



## Quick guide to the railways

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Author: Louise Butcher  
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This note gives a brief outline of the UK rail industry, including the bodies responsible for delivering services, how new schemes are chosen and financed.

Following privatisation in 1993, British Rail was divided into two main parts: one part being the national rail infrastructure (track, signalling, bridges, tunnels, stations and depots) and the second being the operating companies whose trains run on that network.

The infrastructure is owned by Network Rail which is regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). The Department for Transport (DfT) looks after passenger- and train-related matters. Train operating companies (TOCs), both passenger and freight, run the trains. However, in many cases the actual train is leased from a rolling stock company (ROSCO). Railway stations are owned by the network operator, most being leased to the TOC that is the main user of that station. Network Rail, however, retains the operation of the main passenger terminals.

Rail infrastructure projects are planned on a five yearly basis as part of the industry-wide Periodic Review. The industry is currently in the process of deciding on investment projects for the period 2014-19 (Control Period 5). This will be finalised by the end of 2013.

Aspects of the railway are devolved in Scotland and Wales. In particular, infrastructure investment in Scotland is managed by a separate but parallel process to the Periodic Review for England and Wales.

Information on other rail-related issues can be found on the [Railways Topical Page](#) of the Parliament website.

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
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# 1 The role of government

## 1.1 Department for Transport (DfT)

The governance arrangements for the railways are as follows:



The Secretary of State for Transport took over strategic and financial responsibilities for the railways from the [Strategic Rail Authority \(SRA\)](#) under the [Railways Act 2005](#). The Secretary of State is responsible for:

- determining the rail budget;
- setting the strategy; and
- letting the passenger rail franchises.

These functions are carried out within the Department by the [DfT Rail Group](#), which was set up in Summer 2005. It works in conjunction with the industry, other government – including local government – bodies, and passenger groups.

Details of rail policies and publications are available on the [Railways pages](#) of the Department's website.

### ***Fares policy***

Around 45 per cent of fares are subject to regulation by the government. Since January 2004, annual rises in regulated fares have been limited to RPI+1 per cent. This has resulted in wide variations – for example, in July 2009 the RPI was -1.4 per cent, so regulated fares for 2010-11 fell by 0.4 per cent from January 2010; by way of contrast, in July 2010 the RPI was 4.8 per cent, so regulated fares for 2011-12 rose by 5.8 per cent from January 2011. Regulated fares also rose by RPI+1 from January 2012, based on a July 2011 RPI of 5 per cent. From January 2013 it is anticipated that regulated fares will rise by RPI+3 per cent. All other fares are set at a commercial rate by the train operators.

Almost without exception, when the annual fare increases are announced every year passenger groups express concerns that significant increases could ‘price people off the railways’ and put a strain on those that use the railways to commute to work, particularly into and out of London. However, it has been the policy of successive governments to rebalance the funding of the railways between passengers and taxpayers: reducing the relative contribution of the latter. The logical consequence of this is higher fares. The train companies themselves are keen to rebut claims that they are ‘profiteering’ off higher fares, noting that fares income is spent on upgrades and investment projects and, in some cases, is passed on to the government as part of the financial package for the franchise.

In its response to the McNulty rail value for money study, published in March 2012, the government set out its principles for reforming rail fares to make fare rises sustainable in the longer term. A consultation paper on the proposed fares and ticketing review was published at the same time.

Information on the setting of fares policy can be found in HC Library note [SN1904](#); fares statistics can be found in [SN6384](#).

### ***McNulty Rail Value for Money Study***

Before the 2010 General Election the Labour Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Andrew Adonis, announced that the Department for Transport and the ORR would jointly sponsor a value for money review of the rail industry.<sup>1</sup> This would be undertaken by Sir Roy McNulty, the former Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

Sir Roy published his final report in May 2011. He concluded that the UK rail industry should be looking to achieve efficiency savings of approximately 30 per cent by 2019 and proposed recommendation that, together, could deliver cost savings of between £700 million and £1 billion per annum by 2019. Sir Roy found that there were ten principle barriers to efficiency in the rail industry, including: fragmentation of rail industry structures and interfaces; the way in which major players in the industry have operated; roles of government and industry; nature and effectiveness of incentives; legal and contractual frameworks; and relationships and culture within the industry.<sup>2</sup>

In 2011 the industry set up the [Rail Delivery Group](#) – following a recommendation in the report – to focus on delivering the McNulty agenda of improving services while cutting costs.<sup>3</sup>

## **1.2 Scotland**

The provision and regulation of railway services is a reserved matter except for those that both begin and end in Scotland, which are devolved. This includes rail safety and security. ‘Railway services’ are those defined in section 82 of the [Railways Act 1993](#) but excluding the wider meaning of ‘railway’ given by section 81(2) of that Act. This means that railway services for the purposes of the reservation include services in relation to the carriage of passengers (including luggage, parcels and mail) and of goods and services in relation to stations, maintenance facilities and the provision and operation of the rail network itself. As the wider meaning of ‘railway’ does not apply (‘railway’ having the meaning given by section 67(1) of the [Transport and Works Act 1992](#)), tramways and guided transport systems are not included, so the Scottish Parliament has legislative competence in regard to those matters.

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<sup>1</sup> HMT, [Pre-Budget Report](#), Cm 7747, December 2009, p110

<sup>2</sup> ORR press notice, “[Efficiency savings the key to substantial rail industry growth](#)”, 19 May 2011

<sup>3</sup> DfT/ORR, [Realising the potential of GB Rail](#), May 2011

Although parts of the 1993 Act concerning the provision and regulation of railway services are reserved, grants to railway services are an Executive responsibility. This means that the Scottish Parliament has the power to make grants for railway passenger services.

The [Railways Act 2005](#) gave Scottish Ministers the following powers:

- to prepare and publish a strategy for carrying out their functions in relation to railways in Scotland (i.e. the High Level Operating Statement that forms part of the Periodic Review (see section 6.1, below);
- to provide financial assistance for freight services;
- to take increased responsibility for passenger services and infrastructure relating to Scotland;
- to make penalty fare regulations for Scotland;
- to prepare (and from time to time revise) a code of practice for protecting the interests of disabled rail users in Scotland;
- to exercise the functions of the Secretary of State in relation to a railway administration order involving a Scottish railway company.

Regarding the Scottish rail franchise, section 23 of the 1993 Act gives the powers that the Secretary of State has for franchising in England and Wales to 'Scottish Ministers' for the franchise in Scotland, in practice this is Transport Scotland. Information on the franchise can be found in [SPICe briefing 08/38](#).

### **1.3 Wales**

The provisions of the [Railways Act 2005](#) relating to Wales came into effect on 8 June 2005. The Act gives the Assembly Government a role in any franchise that is a Wales-only service or includes 'Welsh services' (i.e. any rail passenger service that starts in Wales, ends in Wales or makes at least one scheduled call in Wales). As a co-signatory to the Wales-only franchise, the Assembly Government is responsible for determining the priorities for local and regional services and setting fares for them. It also has a greater role in developing facilities such as stations and local lines and funding rail improvements.

### **1.4 London**

Section 175 of the [Greater London Authority Act 1999](#), as amended, outlines Transport for London's (TfL's) responsibilities regarding rail services in London. The 2004 rail White Paper set out the government's intention to revise the Mayor of London's powers regarding overground rail in London, including giving an increased role to the Mayor for discrete services within the GLA boundary.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, sections 15-17 of the 2005 Act provided a duty on the Secretary of State and TfL to co-operate on rail matters, including a requirement that the Secretary of State must consult TfL before issuing a rail franchise Invitation To Tender (or when entering a franchise agreement for which an ITT has not been issued) for railway passenger services to, from or within London. The 2005 Act also relaxed the contractual restrictions on TfL, limiting the prohibition on TfL to enter into agreements with rail franchisees without the consent of the Secretary of State. Certain agreements (those in respect of the grant of a use of a railway facility) were excluded from the prohibition.

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<sup>4</sup> op cit., [The Future of Rail](#), paras 5.7.1-5.7.7

In July 2007 the Department for Transport announced its decision to extend the Mayor's powers, as part of the franchise specification process, to propose and pay for extra train services or improvements to stations on a number of 'inner suburban' routes.<sup>5</sup> TfL appointed London Overground Rail Operations Limited (LOROL) to run rail services; they work to TfL's standards of quality, safety, staffing, frequency and ticketing. TfL is responsible for the overall management, and the track and signalling is managed by Network Rail. Information about [London Overground](#) is available on the TfL website.

## 1.5 Passenger Transport Executives and local authorities

There are six Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) in the metropolitan counties outside London ([Greater Manchester](#), [Merseyside](#), [South Yorkshire](#), [Tyne and Wear](#), [West Midlands](#) and [West Yorkshire](#)). Under the [Railways Act 1993](#) the PTEs were co-signatories to the franchises which covered their areas. The 2004 White Paper and the 2005 Act set out a new role for the PTEs in England in relation to rail, following concerns that PTEs were not directly exposed to the consequences of their decisions on fares and service levels. Sections 13 and 14 of the 2005 Act gave PTEs greater flexibility to make a choice between rail and other modes of transport in their areas if rail services offered poor value for money; and removed the PTEs from being direct parties to franchise agreements. In July 2006 the DfT published guidance on the new role of the PTEs in the rail franchising process: they would be involved in the long-term planning of the rail network and would have a statutory right to be consulted on and have a role in proposing amendments to rail franchises in their areas.<sup>6</sup>

The Merseyside Public Transport Executive, Merseytravel, is in a different position, as the [Merseyrail network](#) was exempted from the franchising requirements of the 1993 Act by Order, allowing Merseytravel to let a concession to run the services.<sup>7</sup>

In its March 2012 rail reform command paper, the Coalition Government stated that it would look at devolving more responsibility for English rail franchises to local areas. Consequently, the government published a consultation document seeking views on how this kind of devolved arrangement might work and what powers could be devolved.<sup>8</sup> The paper considers that the most suitable structure for delivering decentralisation would be local transport consortia, comprised of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), local authorities and/or PTEs. These bodies might end up being cosignatories to franchise agreements, or they could buy local enhancements to the base specification of the franchise. This power currently exists but has been little used – probably because these enhancements have to be locally funded in perpetuity. The paper also looks at whether the government might take over funding of these enhancements after a certain period (e.g. three years). The paper proposes other possible scenarios such as having multiple specifications for one franchise; one principle franchise with one or more 'micro-franchises'; and devolving an entire franchise to a consortium.<sup>9</sup>

## 2 The role of the EU

The European Union has been intimately involved in railway development within since 1985 when the White Paper of that year, on completing the internal market, set out the guidelines

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<sup>5</sup> [HC Deb 18 July 2007, cc23-25WS](#); and DfT, [Guidance on the role of Transport for London in the Department for Transport's rail franchising process](#), July 2007

<sup>6</sup> DfT, [The new system for the role of English PTEs in the rail franchising process](#), July 2006

<sup>7</sup> [Merseyrail Electrics Network Order 2002 \(SI 2002/1946\)](#)

<sup>8</sup> consultation closes on 28 June

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, paras 4.36-4.47

for the common European transport policy. The aim of the four waves of legislation that followed (an initial Communication and three railway ‘packages’) has been to promote the efficiency and competitiveness of European railways through gradual liberalisation:

- the First Railway Package aimed to open up the trans-European rail freight network to international goods services by 2008;
- the Second Railway Package was designed to provide for a legally and technically integrated EU railway area; and
- the Third Railway Package aimed to revitalise the international rail passenger market by extending competition and establishing a harmonised system of minimum passenger rights, to improve the interoperability of the EU rail system and to enhance the performance and size of the EU rail freight market.

The legislation has been amended over the years. The most recent proposals date back to September 2010 when the Commission proposed a recast of the First Package as part of its proposal for a single European Railway Area which would allow operators to run services across the whole of the Union on compatible track, using interoperable equipment. Agreement on how to proceed was reached at the June 2011 European Transport Council. In January 2012 new regulations on interoperability came into force; this affects both the conventional and the high speed rail network.

Information on EU rail policy can be found in HC Library note [SN184](#).

### **3 The infrastructure manager – Network Rail**

[Network Rail](#) (NR) is responsible for the railway infrastructure (i.e. the track, signals, bridges and stations). Its main customers are the train and freight operating companies who run train services over the network. It is a company limited by guarantee (CLG), run on commercial lines but without shareholders and, therefore, any profits generated should be reinvested in the railway.

Network Rail’s role includes:

- operating the network;
- managing performance;
- directing service recovery;
- setting timetables;
- allocating capacity;
- leading industry planning; and
- maintaining, renewing and developing the network.

NR owns all [railway stations](#) but, with the exception of 17 major stations which it runs, they are leased to the train operating company (TOC) which is the main user of that station.

Information on Network Rail and its activities can be found on its [website](#).

Although Network Rail assumed a number of responsibilities from Railtrack when it took over the rail infrastructure in 2002; it acquired a range of other responsibilities as a consequence of Labour's [2004 rail White Paper](#), consequently legislated for in the [Railways Act 2005](#). In addition to retaining its core responsibilities for operating, maintaining and renewing a safe national rail network, from 4 April 2005 NR also took on responsibility for:

- drawing up [route utilisation strategies \(RUS\)](#) for agreement by government that make best use of the network's capacity;
- devising efficient and clear timetables based on those route strategies, and input from train companies;
- directing network operations, and getting services back on track following incidents and delays;
- driving up the operational performance of the network;
- devising and delivering infrastructure maintenance and renewals, as well as delivering enhancements to the network as appropriate; and
- accounting publicly for performance.<sup>10</sup>

The government also said that it would not be involved in NR's management strategy for delivering the specified outputs or in its day-to-day operations. Operational responsibility lies with the company's own management team. They decide how best to deliver the outputs set by the government such as where track needs replacing, and where to target their efforts on strengthening embankments or maintaining signalling systems, as well as on other local-level decisions. Where proposed changes fall outside the government's output specifications, or where a case has to be made for additional enhancement funding, the government's approval is required. Other service changes do not normally require government sign-off. NR is free to deploy any profits that it earns as it sees fit in improving the network, which may include sponsorship of enhancement schemes.

### **3.1 Proposed structural changes to how the network is managed and operated**

In his May 2011 report, Sir Roy McNulty recommended that NR and the train operating companies (TOCs) look at the potential benefits of closer working. To achieve this there should be more transparency of information, which should be available via franchise and a vertically integrated exemplar of a regional unit.<sup>11</sup> These ideas should be taken in the context of moves NR had already made to restructure itself into regional business units, in anticipation of closer working with TOCs. In February 2011 NR announced that it was devolving accountability to the route level so that each route managing director would, in effect, be running their own infrastructure railway business with significant annual turnover and resources.<sup>12</sup> In April 2012 NR and South West Trains announced the formation of a joint management team for the franchise, essentially vertical integration.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> [HC Deb 9 March 2005, c110WS](#); and: ORR, [Notice of proposed modifications to network rail's network licence: industry performance and planning and route utilisation strategies](#), April 2005

<sup>11</sup> *op cit.*, [Realising the Potential of GB Rail: Final Independent Report of the Rail Value for Money Study](#), section 23.1.2 and 25.2.1

<sup>12</sup> NR press notice, ["Network Rail moves to create devolved business units"](#), 21 February 2011

<sup>13</sup> NR press notice, ["Passengers to benefit from our new alliance with South West Trains"](#), 30 April 2012



## 4 Train operating companies (TOCs)

Train operating companies (TOCs) provide [passenger](#) and [freight](#) services.

### 4.1 Passenger services

Since privatisation in the mid-1990s, there have been two types of passenger rail service on the UK rail network: open access operators (i.e. those that bid for 'slots' – specific parts of the overall National Rail timetable – to operate their own passenger services) and franchisees (i.e. those who operate a contracted service on a particular part of the rail network under licence from the government and the regulator). By far the majority of services are franchises. Currently there are only two open access operators: [Hull Trains](#) and [Grand Central](#).<sup>14</sup>

The way franchising works is that the government sets out a specification for what it would like a franchise to do over a set period (level of service, upgrades, performance etc.). Companies then bid for the right to operate a franchise to that specification. The government picks whichever company it thinks will deliver the best overall package for the franchise and give the best value for money. Franchise agreements include details of the performance standards that franchisees must meet and arrangements for the termination of a franchise in the case of failure to meet these standards.

TOCs and Network Rail undertake track and station access agreements and these have to be approved by the regulator (ORR). A comprehensive list of the franchised TOCs, their operating names, and the lengths of each franchise is given in section 1 of HC Library note [SN1343](#). Information on individual franchises, including individual franchise agreements and service level commitments, can be found on the [Department for Transport website](#).

The [Association of Train Operating Companies \(ATOC\)](#) is an incorporated association owned by its members (TOCs), and set up following privatisation in the early 1990s. ATOC is the official representative body of the passenger railway to the government, regulatory bodies, and the media. It also coordinates the joint activities of train operators, and is responsible for, *inter alia*, National Rail Enquiries and administering Railcards.

### 4.2 Freight

Rail freight companies are open access operators. They have reserved slots in the timetable, which they use only when they need to do so. Rail freight companies currently pay access charges on an incremental basis: they do not contribute to the substantial core costs of the network. The main freight companies operating in the UK are [Freightliner](#), [DB Schenker Rail](#) and [GB Railfreight](#).

The [Rail Freight Group \(RFG\)](#) is a company limited by guarantee and all revenue is put back into providing services to members. It was originally formed in 1991 to represent the views of those involved with the rail freight industry that were not British Rail. RFG's aim is to promote cost effective rail solutions for freight.

## 5 Rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs)

The rolling stock (trains) that run on the railways is owned by three private companies ([rolling stock leasing companies, or ROSCOs](#)). These companies lease the rolling stock to the train

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<sup>14</sup> this does not include others that could be considered open access operators, like Eurostar and the Heathrow Express

operating companies (TOCs) who then deploy it on their services. For the most part, the train companies procure the rolling stock directly from the rolling stock companies. There are three main ROSCOs – Porterbrook, Angel and Eversholt:

- [Porterbrook](#) is jointly owned by a consortium led by Deutsche Bank (and including Lloyds TSB and BNP Paribas) and OP Trust Private Markets Group (a Canadian company which also owns rail equipment). At its last sale in 2009 it was worth £1.4 billion;
- [Angel Trains](#) is owned by a consortium led by Babcock & Brown (and including Deutsche Bank and Australian investment funds). At its last sale in 2008 it was worth £3.6 billion;
- [Eversholt Rail](#) is owned by Eversholt Investment Group, a consortium consisting of investment funds managed by 3i Infrastructure plc, Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners and STAR Capital Partners. At its last sale in 2010 it was worth £2.1 billion.

In addition, in recent years the government has stepped in to procure large rolling stock orders directly from the train manufacturers. Procurements for schemes such as the InterCity Express Programme, Thameslink and Crossrail have become mired in controversy due to the award of successive contracts to companies based largely outside of the UK. Further information is given in HC Library note [SN3146](#).

## **6 Regulation**

The [Office of Rail Regulation \(ORR\)](#) is responsible for a number of regulatory areas – some more controversial than others. Its main job is to ensure that the rail network performs smoothly and, where it does not, to remedy any problems and hold those responsible to account. It is responsible for safety regulation, the performance of, access to and investment in the network.

One of ORR's key roles is regulating Network Rail, the infrastructure owner and operator. While the regulator does not have a role in regulating the train and freight operating companies, its decisions regarding Network Rail have a direct effect on train services. The regulator can fine Network Rail for breaches to its network licence, which it has done on a number of occasions since 2002.

ORR is presently in the early stages of the quinquennial periodic review process during which it sets Network Rail's outputs and funding for the following review period (this one will run from 2014 to 2019).

In response to the May 2011 Rail Value for Money study, ORR launched a wide-ranging industry reform programme, with the aim of working with the industry to address the recommendations made in the study's final report. This included a consultation on whether ORR should assume regulatory responsibilities for the train operating companies. The government endorsed this approach in its March 2012 command paper where it set out its aspiration to unify the regulatory structure under the ORR. Full details of ORR's economic regulation can be found in HC Library note [SN2071](#).

### **6.1 The Periodic Review**

The rail industry Periodic Review typically takes place every five years. Central to the review is ORR's assessment of what NR must achieve, the money it needs to do so, and the

incentives needed to encourage delivery and outperformance. The review also looks at how NR should work more closely with train operators, suppliers and others to reduce costs and deliver more for customers.

Each review covers what is called in rail industry planning a 'control period'. We are currently in Control Period 4 (CP4), which runs from 2009 to 2014. The outputs and the funding that NR must deliver over this period were set during the [Periodic Review 2008 \(PR08\)](#). In 2011 the ORR launched [Periodic Review 2013 \(PR13\)](#) which will specify outputs and expenditure for CP5, from 2014 to 2019.

PR13 will work as follows:

- In September 2011 the rail industry<sup>15</sup> published its proposals – the Initial Industry Plan (IIP).<sup>16</sup> The IIP provided the starting point for discussions with the government and ORR on the priorities for CP5;
- In July 2012 the Department for Transport and Transport Scotland set out what they want the industry to achieve, and how much funding is available in the High Level Output Specifications (HLOSs) and the Statements of Funds Available (SoFAs);<sup>17</sup>
- In January 2013 NR will produce its final business plan;
- In 2013 ORR will publish their draft determination, expected in June, and their final determination in October.

## 6.2 Safety regulation and accident investigations

The [Office of Rail Regulation \(ORR\)](#) is the independent health and safety regulator for the railway industry, including metros, light rail and heritage, following implementation of the [Railways Act 2005](#). It covers the safety of the travelling public as well as workers on the railways. As the independent economic and safety regulator, ORR can take enforcement action to ensure that those who have duties under the law are held to account for failures to safeguard health and safety.

ORR's health and safety strategy is to secure the proper control by duty holders of risks to the health and safety of employees, passengers and others who might be affected by the operation of Britain's railways. HM Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) sits within the ORR and they have Inspectors and policy advisors who work together to develop and deliver the strategy.

The term 'duty holders' means railway operators such as [Network Rail](#), the [freight](#) and [train operating companies](#) and contractors who have responsibilities under health and safety law. The organisations which manage the business of the railways have the direct responsibility for health and safety but HMRI aims to work with the rail industry to help them in identifying common problems and to agree actions and priorities.

The [Railways Act 1993](#) brought all railway safety legislation within the framework created by the [Health and Safety at Work Act 1974](#), as amended, and confirmed the [Health and Safety](#)

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<sup>15</sup> Network Rail; the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC; the Rail Freight Operators' Association (RFOA); and the Railway Industry Association (RIA)

<sup>16</sup> NR, et al., [Initial Industry Plans 2011](#), September 2011; note there are two plans – one for England & Wales and the other for Scotland

<sup>17</sup> DfT, [High Level Output Specification 2012](#), 16 July 2012; and: Transport Scotland, [The Scottish Ministers' High Level Output Specification](#), 10 July 2012

[Commission \(HSC\)](#) as the principal provider of policy advice to Ministers on railway safety issues. The duties of the ORR with respect to railway safety for the most part replicate those of the HSC as set out in sections 11 and 50 of the 1974 Act. A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the HSE and ORR in order to ensure effective coordination and cooperation between these organisations in relation to the regulation of health and safety, including policy matters and the enforcement of health and safety law, on railways, tramways and other guided transport systems in Great Britain.

HMRI carries out inspections and audits to check that the rail industry has management systems in place and that they are effective in controlling the health and safety risks as set out in the safety cases. HMRI also targets risk areas of particular concern under what is called mandatory inspection programmes.

HMRI is responsible for the investigation of breaches of criminal law and health and safety legislation on the railways while the ORR and the [Rail Accident Investigation Branch \(RAIB\)](#), investigate accidents on the railways. RAIB carries out investigations into the most serious rail accidents and incidents without apportioning blame or liability with a view to enabling lessons to be learned, improving safety on railways and preventing similar accidents and incidents. HMRI is responsible for implementing any recommendation made by RAIB following the completion of their investigations.

## **7 Passenger representation**

Information on how to make a complaint about rail services can be found in section 1 of HC Library note [SN3163](#).

[Passenger Focus](#) is the official, independent voice of all rail passengers. It is a single GB-wide organisation which replaced the previous Rail Passengers Council and regional Rail Passengers Committees in July 2005. Its function is to get the best deal for Britain's rail passengers. It conducts research such as the annual National Passenger Survey and campaigns. It also takes up second tier complaints for passengers who have had an unsatisfactory response from train operators.

[London TravelWatch](#) (formerly London Transport Users Committee) is the representative of London's transport users and was set up under the *Great London Authority Act 1999*. Complaints can be made to London TravelWatch about rail services, on the National Rail Network in or around London, in writing or online.

## **8 Association of Community Rail Partnerships (ACoRP)**

[ACoRP](#) is a federation of over 60 community rail partnerships and rail promotion groups. Community rail partnerships are flexible informal partnerships which bring together railway companies, local authorities and the wider community to promote and develop local rail services. They are funded mainly by local authorities and the local train operator. Further information on community rail lines can be found in HC Library note [SN3285](#).