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# European Defence: From Pörtschach to Helsinki

The past 18 months have witnessed a new urgency and purpose in the search for a more distinct and capable European defence identity. From early initiatives at St Malo, through the experience of the war in Kosovo and NATO's 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, to the EU Helsinki summit, the pace of development has been rapid.

The Government has placed particular emphasis on its role at the forefront of shaping the European defence agenda. This has been reflected in the attention paid to NATO and European defence issues in the 1999 Defence White Paper. (Cm 4446)

This paper provides a review of the milestones in European defence over this period, concentrating on institutional changes within the EU and NATO. It analyses reaction to these changes within the UK, in the rest of Europe and, in particular, the US.

Mark Oakes

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## Summary of main points

The past 18 months have witnessed a new urgency and purpose in the search for a more distinct and capable European defence identity. From early initiatives at St Malo, through the lessons of the war in Kosovo and NATO's 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, to the EU Helsinki summit, the pace of development has been rapid. One of the key developments behind this new momentum was the apparent movement in UK policy, unveiled at the EU meeting at Pörschach in October 1998, towards the EU playing a greater defence role. Key developments up to the end of 1999 have included:

- The development of a direct relationship between the EU and NATO;
- The appointment of Javier Solana as both 'Mr CFSP' and Secretary-General of the WEU;
- An audit of European defence capabilities;
- Proposals to establish by 2003 an EU multinational corps-level force of 50,000-60,000 personnel;
- Proposals to set up permanent politico-military EU bodies;
- Preparations for the establishment of a European air transport command.

The Government has placed particular emphasis on its role in shaping the European defence agenda. This is reflected in the 1999 Defence White Paper which devotes a chapter to NATO and European defence. While re-iterating the primacy of NATO in the UK's security and defence policy, the White Paper argues in favour of the EU being able to "undertake crisis management operations in support of its Common Foreign and Security Policy". The White Paper also promotes the UK's Strategic Defence Review as a blueprint for improving military capabilities through "better targeting defence spending".

The Conservative Party has expressed reservations about the Government's strategy on European defence, warning it could put at risk the transatlantic nature of the Alliance and having "profound dangers". The Liberal Democrats have generally been supportive of the Government's approach.

The US attitude to events over the past 18 months has been one of cautious encouragement. The main area of concern for the US is the fear that any new European defence structure could duplicate and eventually undermine NATO. The US is particularly keen to formalise NATO-EU co-operation as soon as possible and has suggested setting up institutions on a provisional or interim basis.

One of the key questions to be addressed is whether European countries are prepared to spend more on defence to improve European military capabilities.



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## I Background and Context

The end of the Cold War, the creation of a European Union (EU), the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the enlargement of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe have all accelerated moves to establish new forms of European defence co-operation. These moves have built upon initiatives that date back to the era immediately after the Second World War, which witnessed the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO.<sup>1</sup>

During much of the 1990s, the US and the EU have been striving to define a new transatlantic relationship that balances Europe's desire for a more independent political role with its continued reliance on US and NATO military capabilities. The two main concepts to emerge during this period are NATO's "European security and defence identity" (ESDI) and the EU's "common foreign and security policy" (CFSP). These two ideas have developed in parallel and have become linked through their relationship with the WEU.

### A. The WEU

The WEU was originally established by the 1948 Treaty of Brussels. It now numbers ten member countries, (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK) all of which are also members of NATO. The WEU also has Associate Member countries (non-EU members of NATO), Associate Partners (non-EU and non-NATO countries), and several countries with Observer status. With the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the exercise of the military responsibilities of the WEU was transferred to the North Atlantic Alliance.

The WEU was reactivated in 1984 with the aim of developing a common European defence identity and strengthening the Alliance's European pillar. Its role has developed into that of an intermediary between the EU and NATO. Its resources include a Headquarters based in Brussels, a satellite centre in Torrejon, Spain, the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO).<sup>2</sup> For details on recent developments in the WEU see section VI.

### B. The European Security and Defence Identity

The ESDI, first proposed in 1994, was an attempt to build up a stronger European pillar of the Alliance, enabling the European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence while reinforcing the transatlantic link. In June 1996, at a ministerial

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<sup>1</sup> Further background on the history of European Defence Co-operation can be found in Library Research Paper 95/45, "Towards the IGC: Developing a Common Defence Policy", 6 April 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Further details on these organisations can be found at the WEU web site at <http://www.weu.int>. For further background on the development of the WEU see Library Research Paper 97/112, *The European Communities (Amendment) Bill: Implementing the Amsterdam Treaty*, 5 November 1997



meeting in Berlin, NATO affirmed that one of its objectives was to develop ESDI in NATO, which

will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership.<sup>3</sup>

Under the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, agreed at the summit, the WEU, as the European pillar of the Alliance and agent of ESDI, would ‘borrow’ NATO (essentially US) military assets to support its operations. These assets would include logistical support, intelligence, command and control and communications). NATO defines the CJTF as follows:

A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defence of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. It provides a flexible and efficient means where-by the Alliance can generate rapidly deployable forces with appropriate command and control arrangements.<sup>4</sup>

Under ESDI, the CJTF command structures would be embedded within the NATO structure, with appropriate European officers double-hatted in both a NATO and WEU role. The CJTF cells would then detach when required. In other words, there would be no separate European military command structure. This would also facilitate WEU actions on behalf of the European Union in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the CFSP.

### **C. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**

The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the EU under the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in February 1992. Under that Treaty, the objective of the Union in external policy is to “assert its identity on the international scene, in particular, through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.<sup>5</sup> The CFSP contained two separate elements, a diplomatic side, developed from the earlier system of European Political Cooperation, and a new security and defence side which would in large part be implemented by the WEU.

The Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997 saw the CFSP progress through closer cooperation between the EU/WEU and NATO under the CJTF concept, which made NATO-assigned assets available to the WEU for limited military operations. These operations consisted of humanitarian intervention, crisis management and peacekeeping, commonly known as

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<sup>3</sup> NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, NATO web site at: <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>4</sup> NATO web site at <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>5</sup> TEU, Article B

“Petersberg tasks”.<sup>6</sup> A CFSP policy planning and early warning unit was also to be established under the responsibility of a new ‘High Representative’ for the CFSP – commonly known as ‘Mr CFSP’.<sup>7</sup>

Despite these pledges from both sides of the Atlantic to advance towards a more visible European presence in NATO, practical progress over the past decade has been hampered by disputes on how best to proceed. The US, has expressed a desire for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security, while remaining wary of a European caucus developing within NATO that could duplicate some of its functions and eventually undermine the transatlantic nature of the Alliance. British governments have traditionally shared these concerns. The other main Western European military power, France, has had frequent disagreements with the US over the nature of the Alliance since leaving NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structure in the 1960s. Recent Franco-American disputes have centred upon the command of NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe.

A number of events during 1998 served to move the debate forward on European defence and the transatlantic relationship. One of the key developments was the significant shift by the two main players in European defence, France and the UK. These two countries both have permanent seats on the UN Security Council and possess both a nuclear capability and armed forces capable of sustaining out of area operations. France, despite disagreements with the US, had been becoming more involved in NATO and took a significant step when it provided the corps and commander for the Extraction Force for Kosovo and put this force under NATO (US) command.

In the UK the new Labour Government came to power in 1997 expressing a desire to have a “fresh start in Europe”, whilst sustaining the UK’s traditional approach to a European defence identity i.e. that it should work through NATO and the WEU. This policy appeared to shift at the Pörschach meeting in October 1998 towards the EU playing a greater defence role. It has been suggested by the Opposition and by some commentators that a key motivation for this change has been the desire by the Labour Government to prove its European credentials while remaining outside the first wave of the single currency. In a wider context, the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 had obvious symbolic significance regarding European integration and made the EU’s lack of progress in developing the CFSP, backed by a credible armed forces structure, even more anomalous. Other factors that fed into this movement included the recognition of the need to consolidate the European defence industrial sector.

## **II Pörschach – October 1998**

The statements on defence made by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the informal EU summit at Pörschach in October 1998 have been widely regarded as signalling a significant shift in British attitudes to European defence issues. The UK had traditionally

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<sup>6</sup> Agreed at a ministerial meeting of the WEU in Petersberg, near Bonn, on 19 June 1992.

<sup>7</sup> For further details on the defence aspects of the Amsterdam Treaty see Library Research Paper 97/112, “The European Communities (Amendment) Bill: Implementing the Amsterdam Treaty”, 5 November 1997.

avoided discussion of defence issues in the EU, insisting on the primary role of the US and NATO in European defence. Although no formal decisions or records were taken at the summit, Mr Blair outlined the nature of the discussions on European defence matters at a press conference:

...in respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role. This will arise particularly because we are going to be appointing two people to common foreign and security positions in the European Union in the next few months so it is something that is very much on our minds but we are all agreed it was important that Europe should be able to play a better, more unified part in foreign and security policy decisions.....<sup>8</sup>

Later he added:

A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do that.<sup>9</sup>

Mr Blair did reiterate the primacy of NATO in any future common European defence policy:

We need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need to make sure that the institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to it, we need to recognise that that will mean changes in our own defence capability and we also need the political will to back it up whatever we do.<sup>10</sup>

The momentum surrounding European defence and security issues was maintained by the convening of an unprecedented meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna on 4 November 1998. The meeting was informal and could take no decisions but there was a consensus that European countries had to be more effective militarily in dealing with future European crises. The then Austrian defence minister, Werner Fasslabend, said:

We Europeans simply have to be willing and able to get to grips with European crises and conflicts, if necessary also by our own efforts – before hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and millions driven from their homes.<sup>11</sup>

The then UK Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, described the discussions on European defence as representing a “defining moment in European security policy” and told

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<sup>8</sup> Austrian Presidency Informal Summit Press Conference, Downing Street web site at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk>

<sup>9</sup> *ibid*

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

<sup>11</sup> *The Guardian*, 5 November 1998.

reporters; "We can talk a good game but have we got the political will, have we got the military capability to be able to make sure that policy is put into effect?"<sup>12</sup>

The Opposition raised questions regarding the Government's new stance and direction on European defence during a Commons debate on European Union (Defence Policy) on 11 November 1998:

**Mr. Blunt:** I look forward to hearing from the Under-Secretary of State exactly what the Government are up to. The House should have the benefit of a clarification of the Government's policy. That is what this debate is about and I look forward to the Under-Secretary's response to it.

I was quoting the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. It stated:

*"The WEU would become superfluous. Its political role would fall to the EU and its military role to NATO. Blair's ideas are supported by the Foreign Office and Defence Ministry, although the latter has certain reservations."*

We look forward to hearing what those are. It continued:

*"In the long term, this would mean the establishment of something akin to a European Foreign and Defence Ministry."*

*Le Monde* directly asked the Prime Minister:

*"Do you support the idea of abolishing the WEU and transferring its military resources to NATO?"*

He replied:

*"There are all kinds of ideas and many admit that the WEU is less than the ideal instrument which we need. I believe that we must think in a more imaginative way than we are doing."*

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the WEU. What conclusion are people supposed to draw about the future of the WEU from those remarks?

The Prime Minister is considering a very substantial change which, in the light of the Amsterdam treaty, would stand the whole of the Government's approach on its head. I wonder whether other Ministers knew of it. There are rumours of Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence papers for and against the ideas suggested -- yet when Defence Ministers were debating defence in this House, particular points were put to them, but they were unable to say whether those ideas were being considered.<sup>13</sup>

The then Under-Secretary of State for Defence, John Spellar, responded by stating:

Contrary to the unfounded assertions of the hon. Member for Reigate, we are not talking about removing defence from the control of national Governments and national Parliaments. Of course, as the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock) said on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, member states must retain control of the use of their armed forces and the circumstances in which they are placed in danger.

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<sup>12</sup> *The Guardian*, 5 November 1998.

<sup>13</sup> HC Deb 11 November 1999, c286

We do not believe that it would be right for the European Commission or the European Parliament to have any direct role in those decisions, nor must there be any question of undermining NATO or attempting to duplicate it. NATO will rightly remain the foundation of our collective defence, as set out in article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty. That was explicitly recognised for the first time in a European Union context in the Amsterdam treaty.

Our aim is to strengthen Europe's position in the world. Europe's 370 million citizens expect and deserve nothing less. We want to ensure that Europe can speak with authority and act with decisiveness. For that to be a reality, European foreign policy needs to be coherent, responsive and credible.

There is no simple way of achieving that. Partly, it is a question of ensuring that we have sufficient common political will; perhaps even more importantly, it requires the establishment of an effective defence capability to underpin that will; and partly we need to get right the institutional arrangements that link the two.<sup>14</sup>

The approach to European defence issues outlined at Pörtlach provided the basis for Anglo-French discussions at St Malo.

### **III St Malo – December 1998**

The Anglo-French defence initiatives signed at St Malo on 3-4 December 1998 gave further impetus to the strengthening of a European defence identity. The two key events were the signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI) on defence co-operation and a joint declaration on European defence.

The LOI on 'Co-operation in Crisis Management and Operations' (the full text of which is available at Appendix I) signed by George Robertson and French Defence Minister, Alain Richard, aimed at making it easier to undertake joint military operations. The agreement was said to build upon earlier defence cooperation between the two countries in Bosnia and West Africa and existing agreements between the two countries' navies (1996), armies (1997) and air forces (1998). In practical terms, the LOI covered co-operation in logistics, intelligence, civil/military affairs, personnel exchanges and media handling. Any military operations would take place "outside NATO territory where NATO does not take the lead".<sup>15</sup> The LOI stated that the UK/French arrangement is not exclusive and that both countries will "continue to operate with other Allies and UN force contributors as required".<sup>16</sup> Mr Robertson described

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<sup>14</sup> HC Deb 11 November 1999 c303

<sup>15</sup> UK/French LOI, Dep 98/1455

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

the agreement as “a major and practical step towards strengthening Europe’s defence capability”.<sup>17</sup>

Implementation of the initiatives in the LOI will be carried out “progressively by UK and French Ministries of Defence with progress reported annually to Defence Ministers”.<sup>18</sup> The Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, summarised, in a Written Answer, on 24 January 2000, the progress made since the St. Malo agreement in promoting Anglo-French co-operation in defence:

**Mr. Hoon:** The Letter of Intent on co-operation in crisis management and operations signed at St. Malo in December 1998 has allowed work to be taken forward on planning for non-combatant evacuation operations; joint exercises; improved links between operational headquarters; co-ordination of naval deployments; information exchanges on peacekeeping activities; Year 2000 computer problems; logistics; and arrangements for dealing with the media. Specific examples of co-operation are: the posting of liaison officers into operational headquarters; the attachment of HMS Somerset, and later HMS Grafton, to the French FOCH Carrier Task Group in the Adriatic during the Kosovo conflict; the joint signing ceremony in New York on 25 June of Memoranda of Understanding between our respective Governments and the UN on troop availability for UN peacekeeping operations; and co-operation on media handling during the Kosovo conflict. We also signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement at the UK/France Summit held in November 1999.<sup>19</sup>

The joint UK-French statement on European Defence made by President Chirac and Prime Ministers Blair and Jospin at St Malo, (full text available at Appendix II) called for Europeans to complete the provisions of the EU's 1997 Amsterdam Treaty so as to reinforce the Union's CFSP. The joint declaration stated that

the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.<sup>20</sup>

The joint statement is overwhelmingly concerned with the role that the EU and WEU should be playing within a reformed NATO. The use of the word 'autonomous' rather than 'independent' indicated the continued primacy of NATO in European defence. Indeed, the statement goes on to refer to EU approval of military action “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”. Moreover, the strengthening of EU defence ties was justified not only “in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs”<sup>21</sup> but also in that they would be “contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the

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<sup>17</sup> MOD press release, 3 December 1998.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid*

<sup>19</sup> HC Deb 24 January 2000, c54w

<sup>20</sup> Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK-French Summit, St Malo, 3-4 December 1998

<sup>21</sup> *ibid*

collective defence of its members."<sup>22</sup> Mr Cook affirmed the desirability of "a clearer European identity within NATO" but also stated:

We want to see the EU take sensible foreign and security policy decisions and we need to match that up with the ability to call up a military capacity when it is needed ...That military capacity is in NATO , and is going to stay in NATO.<sup>23</sup>

Essentially, the core of the agreement between the UK and France was that the main security responsibility for Europe should remain with NATO, while the European allies would strengthen institutional arrangements for acting together militarily in activities such as peacekeeping that did not require US involvement. This approach formed the basis of the CFSP discussions at Cologne discussed later in this paper. The practical means of enabling the EU to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged was outlined as follows:

the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).<sup>24</sup>

Whether a streamlining of European defence co-operation would result in the eventual absorption of the WEU into the EU was a question left unanswered at St Malo. The declaration at St Malo only refers to the EU, "taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU."<sup>25</sup> José Cutileiro, the then Secretary-General of the WEU, reportedly doubted that the UK and France had decided to scrap the organisation, saying it had become "capable of mobilising the assets of all European countries".<sup>26</sup> However, many observers regarded St Malo as the beginning of the end of the WEU. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, in a Spanish Radio interview on 8 December 1998, interpreted the Anglo-French agreement thus:

Now with this new openness from Britain, which has just signed this joint agreement with France in St Malo, what Britain is doing is clearing the way for this idea (the integration of the WEU into the EU) the majority of we European states have been close to achieving. I think this is good news because it's good for NATO, its good for Europe, which will be able to raise its profile and increase its ability to act and its

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<sup>22</sup> Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK-French Summit, St Malo, 3-4 December 1998

<sup>23</sup> *RUSI Newsbrief*, Volume 19 Number 1, January 1999

<sup>24</sup> Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK-French Summit, St Malo, 3-4 December 1998

<sup>25</sup> *ibid*

<sup>26</sup> *International Herald Tribune* 2 December 1998

good for the USA, which in some ways, sees its wish not to have to always decide for Europe answered.<sup>27</sup>

In the past the UK has been sceptical about a fusion between the WEU and the EU, arguing that the neutral status of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden would make this unworkable. In contrast France, along with Germany, has long advocated folding the WEU into the EU. However, the Finnish and Swedish governments welcomed the St Malo statement, indicating that defence discussions relating to the CFSP were acceptable, providing they related to crisis management rather than mutual defence. Nevertheless, the questions of the WEU's future and the role of neutral EU states would recur at every stage of the development of European defence policy over the next year.

At the press conference following the summit the two leaders outlined their interpretation of what had been achieved at St Malo. President Chirac said:

It confirms some basic fundamental principles, quite naturally the respect of Alliance commitments, that goes without saying, but also the role of the European Council, the purely intergovernmental nature of CFSP, the need to have autonomous capacity to act, resortion to European military resources within or outside NATO if necessary, a necessary adaptation of our military assets.<sup>28</sup>

Mr Blair said:

The relationship between the UK and France in this area is obviously central and when I began this debate at Pörschach in, as it were, opening up the British position, I recognised immediately that it would be extremely important for Britain and France to engage closely with each other upon it. I think that we have taken a very significant step forward in the statement that we issued today and I think it is vital for Europe to have a stronger and more coherent force and voice in international affairs. As we point out, this is fully in conformity with our existing alliances, in particular the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. But I think it is important that we lay out certain clear principles and we have done that today.<sup>29</sup>

There was widespread, if guarded, support for the UK-French initiative at the NATO Summit on 8 December 1999. In a statement to the press the then NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana said:

Work on the ESDI within the Alliance has progressed. The Extraction Force that we are currently deploying in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Madeconia is a good example of Europe assuming greater responsibilities within the Alliance.

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<sup>27</sup> Spanish radio broadcast, 8 December 1998, BBC Monitoring Online at <http://warhol.monitor.bbc.co.uk>

<sup>28</sup> FCO Press Release, 4 December 1998.

<sup>29</sup> *ibid*



At the same time, NATO welcomes the current discussions among EU countries to see how Europe can take more responsibility for its security, and increase its defence capabilities. Our Alliance's decisions on ESDI in Berlin in 1996 have made this discussion possible.<sup>30</sup>

US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, while welcoming the announcements made at St Malo, was keen to emphasise the continued primacy of NATO. This was a position the US reiterated regularly over the next year. She said:

I think what happened there was very important. There is a reason for the Europeans to find an identity in their own defence, but this is a thing that cannot be a duplication or discrimination. It is a manner by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is something that cannot hurt NATO because this is the most important alliance. But we think it is very important that the Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps us in burden sharing.<sup>31</sup>

By duplication, Mrs Albright was probably warning against Europeans establishing military structures i.e. forces, headquarters, infrastructure, in addition to their national or NATO forces. The US believed that such duplication could lead to the de-coupling of European forces from NATO. The term 'discrimination' is less easy to define but probably refers to the need to preserve the right of every NATO member to participate in decision making regarding the use of NATO assets.

European reaction was also generally favourable. The German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, regarded St Malo as a continuation of earlier joint European agreements. He stated in a newspaper article that:

With the initiative by Prime Minister Blair in Pörschach on 3-4 November 1998, the Franco-German summit statement in Potsdam on 1 December and the Franco-British statement of St Malo on 4 December 1998, the prospects for speeding up the process of European integration have decisively improved.<sup>32</sup>

In the UK, the Opposition requested clarification of the precise nature of the proposals. John Maples, the then shadow defence spokesman, stated at Defence Questions on 7 December 1998 that:

Conservative Members wholly support the maximum Anglo-French defence co-operation, but within NATO. Can the Secretary of State explain how an EU capacity for the autonomous use of military forces can possibly be both autonomous and within NATO?<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> NATO web site <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>31</sup> United States Information Agency at <http://www.usia.gov>, 8 December 1998

<sup>32</sup> *Die Zeit*, 18 February 1999.

<sup>33</sup> HC Deb 7 December 1998, c10

Mr Robertson responded:

If it uses the European security and defence identity component – the forces that are designed to be in place for use by Europe and can be triggered through the EU via the WEU. We are talking about the same thing. We are not in any way undermining NATO – indeed, we are strengthening it.<sup>34</sup>

The St Malo proposals received a favourable reception at the Vienna European Council held on 11 and 12 December 1998. On his return from Vienna the Prime Minister declared:

At Pörschach, I urged the strengthening of the EU's foreign policy, not least by backing it with a credible capability for military action in regional crises where the US or NATO as a whole does not wish to be engaged. The joint declaration agreed with the French at St Malo on 4 December gave us a sound basis on which to build this initiative. It was widely welcomed by partners at Vienna. We agreed that work should be taken forward under the German presidency. There is, of course, no question of undermining NATO in any way. Strengthening European defence capability will, I believe, strengthen NATO.<sup>35</sup>

The Government's approach on European defence was challenged by the Leader of the Opposition, William Hague:

What are the Prime Minister's guiding principles on Europe? What has happened to his defence policy? The labour party manifesto states:

“Our security will continue to be based on NATO”.

And contains a commitment to the Western European Union which is clearly under threat. Following the Amsterdam summit, the Prime Minister described proposals along precisely the lines now being suggested as,

“an ill-judged Franco-German transplant operation”.

Why has he changed his mind so dramatically? Do not the proposals in fact endanger our commitment to NATO?<sup>36</sup>

Mr Blair responded:

He said that our agreement on defence somehow undermined NATO. I suggest that he reads the recent words of Madeleine Albright, who has agreed that it is very sensible that Europe, in circumstances where the US does not want to become

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<sup>34</sup> HC Deb 7 December 1998, c10

<sup>35</sup> HC Deb 14 December 1998, c607

<sup>36</sup> HC Deb 14 December 1998, c609

engaged, is able to do more of the cleaning up of problems in its own back yard. Only the Conservative party would see that as a negative move.<sup>37</sup>

The St Malo agreement was described as “historic” by Mr Blair because it made manifest the UK’s ‘fresh thinking’ on European defence issues which he had unveiled at Pörtschach.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, St Malo acted as a framework upon which future European defence initiatives were to build during 1999. The former US NATO ambassador, Robert Hunter, summed up St Malo as being “short on substance but long on political significance”.<sup>39</sup>

## IV NATO’s 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit – April 1999

The NATO 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit held in Washington on 24-25 April 1999, although somewhat overshadowed by the Alliance’s involvement in the conflict in Kosovo, succeeded in covering an ambitious agenda. The agenda included: the drafting of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, which outlined an extended role for the Alliance in ensuring security outside its traditional boundaries to encompass the whole ‘Euro-Atlantic’ region; the induction of three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; the issue of future NATO enlargement; and, of relevance to this discussion, the announcement of a more direct relationship between the Alliance and the EU.

### A. NATO-EU Relations

Under the agreement reached in Washington, the Alliance will make its military assets available “for use in EU-led operations”. This would entail the EU running specific operations, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian relief in Europe, using NATO troops and command structures. Such an operation would be commanded by the Deputy Supreme Commander, Europe, a post traditionally held by a European. The summit communiqué stated:

We therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.<sup>40</sup>

This emphasis upon EU operations, rather than those of the WEU, was new and significant; it finally replaced the arms-length relationship that NATO had maintained with the EU. Although not explicitly stated, developments at Washington seemed to anticipate the end of

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<sup>37</sup> HC Deb 14 December 1998, c610

<sup>38</sup> HC Deb 7 December 1998, c8

<sup>39</sup> Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 March 1999.

<sup>40</sup> NATO Summit Communiqué of 24 April 1999, item 10 - NATO web site at <http://www.nato.int>

the WEU. Moreover, the shift towards a stronger European defence identity by the British government through the Anglo-French St Malo agreement was acknowledged:

We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and - following the St. Malo Declaration - in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

- a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
- b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
- c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
- d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.
- e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.<sup>41</sup>

With regard to relations with the EU, the communiqué continued:

On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

- a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;

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<sup>41</sup> Paragraph 9, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999.

- b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- d. The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to address these measures on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. The Council will make recommendations to the next Ministerial meeting for its consideration.<sup>42</sup>

The move to a more direct relationship with the EU seemed to reflect a recognition in Washington that European willingness to share more of the burden for European security should be encouraged but combined with a continuing reliance on NATO assets. This relationship would, in effect, maintain US involvement in, and control of, any EU military operation.

The reference in the communiqué to “involvement of non-EU European Allies” was inserted to assuage Turkish fears about being excluded from any operations planning relating to the EU. There had been fears before the summit that Turkey would veto any moves giving EU countries a ‘blank cheque’ to mount operations without its approval. Opposition from other non-EU NATO members, such as Norway and Iceland, was more muted because they are not seeking closer links with the Union.

The US cautiously welcomed the new EU role. President Clinton said:

As long as this operation, however it is constituted by the Europeans, operates in co-operation with NATO, I think it will strengthen the capability of the alliance, and I think it will actually help to maintain America's involvement with NATO,”<sup>43</sup>

Mr Blair, on his return from Washington, declared in a statement to the House, that:

A stronger European capability will strengthen NATO and is fully compatible with our commitment to NATO. Making NATO a more balanced partnership will strengthen the essential transatlantic link. The alliance stands ready, as the EU defines its defence arrangements, to make NATO force planning, NATO assets and NATO headquarters available for EU-led crisis-management operations, subject to the necessary approval of the North Atlantic Council. We emphasised the importance of involving fully in that process those allies that are not members of the EU. Those

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<sup>42</sup> Paragraph 10, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999.

<sup>43</sup> *Independent*, 26 April 1999

decisions will ensure that NATO and European capabilities develop in a fully compatible manner.<sup>44</sup>

In the UK the Opposition expressed concern regarding the practicalities of an increased EU role in defence issues. William Hague, said in reply to the Prime Minister's statement:

The Opposition strongly support a new and more flexible approach that frees the organisation from its cold war role, but where does the development of an EU-led, rather than a Western European Union-led, capability leave countries such as Turkey – countries of vital strategic importance which are members of NATO, but not of the EU? How exactly will they be fully involved and kept fully informed in the way in which the Prime Minister outlined in the statement? The communiqué says that the European defence identity will be developed within the NATO structures, but the St Malo agreement that the Prime Minister signed in December provided for the development of an EU defence inside or outside NATO. Are these two agreements reconciled easily?<sup>45</sup>

The Liberal Democrats looked more favourably upon the changes made in Washington, with the then party leader, Paddy Ashdown assessing the summit as a success.<sup>46</sup>

## **B. Defence Capabilities Initiative**

The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was a plan launched at the Washington Summit aimed at improving the ability of European nations to contribute their armed forces to crisis management operations. There had been growing concern in the US that Europe's military structures were still based on Cold War doctrine and were being overtaken by the flexible requirements of the new strategic environment. In addition, European armed forces were being outstripped by the capabilities and technology of the US to the point where their capacity to interoperate was being questioned. According to NATO the objective of the DCI is to

improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces.<sup>47</sup>

It also states that "improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO".<sup>48</sup> NATO has established a High Level Steering

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<sup>44</sup> HC Deb 26 April 1999, c23

<sup>45</sup> HC Deb 26 April 1999, c25

<sup>46</sup> HC Deb 26 April 1999, c26

<sup>47</sup> NATO Press Release, 25 April 1999 at <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*

Group (HLSG) to oversee the implementation of the DCI. The DCI will concentrate upon five areas: mobility; sustainability; precision engagement; command, control and communications; and survivability.

## V Cologne European Council – June 1999

The European Council meeting in Cologne, on 3 - 4 June 1999, was an opportunity for EU leaders to reflect upon the disparity in the relative military capabilities of the US and Europe exposed by the Kosovo conflict. During the campaign, European nations flew a third of the total of aircraft sorties, and 20% of the strike sorties. Furthermore, the European countries in NATO had to stretch their resources enormously in order to deploy a force of a few tens of thousands, which approximated to less than 2% of the total military personnel available to them.

The reliance of NATO upon US military hardware and organisation during the air campaign and Europe's deficiencies in key areas such as intelligence, air lift, command and control and 'smart' weaponry, provided a further impetus to Europe's search for greater clarity and strength in security and defence issues.

Two important steps were taken at the Cologne summit regarding the advancement of a European defence identity. These were the agreement to give the EU a defence capacity, by transferring most of the functions of the WEU to it, and the appointment of Javier Solana, the former NATO Secretary-General, as the EU's first High Representative for foreign and security policy (Solana was replaced as NATO Secretary-General on 14 October 1999 by Lord Robertson, the former UK Secretary of State for Defence.).

### A. "Capacity for autonomous action"

Cologne committed the EU's governments to a common policy on security and defence in order to give the Union:

the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to NATO.<sup>49</sup>

In effect, this means the absorption of some of the WEU functions into the EU. The Presidency Conclusions state:

We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and

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<sup>49</sup> Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999.

the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard, our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States.<sup>50</sup>

A new decision-making structure is to be established to replace the WEU. This will include:

- regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers;
- a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise
- an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee;
- a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;
- other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.<sup>51</sup>

The key areas to be developed include the EU's capacity for independent intelligence-gathering, strategic transport, and command and control. The European Council Declaration on 'Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence' stated:

We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments. We therefore commit ourselves to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose. This requires the maintenance of a sustained defence effort, the implementation of the necessary adaptations and notably the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. This also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces.<sup>52</sup>

Further encouragement to the consolidation of the European defence industry was given:

We also recognise the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We

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<sup>50</sup> Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid*

<sup>52</sup> Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999.



are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries amongst those States involved. With industry we will therefore work towards closer and more efficient defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.<sup>53</sup>

## **B. EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (‘Mr CFSP’)**

The position of High Representative for the CFSP was defined in Article 18 of the Treaty of Amsterdam:

The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.<sup>54</sup>

The main reason for the creation of such a post was the perception by many member states that the CFSP lacked coherence and a focal point resulting in the EU ‘punching below its weight’ in international affairs. An earlier attempt had been made to improve the workings of the CFSP by the creation of the ‘Troika’ (last, present and next holders of the Presidency working together). This aimed to ease the burden on the diplomatic resources of the smaller states when acting as EU President (the Presidency represents the Union in international organisations, conferences, and bilateral relationships) and to provide some continuity in foreign affairs. The Secretary-General will effectively replace the past holder of the presidency in the Troika, since in future only the next presidency can be called upon to assist the current one.

Mr Solana’s role as the EU’s ‘Mr CFSP’ will involve not only providing common policies with a higher profile, but also improving the decision-making process and convincing the rest of the world that the EU means what it says on security issues. Another function will be as the EU’s security representative at the end of the phone when Washington calls. Indeed, it was felt that Solana, coming from NATO, should be in a unique position to reassure Alliance members that the EU will not encroach upon NATO functions and act as a competing military power centre in Europe.

### **1. Position within the EU**

The role of the High Representative is further defined in Article 26 of the Treaty of Amsterdam:

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<sup>53</sup> Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999.

<sup>54</sup> Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article 18, p119.

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency through conducting political dialogue with third parties.<sup>55</sup>

On taking office Mr Solana outlined his perception of his future relationship with the main EU institutions:

I do not need to dwell at length on relations with the Presidency and member states. I am here to assist them. I want to be useful. Naturally, I can only do this by working in symbiosis with the Presidency.

I am equally determined to set up a strong and collaborative relation with the Commission. I have visited this morning the President, Romano Prodi. And I have already been throughout these past weeks in close contacts with him, (External Affairs Commissioner) Chris Patten and other commissioners. We are committed to build a satisfactory co-operation in our work together. There can be no doubt about the total coherence in our action, which everyone wishes to see realised.

The European Parliament is also going to be a major political interlocutor in my work. It is my firm intention to have close and intensive relations with it. I will make every effort to brief the Plenary and the Foreign Affairs Committee as often as possible, or whenever it is appropriate to do so.<sup>56</sup>

Chris Patten, the former Governor of Hong Kong, was appointed as EU External Affairs Commissioner on 15 September 1999. The presence of Solana and Patten, two prominent politicians in the arena of EU external affairs, raises the spectre of future battles between the pair over who has jurisdiction over what area. Indeed, if one aim of the appointment of Solana was to clarify who represents the Union internationally, then the selection soon afterwards of a high profile politician such as Chris Patten could be said to muddy the waters once more. Nevertheless, both have publicly expressed a desire to work effectively together and avoid disputes over areas of competence. In theory, Mr Solana will report directly to EU foreign ministers who meet at least once a month to review international issues. His main focus is expected to be on strengthening Europe's defence capability within NATO and empowering the EU to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo without having to depend on US assistance. Mr Patten, meanwhile, will be expected to handle wider foreign policy issues and the EU's day-to-day diplomatic contacts. The Commission does not have a prominent role in the CFSP which is essentially inter-governmental in its procedures.

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<sup>55</sup> Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article 26, p121

<sup>56</sup> *Reuter Textline*, 18 October 1999

A key test of Solana's effectiveness will be how much independence he can win from EU foreign ministers. The new High Representative will need to be highly active in drawing up foreign policy if he is to succeed in 'adding value' to what EU members can achieve independently. There could well be friction if Solana, in his high profile position, detracts from a member state's foreign ministry achievements during its EU presidency.

The potential for friction and clashes has raised doubts amongst some CFSP observers that the creation of the High Representative post will produce any miraculous improvement in the EU's foreign policy performance. Dr Malcolm Chalmers, lecturer at Bradford University's Department of Peace Studies believes that:

It is a move forward, but it does not fundamentally change the nature of the beast, namely the CFSP is intergovernmental in nature. It does still come back to the extent to which major countries agree.<sup>57</sup>

## **2. Key Tasks**

On 17 November 1999, in an address to the European Parliament, Javier Solana set out his priorities. With regard to current international relations, he highlighted areas such as relations with Russia, particularly with regard to the war in Chechnya, the reconstruction of Kosovo, Bosnia, the Middle East peace process, Algeria and the OSCE summit.

The other theme of his speech was his main priority of developing a European Security and Defence Policy. He stated his expectation that the European Council would set specific and concrete goals for the achievement of a collective military capacity for the undertaking of Petersberg tasks such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. This will require a reassessment of priorities, pooling of resources and multinational task-sharing by the member states. Mr Solana has underlined his determination to focus on developing the EU's capability to use military action for humanitarian aims by recruiting two senior Commission officials with experience in disaster relief. He has named Alberto Navarro, head of the EU's humanitarian aid office, as his chief advisor and Leonardo Schiavo, ex-deputy chef de cabinet to former Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner Emma Bonino, as his number two.

At the same time, the EU will have to develop the ability to evaluate crises and have clear procedures for decision-making in the event of having to take action. A key initiative in improving the EU's intelligence capability is the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

## **3. Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit**

A declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty provides for "a policy planning and early warning unit" to be established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of the High Representative. The staff of this new working tool of the CFSP is

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<sup>57</sup> *European Voice*, 14 October 1999.

drawn from the Council Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU). In addition, the Unit would be able to draw on the information resources of the Member States and the Commission. The Member States and the Commission would also have the right to suggest particular research or planning projects. The declaration annexed to the Treaty lists the unit's main tasks:

1. Monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP.
2. Providing assessments of the Union's interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future.
3. Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions, including potential political crises.
4. Producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy-options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council.<sup>58</sup>

#### **4. US Concerns**

There was a degree of concern expressed in the US regarding the decisions made at Cologne. Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State commented on the summit in a speech in London in October 1999:

the EU's leaders' declaration at Cologne in June, ...could be read to imply that Europe's default position would be to act outside the Alliance whenever possible, rather than through the Alliance.<sup>59</sup>

Further detail on US concerns at the time of Cologne were outlined by The US Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow:

we did have some problems with the way these issues were treated in Cologne – not in the larger sense, but because there were some details that we felt were not treated quite as we had hoped. For example, in Washington there was a very clear statement that, as Allies, we will try to act through NATO “wherever possible.” This reflected the fact that if we are dealing with crisis management or peace enforcement it is certainly always better if we can act with the broadest possible coalition and with the broadest possible military capability to back up our political strategy. The Cologne decision seemed to suggest a desire on the part of the European Union to become the “option of first resort”, rather than an alternative to NATO. There was also, I think, a somewhat vague message coming out of Cologne on the question of capabilities. In fact, the litmus test for whether European defence is going to be real is ultimately going to be whether the capabilities are there on the military side to back it up.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> EU web site at <http://europa.eu.int>

<sup>59</sup> ‘America's Stake in a Strong Europe’, RIIA, London, 7 October 1999.

<sup>60</sup> Speech to the Institute for European Policy, Berlin, 17 December 1999, US Dept of State web site – <http://www.usia.gov>

## VI WEU Ministerial Meeting – Luxembourg - November 1999

At the WEU Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 19 November, Javier Solana was appointed as Secretary-General of the WEU, in succession to José Cutileiro. This decision effectively began the process of merging aspects of the WEU's capabilities into the EU. Mr Solana outlined the new relationship between the two bodies at a conference in Berlin in December 1999:

I will also be examining in more detail how the Union can make better use of WEU assets and know-how. In particular we need to develop a culture of complete transparency between the EU and the WEU. The expertise and specialised resources of the WEU have to be put fully at the disposal of the European Union. My own double-hatted appointment as Secretary-General of the WEU should assist this process. I can at least say that cooperation between the current Secretary-Generals of the EU and WEU is beyond reproach!<sup>61</sup>

The precise means by which WEU functions will be absorbed into the EU will take some time to develop and will probably be presented by the French Presidency of the EU at the end of 2000. Mr Solana's main task will be to transfer the WEU assets relating to the Petersberg humanitarian tasks into the EU. However, the issue of how to deal with the WEU's Article V commitment to mutual defence will probably have to be addressed as well.<sup>62</sup> The adoption of such a commitment by the EU would pose problems for the EU's neutral countries. It has been suggested that the Article V commitment will be imported into a revised European Treaty as an appendix to which Europe's neutral states may accede in their own time.<sup>63</sup> Many commentators suggest that once the WEU has been stripped of most of its assets the institution will be largely moribund.

Other initiatives made at the WEU meeting included proposals for military reforms to improve the ability of European countries to mount crisis management operations. This followed an audit by the WEU that was critical of European military capabilities. These findings fed into recommendations made at Helsinki regarding a European defence capabilities initiative. (see Section VIII)

## VII UK-French Summit – November 1999

The UK-French Summit held in London on 25 November 1999 attempted to formally outline the military assets an EU defence force would require. Some associated proposals related to

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<sup>61</sup> *ibid*

<sup>62</sup> Mr Solana's main task will be to transfer the WEU assets relating to the Petersberg, humanitarian tasks into the EU.

<sup>63</sup> *RUSI Newsbrief*, December 1999.

establishing targets and criteria for European defence capabilities had been made at the UK-Italian Summit in July, further details of which can be found at Appendix III.

The key defence proposal to arise from the meeting between Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac was the establishment of a European rapid reaction corps. The joint declaration issued at the end of the Summit stated:

Our top priorities must therefore be to strengthen European military capabilities without unnecessary duplication. We call on the European Union at the Helsinki Summit to:

- Set itself the goal of Member States, cooperating together, being able to deploy rapidly and then sustain combat forces which are militarily self-sufficient up to Corps level with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat support and other combat service support (up to 50,000-60,000 men) and appropriate naval and air combat elements. All these forces should have the full range of capabilities necessary to undertake the most demanding crisis management tasks.
- Urge the Member States to provide the capabilities to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and within this to provide some smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness. We need to be able to sustain such a deployment for at least a year. This will require further deployable forces (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial force.<sup>64</sup>

With regard to the future role of NATO the joint declaration emphasised that:

NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. We expect NATO and the EU to develop a close and confident relationship.<sup>65</sup>

Both leaders were at pains to reiterate this point in order to reassure the US that NATO would remain the cornerstone of European defence. In a press conference following the summit Mr Blair stated:

Let me make one thing quite clear. This is not about creating some single European army under a single command, it is not an attempt in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO. We are all quite clear on this, which is why NATO welcomed the European defence initiative at the Washington Summit earlier this year. It is about strengthening Europe's military effectiveness and capabilities in a way which will both reinforce and complement the NATO Alliance as the cornerstone of our defence,

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<sup>64</sup> 'Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence', 25 November 1999, FCO web site at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news> A full copy of the UK-French declaration on European defence is attached at Appendix IV.

<sup>65</sup> *ibid*

whilst enabling Europe to act effectively in situations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. And the importance of this text is that it moves us towards a situation where we can get real practical capability to back up the ideas and the initiatives that we have taken.<sup>66</sup>

The newly appointed Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, reacting to reports of US fears said:

Those in America who are becoming nervous about some of the developments that are taking place are wrong. Nothing that is being done in Europe at the present moment threatens the Alliance.<sup>67</sup>

The Opposition remained unconvinced. Commenting on the UK-French summit the Conservative defence spokesman, Iain Duncan Smith said, “This whole deal plays to a French agenda which has been going for 40 years which is about dividing NATO”.<sup>68</sup> He argued that the US was worried about the development of an EU-led force

eventually acting by default before NATO. In other word NATO not having a block on operations. If that happens what you end up with is the arguments in America for them withdrawing from NATO getting stronger and stronger and then you get the split and divide. At the end of the day this isn’t going to improve the effectiveness one little bit.<sup>69</sup>

Other decisions at the summit included the two leaders agreeing to make their joint service headquarters – France’s Centre Opérationnel Inter-armées and the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters – available as options to command EU-led operations.<sup>70</sup> Reference was also made in the joint declaration to future UK involvement in Eurocorps (see section VIII) and the need to strengthen European strategic airlift capabilities. With regard to the latter, a logistics agreement, which includes provision for sharing transport, fuel and other resources, was signed by the two countries’ Defence Secretaries which will “include arrangements by which we can draw on each other’s air, sea and land transport assets to help deploy rapidly in a crisis”.<sup>71</sup> Similar arrangements to pool airlift resources had been developing over previous months between Germany and France. Both of states had expressed a desire to involve the United Kingdom which possesses Western Europe’s largest military airlift capability.

German-French proposals had sought to include not just military transports but also to establish permanent arrangements to charter or requisition civil airliners and cargo aircraft to

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<sup>66</sup> Press Conference given by Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, London 25 November 1999, FCO web site <http://www.fco.gov.uk>

<sup>67</sup> BBC News, 25 November 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

<sup>68</sup> *ibid*

<sup>69</sup> *ibid*

<sup>70</sup> *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 1 December 1999.

<sup>71</sup> ‘Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence’, 25 November 1999, Appendix IV.

assist in force-projection operations. German defence minister Rudolf Scharping has been at the forefront of these plans and has called for Europe to set up a joint air transport command. He has linked the establishment of a joint command to the decision on a common European military transport aircraft - possibly the Airbus Industrie A400M.

## **VIII Helsinki European Council – December 1999**

The European Council meeting held in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999 effectively built upon the recommendations of the UK-French summit a month earlier. The main goal set at the summit was to establish, by 2003, a multinational corps-level force of 50,000-60,000 personnel capable of mounting an autonomous European mission if NATO did not itself become active in a crisis situation. The scope of the European force is to be limited to the Petersberg Tasks i.e. humanitarian intervention, crisis management, peacekeeping, including peacemaking if required, and will not constitute a European army. A clear reference to the primacy of the UN in maintaining international peace and security was made, apparently at French insistence. The Presidency conclusions state:

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.

Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

Co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.

New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.

Modalities will be developed for full consultation, co-operation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

Appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management.



A Non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.<sup>72</sup>

With regard to the 50,000-60,000 strong military force, the Annex to the Presidency conclusions provided some further details on its structure and requirements:

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.<sup>73</sup>

It then specifies the key military capabilities to be improved:

Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit. They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain member States which go in that direction:

- to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
- to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
- to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
- to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
- to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.<sup>74</sup>

## **A. A Role for Eurocorps?**

The allocation of military resources to the new force was not addressed at Helsinki. While it is likely that the UK and France will take leading roles, there has been some lobbying from the five nations of the 60,000 strong European Corps for this formation to provide the foundation of the future force.<sup>75</sup> The UK, which is not a member of the Eurocorps, has

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<sup>72</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

<sup>73</sup> Annex 1 to Annex IV, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

<sup>74</sup> *ibid*

<sup>75</sup> Eurocorps was created in 1992 by France and Germany and was later joined by Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. Each nation provides a part of the corps staff and a part of the Headquarters Support Battalion. Currently the corps numbers more than 60,000 men. The staff comprises more than 300 soldiers stationed in

expressed caution in the past in assigning it such a key task. Recent developments, however, indicate that a central role for Eurocorps may emerge. Firstly, on 28 January 2000, NATO announced that from April 2000, and for a six-month period, command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) will be passed to the Staff Headquarters of Eurocorps. Secondly, at the Cologne European Council, the five Eurocorps members agreed to transform the Eurocorps into a rapid reaction corps aimed at giving the EU a more substantial capacity to undertake crisis management tasks, in particular by providing it with a deployable Headquarters. Thirdly, the UK now has a permanent Liaison Officer based at Eurocorps Headquarters in Strasbourg and announced at the UK-French summit that:

the UK is ready, in due course and with the agreement of the Eurocorps members, to provide British forces to the Eurocorps HQ for specific operations as the Eurocorps members have already done in the case of the British-led Ace Rapid Reaction Corps.<sup>76</sup>

English has also been formally adopted as the Corps official language.

The French Defence Minister, Alain Richard, was reported in the French press as suggesting that Eurocorps would constitute “one of the cores” of an EU military operation. He also suggested that the EU rapid reaction force may eventually total between 100,000 and 150,000 troops, supported by between 200 and 300 aircraft.<sup>77</sup>

## **B. Permanent Institutions**

By March 2000 an interim political-military body of the European Council, based in Brussels, is to start preparing a permanent structure modelled on NATO. The Annex to the Presidency Conclusions outlines these permanent institutions as follows:

- a) - A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence.<sup>78</sup> In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.
- b) - The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military

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Strasbourg, and over 600 soldiers of the Headquarters Support Battalion. Britain has a permanent Liaison Officer at the HQ in Strasbourg. Further details on the Eurocorps are available at <http://www.eurocorps.com>

<sup>76</sup> UK-French declaration on European defence see Appendix IV.

<sup>77</sup> *Atlantic News*, 30 December 1999.

<sup>78</sup> Defence Ministers will be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters.

advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.

- c) - The Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of the EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.<sup>79</sup>

Essentially the PSC will exercise the political control and strategic direction of military operations in a crisis. It would receive advice from the MC comprising the Chiefs of Defence, who would in turn give military directives to the military staff. The military staff, made up of representatives of all branches of the member nations' armed forces, would provide expert advice to the MC and assume the conduct of military operations. These institutions appear to echo proposals made by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, at an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in March 1999.

The Portuguese Presidency was tasked, along with the Secretary General/High Representative to carry work forward in the above areas as a "matter of priority". A first progress report is to be prepared for the Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000, with an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council on 19-20 June 2000, containing "appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary".<sup>80</sup>

On returning from Helsinki, the Prime Minister described the initiatives taken on defence as "truly historic decisions for the European Union."<sup>81</sup> In a statement to the House, Mr Blair denied that the moves would result in a European army or would undermine NATO:

There have been suggestions that this agreement to increase the options open to us in future crises has adverse implications for NATO, or that the European Union is creating a European army. That is the opposite of the case. The European Council made it clear that the EU will launch and conduct military operations only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The process will involve full consultation and transparency with NATO. The six non-EU allies will be involved and consulted before decisions are taken, and will be able to take a full part in resulting operations. The EU will avoid unnecessary duplication with NATO. Final decisions on whether to involve troops will remain firmly with national Governments. These arrangements, as the Helsinki Council made clear explicitly, do not imply a European army.

He emphasised what he regarded as the necessity of the UK's involvement in the European defence debate:

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<sup>79</sup> Annex 1 to Annex IV, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

<sup>80</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

<sup>81</sup> HC Deb 13 December 1999, c21

However, it would be a tragic mistake – repeating mistakes of British European policy over the past few decades – if Britain opted out of the debate on European defence and left the field to others. This is a debate that we must shape and influence from the start, because our vital strategic interests are affected by it. As a result of our participation, it is moving in a clear direction – reinforcing NATO, not in opposition to it. I completely reject the view of those who would have us opt out of this issue.<sup>82</sup>

The Opposition continued to express concern regarding the direction in which European defence cooperation was going. William Hague, stated that:

We are in favour of an enhanced European defence capability within NATO. However, we are concerned about the current deployment of what is euphemistically called readily deployable EU military capabilities outside NATO – in other words, a European army.<sup>83</sup>

He added:

The decision to establish a defence identity outside NATO is momentous--it is one of the biggest changes in foreign and defence policies on which the Government have embarked. We believe that it has profound dangers.<sup>84</sup>

The Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy commented:

On defence, will the Prime Minister acknowledge that - despite all the hokum and nonsense about a European army – among those who take a more sensible and constructive interest in the matter, there will be a welcome for the modest but significant step towards the establishment of a European rapid reaction force? That is not least because it bolts us farther into NATO and bolts a European component into NATO, which is essential for our long-term interest.<sup>85</sup>

In a speech at the Institut für Europäische Politik in Berlin on 17 December 1999, Mr Solana rejected accusations that Helsinki had produced the beginnings of a European army:

The decision at Helsinki has been misrepresented in some quarters as the first step in the establishment of a European army, or else as an unnecessary "militarisation" of the EU. And yet, we could not have been clearer about our objectives.

Most importantly, we have made clear that ESDP is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members. We are in no way attempting to duplicate the work of NATO. In fact the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant gain for the Alliance. Nor does

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<sup>82</sup> Hc Deb 13 December 1999, c22

<sup>83</sup> HC Deb 13 December 1999, c25

<sup>84</sup> HC Deb 13 December 1999, c25

<sup>85</sup> HC Deb 13 December 1999, c28

ESDP attempt to undermine the right of Member States to retain their own specific security and defence policy. The fact that all Member States, including the neutral countries, have been able to endorse the Helsinki decision, should provide sufficient reassurance on this point. So much for what ESDP is not.<sup>86</sup>

Mr Solana also provided some further background to the target set at Helsinki of developing non-military crisis management mechanisms:

The press have inevitably focussed on the decision at Helsinki on military capabilities. This aspect of crisis management is of course new for the EU. But equally important are the non-military aspects. Many of the tools for this are available and in some cases are already being used in response to crises. Individual Member States, as well as the Union, have developed considerable expertise in this area. Resources and experience already exist in the fields of civilian policing, humanitarian assistance, electoral and human rights monitoring. The list is long. But we need firstly to improve coordination. Helsinki recognises this. We have also agreed that we need to identify, on the basis of the existing work on the inventory of resources, those areas where further efforts are needed. We have established an action plan to ensure that we are able to respond rapidly and more effectively with non-military tools to emerging crisis situations. If crises can be defused through non-military means; so much the better. We will never be looking for an excuse to deploy military forces. But recent experience has shown that there will be situations where they will be necessary. Situations where the European public will expect us to back up our words with actions, where NGOs cannot carry out their humanitarian tasks without adequate protection, where we will be called to fulfil a peace-keeping role. In these cases, we have to have the capacity to act militarily, either with or independent of any civilian action.<sup>87</sup>

With regard to Helsinki, the NATO ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 15 December 1999 stated in its Final Communiqué:

we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence and on the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.<sup>88</sup>

At the meeting Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State commented;

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<sup>86</sup> Speech at the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin, 17 December 1999 – <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom>

<sup>87</sup> *ibid*

<sup>88</sup> North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 December 1999 – <http://www.nato.int>

In the past, American officials have discussed ESDI in terms of “the three D’s”: no decoupling of Europe’s security from that of its North American Allies, no duplication of effort or capabilities; and no discrimination against those Allies who are not EU members. But Lord Robertson has come up with another formulation: “the three I’s” – indivisibility of the trans-Atlantic link, improvement of capabilities and inclusiveness of all Allies.<sup>89</sup>

With regard to Helsinki he said:

Helsinki represented, from our perspective, a step – indeed several steps – in the right direction. We welcome Helsinki’s focus on improving European military capabilities, its recognition of NATO’s central role in collective defence and crisis management and that the EU can act “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”<sup>90</sup>

On the subject of European defence he continued:

We’re not against it, we’re not ambivalent, we’re not anxious, we’re for it. We are for a stronger European defence. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged on its own, through the European Union. Period, end of debate.<sup>91</sup>

## IX Conclusions

Defence is now undoubtedly high on the EU’s current and future agenda. Much ground appears to have been covered in a relatively short time. Throughout this process of developing a more distinct and militarily effective European defence identity the reaction of the US has been crucial and will remain pivotal. Advocates and opponents of developments since Pörschach, particularly in the UK, have tended to look to the US for evidence to bolster their argument. As already illustrated, the US approach to the events over the past 18 months has been one of cautious encouragement. The main area of caution for the US, as pointed out after St Malo by Madeleine Albright, is the fear that any new European defence structure could eventually undermine NATO. Such concerns continue to be voiced. For example the Republican chairman of the International Relations Committee in the House of Representatives, Benjamin Gilman, said, “the structures of NATO have proved successful; these new structures are untested and could erode the effectiveness of NATO.”<sup>92</sup>

In October 1999 Strobe Talbott attempted to give a clear indication of US attitudes to current developments in European defence:

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<sup>89</sup> North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 December 1999 – <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>90</sup> *ibid*

<sup>91</sup> *ibid*

<sup>92</sup> *Sunday Times*, 12 December 1999.

Let me make these three points one at a time. On ESDI, I'll start by reiterating what I hope is a clear, unambiguous statement of American policy. It's a policy of support: the US is for ESDI. It's in our interest for Europe to be able to deal effectively with challenges to European security well before they reach the threshold of triggering US combat involvement. As ESDI goes from being a concept to a reality, our support will be guided by the answers to two questions: first will it work? Will it be able to do what it's supposed to do? Second, will it help keep the Alliance together and that means the whole Alliance, European and non-European, EU and non-EU? We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO. That's a long-term concern, obviously, but NATO, after all, is about the long term.<sup>93</sup>

The process of developing the European defence identity will be long, and Mr Talbott's comments seem to reflect this. Despite the rapid changes, European security arrangements remain in their infancy. Certain elements of the institutional development of European defence require addressing quite urgently. These include the need to resolve the participation of non-EU NATO allies and non-NATO EU members into the Union's efforts at crisis management. There is also the broader problem of how to involve WEU associate members and associate partners into any decision-making process. One aspect of this issue was raised by Ambassador Vershbow when referring to the situation of European NATO allies who are not members of the EU:

these six countries, as well as the United States and Canada, have an Article 5 commitment to eleven of the fifteen members of the European Union. While this may be a worst-case scenario, it is not entirely far-fetched to think of a situation in which the European Union is charged with leading a military operation to manage a crisis, but the crisis proves to unmanageable and escalates, with a large number of European forces at great risk. Some crises could even begin to spread to the point that they threaten the territory of NATO members. In those situations, the non-EU allies are under a treaty obligation to come to the defence of their EU partners.<sup>94</sup>

Another requirement is the need to develop institutional links between NATO and the EU. The US in particular has been keen to formalise NATO-EU co-operation as soon as possible and has suggested setting up institutions on a provisional or interim basis. The EU's priority seems to be to establish its own structures first. Some frustration at the EU approach was expressed by Ambassador Vershbow:

We are still not convinced that there are reasons for the EU to postpone institutional cooperation with NATO until after the EU has put all the final touches on its own internal committee structures. These are questions that should be worked out together, as NATO and the WEU did after Berlin. Sometimes one suspects that there are fears

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<sup>93</sup> 'America's Stake in a Strong Europe', RIIA, London, 7 October 1999.

<sup>94</sup> Speech to the Institute for European Policy, Berlin, 17 December 1999, US Dept of State web site – <http://www.usia.gov>

on the part of some members of the EU that if the NATO-EU connection were established too soon, the United States would somehow pollute or contaminate the EU's internal workings.<sup>95</sup>

Some key questions, such as whether European countries are prepared to spend more on defence to improve European military capabilities, remain unanswered. Germany, whose military spending has dropped to 1.5% of gross national product, recently came in for criticism from US Defense Secretary William Cohen for its plans to cut military spending. He was reported as saying that, "the decisions Germany makes in the next few months and years will have a profound and lasting impact on the capabilities, not only of this nation, but of the alliance as a whole."<sup>96</sup> Indeed, the ultimate success or failure of the policy initiatives on European defence may well hinge upon the willingness of Europeans to provide them with sufficient financial backing.

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<sup>95</sup> Speech to the Institute for European Policy, Berlin, 17 December 1999, US Dept of State web site – <http://www.usia.gov>

<sup>96</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 2 December 1999.



## **Appendix I: UK/French Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Crisis Management and Operations**

### **Key Points**

- Major step towards closer military co-operation between Britain and France and towards more capable European defence
- Springs from Prime Minister's initiative in March, welcomed by President Chirac, which called for "a capacity to deploy forces rapidly on a joint basis in future crises, where both countries agree".
- Builds on existing close defence links between UK and France and record of successful combined operations, e.g Bosnia, West Africa and now Kosovo (extraction force).
- Aimed at improving the ability to plan and execute a combined response to crises in areas of mutual interest.
- Puts in place the essential practical links to allow combined joint operation to be mounted.
- Strengthens co-operation in operations, logistics, intelligence, civil/military affairs, media handling, personnel and liaison.
- To be implemented progressively by UK and French Ministries of Defence with progress reported annually to Defence Ministers.
- Contributes to improved European defence capability by further strengthening Franco/British capability to deploy forces together.
- Aimed at operations outside NATO territory where NATO does not take a lead.
- Not an exclusive arrangement. Both countries will continue to operate with other Allies and UN force contributors as required.
- Will strengthen capabilities to conduct all types of operation, including peacekeeping.
- Both countries would welcome co-operating on a similar basis with other Allies.

## **Appendix II: Text of Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK - French Summit, 3-4 December 1998.**

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.

2. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers).

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states.

The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.

5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.

## **Appendix III: Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative, UK -Italian Summit, 19-20 July 1999.**

1. Among the clear lessons of Kosovo are the continued importance of a strong and effective NATO and the pressing need for improved European military capabilities, both for a more effective European role in NATO and to ensure the EU has the capacity for autonomous action in the field of the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management including peacemaking) backed by credible military forces.

2. European Heads of State and Government at Cologne in June committed themselves further to develop the European defence dimension through more effective military capability; and the appropriate decision making institutions, in support of a strong Common Foreign and Security policy. They recognised the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen Europe's industrial and technological base. They also stressed that, avoiding unnecessary duplication, a more effective role for the European Union in conflict prevention and crisis management would contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance.

3. We are therefore launching a joint proposal to set criteria for improved and strengthened European defence capabilities and effective performance to be discussed and agreed at the Luxembourg WEU Ministerial meeting and the Helsinki European Council before the end of the year.

4. This approach, to be developed with our Partners/Allies, will include a timetable to achieve:

- European-wide goals for enhanced military capabilities to undertake crisis management, including peacemaking;
- National capability objectives to achieve this European aim

5. These efforts will be underpinned by:

- Peer review: at least one joint Foreign/Defence Ministers General Affairs Council per EU Presidency, to measure progress against the agreed criteria;
- The detailed work of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative;
- A road map for more effective European defence procurement; this will include harmonisation of military requirements and collaborative arms procurement. We shall also promote defence industry restructuring.

6. These efforts will be complementary to, and proceed in parallel with, work in the European Union, at Italy's initiative, on developing the Union's and the Member States' capabilities concerning the non-military aspects of crisis prevention and management, and improving co-ordination between military and non-military aspects.

7. We shall pursue this bilateral initiative with our partners and Allies in the coming weeks with a view to the earliest possible practical results in the European Union, the WEU and NATO.

## **Appendix IV: Joint declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, Anglo-French Summit, London, 25 November 1999.**

1. A year ago in St Malo, Britain and France launched together a major initiative aimed at building European security and defence. This paved the way for the progress made at Cologne.

2. In the Kosovo crisis, our two countries played a major role in working for a political settlement and in NATO's military operations. This crisis reinforced our conviction that the European nations need to increase their defence capabilities, thus enabling them to conduct effective EU-led operations as well as playing their full role in Alliance operations.

3. We therefore call on the European Council in Helsinki to take a decisive step forward for the development of those military capabilities and for the setting up of the political and military instruments necessary to use them. This is necessary to give the EU the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations.

4. We are fully convinced that, by developing our military capabilities, while reinforcing the EU's capacity for action, we will also contribute directly and substantially to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance, by making a stronger and more balanced partnership. NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. We expect NATO and the EU to develop a close and confident relationship.

5. Our top priorities must therefore be to strengthen European military capabilities without unnecessary duplication. We call on the European Union at the Helsinki Summit to:

- Set itself the goal of Member States, cooperating together, being able to deploy rapidly and then sustain combat forces which are militarily self-sufficient up to Corps level with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat support and other combat service support (up to 50,000-60,000 men) and appropriate naval and air combat elements. All these forces should have the full range of capabilities necessary to undertake the most demanding crisis management tasks.
- Urge the Member States to provide the capabilities to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and within this to provide some smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness. We need to be able to sustain such a deployment for at least a year. This will require further deployable forces (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial force.

- Develop rapidly capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic lift. In this respect:
- We are ready to make available the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters and France's Centre Operational Interarmees and their planning capabilities as options to command EU-led operations. As part of this, we intend to develop standing arrangements for setting up multinationalised cells within these Headquarters, including officers from other EU partners.
- We want European strategic airlift capabilities to be strengthened substantially. We intend to work urgently with our allies and partners on ways to achieve this. We note the common European need for new transport aircraft. We have today taken an important bilateral step by signing an agreement on logistics which will include arrangements by which we can draw on each other's air, sea and land transport assets to help deploy rapidly in a crisis.
- We welcome the ongoing transformation of the Eurocorps into a rapid reaction corps as decided by the five Eurocorps members in Cologne, which will contribute to giving the EU a more substantial capacity to undertake crisis management tasks, in particular by providing it with a deployable Headquarters. Our two countries intend this to be a contribution to the enhancement of key assets available both to the EU and NATO. The UK is ready, in due course and with the agreement of the Eurocorps members, to provide British forces to the Eurocorps HQ for specific operations as the Eurocorp nations have already done in the case of the British-led Ace Rapid Reaction Corps.

6. We also call on the Helsinki European Council to set a clear target date and appropriate review and consultation mechanisms to ensure that these goals are reached. Our work towards the achievement of these objectives and those arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually reinforcing. We also welcome the contributions of the non-EU European Allies and of WEU Associate Partners to this improvement of European military capabilities.

7. In addition to the decisions on military capabilities, we call on the European Union at Helsinki to:

- Set out the political and military structures to enable the Council to take decisions on EU-led military operations, to ensure the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations and, to this end, to endorse the proposal which the UK and France have put forward on the role and composition of a Military Committee and a military staff and the planning and conduct of EU-led operations.
- Provide the basis for participation of non-EU European Allies and the involvement of WEU Associate Partners in EU-led operations.
- Underline the need to develop thereafter modalities for full co-operation, consultation and transparency between the EU and NATO.

8. We reaffirm our conviction that strengthened European defence capabilities need the support of a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology. The restructuring of the European aerospace and defence industry is a major step which will help to improve competition in the global market. We welcome this recent consolidation and restructuring of European defence companies and, in the same spirit, give our full support to the finalisation of the Letter of Intent. The strengthening of our armaments industry will foster the development of European technological capabilities and will allow transatlantic cooperation to develop in a spirit of balanced partnership. We look forward to early progress toward the establishment of Airbus as a single commercial business with a fully united management.

9. We are committed to the efforts being made to harmonise future defence equipment requirements. The successful cooperation between the UK and France, together with Italy, on the Principal Anti-Air Missile System - which will provide world class air defence for our Navies well into the next century - is a good example of how we work together. So too are the French SCALP and the UK's Storm Shadow programme for a long range precision guide air to ground missile, which is based on the proven French Apache missile. We are partners too with Germany on the future medium range anti-armour weapon for our respective infantry.