

Policy implications of artificial intelligence (AI)



Overview

- Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing at a rapid pace and can be found throughout society in a growing range of everyday applications and decision-making. There are implications for security, privacy, transparency, liability, labour rights, intellectual property and disinformation. It presents some risks and benefits to democracy more widely.
- There is no dedicated AI legislation in the UK. Existing legislation restricts how AI can be used in practice, such as in relation to data protection, equality and human rights, and intellectual property.
- In March 2023, the UK Government announced a 'pro-innovation' approach to AI regulation, which largely regulates AI via existing laws enforced by existing regulators. It outlined cross-sectoral principles, such as safety, security, robustness, transparency, fairness, accountability, contestability, and redress, for existing regulators to consider. The approach applies to the whole of the UK, although some policy areas are devolved.
- The Government has brought forward legislation and regulatory action on [automated vehicles](#) and [data protection and digital information](#).
- Some stakeholders have indicated that additional legislation and action may be required, including mandatory impact assessments, bans on certain AI applications, and a right for human intervention to challenge AI decision-making. There are concerns that regulators are not currently equipped with the staffing, expertise or funding to regulate AI.

Background

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be found in a wide variety of everyday applications, such as in deciding what users see on social media^{1,2} digital personal assistants,³ and recognising patterns in images for medical diagnosis.⁴⁻⁷

AI technology is described in [Artificial intelligence: An explainer](#). This briefing focuses on policy aspects.

AI systems are increasingly being used in the public and private sector for decision-making.⁸ Some current and potential future examples of automated decision-making include:

- assisting with managing workers, such as allocating work, monitoring performance, and determining pay⁹
- aiding with local and national public sector decisions, such as social housing allocation,¹⁰ benefit claims, and other issues¹⁰⁻¹⁵
- self-driving cars^{*16,17}

In the past few years, there have been significant advancements in AI capabilities. Single AI systems can now perform a wide range of tasks ([PB 57](#)). Generative AI (see Table for definitions) can generate realistic text, images, audio, and video.¹⁸⁻²⁰

There have been significant public policy developments relating to AI in recent years.

In 2023, the Government published a white paper outlining a 'pro-innovation approach to AI',²¹ along with announcements including £900m for an 'exascale' [†] supercomputer.²² The Prime Minister hosted a global 'AI Safety Summit' in November 2023.²³ It resulted in a declaration on AI safety signed by 28 countries,²⁴ and the establishment of an AI Safety Institute²⁵ that aims to build public sector capacity to research AI safety.

The rapid advancement of AI capabilities means that policy implications are continuously shifting. Some stakeholders have called for further Government action.

* The Kings Speech announced an Automated Vehicles Bill that seeks to introduce new legal frameworks to support safe commercial developments of self-driving vehicles.¹⁶

[†] An exascale supercomputer is a computer that can perform 10^{18} (a quintillion) operations per second.

Table: Definitions of AI and related concepts

Definitions are not universally agreed, are continuously evolving, and are linked.

| Term | Definition |
|------------------------------|--|
| Artificial intelligence (AI) | The UK Government's 2023 policy paper on 'A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation' defined AI, AI systems or AI technologies as "products and services that are 'adaptable' and 'autonomous'." The adaptability of AI refers to AI systems, after being trained, often developing the ability to perform new ways of finding patterns and connections in data that are not directly envisioned by their human programmers. The autonomy of AI refers to some AI systems that can make decisions without the intent or ongoing control of a human (PB 57). |
| Generative AI | The Alan Turing Institute defines generative AI as an "artificial intelligence system that generates text, images, audio, video or other media in response to user prompts." ²⁶ Generative AI applications include chatbots, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT, photo and video filters, and virtual assistants (PB 57). |
| Automated decision-making | A term that the Office for AI* uses to refer to "both solely automated decisions (no human judgement involved) and automated assisted decision-making (assisting human judgement)." ²⁷ |
| Training datasets | The set of data used to train an AI system, which often requires labelling (such as captioning pictures) to explain what the data means. |
| Algorithm | A set of instructions used to perform tasks (such as calculations and data analysis) usually using a computer or another smart device (PB 57). |

* The Office for AI is an office within the Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology.

Benefits and risks

Job creation and displacement

In 2022, a report commissioned for the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology stated that investment in the UK AI sector grew five-fold between 2019 and 2021, and that it brought in £10.6 billion in revenue and employed over 50,000 people.²⁸

OECD analysis published in July 2023 found that AI was changing the nature of work by assisting workers and reducing the time spent on mundane tasks, rather than causing job losses.²⁹

However, some emerging academic research indicates that developments in generative AI may be linked to a loss in the quantity and earnings of white-collar jobs.^{30,31}

There is potential for new jobs across all sectors to be created with improved productivity and global economic growth ([PB 57](#)).³² However, some reports state that certain jobs, such as clerical work,^{33,34} could become redundant.

Stakeholders have raised concerns that AI developments may disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups. For example, the majority of clerical work is carried out by women.³⁴⁻³⁷

A 2021 report commissioned by the former Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy highlighted a regional disparity in the net employment impacts of AI, with London and the South East benefitting from net job gains more than Northern England and the Midlands.³⁴

Some academics and think tanks,³⁸ and technology trade associations,³⁹ have said that the Government should help workers retrain and gain relevant skills, and ensure that existing inequalities are not exacerbated ([PN 697](#)).

In October 2023, the Government announced £118m to increase the UK's AI skills base.⁴⁰

Workers' rights

The use of AI to manage work

Internationally, 'gig economy' * work such as taxi driving and food delivery is carried out through apps (such as Uber and Deliveroo^{9,41,42}), which use AI systems to plan routes, determine how work is allocated, monitor worker performance, and determine

* The gig economy is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "a labour market characterised by a prevalence of short-term contracts and freelance work, as distinct from permanent, full-time employment".

pay.⁹ Human intervention is currently still necessary to operate these AI systems, such as designing, maintaining, and troubleshooting algorithms (Table 1).

Some academics have raised concerns about wage discrimination^{43,44} and power imbalances between workers and employers due to worker-generated data that employers can hold. They state that this can result in employers being able to undermine collective pay bargaining.^{43,45,46}

There has also been an increase in AI used to manage office-based workers, particularly after the shift to remote and hybrid working during the Covid-19 pandemic. This includes surveillance of workers ([PB 49](#)), and use of AI in recruitment, such as sifting CVs.^{47,48}

The Trades Union Congress* and APPG on the Future of Work, amongst others, have raised concerns about possible detrimental impacts on worker dignity and mental health due increased uses of AI for work allocation, monitoring, and disciplinary decisions.^{9,47,49,50}

Concerns around labour practices of AI development

Training generative AI models may require datasets to be labelled,^{51,52} which is often done manually ([PB 57](#)). Labelled data may be used for training generative AI models to identify harmful material and to not produce it.

Labelling data can often be outsourced by companies to workers in low- and middle-income countries. There have been some human rights concerns.⁵³⁻⁵⁸ In 2023, media investigations by the Guardian, BBC and Time magazine amongst others into outsourced OpenAI data labellers in Kenya found workers were paid less than \$2 an hour for labelling harmful content such as child sexual exploitation and violence.⁵⁸⁻⁶⁰ This work is reportedly responsible for a detrimental impact on the workers' mental health.⁵⁸⁻⁶⁰ In response, OpenAI said the outsourced workers could have opted out of this work "without penalisation".⁵⁸

Use in public services

There are benefits and risks associated with the use of AI in public services, such as healthcare and education: the two largest public services by public spending.⁶¹

In healthcare, the use of AI could lead to better health outcomes by assisting with ([PN 637](#)):

- diagnosing diseases^{4-7,62-69}
- devising personalised treatments^{70,71}
- developing new drugs⁷²⁻⁷⁴

* The Trades Union Congress established a taskforce to write a draft AI and Employment Bill to be published in early 2024. The taskforce is advised by an expert committee consisting of technology industry group TechUK, the University of Oxford, the British Computer Society, trade unions, think tanks, and cross-party Parliamentarians.⁵⁰

However, the expanding use of digital and AI technologies in healthcare may create barriers for digitally excluded communities, such as the elderly, in accessing healthcare.⁷⁵

Whilst deployment is not yet widespread,⁷⁶ potential benefits from generative AI in education could include:

- bespoke educational courses that adapt to different learning styles
- reducing teachers' administrative work
- assisting teachers with feedback and marking⁷⁷

However, AI may exacerbate existing inequalities due to differential access to AI technologies. There are concerns around students using AI in assessments, and there are risks around privacy breaches for teachers and students (see [briefing on AI in education delivery and assessment](#)).^{78,79}

Algorithmic bias and discrimination

It has been well established that AI systems can have bias embedded into them,^{80–87} which can manifest through various pathways,⁸⁸ including ([PN 633](#)):

1. Training datasets can be biased,^{80,85–87} as they may consist of data generated and/or curated by humans with implicit or explicit bias.
2. Decisions made by humans in the design of algorithms, such as what attributes they want the algorithm to consider, may be implicitly or explicitly biased.

Widespread use of AI systems with unmitigated algorithmic bias could lead to discriminatory outcomes and exacerbated inequalities,^{87,89,90} particularly in high-risk scenarios such as healthcare ([PN 637](#)).

For example, a 2019 study found that an algorithm used to allocate healthcare in US hospitals was less likely to refer Black people who were equally as sick as White people to healthcare programmes ([PN 633](#)).^{91,92}

Such bias also has implications for human rights such as freedom from discrimination.

Responsibility, liability and transparency

The increasing use of automated decision-making raises implications for responsibility and liability.

It can be unclear to a person adversely affected by an automated decision that AI was used, what choices were made by developers, what went wrong, who is liable, and how to seek redress.^{93–96} Depending on the type of incident, different parties, such as AI developers, deployers, or users ([PB 57](#)), could carry liability.^{97–102}

Transparency on decisions allows individuals to know what has happened and exercise rights they may have.¹⁰³ In healthcare, medical ethicists have stated that responsible use of AI in diagnosis requires transparency, human oversight, and for

regulation to be clear about how liability is defined.^{104–109} Many computer scientists and ethicists advocate for greater transparency when explaining how AI systems work (PN 633).^{93,110–116}

For example, the Automated Vehicles Bill, which had its first reading in November 2023, provides drivers with immunity from prosecution relating to driving incidents if the self-driving vehicle is fully in control of itself, and places this liability on the company that created the vehicle.¹¹⁷

Misinformation and disinformation

Generative AI tools that generate inaccurate text^{118–120} (PB 57) and realistic images, videos and other forms of mis- and disinformation* have become increasingly accessible.^{121–124} Realistic images and videos generated for malicious purposes are commonly referred to as ‘deepfakes’.

This accessibility has lowered the barrier for malicious actors to produce disinformation campaigns at scale,^{123,125} although some academics¹²⁶ warn of exaggerated risks.

For example, in 2023, deepfake audio of Mayor of London Sadiq Khan saying Remembrance Day should be postponed was widely shared on social media.¹²⁷

There are freedom of expression implications when regulating deepfakes, as generative AI can be used to create satirical content.^{128–131} For example, artist Bruno Sartori produced a deepfake video criticising former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic.¹³¹

Elections, trust and engaging the public

Some experts say generative AI advances could increase public mistrust in online content, including election information,^{132–134} and in institutions.^{135–138} Others say concerns about the impact of fake images and news have been around for years.¹³⁶

Some companies and news organisations are developing tools to let audiences know if content is AI generated, although technical challenges exist (PB 57).

Some experts say impacts of AI-based misinformation can be reduced through education in media literacy and fact-checking techniques.¹³⁶

There are concerns around politicians using the atmosphere of distrust to discredit genuine evidence of their actions[†] by claiming that it is AI generated.^{121,124,128,139,140}

* The UK Government defines disinformation as the “deliberate creation and spreading of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead people, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain”. It defines misinformation as “the inadvertent spread of false information” (PB 57).

† Incidences of this have already been reported, such as an Indian politician who claimed a reportedly authentic audio clip of him was a deepfake.¹⁴⁰

AI could also be used to strengthen democracy.¹⁴¹ AI could be used to engage the public with politics and the electoral process. It could help voters understand manifestos and identify which candidates or political parties may best align with their priorities.^{132,142}

Surveillance

There has been increasing use of both live and retrospective facial recognition* by private companies and police forces, as well as predictive policing that uses AI to predict hotspots for future crime.^{143,144}

The Metropolitan Police said these tools save police officers' time, help identify criminals, and safeguard vulnerable people.¹⁴⁵

Concerns have been raised by some academics,^{146–154} parliamentarians,¹⁵⁵ human rights campaign groups,^{155–158} and the Home Office Commissioner for Biometrics and Surveillance Cameras,¹⁵⁹ that live facial recognition, predictive policing,¹⁶⁰ and profiling[†] could restrict civil liberties and impact privacy.

The impacts could be real, in that authorities could limit freedom of expression and the right to protest, and/or perceived, in that individuals may impose restrictions on themselves due to an atmosphere of surveillance.^{146,147}

Harassment, cybersecurity and scams

There have been numerous incidents where deepfake pornographic content of individuals, predominantly women,¹⁶¹ has been shared online, leading to harassment, humiliation, and distress for individuals.^{129,161–167} Sharing of non-consensual pornographic deepfakes has been criminalised by the Online Safety Act 2023.^{168–170}

Generative AI can be used to create fake personas online¹⁷¹, or impersonate real people.^{172–176} This increases security risks, such as confidential information being unwittingly released to malicious actors, and convincing phishing and scam calls.¹⁷⁷

* Live facial recognition refers to the use of facial recognition in real time via surveillance cameras. Retrospective facial recognition refers to the use of facial recognition after photographic or video evidence has been captured and/or taken from a different party. Facial recognition tools use AI ([PB 57](#)).

† Profiling is defined by the UK GDPR and ICO to be "any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements",¹⁶³ with profiling in the policing context referring to the aim of predicting an individual's propensity to crime.

Image ownership

AI can be used to recreate voices and images imitating living or deceased individuals.¹⁷⁸ This can have benefits in the arts, such as using AI for the consensual de-aging of performers.¹⁷⁹

On the other hand, creative sector trade unions have raised concerns around companies being able to recreate the likeness of living or dead performers in perpetuity,^{180,181} with implications for what fair remuneration for performers looks like.*

In the United States and many EU member states there exists a legal right to own your image.^{182,183} There is no such right in the UK. However, privacy legislation, laws around misrepresentation, contract law, and other intellectual property rights could provide some protection for people who wish to control the use of their image.¹⁸³

Some legal academics argue that the current body of law is not sufficient to protect people's image in the context of AI.¹⁸⁴

The Government has committed to ratifying the Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances[†], which would give intellectual property rights to performers.¹⁸⁵

Intellectual property

Generative AI tools are trained using datasets, which may or may not be open to the public (PB 57). Generative AI tools can output written, visual, aural, or audio-visual works that can mimic the style of specific human creators if their works are present in the datasets.¹⁸⁶ This raises implications for intellectual property rights, regardless of whether companies are transparent with datasets or not.¹⁸⁶⁻¹⁹¹

In ongoing court cases, some authors and rightsholders have sued model developers in the UK and US alleging copyright infringement based on outputs that may imply that the datasets contain their work.^{192,193}

There are also differing views on whether copyright should lie with users of AI tools, developers, those whose works appear in the dataset, or with nobody at all.^{186,194,195}

Resource requirements

The Competition and Markets Authority,¹⁹⁶ US Federal Trade Commission,¹⁹⁷ and researchers,^{198,199} have warned that the requirement of vast amounts of computing power for the largest AI models may restrict AI development to large companies and increase monopolisation in the technology sector.

* In 2023, implications for what fair remuneration looks like for performers came to the forefront as film and TV production in Hollywood ceased due to actors' and writers' strikes. Part of the disputes involved studio use of AI.¹⁸⁵

† The Beijing Treaty was signed in 2013, but the UK Government were unable to ratify it independently while an EU member. The Intellectual Property Office has launched a consultation on the implementation of the Treaty.¹⁸⁹

Concerns have been raised around the environmental impacts of intensive energy and water demands of AI infrastructure (PB 57).^{200–202}

Existential risk to humanity

Some futurist philosophers and industry leaders have warned that AI may pose an existential risk to humanity if it were to supersede human thinking ability in every domain. Experts have varying views on the nature of future types of AI and what risks and opportunities it poses (PB 57).^{203–207}

In 2023, some tech leaders, such as Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak, called for a six-month pause on the development of powerful AI to prioritise the mitigation of existential risks.^{208,209}

A focus on existential risks has been heavily criticised by some academics,^{210–215} the Ada Lovelace Institute,²¹⁶ and other industry experts^{217–221} who say well-evidenced current risks should take precedence over speculative, long-term risks.^{222,223} Some AI ethicists have raised concerns that focusing on existential risks diverts attention away from the decisions of tech leaders that are already affecting society.^{214,224,225}

Others argue that existential risks should be taken seriously even if considered unlikely.²²²

Current regulatory environment

Leading AI companies operate and sell their products in multiple markets. The UK's regulatory environment must therefore also be seen in the context of other countries' regulatory regimes.

In the UK

While there is no current body of UK law specifically regulating AI, there are numerous laws that restrict how AI can be used in practice,^{93,226} including ([HoC Library briefing on AI and employment law](#)):

- **data protection law**, such as the Data Protection Act 2018,²²⁷ that affects data collection and processing for AI development, and is the remit of the Information Commissioner's Office
- **equalities, privacy and common law**, such as the Equality Act 2010²²⁸ and the Human Rights Act 1998.²²⁹ These laws affect the outcomes of AI systems and decisions which may have discrimination and human rights implications, and are the remit of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. Privacy and common laws may limit the degree to which employers can substitute AI decision-making for their own judgement and places some restrictions on the use of surveillance tools to monitor workers²²⁶
- **intellectual property law**, such as the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,²³⁰ which governs ownership and legal use of any intellectual property in outputs or in datasets, and is the remit of the Intellectual Property Office

The Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (DRCF) was established in 2020 to foster collaboration between regulators regarding digital affairs.²³¹ As of 2023, the DRCF consists of Ofcom, the Information Commissioner's Office, the Competition and Markets Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority.

In the 2023 white paper 'A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation',²¹ the Government outlined a common set of cross-sectoral AI regulation principles for regulators to follow:

- safety, security, and robustness
- appropriate transparency and explainability
- fairness
- accountability and governance
- contestability and redress

In the EU and US

The European Union is currently finalising an AI Act.²³² As it stands, the Act is designed to work with existing EU legislation such as the [General Data Protection Regulation \(GDPR\)](#) and the [Digital Services Act \(DSA\)](#).

The Act defines different risk levels with corresponding levels of regulation. It bans certain high-risk applications, such as live facial recognition.

In the US, a 'Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights' has been outlined.²³³ Currently these are non-binding guidelines that aim to address discrimination, data privacy, and transparency. In October 2023, US President Joe Biden signed an Executive Order on AI mandating standards and disclosures for the largest AI companies, and measures to protect workers and disadvantaged groups.²³⁴

Potential future regulations

Human intervention in automated decision-making

Some civil society groups²³⁵ and academics^{236,237} have suggested a law to enshrine a right to human intervention in automated decision-making. There are two ways to implement this:

1. **All major decisions would be subject to human review.** Some legal scholars argue this is necessary so there is a designated human that can bear some degree of liability for the decision, while others argue this would reduce the efficiency gains of using automated decision-making.²³⁵⁻²⁴⁰
2. **Only contested decisions would be subject to human review.** Some legal scholars argue this is preferable for efficiency and sufficient to address

ethical concerns, while others argue that the lack of transparency may make it less likely that certain people, particularly those from digitally excluded communities, would be subject to a fair decision.²⁴¹

Some legal academics have stated that mechanisms already exist in UK law (Section 49 of the Data Protection Act 2018)²²⁷ to ensure human oversight in automated decision-making.²⁴²

However, other academics and civil society groups have raised concerns that in many systems, even when a human is involved in compliance with the law, they defer their judgement to AI.^{239,242}

The [Data Protection and Digital Information Bill](#),²⁴³ carried into the 2023-2024 parliamentary session, which is intended by the Government to reduce burdens on businesses,²⁴⁴ has been criticised by some civil society groups for “watering down protections”^{245,246} present in current law against automated decision-making.

Ban on automated decision-making and ban on live facial recognition

Rather than regulating automated decision-making, some legal scholars propose banning it entirely and argue that it is an “illegitimate source of authority in liberal democracy”, is not compatible with societal values such as equality and fairness, and that it can infer intimate knowledge about humans.*^{247,248}

Civil liberty campaigners and some Parliamentarians have called for a ban on live facial recognition (see [Surveillance](#))¹⁵⁵ akin to the ban proposed by the European Parliament in its draft AI Act.²³²

In 2020, the Equality and Human Rights Commission recommended the suspension of live facial recognition due to “discriminatory impacts”.²⁴⁹ The Metropolitan Police and Home Office have defended the use of live facial recognition, with the Home Office saying that it “has already enabled a large number of serious criminals to be caught”.^{250,251}

Open access to underlying AI code and related documentation

There has been considerable debate on whether companies developing AI models, particularly models used for automated decision-making, should make their models and documentation public and free to modify for transparency on how the models work. This may also promote competition by making AI developments accessible to small businesses.^{252–257}

* An example of this was a shopping algorithm at US supermarket Target which could guess, based on insights from customers’ shopping data, if a customer was pregnant. The algorithm would then send vouchers for pregnancy-related items, which in one case alerted a father to his daughter’s teenage pregnancy.²⁵¹

Companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic have argued against making AI code public, raising safety concerns around potential uses for malicious purposes.^{258–261} Other companies (such as Meta and Mozilla) have voluntarily shared some of their underlying code.²⁶²

Algorithmic impact assessment and audits

Some learned societies and academics have said that a duty to carry out impact assessments of automated decisions (algorithmic impact assessments) could be placed on companies and public bodies.^{263–268}

In existing regulation, the Data Protection Impact Assessment, mandated by Section 64 of the Data Protection Act 2018, places a duty on data controllers to assess data management processes that are “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals”.^{227,264}

Some stakeholders, such as the Institute for the Future of Work,²⁶⁴ have stated algorithmic impact assessments could be modelled on the existing Data Protection Impact Assessment, and thus could involve:

- describing the AI systems and processes
- assessing the potential impact of AI processes on peoples' rights and freedoms
- measures to address those risks
- safeguards and mechanisms to ensure compliance with regulations

Algorithmic impact assessments exist in the Canadian public sector and require government agencies to complete a questionnaire before deploying automated decision-making.²⁶⁹

There is a voluntary Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard that UK public bodies can use to disclose information about their use of AI.²⁷⁰

The Institute for the Future of Work has stated that audits of AI systems could ensure that these systems are compliant with their impact assessments and the law, and that the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum could play a role in helping regulators cooperate on these audits.²⁶⁴

The Information Commissioners Office currently carries out consensual and compulsory data protection audits* of AI systems²⁷¹. However, issues relating to AI are wider than data protection and fall under the remit of not just the Information Commissioners Office but multiple regulators (see [Current regulatory environment](#)).^{264,272}

The Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum is currently exploring the future landscape of AI auditing.²⁷²

* Compulsory audits are carried out under Section 146 of the Data Protection Act, whereas consensual audits are carried out under Section 129 of the same act.

Opt-in/opt-out datasets

It has been proposed that an 'opt-in' or 'opt-out' model* could be used to give greater control to creatives over their works appearing in generative AI datasets.^{194,273}

An opt-in model would prioritise creators. However, it may lead to restricted datasets due to low uptake that may hamper development. An opt-out model would automatically allow for more expansive datasets but increase the administrative burden on rightsholders and developers who must manually resolve opt-out requests.

The Government is working on a voluntary code of practice on copyright and AI.²⁷⁴

Regulatory capacity and funding

The Alan Turing Institute proposed a resource of expertise on AI that regulatory bodies could consult in order to respond to AI related matters that concern their individual remits.²⁷⁵

Experts and the Government have recommended to regulators the role of the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (see [Current regulatory environment](#)) could be expanded to be a central resource of expertise, and that more regulators (such as the Equalities and Human Rights Commission) could join to access this capacity.^{21,252,275,276}

There are concerns amongst civil society^{93,275,277,278} and Parliamentary committees,²⁵² that regulators are not currently equipped with the staffing, expertise or the funding to regulate AI and ensure current laws are enforced. Regulatory bodies²⁷⁹ and the Government²¹ have acknowledged these concerns.

* An opt-in model would require copyright holders to explicitly give consent for their intellectual property to be included in training datasets, whereas an opt-out model would mean that AI developers can use intellectual property by default unless rightsholders explicitly request to remove their work from the datasets.

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