defence and eight Member States spending 1.6% or less.³⁹ Despite a recent modest increase in the UK defence budget, there would not appear to be the political will in Europe to increase defence spending. Some commentators have argued that the requirement is not to spend more but rather to spend more wisely. Another view is that new emerging defence technologies represent a quantum leap in defence capabilities, and that in the long term Europe will have to spend more if it wishes to act autonomously or be a partner of the US in the development of defence equipment.

B. Institution Building and Decision-making Structure

Both the Portuguese and French Presidencies have faced several key challenges in the construction of new CESDP institutions and the development of a decision-making process. These challenges can be summarised as follows:

- Establishing permanent EU political and military bodies
- Establishing an EU/NATO decision-making framework
- Incorporating non-EU countries into EU humanitarian operations
- Incorporating the WEU

1. New EU Permanent Political and Military Bodies

With regard to progress in the development of permanent political and military bodies, the Presidency Conclusions at Feira state that:

...work has been carried out on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies, in accordance with the Helsinki

³⁸ *Agence Europe*, 23 September 2000.

³⁹ These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland and Spain.

conclusions. Further work is under way, in order to ensure as soon as possible the start of the permanent phase and of the EU operational capacity for crisis management.⁴⁰

The French Presidency was tasked with having the permanent political and military structures in place, as soon as possible after the Nice Summit in December 2000. Although this area of the CESDP is still evolving, a draft presidency report presented to the Lisbon European Council on 14 March 2000, entitled *Military bodies in the European Union and the planning and conduct of EU-led military operations*,⁴¹ provided a blueprint for the likely structure and operating procedures of the two proposed military bodies – the European Military Committee (EMC) and the European Military Staff (EMS).⁴² The key points are:

The European Military Committee

- Highest EU military body.
- Composed of the fifteen EU Chiefs of Defence Staff.
- Day-to-day business conducted by national military delegates (EU nations who are also NATO members would *ideally* be dual-hatted with the NATO representative).
- The Chairman of the EMC to be a 4-star officer, such as a former Chief of Defence, selected (from outside the EMC) by the Chiefs of Defence of the EU Member States.
- Chairman would participate in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and in the NATO Military Committee with rights to contribute to discussions (although he will be a member of neither), and would have a close working relationship with the SG/HR for CFSP.
- Chairman will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken. He will direct the day-to-day business of the EMC and issue directives and guidance to the Director of the EMS.
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACUER)⁴³ would participate as appropriate in the EMC, although would not be a member. To provide ‘transparency’ between the EU and the Alliance, the Chairmen of the EU and the NATO Military Committees should be able to attend the other committee.
- In case of operations, the EU operational commander would attend or be represented at the EMC.

The European Military Staff

- The EMS will not act as an operational HQ but should:

⁴⁰ Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, paragraph H, Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.

⁴¹ Dep 00/691

⁴² Their main roles, along with that of the PSC, have already been referred to in Chapter I section 2 of this paper.

⁴³ Currently General Sir Rupert Smith of the UK.

- perform three main Operational functions: early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning;
 - provide a dedicated source of military expertise to the EU in peace time, crisis management situations, and during EU-led operations;
 - act as an interface between the EU's political and military authorities and the military resources available to the EU;
 - be capable, in particular, of providing effective military support to the EMC during the strategic planning phase of crisis management situations over the full range of Petersberg tasks, whether or not the EU draws on NATO assets and capabilities;
 - have working procedures and operational concepts based on, and in any case compatible with, those in NATO.
- During peacetime it would: provide military expertise on EU defence policy issues; monitor potential crises; carry out generic strategic planning for Petersberg missions; identify European national and multinational forces for EU-led operations; and contribute to the development (including training and exercises) of European national and multinational forces in co-ordination with NATO as appropriate.
 - In crisis management situations, the main task of the EMS would be to provide a set of prioritised military strategic options to the PSC through the EMC.
 - During EU-led operations, the EMS would support the PSC/EMC in the drafting of Initial Planning Directives, Planning Directives and Mission Directives; continuously monitor the operation and conduct strategic analysis to support both the PSC in its role of strategic direction and the EMC in its role of providing military guidance, in coordination with the designated European Operation Commander.
 - Organisation. The EMS would work under the authority of the Director EMS and would be subordinate to the Chairman of the EMC. The EMS would consist of a permanent core, organised to perform five main staff functions: intelligence assessment; situation monitoring; strategic planning; force preparedness (including training and logistics); and administration. It would have sufficient capacity and facilities for rapid augmentation in times of crisis to provide in particular 24-hour manning. This is currently estimated to require around 60-90 officers, although this can only be determined as a result of a much more detailed study of composition, staffing, and structure. It will also:
 - be located as close as possible to the EU CFSP Machinery/EMC (preferably co-located);

- require a command and information system, which has full connectivity with capitals, national and multinational HQs, as well as NATO;
- during crisis management situations, set up a dedicated Crisis Action Team (CAT) to undertake military situation assessment, strategic planning and operations monitoring. The CAT will draw upon the EMS for manpower and expertise and, if necessary, on external temporary military augmentation.

The Conduct of EU-led Operations

The basic stages in the planning and conduct of EU-led operations as a crisis emerges would be as follows:

- The EMS will provide an initial military situation assessment to the PSC through the Chairman of the EMC.
- The PSC, together with the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and other elements of the European Council Secretariat, would develop a political/military framework for addressing the crisis.
- Once the framework has been agreed by Member States, the PSC, through the Chairman of the EMC, would task the EMS to develop military strategic options. These options could include operations with or without the use of NATO assets.

Operations with the use of NATO assets

Under the arrangements agreed at the NATO Washington Summit, the EU would have access “to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance”.⁴⁴ These arrangements when fully implemented, will provide the EU with “extensive, capable and proven multinational military resources to plan and conduct operations in support of its Common Foreign and Security Policy”.⁴⁵ Once an Operation Plan for an EU-led military operation was agreed by the PSC, the PSC and the Council would appoint an Operational Commander and Military Strategic Operation HQ. The primary, although not the only candidates, for these roles have been identified as DSACEUR and NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).⁴⁶

⁴⁴ NATO Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999.

⁴⁵ *Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy*, para 18, 14 March 2000
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), based at Mons, Belgium, is the headquarters of NATO’s Allied Command Europe (ACE) .

a. UK Reaction

In their recent report on European defence,⁴⁷ the Defence Select Committee recommended that those EU countries that are also NATO members should ‘double-hat’ their military representatives wherever possible. The advantage of this approach, as already adopted by the UK in the interim committees, is that it helps to reinforce the linkage between the CESDP and NATO, by ensuring full transparency in Alliance and EU decision-making and avoiding duplication. The Committee also recommended that the Chairman of the EMC, like the SG/HR, should have the right of direct access to both the General Affairs Council and the European Council. The Committee also proposed that DSACEUR should have the right to attend all meetings of the EMC.

In their observations on the Defence Select Committee report, the Government broadly supported the Committee’s recommendations, noting that:

13 of the 15 EU Member States’ Military Representatives or military Heads of Mission are currently dual hatted to NATO and the EU. The Government agrees that DSACEUR’s attendance at the EU Military Committee will, in many cases, be essential, not least to ensure transparency between the EU and NATO.⁴⁸

With regard to the EMS specifically, the Government stated:

The Committee recognises that the EMS will have a role in identifying the constituent parts of the European rapid reaction forces and recommends that it should be tasked with maintaining and improving interoperability not only across EU forces but across the whole of NATO. Clearly the EMS as a body of the European Union, cannot co-ordinate action taken to improve the forces of Allies who are not EU Member States. However the forces that Member States commit to the Headline Goal will in most cases also be forces that are assigned to NATO. The importance of interoperability across the board is understood and accepted by all. Close cooperation and understanding between the two organisations will be essential.⁴⁹

b. Role of other EU Bodies

The broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the new military aspects of CESDP, is governed by the General Affairs Council (GAC), which consists of the foreign affairs ministers of the Member States. Although decisions on military matters are to be decided on this inter-governmental basis, there will be important related areas where the Commission and European Parliament will become

⁴⁷ Defence Committee report, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxix, para 52.

⁴⁸ *Government Observations on the Eighth Report from the Defence Committee of Session 1999-2000*, HC 732, 13 July 2000.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

involved. The Commission would be active in a range of diplomatic and economic measures that would probably precede or follow any EU military mission. Also, the Commission and EP would be involved in the financial arrangements surrounding humanitarian tasks and post-crisis stabilisation. How the roles of SG/HR and the EU External Affairs Commissioner (currently Chris Patten) will operate during a crisis is still not entirely clear. The Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, recently attempted to explain the relationship between Solana, Patten and the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson:

... the Secretary General of NATO [is] responsible for the continued development of the ESDI within the Alliance and, indeed, responsible for developing and fostering European Union and NATO links ... [T]he European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy ... is charged with developing new structures within the European Union, necessary links between the European Union and NATO and, finally, the transitional arrangements from the WEU to the European Union. Thirdly ... the European Commissioner for External Affairs ... may have a role in the non-military aspects of crisis management, but I would emphasise not the military aspects. Specifically, he would not be able to control or commit forces to conduct European Union operations. What is crucial is the way in which the three of them are able to work together ... as we deal with an evolving crisis ... there would ... be an essentially political discussion in the first place, within the European Union, as to what should be the appropriate, in the first place, political response of European Union countries ... [I]t may begin by no more than a resolution passed by the General Affairs Council; it might mean that that was, in an appropriate situation, escalated to some degree of economic or other sanctions, but, ultimately, if that had failed to resolve the crisis it might well be that the European Union recognise the necessity for a military response ... At the beginning of the crisis ... we would expect, as happens today, NATO planners to have been preparing the appropriate military response should that unfortunately prove necessary. That is why there would be a seamless exchange of information between the European Union and NATO.⁵⁰

The ability of the EU to apply a multifaceted approach to crisis management, including a strong political and economic dimension, has been seen by several observers as the strength of CFSP/CESDP. Despite recent changes in NATO, it still remains essentially a military organisation. The decision at the Cologne European Council to wind up the WEU by transferring most of its functions to the EU has effectively made the CESDP the European pillar of NATO. The Defence Committee highlighted the significance of this regarding the contribution the CESDP could make to future European security:

If there is a distinctively EU contribution to be made to European security, it will be in its ability to deploy a wider range of instruments of peace making in

⁵⁰ Defence Committee, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxxii, para 58.

coordination with military means of crisis management. Locating the ESDI [European Security and Defence Identity – European pillar of NATO] in the CESDP may also have a benign educative effect on the EU's wider foreign and security policy. A CFSP with no defence dimension tempts the exercise of diplomacy without regard to military power and without responsibility for the exercise of such power. Military force should always play second fiddle to the other instruments of diplomacy, but a more outward-looking foreign policy may have to act within the constraints of the military capability which lies behind it. To the extent that the EU should have a Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is better that it should be interpenetrated at all levels by a commonly held defence awareness, rather than that it should be left to float on a sea of good intentions, unanchored in pragmatic military reality.⁵¹

2. EU/NATO Relations

EU/NATO relations have been slow to progress. Proposals so far point towards a somewhat complex interlocking EU/NATO institutional arrangement, resembling the illustration at Appendix IV. An obvious complicating factor in linking the new EU bodies and NATO is the different membership of the two organisations. As the illustration below shows, there are six European members of NATO which are not members of the EU (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) and four members of the EU who are not members of NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden):

NATO ONLY	NATO & EU	EU ONLY
Canada Czech Republic Hungary Iceland Norway Poland Turkey USA	Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain UK	Austria Finland Ireland Sweden

The Defence Select Committee concluded that:

In reality, we suspect, in operational circumstances the institutional arrangements of the CESDP/ESDI are going to have to be very fluid and flexible. This runs the risk of a lack of clarity, but the resolution of that problem is more to do with

⁵¹ Defence Committee, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxxii, para 59.

political will and clarity of purpose than the design of essentially bureaucratic structures.⁵²

With regard to the EU neutral countries, all, including most recently Ireland, are now members of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and are committed to, and comfortable with, participation in crisis management operations. As the CESDP is not about collective defence, they will not be in danger of compromising their traditional neutrality. The most important EU/NATO inter-relationship to be resolved in order for the CESDP to operate successfully is that of the six European non-EU members of NATO. These six will have a veto over the use of NATO assets by the EU. It seems necessary to accord some special status to these six, particularly because under the CESDP arrangements the four EU neutral countries will in theory enjoy equal status with the eleven EU/NATO members. This problem may to some extent resolve itself in the longer term because four of the six are aspirant EU members, so that special arrangements may only need to apply to Iceland and Norway.

Of the six, Turkey in particular has emerged as a potential problem area for EU/NATO relations. Turkey, with its military and strategic importance, could be a significant contributor to any EU operation, but has been the most reluctant NATO member in supporting CESDP. Soon after the Helsinki summit, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting that "the understanding prevailing in the EU is still far from satisfactory as far as the participation of non-EU European allies like Turkey is concerned".⁵³ At the beginning of August 2000, the Turkish Embassy to the EU issued a statement underlining that:

It goes without saying that there will be no automatic access by the EU to NATO assets and capabilities and that any request will have to be considered by the members of the Council (NATO) including Turkey.⁵⁴

Turkey's concerns regarding CESDP were still evident as recently as the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers held in Birmingham on 10 and 11 October 2000, where Turkey reportedly demanded full and equal participation in all decision-making about EU military operations in Europe.⁵⁵

The Defence Select Committee stressed that the special status of the six should be formally and fully acknowledged. It suggested that:

There must be a structure for the non-EU European Allies, which exists alongside but is fully integrated with the EU structures. Regular consultation, information

⁵² Defence Committee, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxxvi, para 71.

⁵³ *Turkish Daily News*, 16 December 1999

⁵⁴ *Atlantic News*, 10 August 2000.

⁵⁵ *The Guardian*, 14 October 2000.

sharing and cooperation at 15+6 should be implemented by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee (MC). The Council of Ministers should meet at 15+6 at least once every six months. The meetings of these institutions at 15+6 should be held "back to back" with meetings of the 15 and there should be a common agenda. The European Military Staff (EMS) should include secondees from the armed forces of the six.⁵⁶

The US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, urged the EU to recognise that:

the willingness of all six non-EU European Allies – and of Canada – to contribute to future EU operations is a tremendous advantage to the EU; it should not be seen as a burden or complicating factor.⁵⁷

He pointed out that:

it is quite possible that a crisis being managed by the EU could escalate to the point that it involves NATO's Article 5 commitment. This commitment by the non-EU Allies to their eleven EU partners is reason enough for the non-EU six to have a special status in the new structure of ESDP.⁵⁸

The fact that the six will have a special separate meeting with EU Member States at the Capability Commitment Conference suggests that the French Presidency is attempting to show sensitivity towards their needs. Mr Solana commented at a recent meeting with NATO officials that this meeting will enable the EU to "formally recognise the generous offers of forces made by many of you here".⁵⁹

In a separate development the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) and EP have been establishing contacts. On 22 February 2000 the NATO-PA held its first meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP. Many speakers at this meeting raised the issue of parliamentary oversight of the CESDP noting that this issue remained unresolved. It was agreed at the meeting that the NATO-PA and EP's Foreign Affairs Committee would hold regular consultations in future with NATO officials being present at the quarterly meetings of the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee. Plans were also announced to grant the EP a special status in the NATO-PA.

⁵⁶ Defence Committee, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxxvii, para 74

⁵⁷ *Atlantic News*, 12 October 2000

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ *Atlantic News*, 22 September 2000.

a. Ad-hoc Working Groups

A more positive development in EU/NATO relations has been the establishment of joint working groups. Annex I to the Feira Presidency Conclusions recommended that “ad hoc working groups”, covering four key areas, be established between the EU and NATO:

The Council has identified the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed. As to modalities, the Council has recommended that the EU should propose to NATO the creation of four "ad hoc working groups" between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation.⁶⁰

The main tasks facing the working groups are:

- (a) for security issues: preparation of an EU-NATO security agreement;
- (b) for capability goals: the implementation of information exchange and discussion with NATO on elaborating capability goals. It is understood that DSACEUR could participate, as appropriate;
- (c) for modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets: preparation of an agreement on the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities as agreed at Washington. It is understood that DSACEUR should participate;
- (d) for the definition of permanent arrangements: defining the main parameters of an EU/NATO agreement which would formalise structures and procedures for consultation between the two organisations in times of crisis and non-crisis.

These committees, which form the practical core for cooperation between the two institutions, had all met by mid-September 2000. Significantly, the security committee has reached an agreement between NATO and the EU to permit the exchange of classified documents and sensitive information.

The committees were present at the first meeting on 19 September 2000 of the EU's interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) and NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) at EU Council Headquarters. This meeting was described as “historic” by all those involved, with the iPSC Chairman, French Ambassador to the WEU Michel Duclos, adding that “We now agree on the methods which comprise an intensification of contacts on concrete subjects in the weeks and months to come”.⁶¹ Lord Robertson commented that, “Two key strategic players are now getting together”.⁶² It could be said that rather

⁶⁰ Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, para J, 19 and 20 June 2000.

⁶¹ *Atlantic News*, 22 September 2000.

⁶² *ibid*

than being ‘historic’, this meeting was long overdue and essential. Before this meeting, the only high-level contacts between the two organisations were the informal working breakfasts between Mr Solana and Lord Robertson. A graphic illustration of the previous level of awkwardness in EU/NATO relations was provided by comments made by Lord Robertson on 13 September:

NATO-friendly European defence is finally taking-shape and it is taking the right shape. It will not be long before we look back at this period as one looks back at any birth: a little painful, a little messy, but definitely worth it.⁶³

3. Involvement of third states in EU military crisis management

At Helsinki the Portuguese Presidency was tasked with defining appropriate arrangements that would allow non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management.

The Feira Conclusions announced the establishment of regular meetings involving the 15 EU members, the 15 countries that are non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU. These meetings will be established on an interim and permanent basis:

Work has been carried forward on the modalities of consultation and/or participation concerning the non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU.

In this context, the aim has been to identify, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, arrangements for dialogue, consultation and cooperation on issues related to crisis management ensuring the decision-making autonomy of the EU. These arrangements will provide for the interim period meetings with the above mentioned countries, which will take place within a single inclusive structure and will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on CFSP matters. Within this structure there will be exchanges with the non-EU NATO European members when the subject matter requires it. For the permanent phase, arrangements will take into account the different needs arising in the routine phase and in the operational phase.⁶⁴

Full details of these somewhat complex arrangements can be found at Appendix III. The key points are summarised as follows:

⁶³ *Atlantic News*, 13 September 2000.

⁶⁴ *ibid*

Interim Period

- a minimum of two meetings in EU+15 format will be organised in each Presidency on CESDP matters
- a minimum of two meetings will take place with the six non-EU NATO members (in EU+6 format) in each Presidency.

Separate 'routine' (non-crisis) and 'operational' arrangements have been distinguished under the permanent phase. These are:

Routine phase

- regular meetings in EU+15 format, at the appropriate level.
- at least two meetings with the participation of the non-EU European NATO members in EU+6 format.
- additional meetings will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the PSC.
- arrangements for Ministerial meetings during the permanent phase will be based upon the experience gained during the interim phase.

Operational Phase

- a) Pre-operational phase (during which options for action are considered and dialogue and consultations are intensified).
 - When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, these consultations will provide a framework for exchanges of views and discussion on any related security concerns raised by the countries concerned. Where the EU recourse to NATO assets is under active consideration, particular attention will be given to consultation with the six non-European NATO members.
- b) Operational phase "stricto sensu" (this starts when the Council takes the decision to launch an operation, and an ad-hoc *Committee of Contributors* is set up)
 - Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.
 - Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited to take part in the EU-led operation.
 - Those non-EU European NATO members and countries candidates for accession that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of that operation.

- An ad-hoc committee of contributors will be set up comprising all EU Member States and the other participating countries for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. The Council/PSC will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For the military day-to-day conduct of the operation, functions and roles of the MC and of the operation commander will be set out in the relevant arrangements.
- The decision to end an operation shall be taken by the Council after consultation between participating states within the ad-hoc committee of contributors.

Of particular significance is the establishment of a Committee of Contributors, and the fact that those contributing to an EU-led operation will have the same rights as EU Member States. The problem of how to incorporate non-EU countries into any future EU-led military operation that they wish to become involved in is a complicated one. Under the French Presidency it has taken on almost equal importance to the two main tasks of institution building and the identification and development of military capabilities. The problem is that, while it is unlikely that the EU will want to grant non-members real influence in the CESDP, such as voting rights, many non-members will eventually become EU members, so it is wise to incorporate them in some way into the CESDP process.

Two European states that were specifically mentioned in the Presidency Conclusions at Feira were Russia and Ukraine. Incorporating these two countries, particularly Russia, into any future EU-led operation will obviously pose considerable difficulties. How, for example, they could comfortably be incorporated into the Committee of the Contributors during an operation is not clear. Current indications suggest that this challenge will be passed to the forthcoming Swedish Presidency.

4. The WEU and Treaty amendment

At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the decision was made to transfer most of the functions of the WEU to the EU. The Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, provided the Government's assessment of the transfer process in written evidence to the Defence Select Committee:

We expect the establishment of new structures and arrangements for defence in the EU to lead to the transfer of some WEU's functions to the EU. Other functions would no longer be required and could be discarded...We are still considering with partners the future role of the groups which are under the WEU umbrella including the Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies, WEU Assembly, Western European Armaments Organisation, Western European Armaments Group, Western European Logistics Group, Eurolongterm, Eurocom and Transatlantic Forum.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Defence Committee, *European Security and Defence*, 19 April 2000, HC 264 1999-2000, xxxix, para 76

Potentially the most problematic issue will be the WEU's commitment to collective self-defence under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. The neutral members of the EU would be reluctant to incorporate these provisions into the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Whether treaty amendment is necessary or not has become a contentious issue. The UK position is that the WEU's Article V is largely irrelevant since collective defence is covered by NATO's Article 5. The Defence Select Committee concluded in their 1996 report on the WEU that "the WEU's role in collective defence under the modified Brussels Treaty is of no continuing significance".⁶⁶ The current Defence Select Committee saw no reason to amend that conclusion.

At Helsinki the Portuguese Presidency was tasked with assessing whether the creation of the CESDP required any amendment of the TEU. At the Feira Summit, the Portuguese reported that the Council's Legal Service conclusion on this subject was as follows:

The Council's Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European Union.

With regard to the WEU it stated:

However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer the Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally appropriate.⁶⁷

Although defence is not on the formal IGC agenda, the French Presidency have continued to examine the issue of Treaty revision in the lead up to the Nice European Council.

The French have traditionally been keen to see a merger of the EU and WEU. However, Mr Richard, indicated at a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Committee in Strasbourg on 24 October 2000, that some aspects of the organisation would be retained. He advocated retaining the WEU Assembly and its powers, with the possibility of it holding an annual debate on defence issues. Earlier this year WEU members decided to transform the WEU Assembly into an interim 'European Security and Defence Assembly' (ESDA) details of which are provided below:

The WEU Assembly has made a particularly positive contribution to the shaping of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with a considerable number of its own proposals. As far as the new EU-based institutional architecture is concerned, the Assembly has formally proposed the creation of a European

⁶⁶ Fourth Report, Session 1995-96, paragraph 11.

⁶⁷ Feira European Council Conclusions, paragraph K, 19 and 20 June 2000.

Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) which would monitor the activities of the EU security bodies from the perspective of national parliamentarians. The ESDA is to be a parliamentary assembly based on the Treaty on European Union, composed of the 15 EU member states and enlarged to include the 15 EU candidate countries/non-EU European NATO countries. The proposal was launched at a special plenary session in Lisbon in March 2000 ('Lisbon Initiative') and has led to an intensive international discussion on the role of parliaments in European Security and Defence Policy.⁶⁸

On other aspects of the WEU, Mr Richard confirmed that its operational resources could be transferred to the EU, including the research centre and satellite centre.

III US Reaction

US attitudes to developments in the CESDP over the past 10 months still essentially reflect the 'three Ds' slogan of the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, made in 1999. These assert that security arrangements under the CESDP must:

- complement rather than *duplicate* NATO assets and institutions;
- be linked to, rather than *decoupled* from, NATO structures; and
- provide for full active and equal participation of all European Allies, not *discrimination* against those who are not member states of the EU.

What the 'three Ds' really boil down to is the vexed question of how 'autonomous' the EU should be in the conduct of any crisis management operation. Although US concerns are understandable, it would seem that some level of duplication is inevitable, both in structures and capabilities, in order for the EU to have the option of leading a crisis management operation. On the other hand, some commentators have found it difficult to imagine a scenario where a crisis emerges of such significance that the 15 nations of the EU want to become involved, while the US decides not to. It has been argued that such a division between the North American and European wings of NATO would ultimately lead to the demise of the Alliance.

The most recent keynote speech on US views towards the CESDP was given by the US Secretary of State for Defence, William Cohen, at the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Birmingham on 10 October 2000. He expressed strong support for the EU's headline goal and said that it was "right and natural that an increasingly integrated Europe seeks to develop its own Security and Defence Policy with a military capability to back it up".⁶⁹ He also laid out in considerable detail how he would like to see EU/NATO relations develop. His main points are summarised below:

⁶⁸ WEU web site - <http://www.weu.int/assembly>

⁶⁹ "Meeting the challenges to transatlantic security in the 21st century: a way ahead for NATO and the EU", US Secretary of State, William Cohen, 10 October 2000. Office of US Mission to NATO.

On discrimination he said;

..to build the best foundation for success of any EU-led operation, the six non-EU European Allies should be invited to participate, to the widest possible extent, in EU preparations to meet its Headline Goal and to consult closely with EU members before an EU decision on a military operation.

In addition, once EU members have decided to conduct an operation, non-EU European Allies willing to contribute to the operation understandably should participate in decision-shaping on implementation of that operation – not unlike Partners who have elected to contribute to a NATO-led crisis response operation.⁷⁰

On duplication, he referred to defence planning processes, where he proposed unifying the EU and NATO systems under a “European Security and Defence Planning System” or “ESDPS.” He argued that:

It would be highly ineffective, seriously wasteful of resources, and contradictory to the basic principles of close NATO-EU cooperation that we hope to establish if NATO and the EU were to proceed along the path of relying on autonomous force planning structures.

Thus it is hard to conceive of any argument based on logic, practicality, or effectiveness that European Allies who are also EU members should proceed along separate defence planning tracks – one within NATO, the other within the EU – to prepare for the same range of crisis response operations.⁷¹

Mr Cohen believed that DSACEUR should be at the heart of EU/NATO relations. He described his role as the “strategic coordinator” between NATO and the EU in peacetime, with the role of “force generator” during a crisis. DSACEUR would perform this function even during an EU-led crisis response operation that does not use NATO assets.

While Mr Cohen’s comments are essentially constructive, his ideas do involve an ever-closer cooperation between the two organisations that could be seen by some Europeans as an attempt to dominate or straightjacket the CESDP while it is still evolving. The French appear keen for the EU to decide on its own military requirements and develop new Euro-centred military plans. One commentator has described US/EU relations as somewhat paranoid:

The US appears to be saying: ‘We are encouraging much greater EU involvement and self-reliance, but are terrified of this going beyond a certain point’. The EU

⁷⁰ “Meeting the challenges to transatlantic security in the 21st century: a way ahead for NATO and the EU”, speech by US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, 10 October 2000. Office of US Mission to NATO.

⁷¹ *ibid*

seems to be saying: 'We wish to enjoy far greater autonomy, but not so much that the US will succumb to isolationism.'⁷²

Although this comment may overstate the problem, it is evident that mutual suspicion persists on both sides. It is likely that relations between the EU and the US will remain wary, particularly while the EU is still in the process of evolving its CESDP decision-making and institutional framework.

IV Conclusions

It is difficult to overstate the pace of development in the CESDP over the past ten months. Since January 2000 the EU has established new military and political bodies, developed headline and capability goals, and formulated structures for closer cooperation with NATO, and other European nations. Despite this rapid progress much work remains to be done. It is still not entirely clear when and where the EU would intervene militarily in a crisis.

The Anglo-French relationship will be crucial in maintaining the impetus behind the CESDP. Since St Malo these two countries, the two major EU military powers, have provided the driving force behind the reinvigorated search for a more capable European defence pillar. Despite their differing approaches to the Euro-Atlantic area (French Europeanism versus British Atlanticism), the two countries seem to have sustained an effective working relationship on CESDP. The Conclusions of the Nice Summit in December 2000 will provide an important indication of whether the balance between these two approaches to European security has been maintained. The basis for UK involvement in the construction of the CESDP has been the belief that a credible CESDP is compatible with a strengthened NATO. It remains to be seen whether this belief will be borne out as the CESDP evolves. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the UK will have to choose one day between its ties with the US and its involvement in the CESDP, but finding an approach that does not alienate the US has been elusive and remains the key challenge for CESDP policy-makers.

The incoming Swedish Presidency has pledged to make the planned European defence force operational by the end of its term, but this looks optimistic.⁷³ Indeed many commentators are sceptical about the headline goal being truly operational by the 2003 deadline. In the short-term any EU-led force will remain heavily reliant upon NATO expertise and assets. European states will have to strengthen their defence capabilities in order for the CESDP to undertake truly autonomous operations. This will involve spending more on defence and strengthening cooperation and coordination in defence

⁷² 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', Jolyon Howorth, *Survival*, vol 42, No 2, Summer 2000.

⁷³ *Svenska Dagbladet*, 25 September 2000.

procurement. Until this is done an EU-led operation without the use of NATO assets may remain a theory rather than a reality.

Appendix I: Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999

Common European Policy on Security and Defence

25. The European Council adopts the two Presidency progress reports on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence.

26. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

27. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.

28. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.

29. The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management. The incoming Presidency is invited to draw up

a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary. The General Affairs Council is invited to begin implementing these decisions by establishing as of March 2000 the agreed interim bodies and arrangements within the Council, in accordance with the current Treaty provisions.

Appendix II: Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting, Sintra, 28 February, 2000.

ELABORATION OF THE HEADLINE GOAL – “FOOD FOR THOUGHT”

The European Council, meeting on 10-11 December 1999, agreed that *“by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, [Member States] will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial force.”*

This Headline goal is intended as a spur towards the progressive improvement of Europe’s military capabilities for crisis management operations. This process will take account of the results of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities. The resulting capabilities are intended to enable the conduct of effective EU-led operations, whether or not the EU has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities as well as being a full contribution to NATO-led operations and, for those involved, in NATO. The European Council invited the General Affairs Council to elaborate this goal, and other, collective capability goals, with the participation of Defence Ministers. The GAC will also develop a method for meeting, maintaining and reviewing these goals and through which national contributions will be defined. In addition, *Member States will use existing defence planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP*. In the first instance it is necessary to identify in detail the forces and capabilities required from Member States collectively in order to achieve the headline goal. This paper focuses on this first task. A section on further work is included at the end.

Methodology

The headline goal expressed at Helsinki represents a political commitment by the Member States. It includes insufficient detail for the purposes of military planning, raising questions such as where EU-led task forces might be expected to operate, with whom and how often. Some of the key figures in the headline goal (e.g. 60 days) are also open to interpretation. The elaboration of the headline goal should follow a systematic approach. This will provide a clear link between the policy context of the CFSP, the broad statement of the headline goal and the detailed listing of capabilities and force

elements necessary to deliver the goal. The key steps are set out below. In particular, agreement on the first three steps is needed before progress can be made on the later steps of the process.

- Step 1 An outline of the overall strategic context.
- Step 2 Articulation of key planning assumptions.
- Step 3 Selection of planning scenarios that describe illustrative situations for the employment of forces.
- Step 4 Identification of the force capabilities required to support the scenarios
- Step 5 Development of illustrative force packages that have the required capabilities and confirmation of their effectiveness against the planning scenarios.
- Step 6 Using these different force packages to define the full range of requirements implicit in the headline goal.

We will, once the headline goal is elaborated in this way, need to consider the question of national contributions to it, and to identify “capability gaps” by comparing the elaborated goal against these. Consideration of how these tasks will be undertaken is beyond the scope of this paper (but see the section on further work below).

Step 1. Strategic Context

In today’s strategic environment, we face new risks such as ethnic and religious conflict, inter-and intra-state competition for scarce resources, environmental damage, population shifts. Europe needs to be able to manage and respond to these, including by intervening to prevent crises escalating into conflicts. This may require operations across the full Petersberg spectrum:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks; and,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as peace enforcement by some nations).

While these operations are likely to be smaller than those envisaged during the Cold War, they will often be more demanding in other ways. Rapid deployment at short notice to crisis regions will be essential to deter or contain conflict. Armed forces may have to operate in areas where the supporting infrastructure is limited, and sustain concurrent operations for long periods. Operations will frequently be conducted under the constant gaze of the world’s media. We can increasingly expect adversaries – armed with sophisticated, commercially available military technology, able to extensively adapt

technologies developed for civil application and some with access to weapons of mass destruction – to employ asymmetric approaches to disrupt our capabilities. We also expect that there will be increased emphasis on minimising casualties (own forces, opposing forces and civilian) and restricting collateral and environmental damage.

Elaboration of the headline goal will need to devote particular attention to the capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management in the context of this security environment: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control. These objectives of capability improvement and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, will be mutually reinforcing.

Step 2. Key Planning Assumptions

We should make the following assumptions for the purpose of further planning:

- a. **Target date.** The headline goal is to be met if possible by June 2003 (and by December 2003 at the latest).
- b. **Geographical area.** We should plan on the basis that within the agreed range of missions, the most demanding will occur in and around Europe. Forces should also be available and able to respond to crises world wide, albeit at lesser scale.
- c. **Contributions.** The headline goal is a policy and planning commitment for the EU Member States. The scale and nature of national contributions cannot be fully addressed until the overall requirement is clearer. Additional contributions to the overall improvement of European military capabilities will be invited from European NATO members who are not EU Member States and other countries who are candidates for accession to the European Union. We would expect other Europe nations to participate in specific EU-led operations.
- d. **Scale of Effort.** We should assume that the most demanding mission will be a complex peace enforcement task in a joint environment in or around Europe. In order to be able to undertake this task as well as the rest of the full range of Petersberg missions, the EU will require access to a ready pool of various types of combat brigades, plus the necessary combat support and combat service support elements and additionally appropriate maritime and air elements. It is the size of this pool that will be defined by the scenario-based planning. This pool can be regarded as the source from which an appropriate force package could be constructed, depending on circumstances, of up to 50,000 – 60,000 troops. Within any overall figure the proportion of combat troops to support troops will vary according to the operational task. The assembled force should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support and appropriate maritime and air elements. We should ensure that the forces and capabilities required to meet the most demanding

mission as defined above will also be able to undertake a range of smaller-scale or less combat-orientated contingencies, against agreed concurrency criteria.

- e. **Concurrency.** We should plan to be able to conduct a single corps sized crisis management task, while retaining a limited capability to conduct a small-scale operation, such as a NEO. Alternatively, within the overall total of the headline Goal, we should be prepared to maintain one longer term operation at less than the maximum level and at the same time be able to conduct another operation of a limited duration. It may be that this requirement will pose the most demanding challenge for the EU member states, given the competing demands for key assets. It is also assumed that the EU-led corps-size operation referred to in the headline goal is not additional to the concurrency assumptions in NATO Ministerial Guidance 98. The implications of the other concurrency assumptions listed above will need to be analysed in connection with the further development of NATO Ministerial Guidance 2000.
- f. **Endurance.** We should plan to sustain a deployment of corps size, able to undertake the most demanding mission, for at least one year. Our initial assumption is that national commitments of forces and capabilities, once defined, will include a commitment to provide those elements for at least a year. This will require an additional pool of deployable forces to provide replacements for the initial ready force. (We note that in practice both the size of the force and the capabilities required might reduce as normality returned, within or beyond this initial period).
- g. **Readiness.** We should plan for forces to be held at graduated readiness, sufficient to deploy in full at corps level within 60 days, from a Council decision on the forces required (equivalent to NATO ACTORD/WEU Force Creation Message) to the point when all forces are fully trained and deployed in a theatre of operations, in or around Europe, with Transfer of Authority to the Operation Commander completed. Within this limit we should plan to provide a smaller rapid response element of immediate reaction forces at very high readiness, particularly of entry and other enabling forces; the scale and nature of such forces will depend on the particular circumstance of an operation. Guidelines will be established as part of further work.
- h. **Sustainability.** We should plan to deploy forces with sufficient holding to conduct operations until their re-supply has been established (within 10 days for air supply and 28 days for sea supply). We should then be able to sustain the forces deployed, up to 60,000 troops, for a period of at least 12 months.

Step 3. Planning Scenarios

We have expanded the requirements implicit in the headline goal by defining the key planning assumptions listed above. We now need to select illustrative scenarios against which capabilities and force packages designed to meet these requirements may be tested.

The WEU has already generated a set of illustrative Petersberg mission profiles, including scenarios for European-led operations up to corps sized level. These scenarios will also cover maritime and air elements. This work should be built on for the purposes of elaborating the headline goal. At least initially we need to identify a small number of scenarios which would be representative of the range of different mission types the EU might conduct.

Conclusions

The elaboration of the headline goal called for by the European Council at Helsinki is a complex task. To achieve the aim, Member States should first:

- a. agree a systematic methodology as described in this paper in order to establish a sound planning basis for ongoing work (para 3);
- b. agree a broad outline of strategic context and force characteristics (para 5-7);
- c. agree key planning assumptions (para 8);
- d. make use of the illustrative mission profiles for Petersberg Missions and associated scenarios agreed by the WEU (Reference WEU C(96)267 of 24 September 1996) (para 9);

in order to:

- e. identify capability requirements and develop illustrative force packages;
- f. produce a comprehensive statement of the pool of forces and capabilities collectively required to conduct Petersberg Missions up to the scale of the headline goal.

Further Work

If the conclusions above are agreed, the following further work will need to be urgently prepared:

- a. detailed force modelling by expert military Planners to generate proposals for the overall “headline goal” pool of forces and capabilities;
- b. analysis of this pool in comparison with existing Member States’ capabilities and the development of a method for the identification of key shortfalls and for definition of national contributions;
- c. a method for inviting no-EU Allies to identify additional contributions (as called for at Helsinki);

- d. definition of a system for providing regular review and incentives for Member States' progress towards the headline goal;
- e. a timetable for the conduct of this further work.

It will be essential for all of this further work to be closely co-ordinated with existing NATO and PfP planning processes, since the forces involved are also being developed and held available for NATO, or NATO-led, operations.

Appendix III: Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.

Common European Security and Defence Policy

6. The European Council reaffirms its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union's external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as well as a civilian one, in full respect of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

7. The European Council welcomes the Presidency report endorsed by the Council on "Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy" and associated documents (*see Annex I*). Satisfactory progress has been made in fulfilment of the Helsinki mandate on both the military and the civilian aspects of crisis management. In this context, the European Council notes the progressive development of the interim Political and Security Committee and the interim military body established at Helsinki.

8. Improving European military capabilities remains central to the credibility and effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The European Council is determined to meet the Headline Goal targets in 2003 as agreed in Helsinki. In this context, it looks forward to the Capabilities Commitment Conference later this year, where Member States will make initial national commitments, and to the creation of a review mechanism for measuring progress towards the achievement of those targets. The necessary transparency and dialogue between the Union and NATO will be ensured and NATO expertise will be sought on capability goal requirements.

9. Principles and modalities for arrangements have been identified to allow non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management. Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations have also been identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements.

10. Contributions are invited from all partner third states to the improvement of European capabilities. The European Council welcomes the offers made by Turkey, Norway, Poland and the Czech Republic, which will expand the range of capabilities available for EU-led operations.

11. The European Council welcomes the setting-up and first meeting of the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the identification of priority areas for targets in civilian aspects of crisis management and of specific targets for civilian police capabilities. In this respect Member States, cooperating voluntarily, have undertaken that by 2003 they will be able to provide up to 5 000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations. Member States have also undertaken to be able to identify and deploy up to 1 000 police officers within

30 days. The European Council also welcomes the willingness of the Commission to contribute to civilian crisis management within its spheres of action.

12. The European Council underlines the Union's determination in its approach to conflict prevention and crisis management to assume fully its Petersberg task responsibilities as referred to in Helsinki. It invites the incoming Presidency together with the Secretary General/High Representative to carry work forward within the General Affairs Council, in accordance with the mandates referred to in the Presidency report, and to submit an overall Presidency report to the European Council in Nice. The permanent political and military structures should be put in place as soon as possible after Nice.

ANNEX I

PRESIDENCY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In Cologne, the European Council expressed its resolve that the EU should play its full role on the international stage and that to that end the EU should be provided with all the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. Since Cologne, the European Union has been engaged in a process aiming at building the necessary means and capabilities which will allow it to take decisions on, and to carry out, the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union ("Petersberg tasks"). These developments are an integral part of the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and are based on the principles set out in Helsinki. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Having approved the two Finnish Presidency progress reports on military and non-military aspects of crisis management, including the common European headline goal and the collective capabilities goals, the European Council in Helsinki asked the Portuguese Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects, as a matter of priority. The Portuguese Presidency was invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

3. A first progress report, reflecting the work carried forward by the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, within the General Affairs Council was presented to the Lisbon European Council. The European Council of Lisbon welcomed the progress already achieved and in particular the

fact that the interim bodies had been established and had started to function effectively and that the Council had identified a process for elaborating the headline goal and identifying national contributions so as to meet the military capability target.

4. The European Council in Lisbon looked forward to the further work that the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, would pursue in the Council and to the Presidency's overall report to the Feira European Council, including proposals on the involvement of third countries in EU military crisis management and the further development of the EU's relationship with NATO.

5. The Lisbon European Council furthermore appreciated what had been achieved in the non-military crisis management track and invited the Council to establish by, or at, Feira a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management.

6. Since then, work has been carried forward on all aspects of military and non-military crisis management and substantive progress has been made, in particular with the identification of appropriate arrangements for the participation of third countries to EU military crisis management, as well as of principles and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations. The headline goal has been further elaborated; a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up; a coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been established at the Council Secretariat; the study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management has been concluded; concrete targets for civilian police have been identified.

7. The Presidency submits herewith its overall report to the Feira European Council covering, in Chapter II, the military aspects and, in Chapter III, the non-military aspects of crisis management. Work has also been carried out on conflict prevention. The usefulness of finding ways of improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in the field of conflict prevention has been recognised.

8. In the course of the work during the Presidency on the strengthening of military and non-military crisis management and conflict prevention, the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation between the EU rapidly-evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

9. In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol No 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

G. Elaboration of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals

1. Concerning the development of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals, the General Affairs Council, reinforced with Ministers of Defence, concluded at its meeting of 20 March that the "Food for thought" paper on the "Elaboration of the Headline Goal", including the timetable set out therein leading to a Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened by the end of 2000, constitutes a basis for future work to be conducted by the competent bodies.

2. The General Affairs Council, at its session of 13 June, with the participation of Ministers of Defence, approved the work carried out by the Interim Military Body and forwarded through the IPSC, up to the "First Seminar of National Experts in Defence Planning" held in Brussels on 22-24 May 2000. The Council, inviting the competent bodies to continue on that basis, adopted the following guidelines for further work:

- The development of the Headline and collective capabilities goals, which have been agreed at the European Council in Helsinki, should be conducted by the 15, in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of the EU as well as the requirements regarding military efficiency.
- The Interim Military Body, with the political guidance of the IPSC, will propose the elements which will encompass the Headline Goal.
- In order to do this, the Interim Military Body will identify the capabilities necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.
- In elaborating the Headline and collective capabilities goals by drawing on Member States contributions, the IMB, including representatives from capitals, will also call meetings with DSACEUR and NATO experts in order to draw on NATO's military expertise on the requirements of the Headline and collective capabilities goals.
- In this connection, transparency and dialogue between the EU and NATO will in addition be provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the capabilities goal provided for in Appendix 2.
- The Headline Goal requirements agreed by the IMB at CHODs level will, after endorsement by the Council, be the basis for the Member States in considering their initial offers of national contributions to the Headline Goal. These contributions will be examined by the Interim Military Body. This process must be concluded before the convening of the Capability Commitment Conference.

- It will be important to ensure coherence, for those Member States concerned, with NATO's defence planning process and the Planning and Review Process.
- In accordance with the determination expressed at Helsinki and Lisbon, once the needs and resources available have been identified, Member States will announce, at the Capability Commitment Conference, their commitments with a view to enabling the EU to fulfil the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities goals. It will be also important to create a review mechanism for measuring progress towards the achievement of those goals.
- The European Union will encourage third countries to contribute through supplementary commitments. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming presidency regarding the Capabilities Commitment Conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the six non-EU European NATO members. The offers of capabilities already made by Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway are welcomed.

H. Recommendations on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies related to the CESDP within the EU

The interim political and military bodies were established on 1 March 2000. In the light of the experience gained since their establishment, work has been carried out on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions. Further work is under way, in order to ensure as soon as possible the start of the permanent phase and of the EU operational capacity for crisis management.

I.

Proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management

Work has been carried forward on the modalities of consultation and/or participation concerning the non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU.

In this context, the aim has been to identify, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, arrangements for dialogue, consultation and cooperation on issues related to crisis management ensuring the decision-making autonomy of the EU. These arrangements will provide for the interim period meetings with the abovementioned countries, which will take place within a single inclusive structure and will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political

dialogue on CFSP matters. Within this structure there will be exchanges with the non-EU NATO European members when the subject matter requires it. For the permanent phase, arrangements will take into account the different needs arising in the routine phase and in the operational phase. The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 1 to this report.

Exchanges took place on 11 May 2000 between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members and other candidate countries as well as between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members.

Russia, Ukraine, other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States, may be invited to take part in EU-led operations. In this context, the EU welcomes the interest shown by Canada.

The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward further work within the General Affairs Council in order to make initial proposals to the Nice European Council on appropriate arrangements for consultation and/or participation to allow these other prospective partners to contribute to EU-led military crisis management.

J. Proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis

The Council has identified the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed. As to modalities, the Council has recommended that the EU should propose to NATO the creation of four "ad hoc working groups" between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation.

The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 2 to this report.

K.

Indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary

The existing provisions of the TEU define the questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy governed by Title V of the Treaty. On this basis, the Council has decided to establish the interim Political and Security Committee and the Interim Military Body, and to reinforce the Council Secretariat with military experts seconded from Member States. Article 17 TEU

expressly includes the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP. The Presidency took note of the opinion of the Council Legal Service the conclusion of which reads as follows:

"The Council's Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European Union. However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer the Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally appropriate."

The Presidency suggests that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

III. CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. The Presidency has, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, responded as a matter of priority to the Helsinki European Council's invitation to carry work forward on all aspects of civilian crisis management, as defined in Annex 2 to Annex IV to the Helsinki conclusions.

2. The aim of this work has been to enhance and better coordinate the Union's and the Members States' non-military crisis management response tools, with special emphasis on a rapid reaction capability. This will also improve the EU's contribution to crisis management operations led by international and regional organisations.

3. As a concrete result of this intensive work, the following measures have been taken:

(a) A Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up by a Council decision adopted on 22 May 2000. The Committee held its first meeting on 16 June 2000.

(b) A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been set up at the Council Secretariat. Further developing the inventory of Member States and Union resources relevant for non-military crisis management, it has, as a first priority, established a database on civilian police capabilities in order to maintain and share information, to propose capabilities initiatives and to facilitate the definition of concrete targets for EU Member States collective non-military response. The coordinating mechanism has further developed its close cooperation with the interim Situation Centre/Crisis Cell established by the Secretary General/High Representative.

(c) A study (Appendix 3), drawing on experience from recent and current crises, on the expertise of the Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis management in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000, has been carried out to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management. This study identifies priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase, without excluding the use of all the other tools available to the Union and to Member States.

(d) Concrete targets for civilian police capabilities have been identified and are set out in Appendix 4. In particular, Member States should, cooperating voluntarily, as a final objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. Within the target for overall EU capabilities, Member States undertake to be able to identify and deploy, within 30 days, up to 1 000 police officers. Furthermore, work will be pursued to develop EU guidelines and references for international policing.

4. In addition to these measures, the Council has received and is examining the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation creating a Rapid Reaction Facility to support EU activities as outlined in the Helsinki Report.

IV. FOLLOW-UP

1. The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry work forward within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The French Presidency is invited to report to the European Council in Nice, in particular on:

(a) the elaboration of the headline goal and the collective capabilities goal agreed at Helsinki, including results reached at the Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened before Nice;

(b) the establishment of the permanent political and military structures to be put in place as soon as possible after the Nice European Council;

(c) the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU in the field of the Petersberg tasks;

(d) the implementation of the Feira decisions on :

– the arrangements that will allow consultations with and participation of third countries in EU-led military crisis management;

– the development of the arrangements ensuring consultation and cooperation with NATO in military crisis management on the basis of

the work undertaken in the relevant EU-NATO "ad hoc working groups";

(e) the development and the implementation of EU capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management, including the definition of concrete targets.

2. The issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

3. The Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission are invited to submit to the Nice European Council, as a basis for further work, concrete recommendations on how to improve the coherence and the effectiveness of the European Union action in the field of conflict prevention, fully taking into account and building upon existing instruments, capabilities and policy guidelines.

APPENDIX 1

ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE COUNCIL ON MODALITIES OF CONSULTATION AND/OR PARTICIPATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CANDIDATES FOR ACCESSION TO THE EU TO CONTRIBUTE TO EU MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

MANDATE

1. In the Helsinki European Council Conclusions the Portuguese Presidency is "...invited to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including (...) proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management".

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

2. The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU on EU-led crisis management.

3. Appropriate arrangements will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management.

4. There will be full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework.

5. There will be a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU.

6. There will, within this structure, be exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

MODALITIES

7. Modalities for the participation of non-EU European NATO members and candidate countries, to be established for the permanent phase, will need to take into account the different needs arising in different situations:

- routine non-crisis phase: mechanism for a regular dialogue;
- operational phase, including two stages:
 - (a) pre-operational phase when options for action are considered, in which dialogue and consultations will be intensified;
 - (b) operational phase "stricto sensu", which starts when the Council takes the decision to launch an operation, and an ad hoc Committee of Contributors is set up.

Full account should be taken of the role of the Secretary General/High Representative in the EU's CFSP and CESDP.

A. For the interim period

8. Until the implementation of the modalities established for the permanent phase, meetings with the 15 countries concerned (non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU) will take place within the single inclusive structure referred to in paragraph 5. The choice of the appropriate form and modalities will be based on considerations of pragmatism and efficiency, depending on the circumstances, subject-matter and needs.

9. A minimum of two meetings in EU+15 format will be organised in each Presidency on ESDP matters. These will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on CFSP matters.

10. Within this framework, a minimum of two meetings will be organised with the six non-EU European NATO members (in EU+6 format) in each Presidency.

Additional exchanges will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the IPSC.

11. A meeting at Ministerial level within the framework referred to in paragraph 8, will be organised in each Presidency with the 15 and with the 6.

12. The exchanges provided for in paragraphs 9 and 10 will cover the elaboration of the headline and capability goals as well, so as fully to inform non-EU members of ongoing work on the list of necessary means. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming Presidency regarding the capabilities pledging conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the 6 non-EU European NATO members.

B. For the permanent phase

– Routine Phase

13. Exchanges on issues related to security and defence policy and, in particular, on progress within the EU in establishing its crisis-management capabilities, will take place during the routine phase.

14. During the routine phase there should be, in the course of each semester,

- regular meetings in EU+15 format, at the appropriate level;
- at least two meetings with the participation of the non-EU European NATO members in EU+6 format;
- additional meetings will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the PSC.

PSC will play a leading role in the implementation of these arrangements, which should also include exchanges at military level.

15. Arrangements for Ministerial meetings during the permanent phase will be based upon the experience gained during the interim phase.

16. The exchanges will facilitate participation of the concerned countries to EU-led operations.

– Operational Phase

(a) Pre-operational phase

17. In the event of a crisis, dialogue and consultation will be intensified.

18. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, these consultations will provide a framework for exchanges of views and discussion on any related security concerns raised by the countries concerned. Where the EU recourse to NATO assets is under active consideration, particular attention will be given to consultation with the six non-EU European NATO members.

(b) Operational phase "stricto sensu"

19. When deciding on the military option, the EU will address participation of non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates to accession to the EU according to the provisions agreed in Helsinki:

"Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.

Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation."

20. The operational phase will start when the Council decides to launch a military crisis management operation. Those non-EU European NATO members and countries candidates for accession which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces, will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day to day conduct of that operation.

21. An ad hoc committee of contributors will be set up comprising all EU Member States and the other participating countries for the day to day conduct of the operation. The Council/PSC will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For the military day to day conduct of the operation, functions and roles of the MC and of the operation commander will be set out in the relevant arrangements.

22. The decision to end an operation shall be taken by the Council after consultation between participating states within the ad hoc committee of contributors.

23. The Council will formalise the necessary arrangements in due time and will examine the options for doing so.

APPENDIX 2
PRINCIPLES FOR CONSULTATION WITH NATO ON MILITARY
ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING MODALITIES
FOR EU/NATO RELATIONS

The Mandate

The European Council in Helsinki invited the Portuguese Presidency to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including "proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and at Cologne".

The Principles

1. Development of consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO must take place in full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making.
2. The EU and NATO have undertaken further to strengthen and develop their cooperation in military crisis-management on the basis of shared values, equality and in a spirit of partnership. The aim is to achieve full and effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in order to identify and take rapid decisions on the most appropriate military response to a crisis and to ensure efficient crisis-management. In this context, EU-objectives in the field of military capabilities and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, will be mutually reinforcing.
3. While being mutually reinforcing in crisis management, the EU and NATO are organisations of a different nature. This will be taken into account in the arrangements concerning their relations and in the assessment to be made by the EU of existing procedures governing WEU-NATO relations with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO framework.
4. Arrangements and modalities for relations between the EU and NATO will reflect the fact that each Organisation will be dealing with the other on an equal footing.
5. In the relations between the EU and NATO as institutions, there will be no discrimination against any of the Member States.

ISSUES AND MODALITIES FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

Contacts with NATO (informal contacts by SGs, briefings by the Portuguese Presidency at the NAC) have taken place in accordance with the Helsinki definition for the initial phase in which the EU-interim bodies have concentrated on establishing themselves. There is now a need for a further evolution in EU-NATO relations.

A. Issues

1. **Security:** EU efforts towards finalising its own security arrangements (physical and personal security, and work towards an EU security agreement) are an absolute priority. On this basis, the Union will have to establish a dialogue with NATO to define security arrangements between the two organisations. These discussions should lead to an agreement, which will govern inter alia information exchange and access by designated officials from the EU and its Member States to NATO planning structures.

2. **Defining capability goals:** to ensure that "these objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually reinforcing", modalities for consultation on these issues will need to be established. These modalities should permit the EU to draw, as needed, on NATO military expertise, as the EU elaborates its headline goal by drawing on Member State contributions. Having elaborated the headline and capability goals, the EU, as agreed in Helsinki, will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and through which national contributions reflecting Member States' political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use existing defence planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process of the PFP.

3. **Arrangements enabling the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin and Washington agreements):** Helsinki and Cologne defined two approaches to implementing EU operations: with or without NATO assets. To use NATO assets, it is important to make progress on defining together how this will work in practice in order to draw up an agreement. This agreement should be ready by the time the EU becomes operational. To make this possible, the EU looks forward to substantial progress within NATO.

4. **Defining permanent arrangements:** Following the Feira European Council, discussion will be needed to determine the nature of the permanent arrangements, which will govern relations between the EU and NATO. These arrangements should be based upon the principles defined above.

The groundwork undertaken on these four issues will pave the way for establishing permanent arrangements between NATO and the EU. Our aim is that these should be ready at the same time as the EU permanent structures are put in place after the Nice European Council.

B. Modalities

1. The Feira European Council should decide to propose to NATO the creation of "ad hoc working groups" between the EU and NATO for each of the issues mentioned above.
 2. The "ad hoc working groups" would have the following tasks:
 - (a) for security issues: preparation of an EU-NATO security agreement;
 - (b) for capability goals: the implementation of information exchange and discussion with NATO on elaborating capability goals. It is understood that DSACEUR could participate, as appropriate;

 - (c) for modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets (Berlin and Washington agreements): preparation of an agreement on the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities as agreed at Washington (draft framework agreement on Berlin Plus implementation). It is understood that DSACEUR should participate;

 - (d) for the definition of permanent arrangements: defining the main parameters of an EU/NATO agreement which would formalise structures and procedures for consultation between the two organisations in times of crisis and non-crisis.
 3. If, having regard to the principles set above, new issues were to arise which were recognised as requiring consultation between the EU and NATO, further "ad hoc working groups" could be considered.
 4. On the EU side, the IPSC will have a coordinating role for the work of the "ad hoc working groups", and will be a focal point for dialogue.
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Appendix IV: Chart of NATO and the European Pillar

Source: Defence Committee Report, *European Security and Defence*, HC 264, 19 April 2000.

