

War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia

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This paper provides a brief history of the war in the Former Yugoslavia and looks at the parties to the conflict from a military perspective. It examines the changed strategic situation since the spring of 1995 and the future roles of NATO and UN peacekeeping forces. A complimentary paper will look at political attempts at resolution of the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts since May.

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Contents

	Page
I The Start of the War	5
II The Conflicting Parties in Bosnia: Spring 1992-Spring 1995	6
III UN Peacekeeping Forces in the Former Yugoslavia	9
A. History and Structure	9
B. The British Contingent	10
C. Role	11
IV NATO Forces	13
V The Formation of the UN Rapid Reaction Force	14
VI The Croatian August Offensive and the Fall of Serb Krajina	16
VII Sarajevo and Operation Deliberate Force	18
VIII The September Offensive	20
IX The Peace Implementation Force	21
X The Future	22
Annex A	
Factions in the Bosnian Conflict	25
Annex B	
The UN Rapid Reaction Force	26

I The Start of the War

The final collapse of Yugoslavia began on 25th June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia, two of the constituent republics of the Federal Republic, declared their independence. On that day units of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) sought to resubordinate Slovenia to the Federation by attempting to seize the capital, Ljubljana, using troops garrisoned there and by invading from neighbouring Croatia. JNA efforts were half-hearted in the face of stern Slovene resistance and ceased after only ten days.

Prior to June 1991 the armed forces of the Federal Republic were divided into two separate groups of forces. Firstly there were the regular army (169,000, about sixty per cent conscript with 1,850 tanks), an air force and a small navy.¹ The JNA was notable in being dominated by Serbs and Montenegrans who constituted 70 per cent of the officer corps. Secondly, fearful of invasion and remembering the partisans of World War Two, Tito had established Territorial Defence Forces on a republic basis. The latter were equipped with small arms and some anti-tank weapons only. The bulk of the equipment used by both JNA and the Territorial forces was either of Soviet origin or produced by Yugoslavia's large indigenous defence industries.

During the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 the JNA made sure that the majority of the heavy weapons of the Federal Army either returned to Serbia or passed into the hands of local Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia. In turn, these forces also benefitted from the military experience of Serb officers and NCOs. In contrast, the armed forces of the new republics of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, and of the Bosnian Croats, were based initially on the mobilized Territorial Defence Forces with only small regular cadres.²

After its defeat in Slovenia, the JNA was unwilling to abandon Croatia without a fight, particularly those areas with substantial Serb populations. From the end of June, JNA units, together with Serb militias, quickly seized control of the predominantly Serb areas of Krajina and Western and Eastern Slavonia in battles with the Croatian National Guard and Croat militias. Fighting was particularly intense in Eastern Slavonia, an area bordering the Serbian Republic, where there was a large JNA presence. The climax of the first round of the Croat-Serb war was the siege of the Croat-occupied town of Vukovar in this region which fell to the Serbs in mid-November after a three-month siege.³ Fighting also took place around the Croatian Dalmatian port of Dubrovnik which was shelled for the first time in October 1991. Between June 1991 and February 1992 it has been estimated that the war in Croatia cost some 10,000 lives.⁴

¹ IISS, *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp.96-97

² see M. Vego, 'The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1993

³ M. Thompson, *A Paper House: the Ending of Yugoslavia*, p.297

⁴ op.cit. p.299

Research Paper 95/100

The war ended in stalemate in early 1992. The Serbs had achieved control of the mainly Serb-populated areas and the Croats were not able to dislodge them. The introduction of UNPROFOR peacekeepers in ceasefire zones between the opposing sides in Slavonia and Krajina from January 1992 effectively froze the battlefield. Attention moved to Bosnia where a fresh conflict broke out in spring 1992 but here again lines of confrontation, although fluctuating, became fairly fixed.

From spring 1995, the conduct of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia changed dramatically. Three years of largely static warfare gave way to a war of movement. Following the Croatian seizure of the Serbian pocket of Western Slavonia in May, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) moved to capture the eastern Bosnian government "Safe Areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa in July. Later that month Bosnian government (BiH), Bosnian Croat (HVO) and Croatian government (HV) forces moved to push BSA units back from the Dalmatian/Bosnian border. These operations presaged a large-scale Croatian government offensive to regain control of the Serb-controlled Krajina in August and a combined BiH, HV and HVO offensive which drove the BSA out of much of north western Bosnia in September. Discovering a new robustness following the hostage crisis of May, the UN created a Rapid Reaction Force which deployed to the outskirts of Sarajevo in July. NATO mounted a concerted air offensive against the BSA in August in response to a Serb mortar attack on Bosnian civilians in the capital. NATO and the UN, which had been considering NATO military intervention to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, have now turned to consider direct NATO enforcement of a new peace agreement.

II The Conflicting Parties in Bosnia: Spring 1992-Spring 1995

In contrast to the conflict in Croatia which, despite acts of barbarity and ethnic cleansing, quickly turned into a more conventional war of two sides, the conflict in Bosnia became more complex. Between 1992 and spring 1995, it perhaps most resembled medieval warfare with its fortified strongholds, sieges, rebels and atrocities, committed by all parties albeit in differing degrees. Like medieval warfare, the struggle was influenced by factors of supply and the climate. No side had the extensive logistical back up of a modern army and each was forced to some extent to live off the land. Operations were also severely curtailed each winter by bad weather.

The war in Bosnia began as a three-sided conflict between Bosnian Croat forces (HVO), the Bosnian government army (BiH, predominantly Muslim) and the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) in spring 1992. Both the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs received assistance from the Republics of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), respectively. The Bosnian Serb Army also worked in collaboration with the Serbian forces in the Croatian

region of Krajina (Army of the Serb Republic of Krajina, ARSK). In Bihac, a Bosnian government enclave in north western Bosnia, the conflict was further complicated by the presence of the so-called Army of Western Bosnia, led by the Serb-backed Fikret Abdic, a Muslim who had fallen out with the Sarajevo government.⁵

In autumn 1992, the BSA totalled some 70,000 regulars with around 300 tanks and 500 artillery pieces as compared to around 30-50,000 regulars in the BiH forces and 50,000 in the HVO. The latter factions deployed almost no heavy weapons.⁶ The BSA quickly used its numerical superiority to take over 70 per cent of the area of Bosnia Herzegovina. However, it lacked the strength to take the mainly Muslim towns of eastern Bosnia: Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde; and the whole of the capital, Sarajevo. Prolonged sieges along fluctuating frontlines therefore ensued. A bitter conflict also raged between Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces in Mostar and to the west and north of Sarajevo.

Strategically, the conflict was altered by the ceasefire between Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces in March 1994 which led to the formation of a new Muslim-Croat Federation. This allowed the Bosnian government to redeploy many of its forces to face the BSA. It also meant that the Bosnian army could rely on occasional Bosnian Croat support against their now mutual foe. Croatian army units were withdrawn from Federation territory.

Since 1992 there has been a substantial improvement in both the quality and quantity of the Bosnian government army. From being a lightly armed and poorly organized militia, it has become a more professional and better equipped force. The BiH army now expanded to around 110,000 regulars and, despite the UN arms embargo, has managed to procure heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons and other equipment.⁷ There have been allegations of arms supplies from sympathetic Muslim countries, such as Iran and Turkey, being supplied through Croatia. It seems likely that the Croatia Government, mindful of its former antagonism with Sarajevo, has taken pains to keep a firm grip on the supply.⁸ In addition, several hundred *Mojahedin* were reported to be fighting on the BiH side in the initial stages of the conflict but, they now seem to have been removed. Similar improvements took place in both the quality and quantity of the HVO.

There have also been suggestions that the US government has condoned or even covertly assisted with the armament of the BiH army. This has been denied. In July, Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant US Secretary of State for European Affairs stated that "The United

⁵ Fikret Abdic was backed by some 2,500-3,000 men. His army was dispersed or surrendered to the BiH by 8th August 1995.

⁶ IISS *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p.70

⁷ IISS *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, p.83.

⁸ *The Daily Telegraph* 7/6/95

Research Paper 95/100

States is not violating the arms embargo ... It is not arranging, co-ordinating, overseeing or participating in covert supply to the Bosnian government as some European officials have charged". Despite this statement, a number of retired US officers have been prominent in Bosnian government circles as advisers. Maj. Gen. John Sewall (ret) is the official adviser to the US Secretaries of State and Defense on the military affairs of Muslim-Croat Federation. It has been alleged that he has also advised the Bosnians on strategy and tactics. Gen. Galvin, a retired former NATO SACEUR, may also have given counsel to the BiH.⁹

In contrast to the BiH army, the BSA, its pool of manpower smaller than that of the Sarajevo government, was not able to expand. Thus, the balance of forces tipped towards the Bosnian government's favour as the conflict progressed. An analysis of July 1995 put BSA strength at 100,000 men with 450 tanks and 1,800 artillery and anti-aircraft guns in contrast to a combined total of 200,000 Bosnian government and HVO forces with some 135 tanks and 900 guns.¹⁰ There have also been reports that the closure of the border between the Bosnian Serb republic and Serbia proper in August 1994 has had an impact on the effectiveness of the BSA with shortages of fuel and ammunition. Limited resources dictated the nature of the conflict. Offensives by both sides need to be laboriously prepared. For example, the large BiH offensive around Sarajevo in mid-June petered out after a matter of days. Moreover, all sides had to contend with the fact that the international community had become engaged in the conflict, albeit reluctantly, and the presence of UN peacekeepers placed some checks on the ability of the warring sides to pursue their ultimate goals.

⁹ *International Herald Tribune* 29/7/95

¹⁰ *The Guardian* 19/6/95 and See Annex A

III UN Peacekeeping Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

A. History and Structure

The first UN peacekeepers arrived in Croatia in January 1992 although the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was not established until the following February under UNSCR 743.¹¹ There followed a deployment of a Canadian battalion, commanded by Gen. MacKenzie, to Sarajevo in the summer of 1992.

Under successive enlargements the UN presence in the Former Yugoslavia has expanded into the largest and most complex UN peacekeeping operation ever. Under UNSCR 761, the force was authorized to secure the airport of Sarajevo to assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid. The Canadians were later relieved by a force of three battalions from France, Egypt and the Ukraine, respectively. In August 1992, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 770 which called on states to take all necessary means to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. A UN force to protect humanitarian convoys, UNPROFOR II, was authorized by UNSCR 776 of September. This force began to deploy in October 1992 and was joined by a British battalion group in November. UNPROFOR was extended to Macedonia by UNSCR 795 of December 1992. The UN Safe Areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica were established in May 1993 under UNSCR 824. The size of the British contingent was expanded with the addition of another battalion group in March 1994.¹²

By mid-August 1995, the strength of UN forces in the Former Yugoslavia had peaked at some 50,000 soldiers from 36 countries, although this was below their authorized military strength of 57,000. Besides the UN Peace Forces (UNPF) HQ in Zagreb (2,500), in this month 12,500 UN troops were located in Croatia (UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, UNCRO), about 33,000 from 18 countries in or connected to operations with UNPROFOR in Bosnia and 1,100 in the UN Preventive Deployment (UNDRP) mission in Macedonia. As of 13th September 1995, 198 soldiers had been killed and 1606 injured during the UN operation in the Former Yugoslavia.¹³

The overall UN Military Commander in the Former Yugoslavia is the Frenchman Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier. His civilian counterpart has been Yashushi Akashi. Mr Akashi is set to be replaced temporarily at the end of October by Kofi Annan, the UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping, until a new postholder can be found.¹⁴ In Bosnia, Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith

¹¹ Britain contributed initially contributed an Army field ambulance to UNPROFOR in Croatia but this was withdrawn in September 1993, *SDE 94*, p. 46

¹² HC Deb 10/3/94 c 397-408

¹³ UNPF Factsheets 5/7/95 and 13/9/95

¹⁴ *The Guardian* 11/10/95

heads UNPROFOR. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) staff is led by the British Maj. Gen. David Pennefather.¹⁵

Following the Croatian reoccupation of the Krajina in August, the UN authorized a withdrawal of most of its forces in UNCRO reducing its numbers from 12,500 to 2,500. The latter will largely comprise UN troops remaining in Eastern Slavonia on a ceasefire line between the Croatian Army and rebel Serbs as well as UNMOs [military observers] and police in this and other zones.¹⁶ The reconfiguration, which started in September, is due to be completed by November when the UNCRO mandate faces renewal. The UNPF headquarters will remain in Zagreb. At the same time as the Croatian withdrawals were announced, secret planning began on a substantial withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia.¹⁷ The pull out, involving some 9,000 troops from Britain, Bangladesh, Canada, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey and Spain, was subsequently announced in early October.¹⁸ Many of the units were involved in patrolling Croat-Muslim ceasefire lines, a responsibility deemed no longer necessary, although UNMOs and civil police will remain in this task.

The scaling down of the UN presence in Bosnia and Croatia has taken place against a background of a severe UN funding crisis which has seen unpaid contributions to UN budgets reaching \$3.7bn. The UN has borrowed some \$300m from the peacekeeping budget to pay administrative costs. It now owes some \$900m to countries providing soldiers and equipment for peacekeeping duties. Such was the crisis that UN payments to peacekeepers were suspended at the end of September.¹⁹

B. The British Contingent

Following reinforcements, the British contingent in UNPROFOR reached a peak of about 8,000 personnel in August. The monthly cost of British military contributions to UNPROFOR and the UK financial contributions to the UNPROFOR budget totalled £26.1m per month.²⁰ To date, 18 British soldiers and four British aid workers have been killed in Bosnia.²¹ At the same time, France, which until recently deployed the largest number of UN troops, had some

¹⁵ See Section 5

¹⁶ *The Times* 11/8/95

¹⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 20/8/95

¹⁸ *The Guardian* 6/10/95

¹⁹ *JDW* 30/9/95

²⁰ The total UK humanitarian aid for the 95/96 financial year is £38.5m. HC Deb 19/7/95 c 1227w

²¹ Further details of British forces, including full casualty lists, are given in RP 95/55, pp.19-21 and Annex II and RP 95/69, pp.18-21. On 20th August, four British Servicemen died in a crash of a Lynx helicopter in the Adriatic.

7,000 men in the Former Yugoslavia.²² It has suffered the heaviest casualties of any troop contributor with 49 dead and some 300 injured.²³

On 21st September the MOD announced the first in a number of reductions in the size of the British Army presence. Following the deployment of additional Belgian and French artillery batteries to Bosnia, it was decided to withdraw the personnel of 19/5 artillery battery, based on Ploce, although not their guns. In addition, the majority of BRITCAVBAT would also be withdrawn, leaving one squadron of the Light Dragoons to serve with the RRF. This would lead to a net reduction of some 350 men. The roulement of HQ BRITFOR and many of its support units has begun and will be completed by November with the replacement of 1st Bn Devon and Dorsets by the 2nd Bn Light Infantry.²⁴ The other British battalion currently serving in Bosnia is the 1st Bn Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. At the beginning of October it was announced that the bulk of the 24th Airmobile Brigade would also be withdrawn.²⁵ When complete, this will reduce the size of the British contingent of UNPROFOR to about 4,500. Up until August 1995, it is estimated that British troops have killed some 200 soldiers of the various warring factions who have either attacked or threatened to attack British or other UN personnel over the previous three years.²⁶

C. Role

The UN command in the Former Yugoslavia has faced accusations of being inefficient, lethargic, bureaucratic and overly pliant in the face of force. Until the end of July 1995, the use of NATO airpower in Bosnia was determined by dual key arrangement whereby requests for air support were relayed upwards from battalion commanders, to Gen. Smith and then to Gen Janvier and Mr Akashi, the overall UN military and civilian commanders, in Zagreb, before being passed to the NATO commander, Admiral Smith, in Naples. Whereas the NATO commanders have favoured the use of force, UNPROFOR, and particularly its civilian hierarchy, has been more reticent, in part due to fears of provoking retaliation against UN military and civilian personnel on the ground. On 8th July 1995, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica asked for a Close Air Support to attack tanks firing on their positions. A limited CAS mission was mounted three days later.²⁷ The USA, in particular, was strongly critical of the often slow confirmation of airstrike requests.

²² UNPF Factsheet 13/9/95

²³ *International Herald Tribune* 24/8/95

²⁴ MOD PR 21/9/95

²⁵ *The Guardian* 6/10/95 and see Section 5

²⁶ *The Independent* 28/8/95. The additional cost to the MOD of UNPROFOR operations in 1993/94 was £73.92m, reimbursed by the FCO, of which only £20.84m was received from the UN. The additional cost of UNPROFOR operations in 1994/95 was £86.25 of which £39.39 has been received from the UN (Defence Select Committee Ninth Report, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995*, HC 572, Sess. 1994/95, Para 23).

²⁷ A journalist wrote of the UN HQ in Zagreb "It is impossible to convey properly the monumental torpor of UN headquarters in former Yugoslavia: soldiers sitting around; swigging beer; the heat; lines of gleaming white limousines; papers moving from desk to desk, to and fro, to and fro" (*The Observer* 16/7/95)

Research Paper 95/100

Despite these criticisms, the UN played a significant role in providing and escorting humanitarian aid and, until July 1995, acted to reduce the intensity of the conflict.²⁸ In 1992 the war claimed 120,000 civilian lives; in 1993, 11,000 and; in 1994, less than 3,000. Up until mid-June 1995, 300 civilians had been killed.²⁹ One reason for this relative decline had been the ceasefire between Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces, agreed in 1994, which the UN continues to police. A further reason was the manner in which UNPROFOR, as with previous UN peacekeeping operations, acted to stabilize many of the lines of confrontation between opposing sides. Until mid-1995 they had not moved significantly since 1992. Lawrence Freedman holds that the early UN presence "altered the course of the war. The Serbs were not able to finish the job they started in 1992, and the Bosnian army has been given a breathing space to regroup, to free itself from a second front against the Croats, to rearm (covertly but significantly) and to test itself in battle".³⁰

Whatever its success in the Former Yugoslavia, the UN has faced the conflicting priorities of undertaking peacekeeping operations (the provision of humanitarian aid, policing of ceasefires and negotiations between warring parties based on their consent) and peace enforcement (retaliation against a side in a conflict for violation of UN Security Council Resolutions). Many critics of the UN operation in Bosnia have seen evidence of "mission creep" that is of a fairly limited peacekeeping operation with limited objectives being dragged into a conflict for which it was not prepared and not intended. Certainly, many felt that there was a danger of crossing the 'Mogadishu Line' and, as with the UN mission in Somalia, becoming embroiled in a conflict as a contending party.

At the same time there has been evidence of the UN's marginalization in the conflict. UNPROFOR in Bosnia was run increasingly by Britain and France, often with little consultation with the UN civilian hierarchy. Under American pressure, the balance between NATO and the UN in the planning and authorization of airstrikes passed increasingly to the former. In addition, the UN peacekeepers position during the fall of the eastern Safe Areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and the role of UNCRO during the Croatian August offensive were perhaps morally ambiguous. On the one hand UN troops appeared powerless to prevent the ethnic cleansing and atrocities which took place. On the other, they lacked the mandate and, more importantly, the weaponry and the numbers to protect the weak. Even maintaining their limited role led to a number of UN casualties. During the summer of 1995 there were increasing signs that the UN Secretary General has become frustrated with the cost and nature of the UN's mission in the Former Yugoslavia, buffeted, as it were, between the warring factions on the one side and the members of the Security Council on the other. If peace can be agreed in Bosnia, NATO will assume direct responsibility for its enforcement and the UN

²⁸ The UN provided support for 2.7m people in Bosnia. Between July 1992 and April 1995, 153,000 tonnes of food aid were airlifted in Sarajevo (HC Deb 19/7/95 c 1742). Some international aid has been used to feed the rival armies.

²⁹ US Secretary of Defense William Perry quoted in *AN* 10/6/95

³⁰ *The Times* 13/7/95

may be restricted to residual peacekeeping activities in Eastern Slavonia and Macedonia and, for the time being, solely non-military activities in Bosnia.

IV NATO Forces

NATO involvement in the Former Yugoslavia began in 1992 when the Alliance began to monitor UN sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic by both air and sea. Called Operation Sharp Guard, the authority for this action was derived from UNSCR 787. A fluctuating force of up to 20 destroyers and frigates under the joint NATO/WEU Combined Task Force 440 continues in this task and usually includes two RN ships. Thereafter NATO intervention expanded. UNSCR 781 of October 1992 established a No Fly Zone over Bosnia to be monitored by NATO AWACs aircraft. NATO combat air patrols to enforce the Zone were authorized under UNSCR 820 and began on 10th June 1993. UNSCR 836 of June 1993 then authorized the use of NATO air power in and around the Safe Areas in support of UNPROFOR either in a strategic or close air support role.

Despite the introduction of these measures, it was not until 28th February 1994 that US jets shot down Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the Zone. This was the first use of NATO military force in its history. On 10th April 1994, US aircraft carried out the first NATO airstrike, attacking BSA positions near Gorazde. Air power was used on four subsequent occasions during 1994 and three times during 1995, usually on single targets, before the NATO air offensive which began in late August.³¹ NATO operations in the Former Yugoslav theatre are co-ordinated by the US commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), based in Naples. The incumbent is Adm. Leighton Smith.

There are some 200 allied fighters, ground attack, reconnaissance, transport and AWACs aircraft based in Italy. Approximately half of these come from the USA and the remainder from Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. At the end of June, the *Bundestag* voted to dispatch *Luftwaffe* aircraft to Italy; and a 500-man military hospital and logistical units to Split to support the RRF in Bosnia.³² The air contingent, supported by 1,000 air and ground crew includes six reconnaissance and eight anti-radar Tornados as well as 12 transport aircraft.³³ The German air group has flown the first *Luftwaffe* operational sortie since World War Two but have yet to use their weapons offensively. An RAF contingent of eight Tornado F3 fighters and 8 Harrier ground attack aircraft continue to be

³¹ *The Financial Times* 31/8/95 and *The Times* 31/8/95

³² The vote was 386 for to 258 against with 11 abstentions. Many opposition SPD Members deserted the party line and voted for the CDU/CSU/FDP government (*International Herald Tribune* 1/7/95).

³³ *Jane's Defence Weekly* 1/7/95

based at Gioia del Colle in southern Italy.³⁴ They were joined by two Jaguars, flown out in late August, to provide laser designation of targets.³⁵ Following the fall of Srebrenica, the Italian government offered the use of 14 strike aircraft to NATO for the offensive and the opening of a new air aid route from Pisa to Split.³⁶ Italian aircraft participated in their first mission over Bosnia on 4th September 1995.³⁷ NATO air forces on land are supplemented by three carrier task groups, one British, one French and one from the USA, usually stationed in the Adriatic. They deploy approximately 100 aircraft of which the majority are American. Six Sea Harriers fly from *HMS Invincible*.

V The Formation of the UN Rapid Reaction Force

The decision to establish a new Rapid Reaction Force was taken in response to the seizure of 300 UN peacekeepers as hostages at the end of May. The unit was formally set up on 3rd June. A strength of 12,500 was sanctioned by the UNSCR 998 although the force has never grown beyond around 10,000. The RRF was to be drawn from existing British troops in Bosnia and British, Dutch, and French reinforcements. Contributions were also expected from other countries but only Belgium provided a fresh front-line contingent in the form of an artillery battery.³⁸ Although no US personnel are assigned to UNPROFOR in Bosnia or to the Rapid Reaction Force, President Clinton provided 2 US merchant ships and 11 transport aircraft to help with the latter's deployment using executive contingency funding.³⁹

The RRF was initially the subject of confusion as to its role, rules of engagement and command. It appears to have been a largely Anglo-French initiative which was taken forward in advance of consultation with the UN and European allies. Agreement between British, French and Dutch officials on the one hand and UN representatives on the other on its rules of engagement and command was not reached until two weeks after the formation of the RRF was announced.⁴⁰ Whereas Britain regarded the Force as a "theatre reserve"⁴¹ to assist other UN forces in the enforcement of their humanitarian mandate, France consistently viewed it as potentially undertaking more aggressive actions. Significantly, whereas British units in the RRF at first wore blue helmets and painted their equipment white, French units dressed for full military action. A sign of the dissonance surrounding the RRF was perhaps the fact that the word Rapid was removed and then subsequently reinstated as part of the formation's title.

³⁴ A Jaguar crashed during a training flight in Italy July 1995 (*Janes Defence Weekly* 8/7/95). An RN Sea Harrier was shot down over Bosnia in 1994.

³⁵ *The Times* 31/8/95

³⁶ *International Herald Tribune* 16/8/95

³⁷ *La Repubblica* 5/11/95

³⁸ 6 105mm guns with 200 men *JDW* 9/9/95

³⁹ *Janes Defence Weekly* 15/7/95

⁴⁰ *AN* 10/6/95

⁴¹ HC Deb 31/5/95 c 1099

The Rapid Reaction Force was divided into four parts: Task Force Alpha (Anglo-Dutch, some 1,500 men) and Task Force Bravo (French, some 1,700 men) (together the Multinational Brigade); the British 24th Airmobile Brigade (5,000); a largely Franco-German logistics group (2,400) and a French brigade (4,000) on standby in France. Initially, the military organization of the RRF appears to have progressed smoothly with British units in central Bosnia being regrouped as Task Force Alpha near Tomislavgrad. Two batteries of British guns and additional engineers and support troops had arrived by mid-June. In oral evidence to the Defence Select Committee given at the end of June, Malcolm Rifkind, then Defence Secretary, stated that the bulk of 24th Airmobile Brigade would arrive in Bosnia by the end of July. The MOD then stated that it would not be in place until mid-August.⁴² Additionally, it was reported that only half the brigade was to be deployed.⁴³ In the end only two of the major units of the Brigade, the 1st Bn Royal Anglian Regiment and 3rd Regt Army Air Corps were dispatched and finally arrived in mid-August.⁴⁴

The slow pace of deployment may have been due to several factors. Firstly, although preparations were made from late May for deployment, 24th Airmobile was at first only offered to UNPROFOR.⁴⁵ Actual deployment was not finally authorized until later. Secondly, despite being part of NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, the MOD had not formulated plans for the strategic deployment of the Brigade. Nearly a month after announcing its possible move, the MOD was still unclear as to how the Brigade would be transported to Bosnia. Further delay then occurred in waiting to take maximum advantage of the US offer of sea and air lift gratis. Additional problems were caused by the difficulty of negotiating use of the port of Ploce and onward passage in land with the Croatian and Bosnian governments. The fact that the French government appears to have dispatched Task Force Bravo to Bosnia via Ploce without consultation with Zagreb appears to have complicated matters. It now appears that after a period of possible obstruction, the Croatian government was satisfied and deployment of the Brigade began.⁴⁶ Whatever the complex reasons for the Brigade's slow arrival, this meant that Gen. Smith lacked a key element of his reserve, particularly of helicopters, at a time when they might have enabled a more forceful reaction to have been taken to the BSA attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa in July^{47 48}.

On 23th July, following the death of two French peacekeepers in Sarajevo, detachments of the RRF began to move towards the Bosnian capital. Units of Task Force Alpha and Task

⁴² HC 572, Sess.94/95, Para 27

⁴³ *The Times* 6/7/95

⁴⁴ *The Soldier* 21/8/95

⁴⁵ HC Deb 31/5/95 c 1004

⁴⁶ *The Sunday Telegraph* 2/7/95

⁴⁷ The extra British artillery and engineer units sent to Bosnia to reinforce Task Force Alpha will cost £26m a year. Deployment of 24th Airmobile Brigade for a full year was estimated to cost some £245m. The additional costs to the MOD of existing British military deployments to and in support of UNPROFOR are ultimately borne by the FCO which then seeks to reclaim these costs from the UN. It is unclear whether the financing of extra British contributions to the RRF has been resolved

⁴⁸ Further details of the RRF are given in Annex B

Force Bravo dug in on Mt. Igman, overlooking the city. They included 6 British 105 mm guns of 19 Field Regiment capable of retaliating against BSA forces should they open fire on UN positions or convoys in and around the city up to a range of 11 miles as well as Dutch and French 120 mm mortars for the same purpose. The remainder of TF Alpha and TF Bravo were tasked with protecting the aid route over Mt. Igman, then the only one open into Sarajevo.⁴⁹ After prolonged negotiations with the Croatian and Bosnian authorities, the French government was able to deploy eight 155mm guns onto Mount Igman. These were first used to retaliate against BSA positions in mid-August and have a range of up to 18 miles.⁵⁰ The RRF established a principle of proportionality, that is hostile fire was to be returned with fire of the same calibre⁵¹

At the beginning of October, the MOD announced that some 3,000 men of the 24th Airmobile Brigade would be withdrawn to the UK. Much of its equipment and a rear party of several hundred to service it will remain in Croatia. Its personnel can in theory be returned within a week. Whatever the political impact of its deployment, the Brigade has since spent the last two months largely inactive. The Bosnian and Croatian authorities have restricted its movements. The Brigade's main camp in Ploce is low lying and has suffered from flooding.⁵²

VI The Croatian August Offensive and the Fall of Serb Krajina

The conflict in Bosnia and relative positions of Croatia and Serbia have been transformed politically and militarily by the reoccupation of the Krajina by the Croatian army. This was completed within forty-eight hours of the start of an offensive on 4th August.

In a more profound way than its now BiH ally, the HV has been completely reorganized since Croatian independence. In autumn 1991, it numbered 22,000 poorly armed former territorials.⁵³ By 1995 this had expanded to over 100,000 men with, despite the UN arms embargo, substantial amounts of modern and heavy equipment. From the start, the Croatian government decided to recast its armed forces on western lines, and where possible with western equipment. Modernization was assisted by the presence of former Australian, Canadian and American soldiers of the Croatian diaspora. The sudden collapse of the notionally well-equipped Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (ARSK) of 55,000 men would appear at first surprising.⁵⁴ However, unlike the HV which had prepared to reconquer

⁴⁹ *Janes Defence Weekly* 29/7/95

⁵⁰ *International Herald Tribune* 24/8/95

⁵¹ *The Soldier* 16/10/95

⁵² *The Daily Telegraph* 6/10/95

⁵³ *IISS The Military Balance 1992-1993*

⁵⁴ Some 55,000 men in 6 Corps with 200 guns, 250 tanks, 9 helicopters and 16 combat aircraft.

the Krajina for the last four years, ARSK seems to have become complacent and not to have taken the same opportunity to recast itself as a modern army. The Yugoslav army (JNA) did not come to its support, although it quickly moved to reinforce Serb positions in Eastern Slavonia.

The Croat August offensive was prompted, in part, by the success of the more limited HV operation to retake the Serb-controlled pocket of Western Slavonia in May. Perhaps, a more important catalyst was the status of Bihac. Throughout July, the BiH government held enclave had been under attack from the BSA, the Krajina Serbs and the rebel Muslim forces of Fikret Abdic. The fall of Bihac, a key communications centre, would have enabled the Bosnian Serbs to complete their link up with their Krajina brothers and would thereby have consolidated Serb control over the Krajina. The ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica and Zepa in July also provided Zagreb with some moral high ground from which to sweep into its Serb-controlled territory.

The Croatian military revival of 1995 had an impact on the conflict in Bosnia. In July the Croatian and Bosnian governments concluded a military alliance, sanctioning a return of the Croatian army to Bosnia on Sarajevo's side. The August offensive had been preceded by earlier Bosnian Croat (HVO) operations in south-western Bosnia in July aimed at cutting off the roads to the Krajina Serb capital of Knin. The subsequent fall of the Serb Republic of Krajina greatly weakened the whole BSA position in western Bosnia. The siege of Bihac was lifted and the BiH 5 Corps located there was able to rearm itself with heavy weapons taken from Abdic, ARSK and the BSA. In south western Bosnia, the HV/HVO co-operated in carving out a buffer zone within Bosnia to protect the thin strip of the Croatian Dalmatian coast from BSA artillery fire. Meanwhile, the BiH army in central Bosnia and east of Bihac began to advance towards Banja Luka, the main Bosnian Serb stronghold in western Bosnia.

VII Sarajevo and Operation Deliberate Force

Although the events of August greatly improved the BiH army's position in central Bosnia, Sarajevo remained the key to the conflict. If Sarajevo were to fall to the BSA then this would guarantee the end of the UN mission and create an enormous refugee crisis. In military terms, the fate of Sarajevo had in the past been related to the three eastern Safe Areas of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. These acted, in a sense, as outlying bastions of the Bosnian capital by, firstly, tying down several thousand BSA troops, and, secondly offering jumping off places for the BiH forces to mount raids behind Serb lines.⁵⁵ By the end of July, only Gorazde, with its BiH garrison of 10,000, remained under Bosnian government control.

Following the conclusion of the London Conference on 21st July 1995, NATO and UN commanders began to concur on recourse to airpower to defend the remaining Safe Areas, particularly Gorazde. At a NATO meeting held on 25th July NATO members adopted a new proposal for airstrikes to be authorized solely by UN and NATO military commanders, cutting out the involvement of UN civilians. The modalities of this new command arrangement were agreed between Adm. Smith and Gen. Janvier on 1st August.⁵⁶ They stated that air strikes would be used to "deter attacks, or threats of attacks, against a safe area and to be ready, should deterrence fail, to conduct operations to eliminate any threat, or defeat any force engaged in an attack on a safe area".⁵⁷ Given the collapse of the Serb position in Krajina and its weakness in western Bosnia, BSA retaliation against the safe areas was expected. The air attacks were in part made possible by the completion of a reconfiguration of UNPROFOR which removed UN troops from isolated locations. In particular, the final withdrawal of UN troops from the eastern Safe Area of Gorazde took place on 29th August. This left only a handful of Russian UN observers in Serb-controlled territory. The scene was set for the NATO/UN reaction to the Serb mortar attack on 28th August. Two days later, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, its largest use of military power since the Alliance's inception, without fear of a repetition of the May hostage crisis.

On the first day of the offensive about 60 aircraft from Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands and the USA flew 300 sorties against 23 target areas. The initial waves concentrated on attacking Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft defences: missiles sites, radars and command centres. In the first half of 1995, the BSA greatly improved its air defence system. With possible assistance from Belgrade, the BSA brought sections of the pre-war Federal Yugoslav air defence system back into operation.⁵⁸ Radar on Mt. Jahorina, near Sarajevo, apparently had the ability to monitor NATO aircraft as they take off from bases in Italy and carriers in the Adriatic. The BSA deployed SAM 2 and mobile SAM 6 missiles as well as hand-held anti-

⁵⁵ The Observer 16/7/95

⁵⁶ *Atlantic News* 17/8/95

⁵⁷ wording of UN/NATO agreement, *Atlantic News* 17/8/95

⁵⁸ *The Times* 29/6/95

aircraft missiles and an array of more conventional anti-aircraft guns. These defences claimed a US F-16 fighter in early June. The first attacks quickly destroyed them.

With confidence of a degree of security, subsequent air strikes focused on ammunition factories, barracks and arms depots. British, French and Dutch artillery and mortars on Mt. Igman also fired at Bosnian Serb targets, including heavy weapons sites. The NATO and RRF actions were suspended on 1st September to allow for a BSA response to the NATO ultimatum for the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. By this time 500 sorties had been flown and 1,000 shells fired. As the reaction from the Bosnian Serb HQ at Pale was judged inadequate, a second phase of bombing began on 5th September. This continued until 14th September when attacks again ceased to allow for BSA withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a deliberate escalation designed to put pressure on Pale, US Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at targets in Banja Luka on 10th September. A US attempt to use F-117 Stealth fighters during the offensive was vetoed by the Italian government which refused to give permission for them to be based in Italy. This was in reaction to Rome's exclusion from the Contact Group and other key decision-making. Airstrikes were suspended on 20th September after it was felt that the BSA had finally complied with the NATO ultimatum. Subsequently, air strikes were mounted against Serb SAM sites on 4th October, and against a BSA bunker on 9th October following the death of Norwegian peacekeeper attributed to BSA shell fire.⁵⁹

In all, NATO aircraft flew some 3,500 combat sorties in August and September. About a quarter of these were air strikes; the remainder being reconnaissance or other support missions. In total 56 target areas were attacked containing 350 aiming points.⁶⁰ Two thirds of the sorties were flown by US aircraft.⁶¹ A single French Mirage 2000 jet was shot down by the BSA on 30th September. Although attempts were made to rescue the crew, they eventually fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serb government where they remain in custody.⁶² It is difficult to assess the levels of Bosnian Serb casualties. The Pale government claims that up to 200 Serbs have been killed as a result of Operation Deliberate Force.⁶³

Although some initial comparisons were made between NATO bombing and the Allied air offensive which presaged the Gulf War, in many respects the two were very different. NATO aircraft have been flying over Bosnia since 1993 and the area has been extensively photographed not only by aircraft based in Italy and the Adriatic but also by satellite, by U2 reconnaissance aircraft based in the UK and by unmanned US drones flying from sites in Albania. Some targeting has also been provided by forward air control units on the ground.

⁵⁹ *The Independent* 5/10/95 and 10/10/95

⁶⁰ *Independent on Sunday* 17/9/95

⁶¹ *International Herald Tribune* 2/10/95

⁶² Capt. Frederic Chiffot & Lt. Jose Souvignet

⁶³ *JDW* 16/9/95

In comparison with the Gulf War, the targets have tended to be much smaller and the aiming points within them more dispersed. In addition, the 300 aircraft available were considerably less than the over 1,500 used during Operation Desert Storm. In general, the terrain and inclement weather conditions have made target location difficult, in particular given the onus on minimizing civilian casualties.

VIII The September Offensive

In mid-September 1995, Croat-Muslim Federation troops with the assistance of the Croatian army launched a major offensive against the BSA in north western and central Bosnia. Within two weeks, they had captured some 1,500 square miles of territory from the Bosnian Serbs, or some 20 per cent of the total area of Bosnia. Significantly, the BiH/HVO gained control of many of the key lines of communication in north western and central Bosnia. Most of the road from Bihac to central Bosnia came under Federation control. The BiH army also seized the Teskavica Mountains to the east of Sarajevo, strengthening their position around the capital.⁶⁴

Although the Bosnian Serb reversal can be partially ascribed to the improvement in quality of the BiH/HVO since the beginning of the war and a degree of complacency on the side of the BSA, other factors were also important. The collapse of the Serbs in Krajina acted as a major psychological boon for the Federation and corresponding blow to the BSA. More importantly, the participation of the heavy weaponry and logistics of the Croatian army provided the BiH army with the backing to take advantage of its numerical superiority. As one observer commented, "In this offensive I would say that the Croatian Army was contributing 75 per cent, the Bosnian Croats 15 per cent and the Bosnian Army the rest".⁶⁵ Although the US Secretary of Defence has stated that the timing of the Croat-Muslim offensive and the Operation Deliberate Force was "co-incidence",⁶⁶ NATO attacks on the BSA command network had the effect of paralysing the central control of BSA forces in western Bosnia. Even the civilian phone network, upon which the BSA had often depended to co-ordinate the movement of its forces, was severely degraded making it difficult for it to respond to the BiH/HVO/HV offensive.⁶⁷

By the end of September, the offensive had run out of steam. BiH attempts to capture Banja Luka were thwarted, partly by reorganized BSA resistance and partly due to the withdrawal of HV heavy weapons, under US pressure. Washington feared that the fall of Banja Luka to Bosnian government forces might lead to direct Serbian involvement on the BSA side, and

⁶⁴ *The Independent* 6/10/95

⁶⁵ *The Guardian* 16/9/95

⁶⁶ *International Herald Tribune* 2/10/95

⁶⁷ *Independent on Sunday* 17/9/95

thus to a wider escalation of the Bosnian conflict. In early October, the BSA was able to regain some ground at the expense of the now tired and overextended BiH forces. The defences of Banja Luka have now been reorganized, making it unlikely that the BiH army can take the town. The BSA recovery prompted HV forces to return to assist the BiH and HVO. On 10th October, the HVO managed to take Mrkonji Grad, the last BSA held town on the main road linking north western and central Bosnia.⁶⁸ A period of jockeying for positions continued with both sides attempting to seize strategic sites in advance of a ceasefire. The extent of Croatian army's assistance to the BiH may create tensions between Bosnian and Croat in the future as many of the recent territorial gains have passed to Bosnian Croat rather than Bosnian government control.

IX The Peace Implementation Force

The conclusion of a peace agreement between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs brings the prospect of direct NATO intervention on the ground in the former Yugoslavia for the first time in the form of a Peace Implementation Force (PIF). Serious consideration of the parameters of a PIF began in NATO in September.⁶⁹ Planners are able to draw on elements of Plan 40103 (previous planning for NATO implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of 1993) and Plan 40104 (Operation Determined Effort, the mission to cover UNPROFOR withdrawal). The latter was given provisional approval by the NATO Permanent Council at the end of June after some delay.⁷⁰ An advance party of 80 NATO communications specialists, part of a communications network designed to organize any withdrawal, are now based at UN headquarters in Zagreb.⁷¹ Several hundred US communications and logistical specialists, also connected with the withdrawal plan, have moved to Vicenza in Italy. The evacuation was to have taken place via the Croatian ports of Split and Ploce which will now presumably serve as entry points for the PIF.

The overall commander of the PIF will be the US commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Admiral Smith. On the ground, the PIF may be led by the Allied Rapid Reaction Force HQ, deployed from Germany, which is currently under the command of Lt.-Gen. Sir Michael Walker. Figures of between 50,000 and 80,000 troops have been mentioned. The Force is likely to be equipped with tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons. Washington has promised to provide between 18,000 and 25,000 troops. Britain and France may provide up to 15,000 each, although part of these forces will include troops transferred from UNPROFOR.⁷² The British 3rd RM Commando Brigade and a UK-based mechanised brigade had previously been alerted for possible service in Bosnia as part of the British

⁶⁸ *The Independent* 11/10/95

⁶⁹ *AN* 20/9/95

⁷⁰ *Atlantic News* 28/6/95. See RP 95/55, *Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues*, pp.22-25 for further details.

⁷¹ *AN* 21/6/95

⁷² *The Independent* 6/10/95

contribution to Determined Effort.⁷³ It is unclear whether they will join the new operation. Other NATO countries will provide contingents, some of which will again transfer from UNPROFOR command on creation of the PIF. Planning for the new Force has taken a new urgency following the meeting of NATO defence ministers at Williamsburg in early October.⁷⁴

Despite the utility of previous plans, a number of questions relating to NATO intervention need to be resolved. Firstly, although the operation is intended to be under NATO command, it will require some form of UN involvement. A UN Security Council Resolution will be required to provide legal backing for the Force. It is likely to be sanctioned under Chapter 7, that is the peace enforcement chapter of the UN Charter, rather than Chapter 6, the section upon which peacekeeping is based, in order to allow robust rules of engagement. Despite this, the warring factions will still need to give their consent to the PIF's zone and manner of operations. Moreover, the UN may still retain some presence in Bosnia in the shape of UN special agencies which may retain responsibility for aid distribution, for example. Secondly, Russia has made clear its wish to be involved in the PIF and its objections to sole NATO command. Russia can of course veto any Security Council resolution. A compromise may need to be worked out in which Russian forces may operate in a combat support role, that is engage in engineering, communications and other reconstruction work rather than in front-line units. The creation of a PIF steering committee at NATO headquarters which would include some form of Russian representation as well as that from Islamic and eastern European countries, which may also contribute to the PIF, could allow NATO commanders in the field to retain operational control.⁷⁵ Thirdly, although the Clinton administration has assured its allies of its willingness to deploy US forces on the ground in Bosnia for the first time, this will require the authorization of Congress which cannot be guaranteed. Congress is unlikely to agree to such a deployment unless the mission is under NATO, in effect US overall command, and it is limited to a maximum of 12 months. NATO has also yet to address the contentious issue of how the PIF is to be funded. All the above issues may be discussed at a Peace Implementation Conference in London some time in November.

X The Future

The history of the Bosnian conflict has been one of the constant violation of ceasefires and agreements. It remains to be seen whether a lasting settlement can be reached between the opposing sides and the PIF can then be deployed. Crucially there will be an interlude

⁷³ *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1995

⁷⁴ AN 6/10/95. It is interesting to note the extent to which events can concentrate policymakers minds. A PIF would effectively be a form of Combined Joint Task Force discussion on the structure of which have been bogged down since the launch of the CJTF concept at the NATO Brussels summit of January 1994

⁷⁵ French participation might also sooth Paris' sensibilities; France is not member of the NATO military command structure.

between signature of an agreement and the arrival of NATO reinforcements in Bosnia. The deployment of an advanced ARRC HQ to Bosnia may take up to 72 hours.⁷⁶ Armoured and mechanized units could take many weeks to arrive. In the meantime, peace enforcement will be dependent on air power and the existing, now reduced former UNPROFOR units in Bosnia which may be considerably overstretched.⁷⁷ To add to this, the NATO deployment will take place in winter which will not only slow it down but also make accidents more likely.

It is also worth considering the situation after the departure of the PIF. On a military level, an examination of the September offensive and its aftermath may indicate that the Bosnian government army alone is currently incapable of matching the BSA on the battlefield on more than a local level. The US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, commented, "Before the NATO force leaves, we should expect to see some stability in the country. One of the requirements for stability would be reasonable correlations of forces ... To get that stability, there has to be some improvement in the Bosnian government military forces ... We would like to have some confidence that we have left a reasonably stable situation behind".⁷⁸ Gen. Shalikashvili, the senior US military commander, has spoken of a US team to "arm and train the Bosnian government to defend itself".⁷⁹ Such a move would seem unacceptable to NATO allies such as Britain and France, and also Russia, since it would imply that the PIF was not impartial. However, unless some way of strengthening the BiH forces or correspondingly reducing the level of armaments of the BSA and HVO can be found, the relative military weakness of the Sarajevo regime may threaten the stability of the Muslim-Croat Federation and any wider Bosnian peace settlement.

If NATO can leave Bosnia in a reasonably peaceful state, then some body may be required to continue to police ceasefire lines and liaise between the various parties on the ground. Although in theory this could fall to bodies such as the WEU or CSCE, such a traditional peacekeeping mission would seem most likely to be undertaken by the UN. Britain and France would seem likely to supply the major components of such a UN force. This raises the possibility of a long-term military commitment for Britain in Bosnia, a form of commitment which British governments have sought to avoid.

On a wider level, involvement in the Former Yugoslavia has been a difficult experience for the UN. The problems encountered in direct UN peace enforcement in Bosnia may mean that in the future the UN may be unwilling to engage in such 'wider peacekeeping' missions. Future UN peacekeeping operations may well be more small scale and strictly limited. In Europe, military alliances such as NATO and the WEU may prove willing to undertake peace

⁷⁶ *International Herald Tribune* 7/10/95

⁷⁷ *The Independent* 6/10/95

⁷⁸ *International Herald Tribune* 2/10/95

⁷⁹ *ibid*

enforcement on the UN's behalf. This may not be the case in other parts of the world such as Africa.

For NATO, intervention on the ground in Bosnia may prove a further test of the Alliance's credibility. The latter has recovered somewhat following the apparent contribution of Operation Deliberate Force to the Bosnian peace process. If the PIF fails to secure a lasting peace in Bosnia and is even forced to withdraw in the face of a resurgence of fighting, then many of the questions posed as to NATO's continued utility following the end of the Cold War may resurface. In the shorter term, the need to secure Russian approval for the deployment of the PIF in the UN Security Council and the desirability of Russian participation in the Force may lead to concessions being made in other areas of Russian-NATO relations. For example, NATO enlargement may be slowed down and the Alliance may also prove more flexible in discussions on revising the CFE Treaty to allow for greater Russian military deployments along its southern border.

For the EU, its failure to bring peace to Bosnia on its own has been a blow for the more ambitious aspirations for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is largely US pressure which secured the peace between Bosnian Croat and Muslims in 1994, and which continues to force on the Yugoslav peace process, with the EU and UN acting as apparent auxiliaries. Washington has also played a leading role in preserving wider Balkan security by, for example, brokering an agreement between Macedonia and Greece over the Greek recognition of the former and restraining Albanian ambitions in and concerns for the Albanian-populated Serbian province of Kosovo. Yet the current high level of US interest in the Balkans may prove temporary. The EU may thus face new responsibilities for Balkan security in the future. The Union may also have had some successes in the region. The EU administration of Mostar has made some contribution towards reconciliation between Croats and Muslims there. Elsewhere, the successful co-operation between British, French and Dutch troops in the Rapid Reaction Force may show what can be achieved on a local level in European defence co-operation.

Whatever the lessons of foreign involvement in the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, its resolution will remain one of the major tasks for the international community.

Annex A

Factions in the Bosnian Conflict

The armies of the various factions in the Bosnian conflict are divided into brigades of around 2-3,000 men and corps of around 10,000 men, the latter being roughly equivalent to a NATO division. Besides regulars, the number given below, each army can mobilize reservists and more informal militias at short notice.

Bosnian Government BiH

Some 100,000 men in 7 Corps with some 100 guns, 20 tanks and 5 helicopters. Some additional equipment captured from Abdic faction, ARSK and BSA around Bihac.

Bosnian Croats HVO

Some 45,000 men in 4 Corps with 200 guns and 100 tanks. Also some additional captured equipment.

Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)

Some 75,000 men in 7 Corps with 750 guns, 400 tanks, 18 helicopters and 20 combat aircraft. Possible addition of certain ARSK troops who have fled from Krajina to offset recent losses.

Croatian Army HV

Some 100,000 troops in six Corps with 300 guns, 200 tanks, 25 helicopters and 15 combat aircraft.

Croatian Serbs in Eastern Slavonia

Some 8,000 men together with some 10,000 men of JNA in support

Yugoslav Army JNA

Some 80-90,000 men in 8 Corps with some 650 tanks, 1,500 guns, 110 helicopters and 280 combat aircraft.

(Source: IISS *The Military Balance 1994-1995* and press)

Annex B

The UN Rapid Reaction Force

RRF Operations Staff Maj. Gen. David Pennefather (British)

1. Multinational Brigade Brig. Gen. Andre Soubirou (French)

Task Force Alpha (Lt. Col. J. Cook, some 1,500 men)

1st Bn Devon and Dorsets with 52 Warrior AIFV (Lt. Col. J. Cook, 720 men) being replaced on roulement by 2nd Bn Light Infantry

HQ and 2 batteries of 19 Field Regiment RA (the Highland Gunners, CO Lt. Col. R. Appleyard) with 12 105 mm guns (380 men)

1 light armoured sqn of the Light Dragoons with 16 Scimitar light tanks (100 men)

Dutch Marine mortar company with some 180 men and 6 120mm mortars

6-8 Lynx helicopters of 664 Sqn.

Other support units

Task Force Bravo Col. Antoine Lecerf (Some 1,700 men)

Predominantly French Foreign Legion with 12 AMX 10 light tanks, 18 armoured cars, 155mm guns, 120mm mortars, engineers and other integral support troops.

2. 24th Airmobile Brigade Brig. Robin Brims (Some 5,000 men, of which only 3,700 in theatre. In process of being withdrawn although rear party to remain)

1st Bn Royal Anglian Regiment and 3rd Regiment, Army Air Corps deployed (with 27 Lynx anti tank and Gazelle reconnaissance and liaison helicopters)

1st Bn Light Infantry and 4th Regiment Army Air Corps (some 30 Lynx anti-tank and Gazelle reconnaissance and liaison helicopters. Not deployed)

RAF Support Helicopter Force Group Captain Peter Crawford (with some 30 RAF Chinook and Puma transport helicopters)

1 Sqn. RAF Regiment for airfield defence

3. RRF Logistics Group (Some 2,400 mainly Franco-German)

4. French Brigade (4,500 on standby in France)

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