



BRIEFING PAPER

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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran

By Ben Smith



Summary

On 2 April 2015, the world powers negotiating with Iran over its nuclear programme announced a joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA) to move towards a final agreement by the final deadline of 30 June 2015.

The plan involved Iran limiting its uranium enrichment and reducing its enrichment infrastructure for a period of several years and accepting intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

The West agreed to lift sanctions in exchange and to pass a United Nations Security Council resolution backing the deal and setting out a framework for Iran's nuclear materials procurement and ballistic missile use.

Several aspects remained to be worked out in continued negotiations after the April announcement of a framework deal. These included an agreement on 'possible military dimensions' (evidence that Iran may have been working on a nuclear weapon) and the timing of the lifting of sanctions.

Finalisation Day. On 14 July, final agreement was reached.

On 20 July the deal was endorsed by the Security Council.

Adoption Day is 18 October 2015, 90 days after the endorsement of the deal by the UN Security Council.

Implementation Day happens when the IAEA conforms that Iran has fulfilled most of its undertakings and the EU, US and UN simultaneously suspend their nuclear – related sanctions against Iran.

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1. The 2013 Joint Plan of Action and the negotiations

Iran and the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council (China, France Russia, the UK and the US) plus Germany (the P5+1, also referred to as the E3+3) first reached a tentative agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme in September 2013. Under that Joint Plan of Action, both sides would take agreed steps including Iran curtailing its uranium enrichment activities and the P5+1 releasing some frozen Iranian assets.¹

With these confidence-building measures in place, negotiations continued on details of a final agreement. The initial period of six months for the talks was extended by a further six months. On the expiry of the second deadline in the autumn of 2014, a new deadline of 30 June 2015 was set for a full settlement of the dispute.

There were persistent disagreements between the parties – particularly about what the restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment capacity (measured in the number and effectiveness of centrifuges) should be and how long they should last. Iran says it wants to be a trusted user of nuclear energy and not to have more restrictions placed on its production of nuclear fuels than those applied to other countries. The P5+1 say that, with a history of hiding nuclear facilities, Iran needs to comply with extra safeguards for some time.

¹ For more on the Joint Plan of Action, see the Library Standard Notes [The deal with Iran](#), December 2013, [Negotiation with Iran: update May 2014](#), and [Iran, the nuclear negotiations and relations with the UK](#)

2. The Lausanne accord, or JCPOA

2.1 Introduction

On 2 April 2015, the P5+1 and Iran announced in Lausanne, Switzerland, that they had reached a framework agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme, with final agreement to be reached before the deadline of 30 June 2015. None of the provisions in the JCPOA would be acted upon until signature of the final agreement by June 30.

There was no detailed document agreed by both sides at this stage, only a joint statement issued by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif,² respective leaders of the two negotiating teams.

Much of the debate in the press after the announcement was based on the White House's statement on the parameters of the deal, released in April 2014.³ The Iranian side contested the accuracy of the White House document.

2.2 Restrictions on the nuclear programme

Enrichment

The agreement provides for limitations on the amount of enriched uranium that Iran can produce and store.

Iran agreed to reduce by two thirds the number of installed centrifuges. Under the framework agreement one third of Iran's less effective first generation centrifuges would operate for a period of 10 years. Iran also agreed not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years.

Iran undertook not to enrich uranium above 3.67% for at least 15 years and to reduce its stockpile of this low-enriched (3.67%) uranium from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, also for 15 years.

Iran agreed to convert the reactor at Fordow so that it no longer enriches uranium. The Fordow facility is located deep inside a mountain to protect it against attack. Only limited enrichment will take place at Natanz and there will

Uranium enrichment

Uranium naturally contains 0.7% of the isotope U-235 and 99.3% of U-238. Most nuclear reactors work by splitting the U-235 isotope, which is unstable, or 'fissile', but for a reaction to take place, the uranium needs to have a higher concentration of the U-235 isotope than occurs naturally. To increase the concentration of U-235, the uranium is 'enriched'.

In order to be enriched, the uranium oxide from the mine must first be converted into a fluoride that forms a gas at relatively low temperature and is then processed in centrifuges until the concentration of U-235 is between 3% and 5%.

If the centrifuging of the uranium hexafluoride gas continues, it gets further enriched. At 20% it can be used in research reactors. Further enrichment to 85% or 90% produces weapons grade uranium. The enrichment process to get from 0.7% to 20% takes much more effort than the process to get from 20% to 90%.

Based on: [Uranium enrichment](#), World Nuclear Association

² [Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland](#), EEAS press release, 2 April 2015

³ [Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program](#), White House, April 2015

be no other enrichment facility.

Access and information

The IAEA will be able to inspect all Iran's nuclear facilities. The IAEA will also be able to inspect uranium mines and mills for the next 25 years and Iran agreed to return to implementing the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, giving the IAEA the right to make short-notice inspections to sites not previously declared as nuclear.

Iran agreed to early notification to the IAEA of construction plans of any new plants.

Possible military dimensions

Iran agreed to a number of steps in connection with the IAEA's worries about technological programmes that might be connected with nuclear weapons development. Iran was to provide the IAEA with information and access to certain sites, including Parchin.

Arak nuclear reactor

The Arak heavy water research reactor, which has been capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, will be converted so that it can no longer do so.

2.3 Sanctions relief

On Implementation Day the IAEA will confirm that Iran has complied with all of the most important undertakings and the EU, US and UN will suspend all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

It may take some time for Iran to comply with its undertakings and there is still room for disagreement over the timing of the IAEA verification and sanctions relief.

The agreement provides for sanctions to be re-imposed automatically if Iran fails to comply with undertakings.

One of the undertakings Iran must fulfil is providing the IAEA with information and access to facilities to resolve the doubts about earlier possible military dimensions.

The provisions on the Fordow reactor will be completed by one year after Implementation Day.

2.4 UN Security Council

On 20 July, the new resolution was passed with unanimity by the Security Council.⁴ The resolution effectively endorsed the deal, and

Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA gives IAEA inspectors the right to multiple-entry visas and to make short-notice inspections at sites not previously agreed. It is seen as an indispensable extra safeguard against any Iranian attempts to hide nuclear-related activity.

Iran started to implement voluntarily the Additional Protocol in 1997. It signed it in 2003 but, when the nuclear programme was referred to the UN Security Council in 2005, Iran suspended its implementation.

The JCPOA provides for Iran to start implementing the Additional Protocol, effective on Implementation Day, and will 'seek' to have the Iranian parliament ratify it by Transition Day, eight years after Adoption Day.

⁴ ['Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2231 \(2015\), Endorses Joint Comprehensive Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme'](#), UN Security Council press release, 20 July 2015

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foresaw the eventual removal of all nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran and decided that within 10 years of the conclusion of the agreement, pending implementation, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iran nuclear issue.⁵

[Resolution 2231](#) set out a timetable for implementation and a rigorous monitoring mechanism. With a positive report from the IAEA, the Security Council would terminate sanctions set out in resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2015.

The resolution contained provisions to re-impose sanctions immediately in the event of non-compliance.

⁵ ['Security Council adopts resolution endorsing Iran nuclear deal'](#), UN press release, 20 July 2015

3. Negotiations after the Lausanne declaration

Some technical details of the JCPOA remained to be negotiated after the framework was announced. Both experts and political representatives were involved in the discussions, which took place in Geneva, Vienna and New York.

3.1 Activities allegedly related to weapons development

The White House said after the framework agreement was reached that the final deal would set out Iran's cooperation with the IAEA's investigations into 'possible military dimensions'. This cooperation was one of the important items discussed in the run-up to the June 30 deadline.⁶

On 29 May 2015 the IAEA reported no further external building work at the Parchin site,⁷ which it feared may be related to military work. It called for greater cooperation from Iran in providing information related to possible military dimensions of the programme.

3.2 Enriched uranium stockpile

The 29 May IAEA report also said that Iran's stockpile of low-enriched (up to 5%) uranium (LEU) had increased. This appeared to go against the commitments made in the Joint Plan of Action of 2013, which set out that Iran should reduce the stockpile of LEU to 300kg.⁸

The Joint Plan of Action of 2013 provided for Iran to be able to continue to enrich to 3.67% but for newly enriched LEU to be converted from uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide, to be then converted into fuel rods for the Tehran research reactor. That would mean that the stockpile of LEU would not get any bigger.

The problem was Iran's capacity to convert uranium hexafluoride into oxide form. A plant designed to do this (the Enriched Uranium Powder Plant – EUPP) opened later and started working more slowly than expected, meaning that there was a build-up in low-enriched uranium not fully converted into oxide form.

⁶ ['Iran and the IAEA Back on Track?'](#), P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks Alert, Arms Control Association, 16 April 2015

⁷ [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#), Report by the IAEA Director General, 29 May 2015

⁸ [Joint Plan of Action](#), Geneva, 24 November 2014

4. Conclusion of the full agreement

4.1 Opposition

There were those in the US, in Israel and in Iran and elsewhere who opposed the deal. But they did not tend to offer radically different alternatives, largely restricting themselves to arguing that the deal gave too much away to their respective 'opponents'. Iranians were keen to see their economy return to normal while the US public had little appetite for a war with Iran; a poll taken in March 2015 suggested that Americans supported the negotiations by a margin of two to one.⁹

Their support for the JCPOA was less clear, as was their trust in the Iranians to abide by the terms. Similarly, a majority of Iranians were in favour of an agreement but a substantial minority still approved of a military nuclear programme.¹⁰

Iran

Iranian opposition to the deal was probably always less of a threat than that in Washington. However, it did exist. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said after April's framework agreement that he neither supports nor opposes it and that he was waiting for the final details to be agreed. He also disputed the information provided in the White House fact sheet: "The White House published a factsheet which was wrong on most of the issues. It distorted reality."¹¹

One very significant supporter of the framework agreement announced on 2 April was Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The Revolutionary Guards have traditionally been hard-line and have often rejected accommodation with the West. Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani also came out in favour. His and Jafari's support may have been an indication that the political tide in Iran was turning in favour of the deal. Hard-line members of parliament and newspaper editors continue to oppose it, however.

4.2 Final agreement

On 14 July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 group—the US, UK, France, Germany, China and Russia—reached agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action announced at Lausanne. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and EU High Representative Mogherini put out a joint statement:

The E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They

⁹ ['Poll: Clear majority supports nuclear deal with Iran'](#), *Washington Post*, 30 March 2015

¹⁰ ['Iranians More Hopeful for Nuclear Deal'](#), Gallup, 26 February 2015

¹¹ ['Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: no guarantee of final nuclear deal'](#), *Guardian*, 9 April 2015

anticipate that full implementation of this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.¹²

The [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with its technical annexes](#) was made available on the same EU External Action Service webpage.

4.3 Legislative hurdles

US Congress

On 22 May, the US Congress passed a bill requiring the Administration to submit any comprehensive deal to Congress for approval. The White House dropped its threat to veto such a bill after amendments were made to the original draft. In the event of votes disapproving the plan, [The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015](#), sponsored by Senator Corker of Tennessee (Republican), provides for any sanctions waivers to be delayed and also for sanctions to be re-imposed in the event of non-compliance by Iran. The sanctions already lifted in the interim agreement would be exempt.

A motion blocking the deal was not passed by the Senate in September 2015, having been opposed by enough Democratic Senators.¹³

A presidential veto was therefore not necessary. Observers had worried that strong opposition in Congress would make implementation more difficult, and make opposition in the Iranian parliament more likely.

Iranian parliament

The agreement will have to be ratified by the Iranian Parliament before it becomes into force, and the 2012 Parliament is distinctly conservative after few, if any, reformist candidates were allowed to run. That left the election as a contest between conservative supporters of Khamanei and those of the former President Ahmadinejad. Khamanei won.

Conservatives in the Parliament subsequently broke into different factions, some of which leaned towards a supportive position on the nuclear negotiations.

On 13 October 2015, the Iranian parliament passed the deal, “but not without tears and fisticuffs that reflected the frustration of hardliners hoping to scupper the deal.”¹⁴ The parliament voted by 161 votes in favour, 59 votes against, with 13 abstentions, to pass a bill approving the nuclear deal. The following day, the legislation was approved by Iran’s Guardian Council, a body which vets the compatibility with Iran’s Islamic constitution of parliament’s proposed legislation.

The legislation also sets out restrictions on what the government should do with the money released as part of the deal. And it provides for the

¹² [Joint statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif](#), Vienna, 14 July 2015

¹³ [‘Obama’s Iran deal survives vote in Congress’](#), *CBS News Online*, 10 September 2015

¹⁴ [‘Iran’s parliament backs nuclear deal’](#), *Financial Times*, 13 October 2015

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Iranian government to monitor the compliance by the P5+1 with the deal.¹⁵

The Additional Protocol will also have to be ratified by the Iranian parliament, according to the provisions of the JCPOA.

¹⁵ 'Countdown to Adoption Day', Special Arms Control Association Newsletter, Arms Control Association, 15 October 2015

5. Timeline

Finalization Day (14 July 2015)

The day the agreement was reached and endorsed by Iran and the P5+1

The United Nations Security Council endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (July 20, 2015)

UNSC votes unanimously to:

endorse the JCPOA

“terminate” all prior UN sanctions, beginning on Implementation Day (and subject to re-imposition through snapback mechanism)

Adoption Day (18 October 2015)

90 days after the UNSC endorsed the JCPOA the “JCPOA and the commitments in the JCPOA” come into effect

Participants in the JCPOA will begin making “necessary arrangements and preparations” to implement their commitments under the JCPOA

Implementation Day (early 2016)

Iran

The day on which the IAEA report verifies that Iran has done the following:

- Modified the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor so that it cannot produce weapons material. The IAEA will monitor heavy water production and excess will be made available for export.
- Limited the number of its centrifuges and only enriched uranium to 3.67%.
- Ceased enriching at Fordow.
- Kept its stockpile to the limit of 300 kg of 3.67% enriched uranium and either modified or exported any uranium enriched to a higher level than this.
- Refrained from manufacturing any centrifuges more than necessary for replenishing existing stocks.
- Begun the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol.

On the same day the EU terminates the provisions of the Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspends the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP. (Member states will change national legislation to follow suit.)

US

Simultaneously, the United States “ceases the application” of the following sanctions:

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- Financial and banking measures
- Insurance measures
- Energy and petrochemical sectors
- Shipping, port, metals and automotive sectors
- Designations and other sanctions listings

The United States also commits to allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran

United Nations

In accordance with an earlier UN Security Council resolution, the following UN sanctions are terminated, "subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments":

- [UNSC Res 1696 \(2006\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 1737 \(2006\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 1747 \(2007\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 1803 \(2008\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 1835 \(2008\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 1929 \(2010\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 2224 \(June, 2015\)](#)
- [UNSC Res 2231 \(July 2015\)](#)

5 years after Adoption Day (October 2020)

UN sanctions on conventional arms lifted, or earlier if certain conditions are met.

Transition Day, 8 years after Adoption Day (October 2023)

UNSC sanctions on ballistic missiles are lifted, earlier if certain conditions are met.

Iran must seek ratification of the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards.

EU lifts sanctions that impose bans on nuclear- and ballistic missile-related materials for Iran, and other measures.

US lifts permanently the sanctions suspended on Implementation Day, and other measures.

8.5 years after Adoption Day (March 2024)

Some restrictions on Iranian testing and manufacturing of centrifuges lifted.

Termination Day, 10 years after Adoption Day (October 2025)

UNSC resolution endorsing JCPOA terminates, as does all UNSC consideration of the Iranian nuclear programme. Many remaining restrictions on Iranian centrifuges are lifted.

15 years after Adoption Day (October 2030)

Many further restrictions on the Iranian programme, including the size of the 3.67% enriched stockpile, are lifted.

20 years after Adoption Day (October 2035)

Iran's commitment to contain, and allow IAEA surveillance of, rotor tubes and bellows ends.

25 years after Adoption Day (October 2040)

Iran's commitment to permit IAEA verification that all uranium is transferred to the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan (or to future uranium conversion facilities which Iran might eventually build) ends¹⁶

¹⁶ This timeline is a summarised version of the one provided by the Brookings Institution: Jennifer R Williams, '[A comprehensive timeline of the Iran nuclear deal](#)', Brookings Institution, 21 July 2015

6. Reaction

Wendy Sherman for the US State Department said that the deal assured that Iran would abide by its commitments:

...with this agreement, we will have the most extensive system of monitoring and verification we have ever negotiated for any country anywhere in the world. We will have eyes into every part of Iran's nuclear program from cradle to grave. And if we detect Iran is trying to break its commitments or violating the agreement, we will have every single option on the table to respond to them that we have today.¹⁷

The British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond supported the agreement:

We have agreed the key parameters of a comprehensive deal on Iran's nuclear programme. This includes Iranian agreement to restrict its programme by limiting its enrichment capacity, level and stockpile for specified durations. Research and development will be conducted within agreed bounds. Iran has also agreed to allow greater oversight of its activities. A comprehensive deal within these parameters will provide reassurance that the programme is peaceful. In return, Iran will receive significant economic and financial sanctions relief including the termination of all UN Security Council Resolutions.

This is well beyond what many of us thought possible even 18 months ago and a good basis for what I believe could be a very good deal. But there is still more work to do. The fine detail of any deal will be very important, in particular specifics of oversight measures and mechanisms for handling UN Security Council resolutions. Diplomats and technical experts from all sides will work intensively over the coming weeks to finalise the detail by the end of June. Sanctions will remain in place until the comprehensive deal is agreed and implemented.

Labour has also strongly supported the talks process.

John Boehner, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, criticised the deal as set out in the White House's *Parameters* document:

The president says negotiators have cleared the basic threshold needed to continue talks, but the parameters for a final deal represent an alarming departure from the White House's initial goals. My long-time concerns about the parameters of this potential agreement remain, but my immediate concern is the administration signalling it will provide near-term sanctions relief. Congress must be allowed to fully review the details of any agreement before any sanctions are lifted.

After visiting with our partners on the ground in the Middle East this week, my concerns about Iran's efforts to foment unrest, brutal violence and terror have only grown. It would be naïve to suggest the Iranian regime will not continue to use its nuclear program, and any economic relief, to further destabilize the region.

In the weeks ahead, Republicans and Democrats in Congress will continue to press this administration on the details of these parameters and the tough questions that remain unanswered. We

¹⁷ ['Remarks at the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism Biennial Leadership Policy Conference'](#), US State Department press release, 27 April 2015

will stand strong on behalf of the American people and everyone in the Middle East who values freedom, security, and peace.¹⁸

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has generally opposed the deal, and he criticised the Lausanne accord:

this deal would pose a grave danger to the region and to the world and would threaten the very survival of the State of Israel.¹⁹

Netanyahu also said that the deal should have included a clause whereby Iran would accept Israel's right to exist.

Russia was a party to the talks and has a stake in successful implementation. However, Russia may react to the developments differently from the West. This was clearly signalled in the Kremlin's announcement on 12 April that President Putin had signed a decree lifting the voluntary moratorium on the sale of the Russian S-300 air defence system to Iran. An oil-for-goods barter programme was also mentioned. The S-300 is particularly sensitive because it would be helpful in protecting Iranian nuclear installations in the event of a military strike. Russia says that the barter deal, involving 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day being swapped for grain and construction goods, would be legal under the present sanctions regime.²⁰

Saudi Arabia has formally supported a negotiated settlement that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but Saudi attention is focussed on the regional power struggle between the largely Sunni bloc and its Iran-led rivals. Some in the Sunni camp fear that the lifting of sanctions and a warming of relations between Iran and the US will strengthen Iran, not least by filling its coffers with money from oil sales. The Saudis fear that that would allow Tehran to increase its support for groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hizballah in Lebanon and, particularly, the Assad government in Syria. The Saudi Ambassador to the UK said in a recent interview:

We have always expressed our support for resolving the Iranian nuclear file in a diplomatic way and through negotiation. We commend the American president's effort in this regard, provided that any deal reached is watertight and is not the kind of deal that offers Iran a licence to continue its destabilising foreign policies in the region.

He went on:

We hope we receive the assurances that guarantee Iran will not pursue this kind of weapon but if this does not happen, then all options will be on the table for Saudi Arabia.²¹

Philip Gordon wrote in the *Financial Times* in September that the deal was quite an achievement given the situation in the Middle East at present:

¹⁸ ['Speaker Boehner Statement on Iran Nuclear Talks'](#), John Boehner press release, 2 April 2015

¹⁹ ['White House to launch PR campaign to build support for Iran deal'](#), *I24 News*, 4 April 2015

²⁰ ['Russia opens way to missile deliveries to Iran, starts oil-for-goods swap'](#), *Reuters*, 13 April 2015

²¹ ['The Saudis are ready to go nuclear'](#), *Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 2015

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We cannot know if Mr Obama's deal will go down in history as a moment to compare with President Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to China. But if Iran's relationship with the world is indeed transformed in the years ahead, it will rightly be traced back to a president willing to take risks with secret diplomacy and to weather enormous political resistance to give his vision of a very different relationship with Tehran a chance. Even if such a change does not take place, the president will still have bought valuable time and deferred a major challenge that one of his successors will have to take up. In the Middle East these days, even the latter is a worthy accomplishment.²²

²² ['Iran deal that promises to change history'](#), Financial Times, 3 September 2015

7. Background and further reading

- [*Iran, the nuclear negotiations and relations with the UK*](#), Commons Briefing Paper SN07010, 3 December 2014
- [*Negotiation with Iran: update May 2014*](#), Commons Briefing paper SN06890, 16 May 2014
- [*The Deal with Iran*](#), Commons Briefing paper SN06780, 13 Dec 2013
- [*The Days after a Deal with Iran*](#), Rand, May 2015
Jeffrey M. Kaplow and Rebecca Davis Gibbons
Slowing or stopping Iran's nuclear development is an important nonproliferation accomplishment, but the international community will need to find ways to mitigate some of the deal's negative consequences.
- [*The Iran Nuclear Deal*](#), International Crisis Group, April 2015
The nuclear framework agreement is just a first step. In this video, Iran Senior Analyst Ali Vaez joins a panel at The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to discuss the strong and weak points of the agreement and the importance of all sides respecting the 30 June deadline for a final nuclear accord.
- [*Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program*](#), White House, April 2015
- [*Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal*](#), *The Atlantic*, 21 May 2015
In an interview, the U.S. president ties his legacy to a pact with Tehran, argues ISIS is not winning, warns Saudi Arabia not to pursue a nuclear-weapons program, and anguishes about Israel.
- [*Nuclear Iran: a glossary*](#), Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Affairs, March 2015
- [*Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*](#), Arms Control Association, August 2015
- Mark Schneider (ICG), [*'Why the Iran Deal is a Watershed Non-Proliferation Agreement'*](#) *The Hill*, 4 August 2015
- [*A Flawed Deal - An Assessment of the Iranian Nuclear Agreement*](#), Henry Jackson Society, September 2015
- Jon Greenwald (ICG), [*'Why Saying 'Yes' to the Iran Deal Is Safer Than 'No''*](#), *Haaretz*, 18 August 2015

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