

Debate Pack
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Debate on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report

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1 Background

A general debate on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report is scheduled for 2 December 2024 in the Chamber.

1.1 The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

On 14 June 2017 a fire broke out at Grenfell Tower, a 24 storey residential housing block in North Kensington, London. 223 people escaped. The fire led to the deaths of 72 people ranging in age from 6 months to 84 years. Their names and stories are described a BBC article on [The 72 victims killed by the Grenfell Tower fire](#) (4 September 2024). Of the 37 disabled residents living in Grenfell Tower at the time of the fire, 15 lost their lives. Disability Rights UK has highlighted that this means [41% of disabled people who lived in the tower died that night](#).

In July 2017, the government announced an [Independent review of building regulations and fire safety](#), to be led by Dame Judith Hackett. An interim report was published in December 2017 and the final report was published in May 2018.¹

Theresa May, then Prime Minister, announced a public inquiry would be set up into the Grenfell Tower fire, to be chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick. [Full terms of reference](#) were published on 14 September 2017, following advice from Sir Martin on the scope of the terms of reference.

The inquiry's terms reference were:

(i) to examine the circumstances surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, including:

the immediate cause or causes of the fire and the means by which it spread to the whole of the building;

the design and construction of the building and the decisions relating to its modification, refurbishment and management;

the scope and adequacy of building regulations, fire regulations and other legislation, guidance and industry practice relating to the design, construction, equipping and management of high-rise residential buildings;

whether such regulations, legislation, guidance and industry practice were complied with in the case of Grenfell Tower and the fire safety measures adopted in relation to it;

¹ Gov.uk, [Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Hackitt review](#), 17 May 2018

the arrangements made by the local authority or other responsible bodies for receiving and acting upon information either obtained from local residents or available from other sources (including information derived from fires in other buildings) relating to the risk of fire at Grenfell Tower, and the action taken in response to such information;

the fire prevention and fire safety measures in place at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017;

the response of the London Fire Brigade to the fire; and

the response of central and local government in the days immediately following the fire;

and

(ii) to report its findings to the Prime Minister as soon as possible and to make recommendations.²

The Prime Minister clarified that the Hackitt Review would “urgently assess the effectiveness of current building and fire safety regulations and related compliance and enforcement issues, with a focus on multi occupancy high rise residential buildings”. She added that the Hackitt Review would co-operate fully with the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.³

The inquiry held over 300 public hearings and received over 1,600 witness statements. The [Phase 1 report](#) was published in October 2019. It explained what the two phases of the inquiry focused on:

- Phase 1 would identify exactly how the fire started, how it escaped from the flat of origin and how fire and smoke was able to spread throughout the building in a manner and at a speed that prevented many people from escaping, despite the prompt attendance of the emergency services. Phase 1 would also examine the response of the emergency services so far as it bore on the decisions made and actions taken on the night of the fire.
- Phase 2 would ascertain the underlying causes of the disaster, including the decisions made in relation to critical aspects of the design and construction of the cladding system, the adequacy of the regulatory regime and the response of central and local government.⁴

On 4 September 2024, the inquiry published its [Phase 2 report](#).⁵ On the same day, the Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the government would look at the inquiry’s 58 recommendations in detail and respond in full within six months. He also said that there would be a debate on the floor of the

² Statement UIN HCWS135, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Terms of Reference](#), 14 September 2017

³ Statement UIN HCWS135, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Terms of Reference](#), 14 September 2017

⁴ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 1 Report: Volume 1](#), October 2019

⁵ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), para 2.4, 4 September 2024

House.⁶ A [debate on building safety and resilience took place on 11 September 2024](#).

Cladding remediation and fire safety work

The inquiry did not look at cladding remediation and fire safety work for other buildings following the fire and how they should be dealt with. For further information on these issues, see the Library briefings on [Leasehold high-rise flats: Who pays for fire safety work?](#) (October 2023) and [Help with paying for historical fire safety work: high-rise blocks \(England\)](#) (August 2023).

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government publishes monthly statistics on buildings with unsafe cladding whose remediation progress is being monitored by the department. The latest release is the [Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release - October 2024](#).

1.2

Building regulations 2010

Building regulations and fire safety are devolved matters, and this briefing focuses on England. For more information on building regulations and fire safety in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, see section 6 of the Library briefing on [Building regulations and safety](#) (July 2024).

Generally, building regulations set out requirements or standards that must be met. They do not prescribe the materials or approaches that must be used to achieve them.

Building work that is carried out in England must generally adhere to building regulations, set out in the [Building Act 1984](#) and the [Building Regulations 2010](#).

Building regulations apply when a building is constructed or when certain building work takes place, as defined in [Regulation 3 of the Building Regulations 2010](#). As a result, the standards that apply to building work depend on when it took place. Otherwise there is no requirement to retrofit existing buildings to comply with updated standards.

[Part B of Schedule 1](#) to the Building Regulations 2010 contains the legal requirements on fire safety. They include that:

The building shall be designed and constructed so that there are appropriate provisions for the early warning of fire, and appropriate means of escape in

⁶ Gov.uk, [Prime Minister's statement on Grenfell Tower Inquiry final report](#), 4 September 2024

case of fire from the building to a place of safety outside the building capable of being safely and effectively used at all material times. [...]

The building shall be designed and constructed so that, in the event of fire, its stability will be maintained for a reasonable period. [...]

The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building. [...] The roof of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the roof and from one building to another, having regard to the use and position of the building.⁷

These requirements have not changed since 2010. The 2016 refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, which added the new exterior aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding that encouraged the fire to spread, was subject to these regulations.

The government provides technical guidance on how to meet these requirements, via ‘approved documents’. Volume 1 of [Approved Document B](#) contains the guidance on fire safety for residential buildings. Approved Document B has been amended several times: the version in use during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower in 2016 was the [2006 edition, incorporating 2010 and 2013 amendments](#) (PDF).⁸

1.3

Fire Safety Act 2021

[The Regulatory Reform \(Fire Safety\) Order 2005](#) (the Fire Safety Order, or FSO) places requirements on a ‘responsible person’ for a residential building to conduct and act on fire risk assessments for communal areas. In blocks of flats, this is usually the building owner, landlord or building manager. For further information, see section 4 of the Library briefing on [Fire safety in houses and flats](#) (May 2024).

The [Fire Safety Act 2021](#) amended the FSO so that it now applies to “the building’s structure and external walls and any common parts”, including doors, windows and “anything attached to the exterior of those walls (including balconies)”. This change was introduced in response to the Grenfell Tower fire and the Hackitt Review. For further information, see the Library briefing on the [Fire Safety Bill 2019-2021](#).

⁷ Legislation.gov.uk, [Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010](#)

⁸ The National Archives, [Approved Document B - Fire safety: Volume 1 - Dwellinghouses](#)

1.4 Building Safety Act 2022

Following the recommendations of the Hackitt review and the inquiry's Phase 1 Report, the [Building Safety Act 2022](#) was introduced. This strengthened the compliance and enforcement regime governing the construction and refurbishment of buildings.

It also introduced a new regulatory regime for 'higher risk' buildings, which are those that are at least 7 storeys or 18 metres tall. This new regime is overseen by the [Building Safety Regulator \(BSR\)](#) which sits within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

For further information on the act, see the following guidance and briefings:

- Government summary of [The Building Safety Act](#) (July 2022), which summarises what the act means for residents and building owners
- Library briefings on the bill, including debate and amendments in Parliament:
 - [Building Safety Bill](#) (16 July 2021), which was published ahead of Commons second reading of the bill
 - [Building Safety Bill: committee stage](#) (17 January 2022)
 - [Building Safety Bill: Lords amendments](#) (14 April 2022)

1.5 Key conclusions and recommendations of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report

The Phase 2 Report was published in [seven volumes](#).⁹ An [executive summary](#) (PDF) was also published.

This section of the briefing will focus on the key criticisms made of different bodies, the report's overall recommendations, and some of the actions that the government has taken to improve the fire safety of buildings. It is not intended to be comprehensive.

The Phase 2 Report concluded that overall, "the fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the danger of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information

⁹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 report](#), 4 September 2024

available to them”.¹⁰ The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has concluded that “the deaths that occurred were all avoidable”.¹¹

Government

The inquiry criticised central government, and particularly the department that is now the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), for several failings, including:

- Failing to learn lessons from previous fires, including at [Knowsley Heights in Liverpool](#) in 1991, [Lakanal House in London](#) in 2009 and [fires abroad](#) that also used similar ACM cladding.
- Failing to “pay due regard to the striking results of a large-scale test in 2001 involving aluminium composite panels with unmodified polyethylene cores, which burned violently” and to numerous warnings between 2012 and 2017 about “the risks involved in using polymeric insulation and aluminium composite panels with unmodified polyethylene cores”.
- Failing to act on the [recommendations of the Environment and Transport Select Committee](#) in 1999 that Approved Document B should be amended to remove Class 0 (a performance rating for building materials that was not a standard identified in any British standard test). The Grenfell Tower Inquiry concluded that “the department was made aware that national Class 0 was an inappropriate standard by which to determine the suitability of external wall panels but allowed it to remain as part of the statutory guidance until after the Grenfell Tower fire. It could and should have been removed years earlier”.
- Failing to amend or clarify the guidance in Approved Document B on the construction of external walls, despite knowing that “Approved Document B was unclear and not properly understood by a significant proportion of those working in the construction industry” and “that some in the industry were worried that combustible insulation and aluminium composite material (ACM) panels with unmodified polyethylene cores were routinely being used on high-rise buildings in breach of functional requirement B4 [on external fire spread]”.
- Following the Lakanal House fire, displaying “a complacent and at times defensive attitude to matters affecting fire safety”, resisting calls to amend the Fire Safety Order to “make it clear that it applied to the exterior walls of buildings containing more than one set of domestic

¹⁰ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), para 2.4, 4 September 2024

¹¹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Press release of Phase 2 report](#), 4 September 2024

premises”, and allowing the government’s deregulatory agenda to dominate “the department’s thinking to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded”.¹²

The class 0 rating was removed from the 2019 edition of Approved Document B. [Further changes to national classes](#) will come into force from 2025 and 2029.

As explained above, the Fire Safety Order was amended in 2021 to [clarify that it applies to exterior walls](#), in response to the fire and the Hackitt Review.

In 2018, the use of combustible materials on the external walls of buildings during building works was banned by an [amendment to the Building Regulations 2010](#).

The Building Research Establishment

The [Building Research Establishment \(BRE\)](#) was established in 1921 as a government body to carry out research into and testing of construction methods and products. The Phase 2 Report criticised the operation of the BRE and the government’s attitude towards it:

BRE held a trusted position within the construction industry and was recognised both nationally and internationally as a leader in fire safety. However, from 1991 much of the work it carried out in relation to testing the fire safety of external walls was marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour. [...]

After [the BRE] was privatised in 1997 the department [now MHCLG] limited the scope of the advice it was asked to provide on fire safety matters. As a result, the department deprived itself of the full benefit of BRE’s advice and experience. On occasions it deliberately curtailed investigations before any proper conclusion had been reached.¹³

Specifically, the BRE was criticised for failing to draw the government’s attention to the inadequacy of the class 0 rating and the 2001 large-scale test showing how aluminium composite panels with unmodified polyethylene cores burned. The inquiry also concluded that the way the BRE carried out tests and kept records “exposed it to the risk of manipulation by unscrupulous product manufacturers” such as Celotex, the manufacturer of the insulation used on Grenfell Tower. BRE staff had advised manufacturers

¹² Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.5-2.14

¹³ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.11 and 2.15

“on the best way to satisfy the criteria for a system to be considered safe, thereby compromising its integrity and independence”.

The BRE [welcomed the publication of the Phase 2 Report](#) and said “We will be reviewing the report and its recommendations and will continue to work constructively with government to ensure the new building safety and testing regime delivers on the findings of the Inquiry’s report and is fit for purpose”.¹⁴

Construction product manufacturers

The Phase 2 Report states that “one very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products”, including “deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market”.¹⁵

Three companies were criticised in particular: Arconic Architectural Products (AAP), which manufactured and sold the cladding used in the external walls of Grenfell Tower and two insulation manufacturers, Kingspan and Celotex.

Arconic Architectural Products

Arconic Architectural Products (AAP) manufactured and sold the Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels used in the external walls of Grenfell Tower. These were an aluminium composite material (ACM) product made of two thin sheets of aluminium with a polyethylene core to provide stiffening.

Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels could be installed in two different ways, including the ‘cassette’ form used on Grenfell Tower. Tests had showed that in cassette form, the product reacted to fire in a very dangerous way. While the [product in ‘rivet’ format had obtained a Euroclass B rating](#), the fire test on the same product in cassette form had to be stopped after 850 seconds because of the amount of heat released and as a result it had no classification.¹⁶

However, the Phase 2 Report stated that “from 2005 until after the Grenfell Tower fire Arconic deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger of using Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, particularly on high-rise buildings.” Despite being aware of the fire safety concerns of the product, Arconic “was determined to exploit what it saw as weak regulatory

¹⁴ BRE, [BRE response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry's report](#), 4 September 2024

¹⁵ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.19

¹⁶ Construction Management, [Grenfell: Arconic regarded stopped cassette cladding test as ‘rogue result’](#), 17 February 2021; Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY: PHASE 2 REPORT - VOLUME 2](#), 4 September 2024

regimes in certain countries (including the UK) to sell Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, including for use on residential buildings”.¹⁷

In its [response to the Phase 2 Report](#), Arconic (or AAP) stated that:

Throughout the Inquiry, AAP has maintained a number of points:

- AAP sold sheets of aluminium composite material as specified in the design process. This product was safe to use as a building material, and legal to sell in the UK as well as the more than thirty other countries in which AAP customers purchased the product. We reject any claim that AAP sold an unsafe product.
- AAP regularly conducted tests of its materials using third-party testing bodies. Reports on these results were all publicly available, and AAP made these reports available to its customers.
- AAP did not conceal information from or mislead any certification body, customer, or the public.¹⁸

Kingspan

Kingspan manufactured K15 insulation.

Although only a [small amount of K15 insulation \(around 5%\) was used on Grenfell Tower](#), the inquiry found that its “dishonest marketing of K15” created “a spurious market for a polymeric insulation product suitable for use on high-rise buildings generally, which drew in Celotex as a competitor”. The Phase 2 Report noted that “Kingspan cannot be blamed for Celotex’s dishonesty, which was the choice of Celotex itself, but it did create the conditions that encouraged it and in which it was able to flourish”.¹⁹

The inquiry found that, starting in 2005, Kingspan “knowingly created a false market in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height by claiming that K15 [insulation] [...] could [...] be used in the external wall of any building over 18 metres in height regardless of its design or other components”.

Kingspan welcomed the publication of the Phase 2 Report and stated that [its insulation and conduct were not the principal reason for the fire spread at Grenfell Tower](#):

We welcome the publication of the final report from the Public Inquiry, which is crucial to a public understanding of what went wrong and why. It explains clearly and unambiguously that the type of insulation (whether combustible or non-combustible) was immaterial, and that the principal reason for the fire spread was the PE ACM cladding, which was not made by Kingspan.

¹⁷ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.21-2.23

¹⁸ Arconic Architectural Products, [Grenfell Statement - Arconic](#), not dated

¹⁹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Volume 2](#), 4 September 2024, para 22.135

Kingspan has long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business. These were in no way reflective of how we conduct ourselves as a Group, then or now. While deeply regrettable, they were not found to be causative of the tragedy.²⁰

Celotex

Celotex manufactured RS5000, a combustible polyisocyanurate foam, which was the main type of insulation used on Grenfell Tower.

The inquiry found that Celotex “found it impossible to create a similar product using polyisocyanurate foam and could not understand how Kingspan had been able to produce an organic polymeric insulation board that apparently enabled designers to follow the guidance in Approved Document B relating to buildings over 18 metres in height”.²¹

It therefore “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”. This included manipulating fire resistance tests and not disclosing that information in its marketing literature, and presenting RS5000 as “suitable and safe for use on Grenfell Tower, although it knew that was not the case”.²²

Celotex’s [response to the Phase 2 Report](#) highlighted that:

Our business’ response started immediately after the fire in June 2017. We conducted our own review to interrogate the circumstances in which the RS5000 product had been tested, launched and marketed. This review was a significant and thorough undertaking, and the results of that work were disclosed promptly and proactively to all relevant stakeholders including the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Information was uncovered through the review that was previously unknown to the management of the company at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire. The company took appropriate action.

Independent testing commissioned following the review demonstrated that the cladding system described in Celotex RS5000 marketing literature met the relevant safety criteria. We also understand that Government-testing in August 2017 showed that a cladding system incorporating RS5000 and a non-combustible aluminium cladding panel met the relevant standards. These systems were substantially different from that used at Grenfell Tower, which incorporated combustible cladding panels. Celotex Limited does not design and install cladding systems and did not do so at Grenfell Tower. The design and construction of the facade at Grenfell Tower and the selection of the various components, were decisions made by construction industry professionals.

Since the fire, we reviewed and improved process controls, quality management and the approach to marketing within the Celotex business to address the issues discovered and ensure that the culture, systems and

²⁰ Kingspan, [Kingspan Insulation UK and the Grenfell Tower Inquiry](#), not dated

²¹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Volume 2](#), 4 September 2024, para 22.135

²² Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.28 and [Phase 2 Report: Volume 2](#), 4 September 2024, para 22.135

processes relating to product compliance and product safety meet industry best practice.²³

The Building Safety Act 2022 aims to “strengthen the construction products regulatory regime, with new requirements to make sure all construction products on the UK market are safe for their intended use”.²⁴ It also introduced retrospective liabilities relating to construction products and extended the deadline for claims to be made.²⁵

On 22 November 2024, the government stated that it “will bring forward comprehensive proposals for system-wide reform of the construction products regime to give consumers confidence and underpin supply chains and housing delivery”.²⁶

Product standards organisations

The [British Board of Agrément \(BBA\)](#) is a commercial organisation that certifies the compliance of products with the requirements of legislation.

The Phase 2 Report explained that:

[the BBA] issued certificates of compliance in respect of one of the insulation products used on Grenfell Tower, Kingspan K15, and the Reynobond 55 PE panels used as the rainscreen. Its certificates were accepted in the industry largely without question but its procedures were neither wholly independent nor rigorous and were not always rigorously applied.

The dishonest strategies of Arconic and Kingspan succeeded in a large measure due to the incompetence of the BBA, its failure to adhere robustly to the system of checks it had put in place, and an ingrained willingness to accommodate customers instead of insisting on high standards and adherence to a contract that was intended to maintain them.²⁷

The Phase 2 Report highlighted that the Building Research Establishment (BRE, see above), “played an important part in enabling Celotex and Kingspan to market their products for use in the external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height”. It concluded that “BRE’s systems were not robust enough to ensure complete independence and the necessary degree of technical rigour at all times” and “as a result, it sacrificed rigorous application of principle to its commercial interests”.²⁸

²³ Celotex, [Celotex Limited and Grenfell Tower – Updates and Information on Celotex RS5000 and the Grenfell Tower fire](#), 4 September 2024

²⁴ Gov.uk, [The Building Safety Act](#), 25 July 2022

²⁵ Construction Products Association, [CPA Guidance - Construction Product Manufacturers Liability](#), August 2023

²⁶ House of Lords, [Debate on Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report](#), 22 November 2024

²⁷ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.41 to 2.42

²⁸ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.51

The [United Kingdom Accreditation Service \(UKAS\)](#) is the UK's national accreditation body, appointed by the government to assess and accredit organisations that provide services including certification, testing, inspection, calibration, validation and verification. The Phase 2 Report found that UKAS “did not always follow its own policies and its assessment processes were lacking in rigour and comprehensiveness”. It also identified that “its powers to take action were surprisingly limited, with no powers of enforcement” as “the most it could do in response to unsatisfactory conduct was to suspend or withdraw accreditation”.²⁹

Building control bodies

[Local Authority Building Control \(LABC\)](#) is a body formed by local authority building control departments in 2005. LABC provides “support with training and technical matters” and “centralised marketing and business development services for members”. Following an initial assessment by a local authority building control surveyor and a second stage review by a group of experts, it issued certificates verifying the compliance of construction products and systems with the Building Regulations and Approved Documents.³⁰ The Phase 2 Report stated that:

The LABC must take its share of the blame for the acceptance by the market of Celotex RS5000 and Kingspan K15 for use on buildings over 18 metres in height. There was a complete failure on the part of the LABC over a number of years to take basic steps to ensure that the certificates it issued in respect of them were technically accurate.

The LABC was vulnerable to manipulation because its processes were not implemented rigorously enough. The task of producing an initial assessment should not have been given to building control officers, who did not have the degree of knowledge and experience necessary to make an informed assessment of the product in question, and those who carried out the second stage review were not always competent to do so and in some cases did not take the necessary degree of care.

Over a period of some years the LABC's certificates relating to Kingspan K15 and Celotex RS5000 contained misleading statements about their fire performance and about the suitability of both products for use in the external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height. Despite warnings from various quarters, the LABC failed to scrutinise properly the claims made for the products by the manufacturers and instead adopted uncritically the language they suggested. In short, it was willing to accommodate the customer at the expense of those who relied on the certificates. As a result, the LABC was also the victim of dishonest behaviour on the part of unscrupulous manufacturers.³¹

²⁹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.52

³⁰ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.46

³¹ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.47 to 2.49

The Phase 2 Report also criticised the National House Building Council (NHBC), which employed building control inspectors and “wielded considerable influence on the industry” for failing to “ensure that its building control function remained essentially regulatory and free of commercial pressures”. The report concluded that:

[the NHBC] was unwilling to upset its own customers and the wider construction industry by revealing the scale of the use of combustible insulation in the external walls of high-rise buildings, contrary to the statutory guidance. We have concluded that the conflict between the regulatory function of building control and the pressures of commercial interests prevents a system of that kind from effectively serving the public interest.³²

[LABC’s response](#) to the Phase 2 Report accepted criticisms of some of its actions:

LABC cooperated fully with the Inquiry throughout, providing detailed evidence and testimony. We can see there are justified criticisms about some of our actions at the time. LABC admitted errors at the very first opportunity and apologised immediately and repeatedly. Again, we wholeheartedly acknowledge and apologise for any areas where LABC has failed in the past.³³

The NHBC published a statement on [reforms it has made since the fire](#).

The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea

The Phase 2 Report highlighted a historically “troubled” relationship between the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) owned by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), and the residents of Grenfell Tower.

The TMO and the RBKC were jointly responsible for the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower. The Phase 2 Report identified several matters that led it to conclude that “the years between 2009 and 2017 were marked by a persistent indifference to fire safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable people”. They included:

- The absence of “any independent or rigorous scrutiny by RBKC of the TMO’s performance of its health and safety obligations, and in particular its management of fire safety”, which was “a particular weakness”.
- The RBKC “took little or no account of an independent and highly critical review of fire safety carried out for the TMO in 2009”. A further “independent and highly critical report produced in 2013” was not disclosed by the TMO to the RBKC.

³² Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, para 2.50

³³ LABC, [LABC response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry final report](#), 4 September 2024

- The TMO's only fire assessor for its entire estate was "allowed to drift into that role without any formal selection or procurement process", and had "misrepresented his experience and qualifications (some of which he had invented) and was ill-qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on buildings of the size and complexity of Grenfell Tower".
- There was "no adequate system for ensuring that defects identified in fire risk assessments were remedied effectively and in good time". The TMO had "a huge backlog of remedial work that it never managed to clear, a situation that was aggravated by the failure of its senior management to treat defects with the seriousness they deserved".
- During the 2016 refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, the RBKC's building control department "failed to perform its statutory function of ensuring that the design of the refurbishment complied with the Building Regulations". As the client for the works, the TMO "failed to take sufficient care in its choice of architect and paid insufficient attention to matters affecting fire safety, including the work of the fire engineer".³⁴

The [Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation \(KCTMO\)](#) "now exists as a residuary body for a single purpose - which is to support and be accountable to the Public inquiry and all other legal proceedings arising from the Grenfell tragedy". In response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, the KCTMO stated:

We are acutely conscious of the terrible impact that this tragedy has had on the bereaved, the survivors, their relatives, and the broader Grenfell Tower community. We accept that the TMO contributed to this and we are deeply sorry. [...]

There are no staff currently in place who were employed by the TMO at the time of the tragedy.³⁵

Local authority provision of emergency and temporary accommodation

The Phase 2 Report identified the following issues with how emergency and temporary accommodation was provided by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) in the aftermath of the fire:

³⁴ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.53 to 2.87

³⁵ KCTMO, [KCTMO Statement on Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#), not dated

- RBKC’s arrangements for responding to civil emergencies “did not include a system for obtaining a large amount of emergency accommodation at short notice”.³⁶
- A distinction was made “at the outset” between the provision of accommodation for residents who had been displaced from the tower itself and residents evacuated from the surrounding area.³⁷
- RBKC’s risk register recognised there was insufficient capacity to arrange temporary accommodation in an emergency, but there were “no processes in place to address that deficiency”.³⁸
- “Too many people who had been found temporary accommodation felt that they had then been left on their own, not knowing for how long they were expected to remain or on what terms and without anyone to turn to, to provide that information. That gave rise to a sense of isolation and powerlessness.”³⁹

The report went on to acknowledge that a “local authority is likely to have difficulty finding temporary accommodation for a very large number of displaced persons but the need to do so should be recognised and contingency plans drawn up.”⁴⁰

In response to the Phase 2 Report, Kensington and Chelsea Council Leader Councillor Elizabeth Campbell wrote an open letter to the bereaved and survivors of Grenfell:

Today is a day for you, the residents and families of Grenfell. Those who survived and those who lost loved ones in the most horrific circumstances imaginable.

On behalf of the Council, I apologise unreservedly and with all my heart to you, and to the local community, for our failure to listen to residents and to protect them. Put simply, we could, and should, have done more to keep people safe in their homes and to care for all of our residents in the aftermath of the fire.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has laid bare the chain of events that led to that night. It shows how you were let down by the systems and people responsible for protecting you and your families. It shows – beyond doubt – that this Council failed the residents of Grenfell Tower and the 72 people, including 18 children, who died.

You have had to wait a long time for answers, and I hope the publication of this report is an important step forward in the ongoing search for justice. We fully accept the findings, which are a withering critique of a system broken

³⁶ Grenfell tower inquiry, [Grenfell tower inquiry: Phase 2 report, volume 7](#), para 107.3

³⁷ Grenfell tower inquiry, [Grenfell tower inquiry: Phase 2 report, volume 7](#), para 104.50

³⁸ Grenfell tower inquiry, [Grenfell tower inquiry: Phase 2 report, volume 7](#), para 104.54

³⁹ Grenfell tower inquiry, [Grenfell tower inquiry: Phase 2 report, volume 7](#), para 113.77

⁴⁰ Grenfell tower inquiry, [Grenfell tower inquiry: Phase 2 report, volume 7](#), para 113.75

from top to bottom. It is crystal clear – profits were put before people, clear warning signs were ignored, and Grenfell was wholly avoidable, with failure at every single level.

The Council’s role will never be diluted by the large number of companies and organisations involved. We failed to keep people safe before and during the refurbishment and we failed to treat people with humanity and care in the aftermath. As a public authority, our primary concern should always be our residents and never our own reputation. The organisation I lead owes it to every single person who lost their lives to learn the lessons, change, and improve.

I know that seeing visible and tangible change is of utmost importance to you. I am grateful to all the bereaved, survivors and residents who are working with us to make change happen, showing us what we need to do differently, challenging us on progress and holding us to account for what we have not yet done. We will never forget that Grenfell happened here, on our watch, and we must work with our residents to build a local legacy here at the Council.

We will learn from every single criticism in the report. We will take time to study it further in detail, listen to the reflections from our communities, and publish a full and formal response in the Autumn.

Finally, we know this is not an ending point, justice is still to be served. The Inquiry report creates urgent impetus for change – here at the Council, and no doubt nationally too. Grenfell can never be allowed to happen again.⁴¹

Chair of the Local Government Association (LGA), Councillor Louise Gittins, said councils “stand ready to work with the government on improving building safety [...] the LGA and councils will take time to properly consider this vital report and its recommendations”.⁴²

Councillor Claire Holland, Chair of London Councils, said:

[the report] must serve as a catalyst for action. The report's findings are damning and make clear how residents were let down by a broken system that failed at every level, with fatal consequences. Boroughs will be reading this report closely to ensure that we understand its findings in full and take action in response to its recommendations.⁴³

London Fire Brigade

The London Fire Brigade (LFB) responded to the Grenfell Tower fire. The LFB has described it as “the biggest challenge any fire service in the UK has faced in living memory”. It also highlighted that “staff responding to the fire on the night of the tragedy, as well as members of other emergency services who

⁴¹ RBKC, [Leader responds to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two report](#), 4 September 2024

⁴² LGA, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry: LGA statement on final report](#), 4 September 2024

⁴³ London Councils, [Statement on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report](#), 4 September 2024

attended in support of the Brigade, showed extreme courage in the face of the most appalling of circumstances”.⁴⁴

The Phase 2 Report stated that “the Lakanal House fire in July 2009 should have alerted the LFB to the shortcomings in its ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings that revealed themselves once more at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017”. It added that “those shortcomings could have been made good if the LFB had been more effectively managed and led”. The Phase 2 Report attributed various failures to “a chronic lack of effective management and leadership, combined with an undue emphasis on process” as well as insufficient training.⁴⁵ The [Phase 1 Report](#) also made recommendations on the LFB’s handling of the fire on the night.

The LFB response to the Phase 2 Report highlighted that all recommendations made by the Phase 1 Report had been accepted and that it would develop an action plan to respond to the Phase 2 Report’s recommendations:

In 2019, the Brigade accepted every recommendation from the Phase 1 Report and we have since implemented significant changes to how we operate. This year, we completed every recommendation directed at us as part of Phase 1. We have introduced important policies, new equipment, improved training and better ways of working, particularly in how we respond to fires in high-rise residential buildings, and Londoners are safer as a result. This was evidenced at the awful fire in Dagenham late last month.

While we are now better prepared to respond to high-rise fires, we are not complacent. We are in dialogue with the Government and Mayor of London as we all look at what must be done to ensure that buildings in London are safe. We will continue to collaborate with them, advocating for improved standards in the built environment to ensure greater safety.

We recognise the importance of the Inquiry’s findings and recommendations. We will set out an action plan, detailing our response to each recommendation, in due course. This will be developed following consultation and in collaboration with the Grenfell community and our Community Forum.⁴⁶

Overall recommendations

The Phase 2 Report made several recommendations, which included that:

- A new construction regulator should be established, reporting to a single Secretary of State. This regulator would be responsible for regulating construction products, including testing and certification,

⁴⁴ London Fire Brigade, [Response to The London Fire Brigade Recommendations GTI Phase 2](#), October 2024

⁴⁵ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 2.90 to 2.98

⁴⁶ London Fire Brigade, [London Fire Brigade's Response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#), 4 September 2024

accrediting fire risk assessors and oversight of building control, amongst other responsibilities. The Phase 2 Report acknowledged the Building Safety Act and establishment of the Building Safety Regulator, but still considered that a new construction regulator was needed to bring together functions overseen by different bodies. This was because the inquiry considered that the arrangements under which the construction industry was regulated had become too complex and fragmented.

- The government should “bring responsibility for the functions relating to fire safety currently exercised by MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade into one department under a single Secretary of State”.
- The Secretary of State should “appoint a Chief Construction Adviser with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry”.
- The definition of ‘higher risk building’ under the Building Safety Act should be reviewed urgently. The report explained that defining a building by reference to its height was “essentially arbitrary in nature” and “the nature of its use and, in particular, the likely presence of vulnerable people, for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would be likely to present difficulty” was more relevant.
- With regards to the building regulations, “statutory guidance generally, and Approved Document B in particular” should be “reviewed accordingly and a revised version published as soon as possible”. This is because the inquiry did not think “that Approved Document B provides the information needed to design buildings that are safe in fire”. The Phase 2 Report also recommended that “a revised version of the guidance [should] contain a clear warning in each section that the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and that compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with them”.
- It should be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy be produced by a registered fire engineer for higher risk buildings. This strategy should be submitted with building control applications for the construction and refurbishment of higher risk buildings, and should be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion. Such a strategy “must take into account the needs of vulnerable people”.
- The government should “appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process”.

This panel should “consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority”.

- The government should “establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable”. This follows concerns that have been “expressed for many years about the competence of some of those offering their services as commercial fire risk assessors and the absence of any scheme of regulation to ensure that responsible persons under the Fire Safety Order can have confidence in the skill and experience of those whom they instruct to carry out fire risk assessments on their behalf”.
- All local authorities should “make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements”. Such arrangements “should, as far as possible, involve local providers of social housing”.
- As part of their emergency planning, local authorities should “make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area.” They should include arrangements in their plans for “providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible.”
- The government should further consider the [Phase 1 report’s recommendations on personal emergency evacuation plans \(PEEPs\)](#) (PDF) for all residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised.⁴⁷

1.6

Next steps

The Prime Minister committed to responding to the inquiry’s recommendations in full within six months of the publication of the Phase 2 report, which would be on or before 4 March 2025.⁴⁸

The Metropolitan (Met) Police has been investigating the fire to identify possible criminal offences and who is responsible. Its work is “independent

⁴⁷ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report: Executive summary](#), 4 September 2024, paras 113.1 to 113.83

⁴⁸ Gov.uk, [Prime Minister's statement on Grenfell Tower Inquiry final report](#), 4 September 2024

of the public inquiry, but detectives must fully consider the report's findings in the context of the ongoing and highly complex criminal investigation".⁴⁹

In May 2024, the [Met Police estimated](#) that once the Phase 2 Report was published, "it will take the investigation team at least 12-18 months to fully assess the inquiry's report and complete evidential files to present to the Crown Prosecution Service for charging decisions". This timeline was [confirmed in the Met Police response to the Phase 2 Report](#) on 4 September 2024. It has also said that "A team of 180 officers and staff remain dedicated to the investigation".⁵⁰

1.7 Stakeholder responses

Responses from the organisations specifically criticised by the Phase 2 Report have been highlighted in the sections above.

Grenfell Tower survivors and families

Grenfell United is a registered family association with an elected committee that seeks to represent survivors and bereaved families. In response to the Phase 2 Report, it issued the following [statement](#):

Today marks the conclusion of a painful six years listening to the evidence of the deaths of 54 adults and 18 children, our loved ones, neighbours and friends. It is a significant chapter in the journey to truth, justice and change. But justice has not been delivered.

The inquiry report reveals that whenever there's a clash between corporate interest and public safety, governments have done everything they can to avoid their responsibilities to keep people safe. The system isn't broken, it was built this way.

[...]

The duty of government should be to safeguard life, whilst protecting us from corporate greed. But for too long, they have aided corporations, facilitating them to profit and dictate regulation.

[...]

The government must now exert control over the sector to prevent further dismantling of public safety, which used to be understood as their primary job, not aiding and abetting crooks and killers.

[...] We expect this government to break old habits and implement all of the recommendations made by Sir Martin Moore Bick from the Inquiry report

⁴⁹ Metropolitan Police, [Investigation into Grenfell Tower tragedy](#), 4 September 2024

⁵⁰ Metropolitan Police, [Investigation into Grenfell Tower tragedy](#), 4 September 2024

without further delay, because the time to address this is already three decades too late.

We are calling on the government to ban Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex and Rydon from central or local government procurement processes. [...]

We have an expectation that the Met Police and the CPS ensure that those who are truly responsible are held to account and brought to justice.⁵¹

Housing

A number of stakeholders in the housing sector issued press statements in response to the report's findings and recommendations.

On 4 September 2024, an Inside Housing article reported that the former chair of Grenfell Tower's leaseholder association, lawyers for the community and campaigners were critical of the inquiry report's decision not to make recommendations for change directed at social housing providers, apparently in light of the anticipated impact of the recently introduced [Social Housing \(Regulation\) Act 2023](#). Specifically:

While the act makes it a requirement for senior social housing staff to gain qualifications and greatly enhances the power of the Regulator of Social Housing to assess the performance of providers' landlord services, including health and safety matters, it does not address all of the issues raised in the Grenfell report.⁵²

The Housing Ombudsman issued the following detailed statement in response to the report:

This report will have huge significance for the way housing operates in the future. But it must also act as a moment of reflection for the whole country.

The survivors and bereaved families who provided such vital evidence throughout the Inquiry should be commended; their voices are clearly heard in this report which is testament to how it has been produced. Everyone at our service is tirelessly committed to fulfilling our role under the Social Housing Regulation Act to deliver change.

Integral to these findings are respect and trust – and the principles of transparency and accountability. It is clear residents' complaints were dismissed and devalued.

Whilst there are technical failings detailed in [the report](#), the gross imbalance of power and dismissal of residents is striking. These are some of the issues we still encounter in our investigations and highlighted in our recent

⁵¹ Grenfell United, [Publication of the Phase 2 Report](#), 4 September 2024

⁵² Inside Housing, [Former chair of Grenfell's leaseholder association criticises lack of recommendations for social housing providers](#) (subscription required), 4 September 2024

systemic [report on attitudes, respect and rights](#). It identified the need for human-centric provision of services by landlords.

There is a wider societal change that needs to take place towards those living in social housing, stopping the stigma towards this important tenure. This starts with the investment needed so that landlords can deliver services that meet residents' needs and are able maintain social homes in a way that is responsible and ensures decency.

Our work with thousands of residents and landlords has reinforced how the role of a landlord has changed – providing a one size fits all approach to housing and repairs is no longer viable.

This is evident from the inquiry's conclusions, with the landlord not fully understanding the needs of the residents they were serving. I see these themes repeatedly in our casework, and remind landlords that complaints hold a mirror up to the quality of service provision and culture of their organisation. Complaints provide landlords with early warning of issues that may be unaddressed, and tackling these can improve relationships and trust between landlord and resident.

Landlords should rigorously review the complaints they receive to drive learning and create a positive complaint handling culture. Landlords should also ensure they are listening and involving residents in their decision making processes, which was devastatingly absent here.⁵³

The National Housing Federation, the national membership body for registered providers of social housing in England, published a statement welcoming the report's recommendations and said they "will continue to do everything in our power to ensure that a tragedy such as the fire at Grenfell Tower never happens again" and "will work with our members to learn the lessons from this report".⁵⁴

Gavin Smart, chief executive at the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH), said the report "highlights critical lessons for all of us working in housing. CIH is committed to supporting our members and the wider sector to improve organisational culture and deliver high standards of safety, accountability, and professionalism".⁵⁵

The national housing charity, Shelter, welcomed the recommendations saying, if implemented, they "will drive lifesaving and life-changing improvements". However, they also argue that the report misses [a] wider context" within which social housing providers have constrained capacity to invest in existing stock and where social housing as a tenure "and by association its tenants", has been "residualised". Shelter also urges the government to amend its statutory homelessness guidance to reflect the

⁵³ Housing Ombudsman Service, [Housing Ombudsman statement in response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report](#), 4 September 2024

⁵⁴ NHF, [NHF response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report](#), 4 September 2024

⁵⁵ CIH, [Publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#), 4 September 2024

recommendation to develop contingency plans to secure temporary accommodation when people are made homeless in an emergency.⁵⁶

1.8 Further resources

Relevant Library briefings and other publications are highlighted on the webpage for the [General Debate on building safety and resilience](#) in September 2024, including:

- Library briefing on [Fire safety rules for blocks of flats since the Grenfell Tower fire \(England\)](#) (14 May 2024)
- Library briefing on [Fire safety in houses and flats](#) (2 May 2024)
- Library briefing on [Building regulations and safety](#) (8 July 2024)
- Library briefing on [Grenfell Tower Fire: Background](#) (20 January 2020)
- Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Hackitt review](#) (18 May 2018)
- Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government reports from the Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce:
 - [Initial report from the Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce](#), November 2017
 - [Second report from the Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce](#), March 2018
 - [Third report from the Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce](#), December 2018
 - [Fourth report from the Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce](#), July 2019
- Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, [Local authority support for Grenfell Tower survivors](#), June 2018 (transcripts of evidence sessions and correspondence from the government)

In August 2024, the BBC released a podcast on [Grenfell: Building a Disaster](#), containing 10 episodes of around 15 minutes each. It summarised the key evidence heard during the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and set out a narrative on the building safety regime before the fire and the events on the night of the

⁵⁶ Shelter, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry: government must invest in social homes to prevent further tragedy](#), 6 September 2024

fire. More detailed episodes on the public hearings are available at [The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast](#).

2

Press and media articles

Fire Protection Association press release

22 October 2024

[Key fire safety bodies hold Grenfell report roundtable](#)

Fire Protection Association press release

16 October 2024

[Inquiry Phase 2 Response – Assessing risk and competency](#)

Fire Protection Association press release

9 October 2024

[Inquiry Phase 2 Response – The future of fire testing](#)

Fire Protection Association press release

2 October 2024

[Inquiry Phase 2 Response – Compliance of construction products](#)

BBC News Online

4 October 2024

[LFB accepts Grenfell recommendations one month on](#)

Fire Protection Association press release

25 September 2024

[Inquiry Phase 2 Response – Time for change](#)

International Fire and Safety Journal

25 September 2024

[Fire industry responds to Grenfell Tower Phase 2 report](#)

Fire Protection Association press release

18 September 2024

[The Fire Protection Association responds to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report](#)

Inside Housing

17 September 2024

[Grenfell Tower Inquiry report: key recommendations for social housing providers](#)

RIBA Journal

10 September 2024

[The Grenfell Report: lessons for architects](#)

Fire Safety Matters

9 September 2024

[“Chain of failures” and “systematic dishonesty” realised Grenfell tragedy](#)

Fire Safety Matters

9 September 2024

[Industry responds to Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 final report](#)

Emergency Services Times

6 September 2024

[What the Grenfell report means for fire and rescue services](#)

Planning, Building and Construction Today

6 September 2024

[Construction industry reacts to the Phase 2 Grenfell Inquiry report](#)

Building Design

5 September 2024

['Every construction professional should read this': how the industry reacted to the Grenfell Inquiry report](#)

Housing Ombudsman Service press release

4 September 2024

[Housing Ombudsman statement in response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report](#)

London Fire Brigade press release

4 September 2024

[London Fire Brigade's Response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#)

London Councils press release

4 September 2024

[Statement on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report](#)

Inside Housing

4 September 2024

[Grenfell Inquiry report elects not to make specific recommendations for social housing providers](#)

Building

4 September 2024

[What the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 report said about consultants and contractors](#)

Inside Housing

4 September 2024

[Failed by 'incompetence, calculated dishonesty and greed': reaction to Grenfell Tower Inquiry report](#)

Construction News

4 September 2024

[Construction industry shake-up recommended by Grenfell Inquiry report](#)

Architects' Journal

3 September 2024

[Grenfell Tower Inquiry: how will final report cut through the web of blame?](#)

3 Parliamentary material

3.1 Statements and debates

Lords debate - [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report](#)

HL Deb 22 November 2024 | Vol 841 cc430-468

Commons debate - [Building Safety and Resilience](#)

HC Deb 11 September 2024 | Vol 753 cc852-930

Lords statement followed by questions - [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#)

HL Deb 9 September 2024 | Vol 839 cc1411-1425

Commons statement followed by questions - [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report](#)

HC Deb 4 September 2024 | Vol 753 cc311-332

Written statement - [Building Safety](#)

HC Deb 2 September 2024 | HCWS62

3.2 PQs

[High Rise Flats: Fire Prevention](#)

Asked by: Amesbury, Mike

To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, whether her Department is taking steps to accelerate Government-funded remediation schemes in the context of the major fire incident in Dagenham on 26 August 2024; and if she will make an

assessment of the potential merits of including non-cladding internal life-critical fire safety defects within the scope of Government-funded remediation schemes.

Answering member: Rushanara Ali | Department: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Speeding up the remediation of buildings is absolutely critical. Seven years on from Grenfell, action has been far too slow and the fire in Dagenham is a horrific reminder of the risk unsafe cladding still poses to far too many people. This Government will expect more from regulators to make sure action is being taken now to make homes safe, speed up remediation and ensure that buildings in the process of being remediated are managed safely for residents. Alongside taking action to increase the pace of remediation, we are also committed to better protect leaseholders from the costs of remediation. Following consideration of the phase 2 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, we will announce further measures to accelerate remediation and protect leaseholders.

HC Deb 09 September 2024 | PQ 3068

Topical Questions

Asked by: Joe Powell

On Wednesday, the phase 2 report of the Grenfell inquiry will be published, and I am sure that the whole House will join me in remembering the 72 residents who lost their lives in an entirely preventable tragedy over seven years ago. Four recommendations for central Government are still outstanding from the phase 1 report, including personalised emergency evacuation plans for disabled people. Will the Secretary of State update us on the progress in implementing the phase 1 recommendations in full?

Answered by: Angela Rayner | Department: Housing, Communities and Local Government

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: this week will be very difficult for the community around Grenfell, including the survivors and those who lost loved ones. He is also right to say that there are outstanding measures from phase 1. The Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Rushanara Ali), made a written ministerial statement today that will hopefully show where the Government intend to go, but there is a lot that needs to be done. On Wednesday, the whole House will have a moment of reflection, and we will think of those at Grenfell in the coming weeks.

HC Deb 02 September 2024 | Vol 753 c22

Topical Questions

Asked by: Joe Powell

In just over a month, phase 2 of the Grenfell inquiry will report. There will be implications for the entire Government, but what preparations have been made ahead of the report's publication? Will the Minister commit to engaging with the bereaved, survivors and the affected community before the Government respond in full to the recommendations?

Answered by: The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Ms Abena Opong-Asare) | Party: Labour | Department: Cabinet Office

I thank my hon. Friend for the question; I know that the issue is close to his heart, as it is to mine. The publication of the report will mark an important milestone for the Grenfell community, and Parliament will have the opportunity to provide the full and proper scrutiny that the issues deserve. As my hon. Friend said, it is important that bereaved families are also part of that process, and we will work closely with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to ensure that all those residents are part of it. The Government will do everything possible to drive the change to ensure that lessons are learned and that a tragedy such as the Grenfell Tower fire can never happen again.

HC Deb 25 July 2024 | Vol 752 c803

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