

Research Briefing

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Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill 2023-24

1

Overview of the bill

The Government plans to send some people who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK to Rwanda, saying that it is safe for refugees. The Supreme Court has held that Rwanda is not safe for refugees because they might be sent away to face persecution, and so the plan is unlawful.

The Government has signed a new treaty with Rwanda containing additional safeguards for people relocated. Parliament is now being asked to consider legislation declaring that Rwanda must be treated as safe, in order to render the relocation plan lawful in UK domestic law.

The [Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill 2023-24](#) was published in draft on 6 December 2023 and introduced on 7 December. Second reading is scheduled for Tuesday 12 December.

1.1

Background to the bill

The Rwanda asylum partnership

In April 2022, the UK and Rwanda announced a Migration and Economic Development Partnership. It includes an ‘asylum partnership arrangement’ under which the UK can ask Rwanda to assume responsibility for some people

who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK. Those relocated to Rwanda may be granted asylum there but cannot apply for return to the UK.

Nobody has yet been relocated to Rwanda. That is because of legal challenges. In June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued a controversial injunction (‘interim measure’) that halted the first attempted removals until proceedings had finished in the UK courts.

On 15 November 2023, the UK Supreme Court found that the Rwanda arrangements were unlawful. In a unanimous decision, the court held that (in essence) Rwanda was not a safe country because of the risk that it would not decide asylum claims properly and send refugees back to places where they would be persecuted.¹

The Government decided to continue with the asylum partnership, upgrading it to a legally binding treaty laid before Parliament on 6 December 2023.² Among other things, the treaty commits Rwanda not to remove anyone relocated there to another country (unless it is back to the UK).

The Illegal Migration Act

The immediate legislative predecessor to this bill is the [Illegal Migration Act 2023](#). It received Royal Assent on 20 July 2023.

The 2023 Act aims to make it easier to remove people arriving by unauthorised or deceptive means, even if they have claimed asylum in the UK. For most nationalities, the Act envisages asylum seekers being removed to a ‘third country’ such as Rwanda, and bars them from being removed to their home country (as the risk of persecution on return would not be assessed). As a result, the core of the 2023 Act depends on the availability of Rwanda or another third country to send asylum seekers to, and so the Government has not yet brought it into force.³

As with the current bill, the 2023 Act attempts to disable legal challenges to removal. Relevant provisions include:

- A legal duty to remove people even if they have applied for a judicial review of the decision to remove them⁴
- Limited provision for challenges that would suspend the person’s removal while ongoing, only if the argument is that the person does not

¹ *R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2023] UKSC 42, 15 November 2023, para 85

² [Written statement HCWS101, 6 December 2023](#)

³ [HC Deb 5 July 2023 c1298](#); “UK government’s contested illegal immigration plan to become law”, Reuters, 18 July 2023

⁴ [Illegal Migration Act, s5\(1\)\(d\)](#)

meet the removal conditions or faces a real risk of serious and irreversible harm⁵

The 2023 Act also identifies Rwanda as a suitable third country for people to be removed to.⁶

None of the provisions mentioned were in force at time of writing.

1.2 Documents accompanying the bill

The Home Office has published explanatory notes and a memorandum addressing the bill's compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights (the 'ECHR', see below).⁷

1.3 Statement of ECHR compatibility

Section 19 of the [Human Rights Act 1998](#) (the 'HRA') requires the minister in charge of a bill to make a statement before second reading to say the bill is compatible with the Convention rights⁸ (section 19(1)(a)), or that they are unable to make such a statement, but the Government wishes Parliament to proceed with the bill nonetheless (section 19(1)(b)).

The Home Secretary has made a section 19(1)(b) statement, indicating that he is not satisfied that the bill would withstand a legal challenge based on compatibility with the ECHR.⁹

A section 19(1)(b) statement was also made with respect to the 2023 Act. The issuing of two such statements within months signifies a change in approach to legislating compatibly with the Convention. Prior to 2023, section 19(1)(b) statements had been issued on five occasions in the preceding 24 years since section 19 of the HRA came into force. Each of these concerned legislation which would have continued or expanded an existing policy, the compatibility of which was unclear, or where amendments were added during the passage of the bill which raised doubts as to compatibility. Previous section 19(1)(b)

⁵ [Illegal Migration Act, ss39-56](#)

⁶ [Illegal Migration Act, s6 and sch 1](#)

⁷ Home Office, [Explanatory notes to the Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill \(PDF\)](#), 7 December 2022; [Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill European Convention on Human Rights memorandum \(PDF\)](#), 6 December 2023

⁸ The Convention rights are the ECHR rights included in Schedule 1 to the HRA

⁹ Dominic Raab described the test of whether to issue a s19(a) statement (indicating that the minister believes that a bill is compatible with the ECHR) as whether it is more likely that not that the Bill would withstand legal challenge on convention grounds: ["effectively a 51% test"](#) (PDF) [Oral evidence to the JCHR](#), 14 December 2022, Q34

statements have generally identified the provision giving rise to the potential incompatibility.¹⁰

Nonetheless, during his statement announcing the publication of the bill, the Home Secretary said “We have no intention of leaving the ECHR” in response to a question on the impact of withdrawal.¹¹

Further, the Government’s ECHR memorandum accompanying the Bill argues that whilst it engages Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment), 8 (privacy), and 13 (right to an effective remedy), it is capable of being applied compatibly with the Convention.¹²

2 Clauses of the bill

The long title is “A bill to make provision about the removal of certain migrants to the Republic of Rwanda”.

2.1 Clause 1: Introduction

Clause 1(1) would state that the purpose of the bill is to “... prevent and deter unlawful migration, and in particular migration by unsafe and illegal routes...”. This is identical to the language of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.¹³

It is also similar to the UK-Rwanda asylum partnership treaty signed on 5 December 2023, the purpose of which is to “deter dangerous and illegal journeys to the United Kingdom”.¹⁴ **Clause 1(2)** would reference the treaty and add that the bill gives effect to “the judgement of Parliament that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”.

Clause 1(3) would summarise the treaty, in particular the elements that have changed from when the two countries first agreed an asylum partnership in April 2022. Among the changes are that nobody relocated to Rwanda can be removed to another country, unless it is back to the UK.¹⁵

¹⁰ The [Local Government Bill 1999-2000](#); [Communications Bill 2002-2003](#); Civil Partnerships Bill 2003-2004; [House of Lords Reform Bill 2012-2013](#); [Northern Ireland \(Executive Formation\) Bill 2017-2019](#)

¹¹ [HC Deb 6 December 2023, c444](#)

¹² Home Office, [Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill: European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum \(PDF\)](#), 6 December 2023

¹³ [Illegal Migration Act 2023, s1](#)

¹⁴ Home Office, [Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees and migrants](#), 5 December 2023

¹⁵ As above, art 10(3)

Clause 1(4)(a) would recognise that Parliament is sovereign. An identical provision appears in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020.¹⁶ **Clause 1(4)(b)** would similarly restate the fact that international law does not override UK acts of Parliament.

Clause 1(5) would define what it means to declare Rwanda a “safe country”. It means that, according to the bill, removing someone there is in compliance with all relevant international law. Joshua Rozenberg, a legal commentator, remarks of this provision “simply saying something is in compliance with international law does not make it so”.¹⁷

Clause 1(6) would define “international law” as including various treaties mentioned by the Supreme Court in its judgment, as well as customary international law and “any other international law... whatsoever”.

2.2

Clause 2: Safety of Rwanda

Clause 2 would attempt to prohibit legal challenges based on the argument that Rwanda is unsafe.

The clause would not say that Rwanda is a safe country. It would instead say that immigration officers and judges must treat it as safe when deciding whether or not to send people there:

(1) Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country.

Previous immigration legislation has contained instructions to decision-makers about how to approach factual questions. For example, certain types of behaviour (such as destroying a passport without reasonable explanation) must be treated as damaging to an asylum seeker’s credibility.¹⁸

Clause 2(3) would contain an ‘ouster’ prohibiting a court or tribunal from hearing a legal challenge to removal to Rwanda based on safety. **Clause 2(4)** would specify that prohibited arguments include the idea that someone removed to Rwanda might be sent to another country where they would face persecution. This was a core concern for the Supreme Court.

Alasdair Mackenzie, a barrister involved in the Rwanda litigation, has suggested that this prohibition on judicial review could itself be judicially reviewed to test the “legality of being denied access to the courts”.¹⁹ The outcome of such a challenge would depend on whether the courts maintained

¹⁶ [European Union \(Withdrawal Agreement\) Act 2020, s38](#)

¹⁷ A Lawyer Writes, [A triumph of hope over experience](#), 7 December 2023

¹⁸ [Asylum and Immigration \(Treatment of Claimants, etc.\) Act 2004, s8](#)

¹⁹ [“UK court battles still lie ahead over revamped Rwanda removal scheme”](#), Financial Times, 6 December 2023

what Professor Mark Elliott calls the “orthodoxy” that parliamentary sovereignty “makes whatever Parliament enacts lawful”, or instead followed suggestions in some previous judgments that parliamentary sovereignty is not absolute.²⁰

The bill would not attempt to stop people from bringing a case to the European Court of Human Rights.

Clause 2(5) would address potential conflicts with existing legislation. Rwanda would have to be treated as safe notwithstanding any existing provision of statute, common law or international law. The sole exception is the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’), which would be disapplied to the extent provided for in clause 3.

2.3

Clause 3: Disapplying the HRA

Clause 3 would disapply most of the operative provisions of the HRA for certain specific purposes.

Section 2 HRA: Interpretation of ‘Convention rights’

Section 2 of the HRA requires that the courts “must take into account” the judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’) that are relevant to their proceedings.

Under **clause 3(3)**, this would be disapplied for the purpose of determining whether Rwanda is a safe country for a person to be removed to in respect of a decision taken under the Immigration Acts.²¹

So, where the question of whether Rwanda is a safe country arises in the context of Convention rights²² in any such proceedings, courts and tribunals would not be required to take account of any relevant ECtHR case law. They would not however be prevented from doing so.

According to the explanatory notes, the purpose of this provision “is to make clear that the courts and tribunals should defer to Parliament’s sovereign view that Rwanda is safe country as defined, and are under no obligation that could conflict with this”.²³

²⁰ Public Law for Everyone, [The Rwanda Bill and its constitutional implications](#), 6 December 2023

²¹ These are defined by [section 61 of the UK Borders Act 2007](#)

²² These are the rights set out in Schedule 1 of the HRA

²³ Home Office, [Explanatory notes to the Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill \(PDF\)](#), 7 December 2022, para 39

Section 3 HRA: Interpretation of legislation

Section 3 requires legislation to be interpreted compatibly with Convention rights “so far as it is possible to do so”.

Clause 3(4) would disapply this section in relation to the entire bill. This would mean that when the courts are interpreting the legislation there is no requirement to attempt to find a Convention compliant reading of it.²⁴

A similar provision was included in the 2023 Act.²⁵ But in that case, the section 3 HRA interpretive obligation was replaced by an obligation to interpret the act as far as possible so as to achieve its purpose of preventing and deterring unlawful migration.²⁶

No equivalent provision is included in the bill. It is unclear how the courts would approach interpretation. The normal rules of statutory interpretation (which applied pre-HRA) would be to follow the ordinary and natural meaning of the language of the statute, but in cases of ambiguity, to adopt the most Convention compliant interpretation. This is based on the general principle that it is presumed that Parliament intended to act compatibly with the UK’s international obligations, including those under the ECHR.²⁷

Sections 6-9 HRA: Public authorities, human rights claims and remedies

Section 6 of the HRA requires public authorities to act compatibly with Convention rights. This applies to all bodies carrying out “functions of a public nature”, including central government and the courts.

Sections 7, 8 and 9 give people the right to bring proceedings and get remedies in UK courts, rather than having to go to the ECtHR to have their rights enforced.

Clause 3(5) would disapply these sections in relation to certain specific decisions:

- A decision to conclusively treat Rwanda as a safe country under clause 2(1) of the bill;
- A decision as to whether to grant interim relief, such as an injunction preventing removal, in a challenge to removal based on particular individual circumstances under clause 4(4) of the bill (see below);

²⁴ Cl 3(4)

²⁵ There is also an equivalent provision in the Victims and Prisoners Bill, in the context of decisions relating to the release of prisoners.

²⁶ [Illegal Migration Act 2023, s1\(1\) and \(3\)](#)

²⁷ Joint Committee on Human Rights, [Legislative Scrutiny: Bill of Rights Bill](#), HC 611, HL Paper 132, 25 January 2023, para 93

- A decision as to whether the person would face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm²⁸ in a challenge to removal to Rwanda based on particular individual circumstances under clause 4(1) of the bill, and in appeals against such a decision.²⁹

As a result, decision makers involved in these decisions (immigration officers, the Secretary of State, courts and tribunals) would not be under an obligation to act compatibly with Convention rights when making the decision. Further, the subject of the decision would not be able to bring a claim in the domestic courts that their human rights had been violated as a result of the decision or receive a remedy on that basis.

The Government's ECHR memorandum acknowledges that clause 3 engages the Article 13 right to an effective remedy together with Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment). This is because the disapplication of sections 2, 3 and 6 HRA "go to the question of whether the UK will still provide an 'effective remedy'" for breaches of those rights.³⁰

However it states that the Government is satisfied that clause 3 is compatible with Article 13 on the basis that:

- It does not prevent the bill being read compatibly with Convention rights;
- The Government considers a declaration of incompatibility sufficient to provide an effective remedy for challenges to decisions based on the presumption that Rwanda is safe (see the following section for further analysis of this point);
- The serious and irreversible harm test is intended to mirror the test applied by the ECtHR when considering whether to grant interim measures.

What is not disapplied?

The bill does not disapply other provisions of the HRA, which leaves open the possibility of obtaining a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA.

A declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity or continuing operation of the legislation and is not binding on the parties. Nor would it

²⁸ Taken under [section 42\(2\) of the 2023 Act](#)

²⁹ Taken under sections [44\(6\)\(a\)](#) and [45\(3\)](#) of the 2023 Act. In an appeal under section 45(3), the risk must also be "obvious".

³⁰ Home Office, [Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill European Convention on Human Rights memorandum \(PDF\)](#), 6 December 2023, para 21

provide any form of compensation. As such it does not provide a remedy for a victim of a human rights violation.³¹

It would be a matter for the Government and Parliament to decide how to respond to a declaration of incompatibility, which could be resolved through primary or secondary legislation, or a remedial order under section 10 HRA.³² There is no requirement in domestic law to resolve an incompatibility, although not doing so would give rise to a risk of an adverse finding by the ECtHR in the event a case was brought on the same point.

Former parliamentary lawyer Alexander Horne has suggested that more cases in the ECtHR could be the ultimate result of the Government's approach, potentially resulting in compensation claims from anyone wrongly removed. He described this as "a significant own goal".³³

2.4 Clause 4: Individual challenges to removal

The bill would not prevent all legal challenges to removal to Rwanda. **Clause 4** would qualify the clause 2 restrictions on challenges based on the safety of Rwanda.

It would do this by saying that challenges based on the person's "particular individual circumstances", as opposed to the safety of Rwanda in general, are still permitted. This is consistent with the Government's long-standing position that there will be case-by-case screening of individual suitability for

³¹ The ECtHR has held that a declaration of incompatibility is not a domestic remedy which needs to be exhausted before a claim can be brought (Article 35(1) of [the Convention](#) requires an applicant to exhaust domestic remedies before bringing a claim to the ECtHR): *Burden and Burden v UK*, App. No. 13378/05, 2006, paras 38-39. The court noted that the potential remedy – a change in the law – was dependent on the discretion of the executive, and said "It is possible that at some future date evidence of a long-standing and established practice of ministers giving effect to the courts' declarations of incompatibility might be sufficient to persuade the Court of the effectiveness of the procedure". However, it has also held that Article 13 does not require states to put in place mechanisms for challenging primary legislation: *Greens and MT v UK* (2011) 53 EHRR 21, para 90-92.

³² This enables a minister to amend primary legislation by order if there are compelling reasons to do so to remove an incompatibility. Ministry of Justice, [Responding to human rights judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Government's response to human rights judgments 2022-2023](#) (PDF), November 2023, CP 958, Annex A sets out how the Government has responded to all declarations of incompatibility to date: generally by introducing primary or secondary legislation, or a remedial order under s10 HRA. The Joint Committee on Human Rights notes that even when the Government chooses to respond to declarations of incompatibility by amending the legislation in question, this is usually a long and drawn-out process, during which the incompatible legislation remains in law and continues to infringe rights: [Legislative Scrutiny: Illegal Migration Bill](#) (PDF), HC 1241, HL Paper 208, 11 June 2023, para 85.

³³ ["The Rwanda Bill is going to be hugely contentious"](#), The Spectator, 7 December 2023

relocation to Rwanda: “No one will be relocated if it is unsafe or inappropriate for them”.³⁴

Clause 4(1) would however require the person to provide “compelling evidence” in support of such a claim. In addition, a court or tribunal cannot grant an injunction suspending the person’s removal from the UK while the challenge proceeds unless there is a “real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”. This is the same test as under the Illegal Migration Act 2023.³⁵

Further, the judge would not be allowed to entertain the argument that Rwanda is unsafe for that particular person because of the risk of being sent to another country to face possible persecution in breach of international law (‘refoulement’). The question of safety based on individual circumstances would have to be confined to conditions in Rwanda itself.³⁶

The Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, has argued “we have set the bar so high that it will be vanishingly rare for anyone to meet it”.³⁷

2.5

Clause 5: Interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights

On occasion, the ECtHR makes urgent orders called “interim measures” before issuing a full judgment if it considers the applicant faces an exceptional and imminent risk of irreparable harm in the meantime.³⁸ Most concern applicants’ fear for their lives (Article 2) or ill-treatment (Article 3) and suspend an expulsion or extradition for the duration of the proceedings before the court.³⁹

³⁴ Home Office, [Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda: Equality Impact Assessment](#), 4 July 2022, p4; PQ 165253 [on [Refugees: LGBT+ People](#)], answered on 22 March 2023

³⁵ [Illegal Migration Act 2023, s39](#). Somewhat confusingly, if the person is seeking to challenge removal under the scheme introduced by the 2023 Act once it comes into force, no injunction would be permitted but removal would be automatically suspended by virtue of [section 47 of that act](#).

³⁶ Institute for Government, [What is in the government's new Rwanda asylum plan?](#), 7 December 2023

³⁷ Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, [PM's remarks on illegal migration](#), 7 December 2023

³⁸ The ECtHR has authority to do this under [rule 39 of the Rules of Court](#). The ECtHR has also held that a failure to comply with interim measures is a violation of Article 34 of the Convention, under which states must not prevent applicants bringing claims to the court. See European Court of Human Rights, [Factsheet – Interim Measures \(PDF\)](#), December 2022.

³⁹ European Court of Human Rights, [Factsheet – Interim Measures \(PDF\)](#), December 2022, p1

The UK Government has criticised the process for granting interim measures and questioned the legal basis,⁴⁰ particularly since they prevented the departure of a number of asylum seekers to Rwanda last year.⁴¹

Clause 5 would provide that where interim measures are indicated in proceedings concerning the removal of a person to Rwanda under the Immigration Acts, a minister can decide whether to comply. Courts and tribunals are therefore instructed to ignore them when considering an application or appeal relating to such proceedings.⁴²

The 2023 Act is excluded from the definition of the ‘Immigration Acts’ for the purpose of the clause.

Section 55 of the 2023 Act provides that the minister can decide that the duty to make arrangements for removal in section 2 does not apply to a person to whom interim measures have been indicated by the ECtHR. In doing so they are permitted (but not required) to consider various factors, including whether the UK Government was given the opportunity to make representations in the case, and the form of the decision to indicate interim measures.

The ECHR memorandum states that the Government considers that clause 5 is capable of being operated compatibly with Convention rights “in the sense that it will not necessarily give rise to an unjustified interference of those rights, meaning the legislation itself will not be incompatible”.⁴³

Whilst the provision does not require a minister to refuse to comply with interim measures, it clearly contemplates such a scenario.

If a minister decided to exercise the power not to comply with interim measures, a person could be removed to Rwanda while their case was being decided by the ECtHR. This would be so even if they faced a real risk of serious and irreparable harm.

⁴⁰ Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Lord Bellamy [explained that in the Government’s view](#) they raise five legal questions: what is the legal basis; what is the procedure for exercising the power; what is the competence of the single judge; what is the effect in domestic law of an orders; and, what constitutes a breach. In November 2023 the ECtHR [issued a press release](#) (PDF) announcing that several decisions had been adopted clarifying and codifying its existing practice relating to interim measures.

⁴¹ ECtHR press release, [The European Court grants urgent interim measure in case concerning asylum seeker’s imminent removal from the UK to Rwanda](#) (PDF), 14 June 2022, ECHR 197

⁴² The JCHR noted in the context of a similar provision in the now abandoned Bill of Rights Bill that although interim measures are not binding on the courts as a matter of domestic law, the fact that they bind the State as a matter of international law is “plainly a relevant matter that the court should take into account when deciding whether it should grant relief”: Joint Committee on Human Rights [Legislative Scrutiny: Bill of Rights Bill](#), HC 611, HL Paper 132, 25 January 2023, para 243.

⁴³ Home Office, [Safety of Rwanda \(Asylum and Immigration\) Bill European Convention on Human Rights memorandum](#) (PDF), 6 December 2023, para 29

This would place the UK in breach of its treaty obligations under the ECHR.

There are few precedents for this situation. The Polish Government recently informed the ECtHR that interim measures issued in a case concerning the transfer of judges to alternative posts against their will [would not be complied with](#).⁴⁴ This was based in part on a [decision by the Constitutional Tribunal](#) which questioned the authority of the ECtHR to assess the compliance of laws concerning the judiciary, saying it was incompatible with the Constitution.⁴⁵ It has been reported that France recently deported a person suspected of involvement in terrorism in defiance of interim measures issued by the ECtHR.⁴⁶

In its legislative scrutiny report on the 2023 Act, the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that what is now section 55 should be removed from the bill on this basis:

... clause 53 gives Ministers legislative permission to act in direct violation of the UK obligations under the ECHR. Where a Minister chooses to ignore an interim measure and therefore breach Article 34 of the ECHR, clause 53 also prevents the courts from having regard to interim measures when considering proceedings under this Bill. This clause therefore permits deliberate breaches of our obligation to comply with interim measures of the ECtHR. Clause 53 must be removed from the Bill.⁴⁷

2.6

Clauses 6-10

The remaining clauses would mostly deal with routine technical issues common to most legislation, such as territorial extent. There are two significant points.

Exemption for Rwandan citizens

First, **clause 7(2)** would exclude Rwandan citizens from the bill's provisions. This is consistent with the general policy on selecting asylum seekers for removal to Rwanda, which excludes Rwandans themselves (their claim for asylum in the UK is likely to be based on alleged persecution by the Government of Rwanda).⁴⁸

⁴⁴ ECtHR press release. [Non-compliance with interim measure in Polish judiciary case \(PDF\)](#), 16 February 2023

⁴⁵ [Ref. No. K 7/21](#), 10 March 2022

⁴⁶ ["If France can ignore the ECHR, why can't we?"](#). The Spectator, 5 December 2023

⁴⁷ [Legislative Scrutiny: Illegal Migration Bill](#), Joint Committee on Human Rights, para 133

⁴⁸ Home Affairs Committee, [Asylum and migration oral evidence HC 197](#), 11 May 2022, Q24 and Q26. A Rwandan citizen can still be sent back to Rwanda if the UK processes their asylum claim and determines that they are not in need of international protection.

Commencement depends on treaty ratification

Second, under **clause 9**, the bill would not come into force until the UK-Rwanda asylum partnership treaty does. The treaty does not come into force until the internal ratification procedures of each country are complete.

The UK Government [cannot ratify until 30 January 2024](#), at the earliest.⁴⁹ This is because the treaty was laid before Parliament on 6 December 2023 and the Government cannot ratify it until 21 parliamentary sitting days have passed.

The Rwandan constitution allows the president to ratify treaties, with some exceptions where parliamentary consent is needed.⁵⁰

Once both the treaty and the act are in force, Rwanda must be treated as safe for anyone being considered for removal from then on, even if they entered the UK before the act was in force.

⁴⁹ [Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, s2Q](#); Commons Library briefing CBP-9568, [UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership](#), section 2.2. Assumes no change in sitting days. MPs can in principle vote to extend the ratification period for another 21 days, and do so repeatedly.

⁵⁰ Constitute, [Rwanda's Constitution of 2003 with Amendments through 2015 \(PDF\)](#), art 167. There have been [further amendments since 2015](#), but not to the provisions on treaty ratification.

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