

**Debate Pack**

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# UK's relationship with Russia and China

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# 1 UK's relationship with Russia and China

A Backbench Business Committee debate on the UK's relationship with Russia and China is scheduled for Thursday 24 February 2022 in the House of Commons chamber.

## 1.1 UK-Russia relations

Apart from a period of relatively cordial relations in the 1990s in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, relations between the UK and Russia have been on a downward trajectory for the last few decades.

Some of the source of the tensions between Russia and the UK stem from differing interpretations of events following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

According to the [mainstream western narrative](#), throughout the 1990s and early 2000s “the West sought to integrate Russia progressively into the Euro-Atlantic community and pursued a vision of a strategic partnership”.

In Russia, however, the 1990s are [seen as a period of domestic turbulence and international humiliation](#) (pdf). From their perspective, the West took advantage of Russia's relative weakness by ignoring its legitimate interests in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans and by refusing to reorganise the Euro-Atlantic security architecture to include them.

The differing perspective over this period mirrors the West's relationship with Russia more broadly, which is often described as one characterised by misconception and misunderstanding of each other.

### Foreign policy frictions

Several international incidents have added to the severe distrust between the UK and Russia. The UK's role with its NATO allies in the 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia, and its later recognition of the Kosovan state, was [viewed by Vladimir Putin](#) as a “direct affront to Russian power in its traditional sphere of influence in the Balkans”.

The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, [Russia's 2015 intervention in the Syrian civil war](#), and principally Russia's [annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine](#) in 2014, have been some of the most consequential events that have added to that distrust.

The 2014 events in Ukraine led the EU, including the UK when it was a member, to impose [a significant package of sanctions](#) on Russia, along with the US and allied countries such as Australia and Japan.

## Attacks on Russian dissidents

Attacks on Russian dissidents, including several based in the UK or with UK connections have also contributed to UK-Russia tensions.

Alexandr Litvinenko, granted asylum in the UK, was killed in London in 2006 by radioactive polonium-210. In 2016 [a public inquiry concluded that the death was almost certainly caused by an operation of the Russian internal security service](#), the FSB, and that it was probably approved by Russian president Vladimir Putin. Russia refused UK requests to extradite two men identified by the police as their principal suspects, Russia says that to extradite Russian citizens would be unconstitutional.

The death in Russian custody of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer employed by the London-based Hermitage Capital, has also emerged as an issue in UK-Russian relations. Mr Magnitsky's death led the US to impose sanctions on the alleged perpetrators of his demise, but then broadened into a movement to apply sanctions to gross human rights abusers anywhere. The US, Canada, several European states including Lithuania and Estonia all implemented such laws, and the UK [created its own Magnitsky Sanctions legislation in 2018](#).

## Salisbury Incident

In March 2018, Russian former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia [were poisoned in Salisbury](#), and subsequently the UK authorities announced that the nerve agent Novichok had been used, leading them to conclude that Russia was responsible for the attack. In response the UK expelled 23 Russian diplomats, [saying it would degrade Russian intelligence capability](#). Many of the UK's allies followed suit, with a total of [143 Russian diplomats](#) being expelled. The UK also suspended all planned high-level contacts with Russia.

## Intelligence and Security Committee Russia report

In July 2020 Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee published a [report on Russia](#) (pdf). The report concluded that "It has been clear for some time that Russia under Putin has moved from potential partner to established threat, fundamentally unwilling to adhere to international law" and argued that the Government had underestimated the response required to the Russian threat.

The Government argued in [its response to the ISC](#):

The Government has long recognised there is an enduring and significant threat posed by Russia to the UK and its allies, including conventional military capabilities, disinformation, illicit finance, influence operations, and cyber-attacks. As such, Russia remains a top national security priority for the Government [...]

We have shown in recent years that the UK takes the threat from Russia extremely seriously and will respond to and call out Russian aggression wherever it occurs.

## Integrated Review

The UK Government's March 2021 [Integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy](#) (Integrated Review), stated that in the UK's "home region of the Euro-Atlantic" Russia "remains the most acute threat to our security".

The Integrated Review observed that "the soft power landscape is changing" and "those who challenge the values of open and democratic societies increasingly do so through culture: systemic competitors like Russia and China invest heavily in global cultural power projection and information operations".

The Integrated Review also stated that "The UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia", however, "until relations with its government improve, we will actively deter and defend against the full spectrum of threats emanating from Russia".

## Ukraine crisis and sanctions

The [Ukraine crisis](#) has brought tensions between the Russia and the UK and its Western allies to their highest since the end of the Cold War.

As part of deterrence measures, on 31 January 2022 [the Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Government would introduce legislation enabling](#) "an unprecedented package of coordinated sanctions", should Russia invade Ukraine.

The [current economic sanctions regime](#) is aimed "at encouraging Russia to cease actions destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine". As such, sanctions can only be imposed on companies and individuals with a direct involvement in the destabilisation of Ukraine.

[Under new measures](#), and in the event of any Russian invasion or incursion into Ukraine, the UK would be able to target the strategic interests of the Russian state more broadly, including Russian banks, the energy sector, and oligarchs who have close ties to the Kremlin. The [Foreign Secretary stated](#):

We will be able to target any company that is linked to the Russian state, engages in business of economic significance to the Russian state, or operates in a sector of strategic significance to the Russian state. Not only will we be able to target these entities, we will also be able to go after those who own or control them. This will be the toughest sanctions regime against Russia we have ever had, and it is the most radical departure in approach since leaving the European Union. Those in and around the Kremlin will have nowhere to hide.

The [secondary legislation implementing these measures](#) was laid before Parliament on 10 February and is being debated in the House of Commons on 22 February. As part of that debate, the Government announced its first set of sanctions against Russia, following the deployment of Russian “peacekeeping” troops into the breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic on 21 February.

### Prime Minister’s Munich Security Conference speech

The Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, gave [a speech at the Munich Security Conference on 19 February 2022](#). In his speech Mr Johnson stated that if Russia invades its neighbour:

[W]e will sanction Russian individuals and companies of strategic importance to the Russian state; and we will make it impossible for them to raise finance on the London capital markets; and we will open up the matryoshka dolls of Russian-owned companies and Russian-owned entities to find the ultimate beneficiaries within.

Mr Johnson said that every nation at this conference “shares a vision of a secure and prosperous Europe of sovereign states, deciding their own destiny and living without fear or threat”, he added “that vision of course extends to Russia, a nation whose cultural patrimony we revere, and whose sacrifice in the struggle against fascism was immeasurable”, and that Russia “has as much right as any other country to live in peace and security, and we should never cease to emphasise that Russia has nothing to fear from our vision, which threatens and marginalises no-one”.

## 1.2

## UK-China relations

### Deterioration of relations

Over the last few years, the [largely cordial relationship between the UK and China has deteriorated sharply](#).

In the previous two decades, regardless of the political make up of successive UK governments, the trend had been towards closer engagement and cooperation.

The high-point of UK-China relations was during the 2015-17 Conservative Government, when there was talk on both sides of a “[golden era](#)”.

However, growing controversy in the UK over the involvement of the Chinese multinational company Huawei in the UK’s 5G mobile phone network, along with mounting concern about the [erosion of the “one country, two systems” status quo in Hong Kong](#), has dramatically changed the atmosphere between the two countries. Other important factors have been [UK concern about Chinese secrecy over the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic](#) and [China’s human](#)

[rights clamp-down against the Muslim Uighur population in the Western province of Xinjiang.](#)

## Integrated Review

In the [Integrated Review](#), China was described as a “systemic competitor”.

The review said the UK will “do more to adapt to China’s growing impact on many aspects of our lives as it becomes a more powerful in the world”. And that the Government will invest in “China-facing capabilities” allowing the UK to better understand China and its people, and improving the UK’s ability to respond to the challenge it poses to “our security, prosperity and values – and those of our allies and partners”.

However, the review also emphasised the Government’s intention to continue pursuing a “positive trade and investment relationship” with China, while also ensuring that national security is protected. It also acknowledged that cooperation with China on transnational issues such as climate change is a necessity.

## AUKUS

In September 2021 the UK, Australia and the United States announced a [new security partnership called AUKUS](#). The agreement will see the three countries collaborate on new nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy and work together on areas such as cyber and artificial intelligence. The three countries said the agreement “will help sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” For the UK, it furthers the UK’s proposed tilt to the Indo-Pacific, articulated in the [Integrated Review](#).

The agreement came as a surprise, and there has been mixed reaction from the Indo-pacific region, with some countries, such as the Philippines, [believing it will help address the military imbalance against China](#). Others, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, [fear it could spark an arms race or heighten the risk of conflict](#).

Responding to concerns about China’s response, [Boris Johnson said](#) the partnership “is not intended to be adversarial towards any other power”.

China was not mentioned in the [Joint Statement](#) released by the leaders of the US, UK and Australia. However, commentators are united in believing that it was in part created to counter growing perceptions of a rising Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific region.

## 1.3

### Russia-China relations

Russia and China have strengthened their ties over the last several years. In [a joint statement published on 4 February 2022](#), the two countries pledged their support for one another and set out their shared foreign policy visions, declaring a “new era” in the global order.

The statement declared that “friendship between the two States has no limits,” and that “there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation”, but that their strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is “neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries”.

While the two countries have deepened ties, they [have their own interests and are not aligned on all matters of foreign policy](#). China has not condemned Russia's [recognition of independence for two breakaway regions](#) in the east of the country but has not endorsed it either. In January 2022, China's ambassador to Ukraine, [wrote an article](#) emphasising that China has always supported Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

## 2

## Press and media articles

The following is a selection of press and media articles relevant to this debate.

Please note: the Library is not responsible for either the views or accuracy of external content.

### [Ukraine crisis tests Xi Jinping's pivot to Vladimir Putin](#)

Financial Times (Subscription required)

Edward White et al

21 Feb 2022

### [Bond Between China and Russia Alarms U.S. and Europe Amid Ukraine Crisis](#)

New York Times

Edward Wong

20 Feb 2022

### [The growing bond between Moscow and Beijing](#)

The Spectator (Subscription required)

Michael Auslin

19 February 2022

### [Why a Russian Invasion of Ukraine Would Hurt China, Too](#)

Voice of America

John Xie

18 Feb 2022

### [Why China Will Not Support a Russian Invasion of Ukraine](#)

The Diplomat

Mu Chunshan

17 Feb 2022

### [How the West can defeat the Xi-Putin axis](#)

The Times (Subscription required)

James Forsyth

17 February 2022

### [Australian prime minister slams China for supporting Russia on Ukraine crisis](#)

AA (Anadolu Agency) News

Islamuddin Sajid

15 Feb 2022



[\*\*Biden rattles his sabre at Putin ... but it's Xi he really wants to scare\*\*](#)

The Guardian  
Simon Tisdall  
6 February 2022

[\*\*Russia, China condemn AUKUS, affirm 'no limits' to their partnership\*\*](#)

Sydney Morning Herald  
Andrew Osborn and Mark Trevelyan  
5 February 2022

[\*\*China joins Russia in opposing Nato expansion\*\*](#)

BBC News  
4 February 2022

[\*\*Xi-Putin summit: Russia inches closer to China as 'new cold war' looms\*\*](#)

The Guardian  
Vincent Ni and Andrew Roth  
3 February 2022

[\*\*Britain warns Putin and Xi: West will stand up to 'dictatorship'\*\*](#)

Reuters  
21 January 2022

[\*\*UK foreign secretary calls on allies to curb rise of Russia and China\*\*](#)

Financial Times (Subscription required)  
Nic Fildes  
21 January 2022

[\*\*China and Russia's tyranny can be stopped, but only if Global Britain trusts in the power of freedom\*\*](#)

i News  
Mark Wallace  
21 December 2021

[\*\*UK says Russia, China needed for 'moderating influence' over Taliban\*\*](#)

Reuters  
Kanishka Singh  
21 August 2021

[\*\*US and allies are pushing China and Russia closer together, but will their 'unbreakable friendship' last?\*\*](#)

CNN  
Nectar Gan and Ben Westcott  
17 June 2021

## 3

## Press releases

### [Russia's military build-up around Ukraine: G7 foreign ministers' statement, 19 February 2022](#)

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street

19 February 2022

G7 foreign ministers remain gravely concerned about Russia's threatening military build-up around Ukraine.

### [PM meeting with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy: 19 February 2022](#)

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street

19 February 2022

Prime Minister Boris Johnson met Ukrainian President Zelenskyy today in Munich.

### [PM speech at the Munich Security Conference: 19 February 2022](#)

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street

19 February 2022

Prime Minister Boris Johnson's speech at the Munich Security Conference 2022.

### [Foreign Secretary's keynote speech in Ukraine, 17 February 2022](#)

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

17 February 2022

Liz Truss spoke at Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kyiv on how nations can work together to make sure that Ukraine, and all of us, are safer in the years to come.

### [Foreign Secretary Liz Truss' speech to the Lowy Institute](#)

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

21 January 2022

Liz Truss spoke about how threats to freedom, democracy and the rule of law are global, and why nations like the UK and Australia have to respond together.

### [Foreign Secretary to back Baltic countries to challenge the threat posed by Russia, Belarus and China](#)

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

11 October 2021

The Foreign Secretary is to discuss Russia, Belarus and China at a meeting of the 3 Baltic countries today.

## 4

## PQs

### Defence: Finance

17 Feb 2022 | 120668

**Asked by: Andrew Rosindell**

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has made an assessment of the potential merits of increasing military expenditure following recent aggression from Russia and China.

**Answering member: James Heappey | Ministry of Defence**

The 2021 Integrated Review recognised the unprecedented challenges posed by geopolitical shifts, including intensifying competition between states, a widening range of security threats, and rapid technological change.

To that end, the Government is increasing defence spending by over £24 billion over the next four years: the biggest investment in the UK's Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. This increase takes the annual Defence budget to £47.9 billion in 2022-23, clearly exceeding the 2% of GDP NATO target.

This commitment reinforces the UK's position as the leading European NATO Ally and underlines our enduring commitment to the defence and security of Europe.

### China: Russia

16 Feb 2022 | 120676

**Asked by: Andrew Rosindell**

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether her Department has made an assessment of the implications for her policies of China's support for Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO; and if she will make a statement.

**Answering member: Amanda Milling | Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office**

In her meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 10 February the Foreign Secretary stated that every nation had the right to choose its own security arrangement. Improving one nation's security did not threaten another's. She rejected zero-sum arguments and raised her concerns at the recent joint Russia-China statement that directly referred to NATO enlargement. She stressed that progress is possible through meaningful negotiations if Russia de-escalates and pursues a diplomatic pathway.

### [China: Russia](#)

10 Feb 2022 | 119719

**Asked by: Catherine West**

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what assessment her Department has made of renewed Chinese-Russian partnerships on (a) stability in the Asia/Pacific and (b) British interests in the Asia/Pacific.

**Answering member: Amanda Milling | Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office**

We are monitoring China and Russia's activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including joint exercises. The UK is committed to deepening diplomatic, security and economic engagement across the Indo-Pacific in support of shared prosperity and regional stability. We are deepening and expanding our partnerships to promote free enterprise, freedom, democracy and good governance. We will continue to uphold the international rules and norms that underpin free trade, security and stability.

### [Engagements](#)

26 Jan 2022 | 707 cc1002-1075

**Asked by: Rob Butler**

Alongside the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine there are real fears of China invading Taiwan. On Sunday, Beijing staged the largest incursion into Taiwan's airspace since October. Does my right hon. Friend agree that military aggression and threat of occupation are never acceptable anywhere in the world, and will he confirm that under this Conservative Government the UK will always be at the forefront of standing up forcefully for freedom and democracy, security and stability?

**Answered by: Boris Johnson | Prime Minister**

I thank my hon. Friend. The Chinese military flights that have taken place near Taiwan in recent days are not conducive to peace and stability in the region. What we need is a peaceful and constructive dialogue by people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I know that that is what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and all colleagues are working for.

### [Ukraine: Russia](#)

25 Jan 2022 | 106659

**Asked by: Andrew Rosindell**

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has made an assessment of potential strategic coordination between China and Russia on the future and security of Ukraine.

**Answering member: James Heappey | Ministry of Defence**

We are watching the situation in Ukraine closely, alongside wider factors which may have a destabilising effect or play into Russia's decision-making calculus. Russia's aggressive posturing is not acceptable; we urge President Putin to withdraw his forces from the Ukrainian border and defuse this situation immediately.

**China and Russia: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference**

**14 Dec 2021 | 90328**

**Asked by: John Healey**

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he last spoke to his counterparts in Russia and China on the NPT Review Conference taking place in January 2022.

**Answering member: Jeremy Quin | Ministry of Defence**

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is the lead Government department for matters relating to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and preparations for the Review Conference including relevant discussions between States party to the Treaty.

Ministry of Defence officials regularly support FCDO engagement on this topic. They have regular engagement with their Russian and Chinese counterparts on the NPT through the P5 process; including during the recent P5 Process Paris Conference on 2-3 December.

**Extradition**

**26 Oct 2021 | 58353**

**Asked by: Ms Lyn Brown**

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps she is taking to prevent abuse of the Interpol red notices system for political reasons by states abusing the human rights of (a) Uyghur people, (b) political opponents of the Russian Government, (c) human rights activists in China and (d) journalists.

**Answering member: Damian Hinds | Home Office**

The Government strongly supports INTERPOL in its efforts to improve the safeguards it has in place to protect human rights and preclude interventions or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. The Government views any allegation of misuse of INTERPOL's systems very seriously and works closely with INTERPOL to ensure the legitimacy of the Red Notice system.

All Red Notices are subject to review by a multidisciplinary Notices and Diffusions Task Force in INTERPOL prior to publication to ensure legal compliance and prevent abuse of INTERPOL systems. In November 2019 the Home Office seconded a senior lawyer to INTERPOL to support the work of the Taskforce.

The UK is committed to the principle of non-refoulement and has repeatedly called on other countries to respect their obligations not to force persons to return to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

### **Telecommunications: China and Russia**

**15 Jul 2021 | HL1723**

#### **Asked by: Baroness Merron**

To ask Her Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of how many companies in the UK telecommunications sector are estimated to be majority owned by Russian or Chinese entities.

#### **Answering member: Baroness Barran | Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport**

The telecommunications sector includes tens of thousands of companies, including telecommunications providers, equipment providers and service providers in the supply chain. The Government does not monitor the nationality of the owners of each of these on a routine basis.

The UK economy thrives, in part, as a result of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the Government therefore strives to be the premier destination for investment in the world. However, an open approach to international investment must include appropriate safeguards to protect our national security and the safety of our citizens. The new National Security & Investment Act introduces a new regime for reviewing and intervening in business transactions, such as takeovers, that might raise national security concerns.

The Government has also recently introduced the Telecommunications (Security) Bill to establish an enhanced legislative framework for telecoms security, which includes new national security powers for the Secretary of State to manage the risks posed by high risk vendors.

## 5 Other Parliamentary material

### 5.1 Debates

#### [UK-Taiwan Friendship and Co-operation](#)

10 February 2022 | 708 cc1121-1152

#### [Autocrats, Kleptocrats and Populists](#)

3 February 2022 | 818 cc289-328GC

#### [Uyghur Tribunal Judgment](#)

20 January 2022 | 707 527-564

#### [Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement](#)

17 January 2022 | 817 cc157-186GC

#### [Russia's Grand Strategy](#)

6 January 2022 | 706 cc204-251

#### [Magnitsky Sanctions: Human Rights Abuses](#)

8 December 2021 | 705 162-178WH

#### [Ukrainian NATO Membership](#)

8 December 2021 | 705 cc101-121WH

#### [China: Genocide](#)

25 November 2021 | 816 cc1014-1053

#### [AUKUS: Impact on Anglo-Chinese Relations](#)

20 October 2021 | 701 cc301-323WH

#### [Ukraine](#)

17 May 2021 | 695 cc512-520

#### [Nord Stream 2 Pipeline](#)

10 March 2021 | 690 cc1386-978

### 5.2 Statements

#### [Ukraine Update](#)

10 February 2022 | HCWS608

**Ukraine Update**

10 February 2022 | HLWS594

**Russia: Sanctions**

1 February 2022 | 818 cc776-789

**Russia: Sanctions**

31 January 2022 | 708 cc55-69

**Ukraine**

26 January 2022 | 818 cc359-372

**Ukraine**

25 January 2022 | 707 cc861-879

**Ukraine**

18 January 2022 | 817 cc1608-1621

**Ukraine**

17 January 2022 | 707 cc59-74

**Russia**

10 January 2022 | 817 cc898-910

**Russia**

06 January 2022 | 706 cc169-184

**Salisbury Incident 2018: Update**

21 September 2021 | 701 cc161-173

**Foreign Interference: Intelligence and Security**

Statement on foreign interference in UK politics.

17 January 2022 | 707 cc23-37

**Hong Kong Six-monthly Report**

The latest Six-monthly Report on the implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was published today, and is attached. It covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2021. The report has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses. A copy is also available on the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office website (<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-development-office>).

14 December 2021 | HCWS474

**Cyberattack: Microsoft**

22 Jul 2021 | 814 cc358-362



### Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

06 July 2020 | 678 cc663-681

## 5.3 Urgent Questions

### Cyber-attack: Microsoft

Urgent question on the reported Chinese state-sponsored cyber-attack on Microsoft exchange servers.

20 July 2021 | 699 cc809-822

### Uyghur Tribunal: London

Urgent question on the treatment by the Chinese Government of witnesses giving evidence to the Uyghur Tribunal in London.

14 June 2021 | 697 cc24-33

## 5.4 Early Day Motions

### Register of Overseas Entities and russian influence in the UK

EDM 903 (session 2021-22)

Layla Moran

26 January 2022

That this House notes the warnings as detailed in successive reports, including the Foreign Affairs Committee's report *Moscow's Gold* and the Intelligence and Security Committee's *Russia Report*, of the interference of Kremlin-linked elites in the UK; expresses its concern at the ease with which individuals with links to the Kremlin have been able to launder money in the UK and in London in particular; notes with concern new research released by Transparency International which covered £1.5 billion of UK property bought with suspicious Russian wealth; welcomes the UK Government's decision, in principle, to take action on this; expresses its frustration that, six years on from an initial announcement to establish a register of overseas entities and their beneficiaries by bringing forward a register of overseas entities, no such scheme has been introduced; calls on the Government to formally support the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, the Second Reading of which is due on 18 March 2022 and has cross-party support; further calls on the Government to implement all the recommendations of the *Russia Report*; and urges the Government to make democracy a national security priority.

**US-UK-Australia military pact**

**EDM 493 (session 2021-22)**

**Richard Burgon**

**18 October 2021**

That this House notes with concern the Prime Minister's announcement on 14 September 2021 of the AUKUS military pact; further notes that this is likely to escalate tension in the Far East and that military manoeuvres and sanctions in the Indo-Pacific region have already led to concerns about the threat of a new cold war with China; notes that this pact will enable Australia to develop, in collaboration with the UK and the US, a new capability of nuclear-powered submarines which will include the supply of weapons grade enriched uranium; notes that this is a dangerous move which contradicts the Prime Minister's statement that this will promote stability in the Indo-Pacific region; notes that supplying weapons grade uranium to a non-nuclear weapons state to power military submarines is in breach of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which stipulates that exchange of nuclear technology must be for peaceful purposes; regrets that this is a breach of international law by this government; further regrets that this agreement is likely to increase rather than diminish the threat of war and nuclear proliferation in the region; and urges the Prime Minister to reconsider this agreement, to take appropriate steps to bring UK actions in line with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to promote stability in the Indo-Pacific region through diplomatic rather than military means.

## 6

## Further reading

[Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development](#)

The Kremlin, 4 February 2022

Natasha Kuhrt and Marcin Kaczmarek, [Russia and China's growing 'friendship' is more a public relations exercise than a new world order](#),

Kings College London, 8 Feb 2022

Gideon Rachman, [New world order: Russia and China's plans take shape](#),

Australian Financial Review, 24 Jan 2022

[Government response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2021–22: In the room: the UK's role in multilateral diplomacy](#), Second Special Report

of Session 2021–22, Foreign Affairs Committee, HC 618, 10 September 2021

[In the room: the UK's role in multilateral diplomacy](#), First Report of Session

2021–22, Foreign Affairs Committee, HC 199, 17 June 2021

[Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain: Government Response to the](#)

[Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2019–21](#), Fifth Special Report of Session

2019–21, Defence Committee, HC 1380, 27 April 2021

[Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain](#), Fourth Report of Session

2019–21, Defence Committee, HC 699, 14 February 2021

[Russia](#), Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, HC 632, 21 July 2020

Keir Giles, [Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic](#),

Chatham House, 9 Apr 2020

[Moscow's Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK](#), Eighth Report of Session

2017–19, Foreign Affairs Committee, HC 932, 15 May 2018

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