



DEBATE PACK

Number CDP-0211 (2019), 5 September 2019

Spending on sanctions policy and implementation

Westminster Hall

Tuesday 10 September 2019

9:30-11:00am

Debate initiated by Tom Tugendhat MP

The proceedings of this debate can be viewed on [Parliament.tv](https://www.parliament.tv)

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1. Background

With the UK's departure from the European Union ever closer, attention has focused on the UK's sanctions policy outside the EU, among other things.

As a member of the EU, the UK derived almost all of its sanctions policy from the EU, implementing sanctions decided at the EU level and using powers in the [European Communities Act 1972](#), including for the many UN-derived sanctions regimes. With the repeal of that act, the legal basis for an independent UK sanctions policy was created by the [Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018](#).

What the UK will do with those powers has been the subject of debate, and an investigation by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. The Committee [started taking evidence](#) in January 2019 and on 12 June published its report: [Fragmented and incoherent: the UK's sanctions policy](#). The Committee concluded that: "... the Government does not have a clear strategy for sanctions. Little high-level thought appears to have been given to UK priorities for post-Brexit sanctions."

There is also the question of whether the UK's official bodies that design and implement sanctions have the capacity to develop and carry out the sanctions strategy. These bodies are principally the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Treasury, particularly the [Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation](#) (OFSI).

The debate on UK sanctions policy and implementation takes place against a fast-changing background. Given that sanctions are largely multilateral, [how independent will the UK sanctions regime really be?](#) The legislative framework looks a lot like the US system but the UK's interests may remain closer to those of neighbours in the EU than those of the US.

UK courts likely to be crucial in shaping policy; it is possible that there will be a big increase in litigation under the new system.

Sanctions, particularly 'targeted sanctions' seem to be ever-more popular; disputes over Iran and North Korea's nuclear programmes bring sanctions to the headlines very regularly.

[Whether either broad sanctions or targeted sanctions achieve their objectives](#) is unclear. Analysts used to be united in agreeing that they generally don't. But recently, a more complex approach to assessing their effectiveness, together with the more complex design of the measures, has led some to change that view and argue that they can be effective.

A new approach is to argue that sanctions have other goals than simply to impose pain on the target country and force that country to choose a different policy. Sanctions can also unite allies and send signals to third parties, for example. And they are also useful because they allow politicians to do something, short of military action.

2. Press Articles

The following is a selection of news and media articles relevant to this debate.

Please note: the Library is not responsible for either the views or the accuracy of external content.

[Sanctions policy under Jeremy Hunt unclear and incoherent, say MPs](#)

Guardian
Patrick Wintour
12 June 2019

[Brexit Could Bring Changes to U.K. Sanctions Policy](#)

Wall Street Journal
Nina Trentmann
14 March 2019

3. PQs

[Sanctions](#)

31 Jul 2019 | 280343

Asked by: Chuka Umunna

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what parts of the Government's plan for sanctions policy in the event of a no deal Brexit have been implemented.

Answering member: Christopher Pincher | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Government is ready to implement sanctions if we leave the EU in a no deal scenario. It has laid Statutory Instruments (SIs) for 18 priority geographic and thematic sanctions regimes under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018). Retained EU law will maintain the remainder as the Government continues to lay SIs; all sanctions regimes will be under domestic legislation by the end of the year. We have also reviewed and strengthened all our individual designation evidence and prepared processes for the efficient and robust operation of our sanctions. As international law requires, the United Kingdom will implement UN sanctions regimes in domestic law after withdrawal from the EU, using the powers in the Act.

[Ukraine: Sanctions](#)

17 Jul 2019 | 276521

Asked by: Paul Farrelly

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment he has made of the implications for his Department's policies of the decision of the European Court of Justice to annul sanctions on members of Ukraine's Yanukovich regime; and whether the Government remains committed to recovering those assets in the UK.

Answering member: Sir Alan Duncan | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

EU sanctions against members of Ukraine's Yanukovich regime were originally imposed on 5 March 2014 and were renewed on a yearly basis. The decision by the European Court of Justice annuls sanctions decisions made in March 2017 and March 2018. However, the EU decided on 4 March to extend asset freezes against the individuals in question until 6 March 2020. The UK continues to freeze the assets of listed individuals under this regime.

[Money Laundering: EU Action](#)

08 Jul 2019 | 270754

Asked by: Stephen Gethins

To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment he has made of the potential merits of UK compliance with (a) current and (b) future EU anti-money laundering policies after the UK leaves the EU.

Answering member: John Glen | Department: Treasury

The UK is a founding member and strong support of the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF), which sets global anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) standards. These standards are generally incorporated into UK law through the transposition of EU directives.

The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive was transposed into UK law by the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. This directive updated EU anti-money laundering policy to reflect the 2012 update to the FATF standards.

The Fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (5MLD) was finalised in 2018 to further strengthen transparency and counter-terrorist legislation. The UK played a significant role in the negotiation of 5MLD and shares the objectives which it seeks to achieve on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. HM Treasury is currently running a consultation process inviting views and evidence on the steps the government proposes to take to meet the UK's expected obligation to implement 5MLD by January 2020, and expects to publish an impact assessment in due course.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act gives the UK the powers to update its future anti-money laundering regime post EU-exit. As a leading member of the FATF, the UK will continue updating anti-money laundering policies according to international standards, ensuring the UK's AML/CTF regime is kept up to date, effective and proportionate.

The Political Declaration that has been agreed with the EU contains a statement of mutual intent that the future relationship should cover money laundering and terrorist-financing.

Sanctions

04 Jul 2019 | HL16631

Asked by: Viscount Waverley

To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon on 20 June, whether they can provide examples of the evidence on which they based their answer; and what assessment they have made of whether leaders of countries targeted by UK sanctions care about the effects of such sanctions on citizens of those countries.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sanctions are designed to effect a change in behaviour through coercing or constraining an individual or entity, or sending a clear political signal of international discontent at particular behaviour. Linking behaviour change to sanctions explicitly is challenging as it is difficult to judge the extent of the influence of sanctions alone as they are always deployed as part of a broader strategy, accompanied by other policy tools. The majority of sanctions implemented by the UK are EU and UN sanctions. It is difficult to assess the personal opinions of the

political leadership of countries which have been sanctioned; however, sanctions are carefully targeted and not intended to be punitive in nature.

[Russia: Natural Gas](#)

03 Jul 2019 | 270793

Asked by: Stewart Malcom McDonald

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, if he will make it Government policy to impose sanctions on Nord Stream 2 in accordance with the recommendations of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee.

Answering member: Chris Skidmore | Department: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

This Government has significant concerns about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and we continue to raise this important issue in discussions with key partners. We judge that it is not necessary to meet future European demand for gas and could harm European energy security and the interests of Ukraine. This is one of the reasons why we supported amendments to the EU Gas Directive that will require the pipeline to be fully compliant with EU rules. While we are an EU member state, the UK will continue to be bound by EU sanctions, which do not currently encompass Nord Stream 2.

[Libya: Freezing of Assets](#)

03 Jul 2019 | 269000

Asked by: Lady Hermon

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when his Department first became aware that HM Treasury had received tax receipts derived from the interest on frozen Libyan assets held in UK banks; and if he will make a statement.

Answering member: Dr Andrew Murrison | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

It is the Government's long-standing policy that designated persons are not exempt from tax as a consequence of having their assets frozen. The Government's response of 24 June to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee report (into Government support for UK victims of IRA attacks that used Qadhafi-supplied Semtex and weapons) set out the releasable information the Government has about tax receipts derived from the interest on frozen Libyan assets held in UK banks. The Government's response says:

"As stated in the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation's letter to the Committee of 23 April 2019, OFSI's responsibilities do not include tracking tax liabilities on frozen assets. HMRC, as the department responsible for safeguarding the flow of money to the Exchequer is responsible for any records of tax liability. HMRC has reconsidered how we can help the Committee within the legal constraints governing our ability to share information. We have concluded that we can use aggregated information to answer the Committee's questions, provided

that information cannot be tied back to individual persons or companies as a result. HMRC receives payments of tax from a small proportion of the entities designated under the Libyan regime. Around £17 million has been received in total since the start of the 2016-17 tax year. HMRC currently receives around £5 million each year. "

[Sudan: Sanctions](#)

25 Jun 2019 | 265436

Asked by: Ivan Lewis

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what the Government's policy is on targeted sanctions against members of the Transitional Military Council in Sudan.

Answering member: Harriett Baldwin | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

We will continue to work with Troika (UK, US and Norway), EU, UN and regional allies to agree on the most effective course of action, including a range of measures, which could include sanctions. The UK's commitment and respect for human rights and accountability, including through the UN Security Council, is steadfast.

[Sanctions](#)

20 Jun 2019 | HL16232

Asked by: Viscount Waverley

To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the successes which can be attributed to their sanctions policies.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The UK plays a leading role in the development and implementation of sanctions in the EU and the UN. Sanctions are always used as part of a broader political strategy and are designed to change, coerce or send a political signal regarding particular behaviour(s). Whilst linking behaviour change explicitly to sanctions can be challenging, we have some evidence to suggest that sanctions on individuals can lead to their removal from positions of power and reduce their ability to carry out harmful actions. Collective sanctions through the UN or EU, for example the sanctions against the GRU officers who carried out the attack in Salisbury last year, also send a strong political signal that the EU condemns their behaviour.

[Sudan](#)

06 Jun 2019 | 798 c179

Asked by: Lord Chidgey

My Lords, civilians are being killed close to military headquarters by soldiers in uniform. Journalists are being expelled on the orders of men in uniform. Supplies are being looted by men in uniform. I think we are getting the message that the military leaders look more and more like the regime they claim to have overthrown. Yesterday, the Transitional

Military Council arrested opposition leader Yasir Arman and are holding him in an unknown location. Surely action is now vital through the African Union suspending Sudan, while condemning the massacre; through convening an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to force Russia and China's hand; by beginning a process to prevent the TMC from representing Sudan in the General Assembly; and through insisting on the immediate release of Yasir Arman. Does the Minister agree that, without these actions, words of remorse, regret or disapproval are merely feckless and expedient measures?

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Party: Conservative Party

I agree with the noble Lord, and assure him that with the United Nations—in terms of the Security Council in New York and the Human Rights Council in Geneva—the United Kingdom as a penholder is taking these responsibilities very seriously. I am in discussions with our ambassadors in both places to see what next steps we can take. On the Security Council, we are co-penholders with Germany and will continue our discussions. The troika is focused on these issues, and, as I said in an earlier answer, we are impressing on the Sudanese authorities—including the ambassador in the United Kingdom—that all options are on the table, including looking at the current sanctions policy. Those who are culpable will be held to account.

Hamas: Freezing of Assets
25 Apr 2019 | 245559

Asked by: Joan Ryan

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether the political and military wings of Hamas, including the Izz-Al-Din Al-Qassem Brigades, will remain on HM Treasury's Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK in the event of the UK leaving the EU (a) with and (b) without a withdrawal agreement; and if he will make a statement.

Answering member: Mark Field | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

As the Prime Minister has set out, the UK will look to carry over all EU sanctions at the time of our departure from the EU. During an implementation period, EU sanctions will continue to apply in the UK. Under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, individual listings will need to meet the threshold of evidence and justification that our legislation requires. In a no-deal scenario, the full list of those subject to UK sanctions will be published on the UK sanctions list on exit-day. The UK proscribes Hamas' military wing as a terrorist organisation and retains a policy of no contact with Hamas, in its entirety.

Brunei: Human Rights

23 Apr 2019 | 243510

Asked by: Anna Turley

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will make it his policy to prevent any Minister or official of HM Government from (a) using accommodation, (b) attending any event at a Dorchester Collection hotel until (i) the Dorchester Collection is no longer under ownership of the Brunei Investment Agency or (b) he is satisfied that Brunei has a legal system that protects universal human rights.

Answering member: Mark Field | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

As I stated in the Westminster Hall debate on Brunei on 10 April, the British Government does not support calls for an economic boycott. This includes the Brunei Investment Agency-owned businesses, including the Dorchester Hotel in London. We believe that open and honest discussions best support our efforts to encourage Brunei to uphold its international human rights obligations, and to respect individual freedoms.

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

15 Apr 2019 | 242680

Asked by: Steve McCabe

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what discussions he has had with his counterpart in the US Administration on that Administration's to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (RGC) as a foreign terrorist organisation; and whether the Government has plans to proscribe the the RGC as a terrorist organisation.

Answering member: Mark Field | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

We regularly engage with the US on Iran policy at a variety of levels, including through a visit to Washington by Our Ambassador to Iran last month.

We do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a whole and a number of associated individuals and entities remain subject to EU sanctions. We have long expressed our deep concerns about the IRGC's destabilising activity both within and outside Iran, including its illicit economic activity and its role in Iran's ballistic missile development and support to non-state groups around the region.

[Russia: Sanctions](#)

28 Mar 2019 | HL14624

Asked by: Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU, in response to the 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea, on relations between Russia and the UK.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sanctions imposed alongside our international partners, including the US, in 2014 have had a coordinated impact on Russia by increasing economic pressure to change its Ukraine policy and sending a clear, united message that Russian aggression in Ukraine will not be tolerated. This impact has been strengthened by the continuation and maintenance of 2014 sanctions since their implementation. The current bilateral relationship is not the one the UK wants and we remain open to a different relationship with Russia - one where Russia desists from attacks that undermine international security and actions that undermine the territorial integrity of its neighbours.

[Korean Peninsula](#)

25 Mar 2019 | 657 c15

Asked by: Mike Gapes

Will the Government make it clear that North Korea cannot play games, as it has done for more than 20 years, just wanting to get sanctions lifted or get economic support from outside and then reverting back to its old policies, and that there will be consequences internationally if it does that?

Answered by: Gavin Williamson | Department: Defence

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and I remember visiting South Korea with him back in, I think, 2010 or 2011 where we looked at this. It is vital that Britain stands shoulder to shoulder with our UN friends in terms of the imposition and enforcement of sanctions, which the Royal Navy has been leading on with our other UN partners.

[Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Public Consultation](#)

15 Mar 2019 | 229749

Asked by: Dowd, Peter | Party: Labour Party

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, how many consultations by his Department (a) are open, (b) are closed awaiting a Government response and (c) have been initiated since 2016.

Answering member: Sir Alan Duncan | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

All public government consultations are uploaded onto GOV.UK where they can be filtered by department, status and date. The Foreign Office has published four documents since 2016. For all of these the consultation processes have been concluded. These were: (a) Public

consultation on the United Kingdom's future legal framework for imposing and implementing sanctions (2 August 2017) (published jointly with HMT and DIT); (b) Consultation on the UK's Foreign Travel Advice service (25 April 2017); (c) Defence and security innovation: proposed accelerator (11 August 2016) (published jointly with DfT, Home Office, MOD, Dstl, CDE and BEIS); and (d) BIOT Resettlement Policy Review consultation (21 January 2016). There are no consultations pending.

[Sanctions](#)

20 Feb 2019 | 220750

Asked by: Ben Bradshaw

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment his Department has made of the extent of potential UK influence on EU sanctions policy after the UK has left the EU.

Answering member: Sir Alan Duncan | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UK and EU partners will continue to face the same threats, for which sanctions will remain a valuable and effective tool. The UK is a global leader on sanctions and has always played a leading role in the proposal, design and negotiation of EU sanctions. The Political Declaration, setting out the long-term vision for our partnership, envisages continued close UK-EU consultation and cooperation on the development of sanctions where appropriate, while enabling both to pursue independent sanctions policies. During and after the Implementation Period, we will maintain close cooperation and work closely with the EU and EU Member States, in order to ensure that sanctions are designed and implemented effectively. Under the planned Exit arrangements, the UK will be able to impose sanctions using the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

[Business of the House](#)

24 Jan 2019 | 653 cc353-5

Asked by: Valerie Vaz

Will the Leader of the House clarify policy, because the Government have been saying different things? Parliament passed the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 with an amendment on public registers. The Act said that such registers would be introduced by 2020 if the overseas territories had not done so voluntarily, and yet a Minister has said that the Government will have

“a requirement for an operational public register by 2023”.

That is three years later than the House agreed and five years after Parliament voted to take action on the issue. Will she clarify that?

Answered by: Andrea Leadsom | Department: Leader of the House of Commons

The hon. Lady asked about the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. I should be grateful if she would write to me about that, so

that I can respond to her directly. She also asked about Bank of England lending limits. I suggest that she should raise that issue during Treasury questions on 29 January.

[Iran: Terrorism](#)

14 Dec 2018 | 199825

Asked by: Emily Thornberry

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what the Government's policy is on whether the preconditions for implementing an EU special purpose vehicle enabling European companies to trade with Iran while avoiding US sanctions should include a requirement for Iran's accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Answering member: Alistair Burt | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The European Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is being designed in full compliance with European Union and relevant national regulatory standards in anti-money-laundering and terrorism-finance. We continue to work with Iran to support their efforts to pass all legislation required as part of their Financial Action Task Force Action Plan.

[Eritrea: Sanctions](#)

21 Nov 2018 | 191343

Asked by: Emily Thornberry

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what his policy is on proposals to lift the UN arms embargo and other sanctions on the Government of Eritrea.

Answering member: Harriett Baldwin | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The United Kingdom welcomes the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2444 on 14 November, which lifted all UN sanctions relating to Eritrea.

[Iran: Sanctions](#)

18 Oct 2018 | HL10466

Asked by: Lord Campbell of Pittenweem | Party: Liberal Democrats

To ask Her Majesty's Government on how many occasions since the President of the United States announced his intention to impose sanctions on UK companies doing business in Iran the matter has been raised at face to face meetings with officials including the United States Ambassador in London.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UK ministers and officials have consistently and repeatedly raised with the US this Government's support for UK companies to continue to trade with Iran. This supports our policy of maintaining the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is important for our national security, and a central part of our Iran policy. British Embassy officials in Washington and officials in London have had weekly discussions with the US on this issue, and a delegation of senior officials visited Washington in September for discussions on Iran.

[Iran: Sanctions](#)

18 Oct 2018 | HL10465

Asked by: Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

To ask Her Majesty's Government what oral and written representations (1) the Foreign Secretary, and (2) the Defence Secretary, have made to their opposite numbers in the government of the United States in relation to the intention of the President of the United States to impose sanctions on UK companies doing business in Iran.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Ministers and officials across Government have consistently raised with the US this Government's support for UK companies to continue to trade with Iran, including through regular engagement by the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor. This supports our policy of maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is important for our national security, and a central part of our Iran policy. The Defence Secretary regularly discusses Iran with his US counterpart, and the Foreign Secretary raised US sanctions with Secretary Pompeo at the UN General Assembly and in a phone call on 11 September.

[Iran: Sanctions](#)

18 Oct 2018 | HL10464

Asked by: Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

To ask Her Majesty's Government what recent oral and written representations the Prime Minister has made to the President of the United States in relation to his intention to impose sanctions on UK companies doing business in Iran.

Answering member: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Ministers and officials across Government have consistently raised with the US this Government's support for UK companies to continue to trade with Iran. This supports our policy of maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is important for our national security, and a central part of our Iran policy. The Prime Minister and President Trump most recently discussed Iran policy when they met at the UN General Assembly in September.

EU Action: Sanctions

11 Oct 2018 | 175887

Asked by: Sir Vince Cable

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment he has made of the merits of coordinating UK sanctions policy with the EU after the UK leaves the EU.

Answering member: Sir Alan Duncan | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sanctions are a key foreign policy tool which are most effective when designed and applied alongside international partners to achieve shared foreign policy objectives. To that end, the UK will continue to maintain close cooperation with our international partners on sanctions policy. The Prime Minister set out in her speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, that the UK will look to carry over existing EU sanctions when we leave the EU. In future, it will be in the UK's and the EU's mutual interest to discuss sanctions policy and decide where and how to combine efforts to the greatest effect.

USA: Sanctions

11 Oct 2018 | 175885

Asked by: Sir Vince Cable

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment the Government has made of the merits of coordinating UK sanctions against individuals with the US.

Answering member: Sir Alan Duncan | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sanctions are a key foreign policy tool, which are most effective when designed and applied alongside international partners to achieve shared foreign policy objectives. To that end, the UK will continue to maintain close cooperation with our international partners, including the US, on sanctions policy.

Leaving the EU: Foreign Policy Co-operation

04 Sep 2018 | 646 c8

Asked by: Greg Hands

One of my right hon. Friend's first visits was to see his German opposite number, Heiko Maas, in Berlin. Could he tell us a little bit about the discussions he had with him about Russia, and specifically about sanctions? Given that 40% of the western traded affected by those sanctions is with Germany, it is important that Germany remain resolute in pursuing economic sanctions against Russia.

Answered by: Jeremy Hunt | Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I heard many compliments when I went to Germany about my right hon. Friend's diplomacy with and links to Germany, and we had very good discussions with Heiko Maas on the issue of sanctions. That is going to become more important in the months ahead, because the

United States has said it will introduce sanctions as a result of the Salisbury attacks and is very clear that it would not be appropriate for Europe not to respond in kind, given that the attack happened on European soil. That is an area where we hope to make common cause with Germany.

4. Early Day Motions

Scrutiny of Russian Companies in the UK

EDM 1578 (session 2017– 19)

04 September 2018

Tom Brake

That this House urges the Government to enhance the scrutiny of companies linked to the Russian state operating in the UK; notes the controversy over the EN+ Group's decision to develop a UK presence following the decision of the US Administration to impose sanctions upon the company in response to the malign activities of the Russian Federation; further notes that shares in EN+ Group had been listed on the London Stock Exchange since 2017, despite well-publicised concerns over the company's corporate governance and ownership; notes that shares in the Russian-government-controlled energy company Rosneft remain listed on the Exchange; expresses concern that Rosneft is recognised internationally as a tool of Russian foreign policy, and appears on both the EU and US sanctions lists; notes that in 2014 an arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague found that the vast majority of Rosneft's assets were unlawfully obtained as a result of the politically-motivated expropriation of Yukos Oil Company by the Russian state; and further urges the Government to review the admission standards upheld by the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Conduct Authority.

5. Further reading

Government guidance

[Sanctions policy if there's no Brexit deal](#)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (updated 1 February 2019)

Deposited paper

Deposited Paper DEP2018-0993 (11 October 2018):

- [Letter dated 11/10/2018 from Alan Duncan MP to Angus Brendan MacNeil MP and others setting out information for a 'no deal' scenario](#)
- [Technical notice: Sanctions policy if there's no Brexit deal](#)

Committee inquiries

[Global Britain: The future of UK sanctions policy inquiry](#)

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

This inquiry looks into the future of UK sanctions and explores and evaluates different options for the UK's approach to sanctions policy after leaving the EU.

Committee reports

[Fragmented and incoherent: the UK's sanctions policy](#)

Seventeenth Report of Session 2017-19
Foreign Affairs Committee
HC 1703,
12 June 2019

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation

[Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation](#)

HM Treasury homepage

[Guidance: Who is subject to financial sanctions in the UK?](#)

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury, updated 15 August 2019
- A guide to the current consolidated list of asset freeze targets, and a list of persons subject to restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in the Ukraine.

[Guidance: Financial Sanctions](#)

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury, 02 March 2018

[Financial Sanctions in the UK, A quick guide to help you understand and comply with financial sanctions](#)

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), HM Treasury
[accessed 5 September 2019]

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) Blog

[International engagement](#)

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) Blog, 13 August 2019

[OFSI releases annual review](#)

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) Blog, 05 October 2018

- How many financial sanctions regimes does the UK implement? How much money do UK institutions hold in frozen funds? You can find out in OFSI's first annual review, released today.

Material from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

[UK Needs to Be Clearer on Sanctions: RUSI Reacts to Foreign Affairs Committee Report on UK Sanctions Policy](#)

12 June 2019

[RUSI Launches High-Level Task Force Examining UK Sanctions Policy after Brexit](#)

30 May 2019

[Launch Event: Task Force on the Future of UK Sanctions Policy](#)

28 May 2019

[RUSI at House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee](#)

25 January 2019

Websites

[Royal United Services Institute \(RUSI\) – sanctions homepage](#)

[You Tube footage: Task Force on the Future of UK Sanctions Policy, Royal United Services Institute \(RUSI\)](#)

30 May 2019

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