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The defence single source contract regulatory framework under review

By Louisa Brooke-Holland

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Summary

Single source procurement is when contracts are placed without competition with a selected contractor. Historically the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has awarded a significant proportion of contracts without an open competition for a variety of reasons, most commonly for reasons of national security or because there is only one specialist supplier available. Over the next few years the armed forces will take delivery of a raft of new equipment procured from a single prime contractor including submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and attack helicopters.

The Government reformed the framework for single source procurement in 2014, introducing new regulations and creating a new oversight body. The MOD conducted a periodic review of the legislation in 2017, as required by the *Defence Reform Act 2014*, which resulted in amendments to the regulations.

The Secretary of State for Defence will conduct a further periodic review of the framework in 2021 (delayed from December 2020). The Single Source Regulations Office consulted on its proposed recommendations for the review in early 2020 and will submit its recommendations to the Defence Secretary.¹

The Defence and Public Accounts Committees and the National Audit Office have examined single source procurement in recent years. They have raised concerns about the number of single source contracts that are excluded from the regulatory framework, questioned the anticipated savings expected to be generated by the new regulations and discussed whether the powers of the Single Source Regulations Office should be expanded. The absence of competition may mean the MOD is not getting value for money for the contracts and may lack leverage when costs escalate or delays occur.

The Defence and Public Accounts Committees are holding inquiries on issues relating to defence procurement during the 2019-2021 Parliament.

This paper focuses solely on single source procurement and the review of single source regulations. For an overview of how the Ministry of Defence buys equipment and a more detailed discussion of the concepts mentioned here, please see Library briefing paper [an introduction to Defence procurement](#), from which some of this briefing is drawn.

¹ This paper was originally published on 3 June 2020. Since then, the Secretary of State for Defence informed the Defence Committee that the intended review in December 2020 will be delayed until 2021. The paper has been updated to reflect this change in date.

1. Introduction

The Government's stated preferred method of procuring defence equipment for the armed forces is by open competition.² However, historically the MOD has spent a significant proportion of its procurement budget on single source contracts. These are contracts placed without competition with a single contractor.

The MOD spent £8.6bn, or 35 per cent, on non-competitive/single source contracts in FY 2018/19.³ The National Audit Office found the proportion of contracts let non-competitively between 2013-14 and 2016-17 was around 50%, although the *value* of non-competitive contracts fluctuated between 24% and 75%.⁴

Single-source procurement can be used to develop, manufacture and support a sovereign capability (such as submarines); meet urgent requirements; secure long-term partnerships with industry; or contract directly with the owner of the intellectual property. The consolidation of the defence sector also means there are fewer national companies producing the high-end equipment defence needs, meaning there is sometimes only one trusted national supplier available.⁵

However, the absence of competition means the MOD may not receive value for money; suppliers can set prices without the worry of being under-cut by competitors and lack incentive to improve performance or efficiency.⁶ Industry competitors may also complain of an unfair playing field.

Why use single source procurement?

The main reason given for using single source procurement is national security. This is explained in a 2012 White Paper which qualifies the Open Procurement principle by stating:

We will take action to protect our operational advantages and freedom of action, but only where this is essential for national security.⁷

² Ministry of Defence, [National Security through technology](#), Cm 8278, 1 February 2012 and "[Industry for Defence and a Prosperous Britain: Refreshing Defence Industrial Policy](#)", 20 December 2017

³ Ministry of Defence '[Finance and economics annual statistical bulletin: trade industry and contracts 2019](#)', 5 September 2019 (revised 19 December 2019)

⁴ National Audit Office, '[Improving value for money in non-competitive procurement of defence equipment](#)', HC 412 2017-19, 25 October 2017, figures 3 and 5

⁵ Ibid para 1.3

⁶ Ministry of Defence, "[An Overview: Single Source Procurement Framework](#)", June 2014, version 1.0

⁷ Ministry of Defence, [National Security through technology](#), Cm 8278, 1 February 2012, section 1.2

Box 1: Operational advantage and freedom of action

The Ministry of Defence explains: “Operational advantage is the ability to find and maintain an edge over potential adversaries, both to increase the chances of our success in hostile situations and to increase the protection of the UK assets involved, especially our people [...] Freedom of action is the ability to determine our internal and external affairs and act the country’s interests free from intervention by other states or entities, in accordance with our legal obligations”.⁸

Library paper [an introduction to defence procurement](#) discusses in further detail why the MOD uses single source procurement and how procurement methods have evolved.

1.1 Parliamentary scrutiny and commentary

Under successive governments, the Defence and Public Accounts Committees and individual MPs have regularly scrutinised the MOD’s acquisition and procurement processes.⁹ This is explored more fully in Library briefing paper *an introduction to defence procurement*.

In recent years the committees and MPs have expressed concerns about the procurement of specific equipment via a single source method. Under the chairmanship of Dr Julian Lewis, the Defence Committee said it was “always concerned by reports that significant procurement decisions are being considered without a competitive tender”¹⁰ and took a keen interest in the procurement of AWACs surveillance aircraft and Army vehicles (see box 2).

The Defence and Public Accounts Committees are holding inquiries into defence procurement during the 2019-2021 Parliament:

- Defence Committee - [Defence industrial policy: procurement and prosperity](#)
- Public Accounts Committee – [Defence capability and the equipment plan 2019-29](#)

⁸ Ministry of Defence, [National Security through technology](#), Cm 8278, 1 February 2012, section paras 50 and 53

⁹ The Defence Committee produced a report on defence acquisition in December 2017 that looked at DE&S, the equipment plan, the SSRO and defence industrial policy (HC 431 2017-19), the NAO published [‘Improving value for money in non-competitive procurement of defence equipment’](#) in October 2017 (HC 412, 2017-19) and the Public Accounts Committee examined non-competitive procurement for its 2018 report [‘Ministry of Defence Acquisition and support of defence equipment’](#) (HC 724 2017-19).

¹⁰ [Letter dated 26 June 2018 from Chairman to Min \(DP\) relating to Sentry AWACS aircraft](#), published 3 July 2018. The Minister’s response was [published](#) on 13 September 2018

Box 2: case studies of surveillance planes and infantry vehicles

In 2018 the MOD said it had [begun discussions](#) with Boeing about replacing the current Sentry fleet of surveillance aircraft with Boeing's E-7 Advanced Early Warning and Control 'Wedgetail' aircraft. Both the Shadow Defence Secretary and the Defence Committee questioned this decision. Nia Griffith asked why the contract "will be gifted to a company without competition" and called for an open competition. Dr Julian Lewis, then Chair of the Defence Committee, said the Committee was "persuaded that a competition would be appropriate".¹¹

Saab UK, a competitor to Boeing, took the unusual step of publicly expressing its unhappiness with the lack of a competition for Sentry's replacement, suggesting its "significant investment" in the UK was premised on the expectation that the MOD's procurement methods "reflect the Government's commitment to fair and transparent free-market competition".¹²

Stuart Andrew, then Minister for Defence Procurement, said "there was no other proven capability that could provide the same level that we need and that Wedgetail provides" and a longer competition would have delayed its acquisition.¹³ In March 2019 the MOD [signed a \\$1.98 bn contract](#) (£1.51 bn¹⁴) to buy five E-7 aircraft with Boeing. The MOD has confirmed the contract is [subject to oversight](#) by the SSRO.

The Army has long required new [Mechanised Infantry Vehicles](#) (MIVs). In 2017, amid suggestions that the MOD was considering re-joining the Boxer programme (a long-running multi-national programme the UK withdrew from in 2003), several MPs signed an [Early Day Motion](#) calling for the MIV to be openly competed, while the Defence Committee [questioned](#) the MOD's decision not to compete the contract.¹⁵ In early 2018 the MOD [announced](#) it was re-joining the Boxer programme and signed a £2.8 bn contract for 500 Boxer vehicles in November 2019.

The Boxer [programme](#) is managed by OCCAR, the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation. The MOD has previously indicated the programme won't fall under the remit of the SSRO, explaining that the OCCAR treaty "contains similar arrangements for collaborative programmes for participatory states. These arrangements afford the UK similar rights for transparency, cost assurance audits and progress reporting mechanisms as those required by the Single Source Regulations Office."¹⁶

¹¹ [Letter dated 26 June 2018 from Chairman to Min \(DP\) relating to Sentry AWACS aircraft](#), published 3 July 2018. The Minister's response was [published](#) on 13 September 2018

¹² Defence Committee, '[Letter from Andrew Walton, head of Saab UK to the chair of the Defence Select Committee](#)', 15 October 2018

¹³ [HC Deb 27 June 2019 c414WH](#)

¹⁴ The £1.51bn figure is given in the Defence Equipment Plan 2019, page 58.

¹⁵ Further information is available in library briefing paper '[Modernising the Army's armoured vehicles](#)'.

¹⁶ Defence Committee, '[Letter](#)', 2 January 2018, from Harriett Baldwin MP, Minister for Defence Procurement on Mechanised Infantry Vehicle and attached relevant Parliamentary Questions', 11 January 2018

2. The regulatory framework

The Government reformed the framework for single source procurement in 2014, introducing new regulations and creating a new oversight body.

Before 2014 the governance of non-competitive contracts was reliant on a non-legally binding framework dating from 1968, known as the Yellow Book, which was overseen by the Review Board for Government Contracts.

A review by Lord Currie led to the [Better Defence Acquisition](#) White Paper in 2013 and the new framework was brought into effect in part 2 of the *Defence Reform Act 2014* and the *Single Source Contract Regulations 2014*.

The single source framework has two main components: the regulations and a body to manage and monitor the framework. Parliamentary committees have expressed concern that not all single source contracts come under the regulatory framework.

2.1 The Single Source Regulations Office

The regulations are overseen by a new body created by the *Defence Reform Act 2014* in July 2014: The Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO).¹⁷

The SSRO's purpose is to ensure value for money is obtained by the Government and industry is paid a fair and reasonable price.¹⁸ The SSRO has seven regulatory functions. These include recommending a baseline profit rate for qualifying contracts; providing guidance on allowable costs; keeping records of qualifying contracts; reviewing the operation of the regulatory framework and making recommendations for changes; and providing opinions or a determination on issues referred by the MOD or contractors.¹⁹

2.2 The Single Source Contract Regulations

Part 2 of the *Defence Reform Act 2014* created the regulatory framework for single source contracts. Substantial parts of the new framework were laid out in the [Single Source Contract Regulations 2014](#). The regulations were amended by three statutory instruments in 2018 and 2019.

The regulations place new reporting requirements on contractors, to improve transparency on costs. Contractors are required to prove costs are appropriate, reasonable and attributable. The regulations allow the MOD to impose civil penalties if contractors do not comply. The regulations also establish statutory rules on contract pricing.

¹⁷ The original version of this paper incorrectly referred to the SSRO as the regulatory office in the text of the paper. This was corrected on 4 June 2020.

¹⁸ Defence Reform Act 2014, [Part 2](#)

¹⁹ More detail on the SSRO's functions and purpose can be found in the [SSRO's Corporate Plan 2020-23](#), 2 April 2020

Reviewing and amending the regulations

The *Single Source Contract Regulations 2014* took effect in December 2014. Section 39 of the *Defence Reform Act 2014* requires the Secretary of State for Defence to review single source procurement legislation within three years of it coming into force and thereafter at five-year cycles, and for the SSRO to keep under review the single source contract regulations. The regulations were reviewed in 2017 will be reviewed again, earlier than required, in 2021.

The 2017 review and resulting legislation

For the 2017 review, the SSRO made 14 recommendations to the Defence Secretary.²⁰ Three statutory instruments were subsequently enacted which amend the 2014 regulations. The first was laid under the affirmative procedure and clarified which contracts cannot be subject to the legislation (are excluded).²¹ The second changed the provisions for repricing contracts that fall under the regime when they are amended, and the time limits for referrals to the SSRO. The third clarified some of the terms in the regulations and amended the reporting requirements.

Maria Pereira, of law firm DLA Piper, suggests the amended regulations are notable for what they don't include:

The SSRO's recommendations were quite wide-reaching - proposing, in essence, an increase in the number of contracts falling within the scope of the Regulations and a broadening of the powers of the SSRO. Key industry players had concerns that the SSRO's recommendations went too far, and while the Secretary of State has taken these concerns into account to date, further amendments to the Regulations may still be made in the future in order to give effect to the intent behind the recommendations of the SSRO.²²

1. [The Single Source Contract \(Amendment\) Regulations 2018](#) (SI 2018/917)

This SI modified the categories of contracts that can be excluded from the regulatory framework. Specifically, it narrowed the criteria for contracts made within the framework of an international co-operative defence programme, and replaced the exclusion of contracts made wholly for the purposes of intelligence activities with an exclusion of those contracts where the Government thinks there is a real risk to national security. It also excludes contracts which are new but in substance a continuation of older contracts which were not qualifying defence contracts.²³ The changes were expected to increase the number of qualifying defence contracts and thus increase the coverage of the regulatory framework: The MOD said at the time it anticipated an

²⁰ ["Recommendations to the Secretary of State: Review of Part 2 of the Defence Reform Act 2014 and the Single Source Contract Regulations 2014"](#), Single Source Regulations Office, June 2017 (published January 2018)

²¹ To go through the 'affirmative procedure' refers to statutory instruments which must be approved by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords to become law. Conversely the 'negative procedure' refers to statutory instruments which automatically become law unless there is an objection from either House.

²² ["Single source contract regulations – recent developments"](#), DLA Piper, 13 August 2019

²³ The [explanatory notes](#) explain these changes in more detail.

additional eight to 10 per cent of annual single source spend would come under the framework.²⁴ The SI was laid in June 2018 under the affirmative procedure and came into force on 1 August 2018.²⁵

2. [Single Source Contract \(Amendment\) \(No.2\) Regulations 2018](#) (SI 2018/1350)

This SI was laid in December 2018 under the negative procedure and came fully into force on 1 April 2019. The [explanatory notes](#) explain that the principle changes relate to pricing amendments within the Framework and amending the time limits for making determination referrals.

3. [Single Source Contract \(Amendment\) Regulations 2019](#) (SI 2019/1106)

This SI amends and clarifies some of the terms in the regulations, amends the reporting requirements and simplifies some of the processes. The [explanatory notes](#) explain that this is “to ensure that the right balance is struck between the administrative burden placed on suppliers and the need to ensure that adequate measures are in place to prevent either party from avoiding the requirements of the legislation”.

The 2021 review²⁶

As discussed above, the *Defence Reform Act 2014* requires the Secretary of State to review single source procurement legislation within three years of it coming into force and thereafter at five-year cycles. Meaning the next review should be in December 2022, five years after the 2017 review.²⁷

In July 2019 the Defence Secretary announced his intention to bring forward the next review to December 2020.²⁸ The reason was given in the explanatory notes to SI 2019/1106, which states that the Defence Secretary has decided that “given the complexity of the framework and the need to keep it current, the next review should be completed within three years”.²⁹

However, the review has now been delayed until 2021 because of the coronavirus virus. In June 2020, the Defence Secretary informed the chair of the Defence Committee of the delay, explaining:

I have taken this decision because the review of the SSCRs needs to take account of the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the priorities and plans of the Ministry of Defence and the wider defence sector. It will be important that the review is aligned with the findings of the Government’s broader Integrated

²⁴ [Letter](#) from Tobias Ellwood to Wayne David, dated 6 September 2018, DEP2018-0873

²⁵ Single Source Contract (Amendment) Regulations 2018 [explanatory note](#). SI 2018/1350 was debated the House of Lords on [9 July 2018](#) and in the Commons on [17 July 2018](#).

²⁶ This section was updated on 24 June 2020 to reflect the delay for the review from December 2020 to 2021.

²⁷ Defence Reform Act 2014, part 39

²⁸ “[Review of the single source regulatory framework 2020: Consultation](#)”, Single Source Regulations Office, 20 December 2019

²⁹ [Explanatory memorandum to the Single Source Contract \(Amendment\) Regulations 2019](#), SI 2019/1106

Review which, as you know, has been paused to allow the Government to focus on its response to the pandemic, as well as the related work to review the UK's defence and security industrial sectors which was launched earlier this year.³⁰

Conducting the review in 2021 is still within the requirement of the *Defence Reform Act 2014*.

As with the 2017 review, the SSRO will review and submit its recommendations to the Defence Secretary. The SSRO consulted on its proposed recommendations in early 2020. These recommendations focus on two key areas:

- reporting requirements; and
- and contract profit rates.

The consultation closed in February 2020 and, based on the original December 2020 timeline, the SSRO had intended to submit its proposals to the Defence Secretary in June 2020.³¹ In light of the delay to 2021, the SSRO said it "will continue to monitor the impact on the sector and the wider economy before finalising recommendations to the Secretary of State's review", adding it looked forward to receiving a new timetable for the planned review.³² At the same time, the SSRO also published the [consolidated responses to the consultation](#). This includes responses from trade group ADS, defence manufacturer Leonardo, and other contributors.

Lastly, with regard to the timing of the SSRO's recommendations, it is worth noting that the SSRO's recommendations for the 2017 review were not published until after that review had been completed, in January 2018.

2.3 Qualifying contracts

Not all single-source contracts come under the Single Source Regulatory Framework, however. The framework only applies to primary contracts and non-competed sub-contracts resulting from those primary contracts if they meet certain criteria.

Qualifying contracts

The qualifying criteria for a Qualifying Defence Contract (QDC) is: the contract is for goods, work or services being procured for defence purposes; and the contract award is not the result of a competitive process; and the value of the contract is above £5 million; and it is not an excluded contract.

A Qualifying Defence Contract (QDC) must have a value of £5m and above (and a Qualifying Sub-Contract (QSC) a value of £25m and above); the contract award must not be the result of a competitive

³⁰ [Letter from the Secretary of State for Defence, dated 9 June 2020, in relation to the next review of the Single Source Contract Regulations \(SSCRs\)](#), Defence Committee [correspondence 2019-21](#), published 23 June 2020

³¹ ["Review of the single source regulatory framework 2020: Consultation"](#), Single Source Regulations Office, 20 December 2019

³² ["Review of the single source regulatory framework 2020: Consultation"](#), SSRO, 17 June 2020 (page update)

process; the contract must be for goods, works or services being procured for defence purposes and it is not an excluded contract.

Excluded contracts

Contracts that are excluded from the regulatory framework include contracts: with foreign governments; for land/buildings; or those made within the framework of a cooperative international defence programme. This means, for example, that contracts for equipment bought from the US Government via its Foreign Military Sales programme do not come under the Single Source Regulatory Framework.³³ In 2017 the MOD said it had more than 300 Foreign Military Sales agreements amounting to just under \$12bn.³⁴ Major equipment ordered via the Foreign Military Sales route include the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Apache AH-64E attack helicopters. In addition, the Secretary of State has the power to exempt a contract from the regulatory framework.³⁵

SI 2018/917 modified the categories of contracts that can be excluded, removing the original exclusion of contracts made wholly for the purposes of intelligence activities with an exclusion of those contracts where the Government thinks there is a real risk to national security. The SI also narrowed the criteria for contracts made within the framework of an international co-operative defence programme.

Concerns about the level of excluded contracts

Only 15-20% of MOD single source expenditure fell within the SSRO regime in 2016. In 2017 the SSRO told the Defence Committee “having over 80 per cent of single source expenditure not subject to the price controls and transparency of the regime runs contrary to the aims of Act”.³⁶ The Committee in turn recommended the SSRO be given the ability to inspect all single source contracts, save for exceptional circumstances.³⁷

The Public Accounts Committee reflected the SSRO’s concern in its report on defence procurement in 2018: “there are still too many contracts which the Department has not brought within the scope of the regulations” including contracts signed before 2014 that can be brought into the regime ‘on amendment’.³⁸ The Government told the committee it had a target of bringing 100% of all *eligible* contracts within the regulations by March 2020.³⁹

³³ The US Defence and Security Cooperation Agency provides an explanation of the [FMS programme](#) on its website.

³⁴ [PO4693](#), 12 July 2017

³⁵ Ministry of Defence, “[An Overview: Single Source Procurement Framework](#)”, June 2014, version 1.0

³⁶ Defence Committee, “Gambling on ‘efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement, 17 December 2017, HC 431 2017-19, [Ev ACQ0008](#)

³⁷ Defence Committee, “Gambling on ‘efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement, 17 December 2017, HC 431 2017-19

³⁸ Public Accounts Committee, “[Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of defence equipment](#)”, 23 March 2018, HC 724 2017-19, para 2

³⁹ Public Accounts Committee, “[Treasury Minutes on the Government response to the Twentieth to Thirtieth Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts](#)”, 23 May 2018, Cm 9618

The SSRO publishes annual statistics on qualifying defence contracts. Between 1 April 2015 and 31 March 2019, 201 contracts became QDCs/QSCs with a total estimated contract price of £26.8 billion.⁴⁰

The Defence Secretary has the power to exempt contracts from the regulations. When asked to identify the contracts granted exemption from the single source contract regulations, the MOD said between April 2015 and March 2018, fewer than 10 contracts were exempted. These, it said, were valued at less than one percent of the 19.4 billion worth of single source defence contracts brought under the regime during that period.⁴¹

2.4 Other issues: profit rate, savings target and tensions

Industry have raised concerns about the baseline profit rates recommended by the SSRO. The baseline profit rate fell from 10.60 per cent in 2015 to 6.81 per cent in 2018.⁴² At the time the defence trade body, ADS, to warn that further reductions could put long-term investment in the industry at risk and called on the Government to ensure the framework incentivises innovation.⁴³ The rate rose to 7.63 per cent in 2019 but Lockheed Martin, one of the major suppliers to the MOD, told the defence committee the rate should be between 8 to 10 per cent and discussed the effect the profit rate has on defence companies:

If a company is not able to cover the cost of capital and meet return on sales expectations, it will not be able to invest in or sustain critical skills, competencies and R&D. This should raise concerns about the ability to sustain parts of the UK's defence industry.⁴⁴

The Defence Secretary increased the baseline profit rate to 8.22 per cent from 1 April 2020.⁴⁵ ADS welcomed the move, although it noted "the profit rate remains low by international standards".⁴⁶

The Public Accounts Committee has questioned the robustness of the £1.7bn savings targets the MOD believes the regulatory framework will deliver over a ten-year period.⁴⁷ The MOD said it was "confident" it would meet the objective of saving £637m by 2020 and the ten-year

⁴⁰ [Annual qualifying defence contract statistics: 2018/19](#), SSRO, 12 June 2019

⁴¹ [PQ253527](#), 16 May 2019

⁴² [HCWS367](#), 11 March 2015 and [HCWS550](#), 15 March 2018. See also [SSRO guidance](#) on the 2018 contract profit rate and a [Q&A](#) explaining how the baseline profit rate is just one of six steps that contribute to the calculation of the contract profit rate, and that the actual profit rate achieved may be higher or lower than the agreed contract profit rate.

⁴³ "[ADS response to new baseline profit rate for single source contracts](#)", 15 March 2018

⁴⁴ [Written evidence by Lockheed Martin, Defence industrial policy: procurement and prosperity](#), Defence Committee, DIP0017, 9 September 2019 (updated March 2020), published 7 May 2020

⁴⁵ [HCWS157](#), 13 March 2020

⁴⁶ "UK MOD boosts profit rate for sole-source contracts", Jane's Defence Industry, 16 March 2020

⁴⁷ Public Accounts Committee, "[Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of defence equipment](#)", 23 March 2018, HC 724 2017-19, para 3

target of £1.7bn “but this will depend on bringing the management of single source contracts under the framework”.⁴⁸

Both the National Audit Office and the Defence Committee reported on early tensions between the SSRO and industry, identifying the “SSRO’s sometimes confrontational tone”, reluctance from some suppliers to fully engage or comply with the regulations, and industry’s unhappiness with the SSRO’s interpretation of its remit. This prompted all sides to commit to making a ‘fresh start’ in their relationships.⁴⁹ George Jenkins, the SSRO’s Chairman, said in 2018 his priority was to build trusted relationships with all stakeholders.⁵⁰

The SSRO underwent a tailored review in 2020. The review found there is a continuing need for the SSRO and the current delivery model – as an independent non-departmental public body – was still deemed appropriate. The review found the SSRO is performing its statutory duties effectively and efficiently although it did find room for improvement. Specifically, it made several recommendations to improve the relationship between the MOD and the SSRO and to strengthen the MOD’s oversight of the SSRO.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Defence Equipment Plan 2017](#), 31 January 2018, para 29

⁴⁹ National Audit Office, [‘Improving value for money in non-competitive procurement of defence equipment’](#), HC 412 2017-19, 25 October 2017, para 3.10

⁵⁰ “Interview: George Jenkins”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 November 2018

⁵¹ [“Tailored review of the Single Source Regulations Office”](#), Ministry of Defence, 7 April 2020

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