



## BRIEFING PAPER

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# Defence Estate strategy

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## Summary

The Ministry of Defence has outlined a 25-year plan to streamline its massive defence estate. Analysis by the National Audit Office (NAO) suggests implementing the plan will “extremely challenging” and there is a “significant risk” that the poor condition of the estate will affect defence capability.<sup>1</sup>

This briefing paper lays out the Government’s proposals and the key findings by the NAO. The Government’s plan focuses on the ‘Built Estate’ part of the Defence Estate and not the Training or Reserves estates.

The Government has committed to reducing the estate in size by 30% by 2040. It has identified 91 sites across the UK it intends to dispose of by that date. These range from historic Fort George in Scotland to Woolwich barracks in London to the closure of 40 Commando’s base in Devon.

The Ministry of Defence says its estate, which covers 1.8% of the UK land mass, is inefficient, expensive to maintain and incompatible with the needs of the modern armed forces. The future estate will be smaller and clustered around areas of specialisation.

The plan, also known as the Footprint Strategy, was published in [A Better Defence Estate](#) in November 2016. The Government says it an additional £4bn will be need to be spent on the remainder of the estate over the next decade. So far it has committed £1bn.

Closing these sites also releases land for up to 55,000 new homes as part of the Government’s wider target of releasing land for up to 160,000 new homes by 2020.

The National Audit Office has scrutinised the plan and concluded that much of it is uncertain and carries risk. In particular, the NAO criticises historic underfunding in the estate; identifies an £8.5bn shortfall in funding needed over the next 30 years to maintain the estate; and questions the assumptions underpinning the Government’s predictions of receiving £1bn in land receipts.

The NAO is also critical of the contract signed with an external, Capita-led consortium. This consortium is contracted as a Strategic Business Partner to the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, which is tasked with running the defence estate. However the NAO says the business partner, brought in to improve the DIO, has not met all expectations and has not made a notable difference in transforming DIO.

The Public Accounts Committee takes evidence on this subject on 16 January 2017.

### Box 1: What is the defence estate?

The defence estate is 1.8% of the UK land mass and is one of the largest estates in the country. It includes land, accommodation and training facilities. The estate as a whole covers 424,000 hectares (the MOD owns 220,000 hectares of land and foreshore and has access to a further 204,000 hectares) and the ‘built estate’ covers 30 million square metres. The MOD spent £4.8bn, or 12% of its budget, on the estate in 2015-16 of which £2.7bn was spent by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, which manages the majority of the built estate.<sup>2</sup> The estate comprises three main areas:

- The Built Estate: barracks, naval bases, offices, storage units, depots and airfields
- The Housing Estate: service family homes
- Training Estate: training areas and ranges<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> National Audit Office, [Delivering the Defence Estate](#), HC782 2015-16, 15 November 2016, press release

<sup>2</sup> National Audit Office, [Delivering the Defence Estate](#), HC782 2015-16, 15 November 2016

<sup>3</sup> [“A radical new approach to managing the Defence Estate”](#), Ministry of Defence, 11 May 2011

# 1. Defence estate plans under Coalition (2010-15) Government

The Coalition Government (2010-2015) sought to reduce the size of the defence estate and a number of sites were either closed or transferred between the services (primarily RAF stations to Army use).

The Government created the Defence Infrastructure Organisation to manage the Defence Estate in 2011.

The Army conducted a Basing Review in 2013 to accommodate both the reduction in size of the Regular forces outlined under the 2010 SDSR and personnel moving to the UK as a result of the decision to withdraw UK forces from Germany by 2020. The rebasing plan also envisaged consolidating the Army around seven centres within the UK based on specialisms. So armoured and tracked capability will be centred around Salisbury Plain Training Area and mechanised, wheeled capability around Catterick.

Relevant House of Commons Library briefing papers:

- [Defence Reform](#), SN06036, 18 July 2011
- [Army Basing Review 2013](#), SN06598, 3 April 2013
- [Defence Estate rationalisation](#), SN06607, 16 April 2013

## 2. Defence estate plans under current Government

### Summary

The Government set the objective of reducing the defence built estate by 30% in land mass in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

The Government has since identified 91 sites for disposal. These were announced in four written statements in January, March, September and November 2016. The Government laid out its strategic approach and rationale in *A Better Defence Estate* published in November 2016. The strategy is to the year 2040 and the timeframe for disposal of the 91 sites is spread from present to 2028.

This section summarises the key points of the Government's strategy.

### 2.1 SDSR commitment

The Government's plan to reduce the defence estate by 30% was made in the [National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review](#) (Cm 9161), published in November 2015:

4.62 The defence estate includes the land, accommodation and training facilities that support our Service personnel and are essential to the delivery of military capability. The MOD's current basing footprint does not meet the needs of our modern Armed Forces. We will make the MOD's estate better suited, while reducing it and making it more affordable. We will invest in key defence sites, and reduce the built estate by 30%, releasing public sector land for 55,000 new homes to support wider prosperity objectives.

### 2.2 The Better Estate Strategy<sup>4</sup>

The Ministry of Defence made four announcements in 2016 concerning plans to reduce the defence estate: in January, March, September and November. The January, March and September written statements announced a total of 35 sites to be disposed of. The Government then published *A Better Defence Estate* strategy paper in November 2016 which identified a further 56 sites for disposal – 91 sites in total.

The strategy document concerns only the built estate. The MOD is looking separately at the Training Estate and the Reserves Estate.

A full list of planned disposals including proposed relocation sites is provided in the [Better Defence Estate](#) strategy. The number of staff located at these sites was provided in response to a Parliamentary Question and is provided in the appendix.

- January 2016: 12 sites identified for disposal which, the MOD anticipates, will generate £500 million and will provide the land for around 15,000 new homes.<sup>5</sup>
- March 2016: 10 sites which the MOD anticipates will provide £140 million in land sales receipts and provide land for up to 7,000 homes.<sup>6</sup> The MOD said together,

<sup>4</sup> A note on terminology: The NAO refers to it as the Footprint Strategy and the Government has since used the term 'estate optimisation programme' in the NSS/SDSR first annual report 2016, para 2.17, which suggests further announcements about this strategy may use that term.

<sup>5</sup> "[Defence Minister Mark Lancaster announces release of MOD sites for development](#)", Ministry of Defence, 18 January 2016; MOD Estate Disposals, [DEP2016-0046](#), 18 January 2016

<sup>6</sup> "[Defence Estate Rationalisation Plan](#)", Ministry of Defence, 24 March 2016; [HCWS659](#)

these 22 sites will generate approximately £640 million and provide land for up to 22,000 new homes.<sup>7</sup>

- September 2016: 13 sites estimated to generate £225 million and provide land for up to 17,017 homes (of which some 12,565 are expected to materialise in this Parliament).<sup>8</sup>
- November 2016: [A Better Defence Estate](#) strategy published with a further 56 sites identified for disposal.

### Box 2: Key statistics of Better Estate Strategy

- 91 sites to be disposed of by 2040
- These 91 are some of the 300 most expensive to maintain and run
- Estimated £140m in savings from running costs over ten years
- Estimated £3bn in savings from running costs in total to 2040
- £4bn investment in the estate over next 10 years

## Planned savings

The MOD says these sites are some of the most expensive sites to maintain and disposal will “provide savings of over £140m of running costs over the next 10 years, rising to nearly £3bn in total to 2040.”<sup>9</sup>

The MOD explained its calculations of these figures in response to a tabled question:

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has gathered financial data on the running costs of each site intended for disposal under "A Better Defence Estate", including Hard Facilities Management, Soft Facilities Management, rates and utilities.

The savings are calculated from the difference between the disposal sites' and receiver sites' running costs. The savings have then been forecast based on the implementation plan's disposal date for each site.

The projected running cost savings also take into account potential Private Finance Initiative unitary charges. The MOD will continue to refine its assessments of savings throughout implementation of an update to parliament each year.<sup>10</sup>

## Funding of £4bn investment

The MOD says an additional £4bn of investment will be required over the next 10 years to enhance and develop new and existing infrastructure. The funding will be sourced from:

- £1bn from the Spending Review 15 settlement
- £1bn from the proceeds of the disposals in the next ten years
- £2bn from other sources as yet to be identified, possibly a Private Finance 2 (PF2) “or other finance mechanisms”.

<sup>7</sup> [“Defence Estate Rationalisation Plan”](#), Ministry of Defence, 24 March 2016 (video)

<sup>8</sup> [HCWS133, 6 September 2016](#)

<sup>9</sup> A Better Defence Estate, Ministry of Defence, 7 November 2016, p7

<sup>10</sup> [HC53020](#), 18 November 2016

## Reasons for estate rationalisation

The Defence Secretary's arguments in his statement to the House can be summarised as: the estate is inefficient, too expensive to maintain, too old and inappropriate for today's armed forces. These are laid out in the Better Defence Estate plan:

- Age of the estate: over 40% of built assets are over 50 years old
- Cost of maintenance: £2.5bn per annum
- Out of proportion: the armed forces have reduced in size by 30% but the estate has only reduced by 9% since the turn of the century
- Estate will be better focused on new centres of specialism
- Estate will be designed around "capability and regional clusters" to provide more stability for families (better employment opportunities for partners/spouses and more stable schooling). For example the Royal Marines will be centred in Devonport in the south west (excluding units in Scotland) and armoured and tracked army vehicles will be clustered around the Salisbury Plain training area.

When asked specifically about Fort George's impending closure, during the debate in the chamber on the proposals, the Defence Secretary said it is "is a very old barracks", costs £1.6bn a year to run, would be "extremely expensive to upgrade" and "is not appropriate for a modern infantry unit."<sup>11</sup>

## The process of selecting the sites

A senior MOD official explained to the Public Accounts Committee that when the MOD looked at all 1,300 sites it uses, it found 300 represented 85% of resource spending. The MOD then worked with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, its strategic business partner (Capita) and the Commands "to identify which of these 300 sites we should get out of."<sup>12</sup> So the sites chosen were, according to the MOD, narrowed down from the 300 most expensive sites.

A number of Design Principles supported and guided the development of the estate plan. These are listed in the Better Defence Estate and include:

- To consolidate the estate into sustainable centres of mass and, where appropriate, specialisation, to better support military capability;
- To reduce the whole life costs of the estate;
- To focus investment on the core and enduring estate.

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<sup>11</sup> [HC Deb 24 November 2016 c1293](#)

<sup>12</sup> Public Accounts Committee, [Strategic Financial Management of the Ministry of Defence \(oral evidence\)](#) HC 392 2015-16, 14 October 2015, q40

## Location of sites

The 91 sites are spread across the UK and include 8 sites in Scotland, four in Wales and 3 in Northern Ireland. The following table is taken from the National Audit Office report.<sup>13</sup> A full list of sites is available in the appendix.

Region	Existing sites covered by the Footprint Strategy	Sites announced for disposal
South East	77	23
South West	71	12
Yorkshire and the Humber	29	10
Scotland	24	8
Eastern	23	11
West Midlands	19	5
London	15	5
East Midlands	14	4
North West	10	6
Wales	10	4
Northern Ireland	7	3
North East	2	0
Total	301	91

## Contribution to wider housing commitment

The Government said in the SDSR that it will release “public sector land for 55,000 new homes to support wider prosperity objectives.”<sup>14</sup> This is in reference to the Government’s wider housing commitment to release land for 160,000 homes by 2020.<sup>15</sup>

The *Better Defence Estate* strategy expands upon this, stating that an “additional objective” of the strategy is to support broader Government targets for the use of the public estate, in particular the “release of land with housing potential for 55,000 in this Parliament.” Current projections are outlined in the document which estimates the potential number of homes that may result from each housing workstrand. So an estimated 11,200 may come from existing MOD disposals, over 20,500 from the transfer of 5 large sites to the Homes and Communities Agency and 15,200 from Estate Optimisation Disposals.

<sup>13</sup> National Audit Office, *Delivering the Defence Estate*, HC 782 2016-17, 15 November 2016, figure 10

<sup>14</sup> [National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review](#) (Cm 9161), November 2015, para 4.62

<sup>15</sup> DCLG [Single Departmental Plan](#) section 1.1

## Next steps

- Annual report to Parliament
- Annual Industry day
- To examine Training Estate and Reserves Estate

The MOD will submit an annual update to Parliament on the implementation of the plan with the first report due in autumn 2017.

An industry day will be held in the next three months (from date of publication). It will be held in [London](#) but at the time of writing no further details are available. An industry day will be held every year of this Parliament.

The MOD will separately examine the Training Estate and Reserves Estate. The MOD says there are clear links to the Future Accommodation Model which is looking at the provision of housing for service personnel.

The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Capability) is responsible for implementing what the MOD is calling the Strategic Estate Optimisation portfolio. Within this there will be a number of individual Estate Optimisation Programmes allocated to the appropriate lead Command or Top Level Budget holder within Defence. Each programme will have a Responsible Owner who is responsible for delivery. The plan will be monitored by the Defence Major Programmes Portfolio and the Defence Board.

### 3. Debate in Parliament

The Secretary of Defence gave an [oral statement](#) to the House on 7 November 2016. Sir Michael Fallon emphasised the inefficiency, age and unsuitability of the estate for the current needs of the armed forces. The armed forces would in future be clustered around centres of specialism, for example, armoured vehicles around Salisbury plain, surface ships in Portsmouth and Devonport and combat aircraft at three fast jet bases in England and Scotland. The strategy will deliver “a better estate for service families” the Defence Secretary said, to provide more stable schooling and better job opportunities for partners. Going forward, he said, the MOD will work with local authorities, the devolved administrations and industry.

Nia Griffiths, the shadow defence secretary, said the Labour party recognised the need for the defence estate to be restructured to reflect the current and future needs of the armed forces. However she noted the changes are “very considerable in scale” and expressed concern about the impact on the armed forces and families, how the Government planned to consult stakeholders, and how to ensure the 55,000 houses will be affordable and located in areas where there are housing shortages. When questioned, the Defence Secretary confirmed all receipts from land sales would “come back into the defence budget.”

Several MPs focused on the impact of closures of bases in their own constituencies and the strong links between the units and the local community. Drew Hendry cited the closure of the garrison at Fort George “after 250 years of service and sacrifice” while Rebecca Pow worried about the “knock-on effect” in Taunton with 40 Commando leaving their Norton Manor camp.

In response, the Defence Secretary pointed out many closures would not take place until after 2020 and said the MOD would begin talks with the relevant local authorities to help alleviate the impact on local communities. The high maintenance and upgrade costs of some bases, for example Fort George, were also mentioned.

Members of the Scottish National Party focused on the eight sites that are to be disposed of in Scotland and Brendan O’Hara (SNP) asked how the cutbacks could be considered good for Scotland. Lady Hermon (Ind) raised the closure of three sites in Northern Ireland.

Matthew Pennycook secured a debate on the proposed closure of Woolwich Barracks on 20 December 2016. Mr Pennycook said he was unconvinced by the arguments put forward by the Government for the closure of the barracks and questioned whether the defence estates strategy “is the right one.” He suggested his constituents might see it as “little more than an asset-stripping exercise driven by an analysis of rising land values in London rather than an exercise driven by the requirements of our defence estate.”<sup>16</sup>

#### Other reaction

Mark Serwotka, general secretary of the public sector PCS union, told The Guardian “we are opposed to these closure plans that throw the future into doubt for thousands of staff. The MoD has a poor track record on selling off land for homes and this again exposes how the Tories are simply paying lip service to the urgent need to address the housing crisis.”<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> HC Deb 20 December 2016 c1417

<sup>17</sup> “MOD to sell tenth of UK defence sites including D-day training ground”, The Guardian, 7 November 2016

## 4. NAO warns plan is “challenging”

The National Audit Office published its analysis of the MOD’s Defence Estate strategy on 15 November 2016.<sup>18</sup>

The NAO’s key findings include:

- Maintaining the estate will be a “huge challenge” because of years of underinvestment and only essential maintenance has been carried out since 2009. This has led to a “steady decline in the overall condition of the estate” with assets needing to be replaced rather than repaired, a most costly option.
- The constraints on funding means the MOD is making decisions that are poor value for money in the long-term.
- There is a “significant risk” the poor condition of the estate will affect defence capability.
- The Department faces a shortfall of £8.5bn in its future funding for “lifecycle replacement costs”, based on the expected size and condition of the estate, over the next 30 years.
- The MOD intends to delegate budgets to the Commands (the individual services) but the NAO warns “the Commands underinvested in the estate when they previously held this budget prior to 2011, which is a significant cause of the problems the Department now faces.”
- The Footprint Strategy is based on assumptions and estimates which will evolve over time. If the Departments fails to secure the disposal proceeds predicted, or costs increase, this could “reduce the financial benefits of the strategy and cause potential funding gaps.”
- More than 40% of disposal proceeds will come from the disposal of a few sites in London.
- The Department does not have enough funds to finance the strategy in full and other finance models could be more expensive and less flexible than direct government funding.
- Successfully implementing the strategy will be “extremely challenging” as much of the estate disposals, re-provisioning of essential facilities and personnel moves are interdependent. Sustaining focus over the 25-year life of the strategy will be “difficult.”
- The risks to military capability from the estate will continue unless further actions are taken to address the shortfall in funding to sustain the estate.
- The MOD is aware that current assumed budgets will only allow for a “partial reversal of the decline of its remaining estate” and there will be a “gap of at least £8.5bn in relation to the funding required to sustain the estate.”
- The MOD “has not yet set out a strategy for achieving an optimised estate that can be sustained at acceptable risk within planned funding levels.”
- There were fundamental weaknesses in the Department’s contracting with a strategic business partner.
- The MOD failed to transform the Defence Infrastructure Organisation as planned prior to contracting with the strategic business partner.

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<sup>18</sup> National Audit Office, Delivering the Defence Estate, HC782 2016-17, 15 November 2016

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- The strategic business partner's performance "has not met all expectations" and "has not made a notable difference in transforming the DIO to better meet the needs of the Commands.
- The Department does not yet have an overall model for managing the estate effectively.

A summary and the full report are available on the NAO website: [Delivering the defence estate](#)

The Public Accounts Committee will take evidence from Ministry of Defence officials on the [Defence Estate](#) on 16 January 2017, based on the National Audit Office report.

## 5. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation

The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) was created on 1 April 2011, bringing together all aspects of defence infrastructure, asset management and facilities management under one organisation. It incorporated Defence Estates which, until then, was responsible for managing the MOD's land and buildings.

Establishing the DIO was one of a number of reforms recommended by Lord Levene in his major 2011 report into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence.<sup>19</sup> The Defence Secretary announced plans in 2012 to appoint a Strategic Business Partner to help transform the DIO.<sup>20</sup>

The National Audit Office criticised the contract with the strategic business partner in its report on the defence estate. The strategic business partner is a Capita-led consortium.

### **Appointment of a Strategic Business Partner**

The Defence Secretary announced the selection of a Capita-led consortium in March 2014. He said the strategic business partner would help with the transformation of the DIO, would enable the DIO to "make a significant contribution to department savings and asset realisation targets", improve the skills base across the DIO and introduce a more "commercial approach." The £400 million, ten-year contract would include an incentive-based arrangement, the Defence Secretary said.<sup>21</sup>

The contract was signed in June 2014 with Capita in conjunction with URS and PA Consulting.<sup>22</sup>

### **Criticism of the contract by the National Audit Office**

The NAO describes there being "fundamental weaknesses" in the Department's contracting with the strategic business partner (SBP). The NAO said the MOD failed to set contractual safeguards to ensure the savings it was required to deliver would be achieved from operational improvements rather than one-off cost-cutting. The key performance indicators regime set in the contract to measure DIO's performance has weaknesses with around half of the KPI's not place at the start of the contract. The NAO says the SBP's performance "has not met all expectations" and "has not made a notable difference in transforming DIO to better meet the needs of the Commands." It found the NAO had not met all the milestones nor performed adequately against agreed key performance indicators. Significantly, it found "many stakeholders across defence have lost confidence in DIO's ability to deliver the requirements of the Commands."

A list of the 41 Key Performance Indicators was provided in a written question which is available on the Hansard website: [PQ53021](#), 18 November 2016.

The MOD was supposed to transform the DIO, including putting in place an effective operating model supported by a single IT system, before bringing in the private sector partner. However the NAO found the failure to deliver this transformation "affected the partner's performance" and complicated the MOD's ability to hold the partner to account for its performance. The Capita-led consortium was also brought in to an organisation

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<sup>19</sup> See House of Commons Library Briefing Paper [Defence Reform](#), SN06036, 18 July 2011; and [Defence Reform. An independent report into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence](#), Ministry of Defence website, June 2011

<sup>20</sup> HC Deb 24 May 2012 81WS

<sup>21</sup> HC Deb 10 March 2014 c3WS

<sup>22</sup> HC Deb 9 June 2014 c24WS

that was “less capable” than expected. Capita was paid “90 million between June 2014 and July 2016.

The performance of the DIO and the Capita-led consortium has been scrutinised by Parliament via a number of tabled questions.

The MOD gave an updated figure of the amount paid to the Capita-led consortium since contract signature: £97.5 million (this includes the £90.2million identified in the NAO report plus £7.3 million in fees paid in August and September 2016).<sup>23</sup>

The MOD outlined the measures it has introduced to try to reduce high levels of sickness, improve morale and attract specialists to DIO, including staff engagement schemes, workshops and recruitment focus on core capabilities and difficult to recruit areas.<sup>24</sup>

### **Government drops plans to transform DIO into a GovCo**

The MOD intended the DIO to become a GovCo – a Government Company managed by the Strategic Business Partner. The Defence Secretary said in a written statement in March 2014:

For the first phase of the contract, the DIO will remain fully within the Ministry of Defence. During this period, however, the strategic business partner will help the DIO prepare to move to an incorporated model, currently assumed to occur in 2016, which will entail the creation of a Government Company (GovCo) to manage defence infrastructure. This would be a separate legal entity, 100% owned by the Secretary of State for Defence and managed by the strategic business partner under contract. Under this innovative arrangement, the MOD will oversee the activities and performance of the new company through a governing authority set up within the Department.<sup>25</sup>

The Defence Secretary confirmed the intention to create a GovCo to manage defence infrastructure from 2016 in his written statement of June 2014.<sup>26</sup> Options included an ‘incorporated model’ which would involve a separate legal entity under contract to and managed by the Strategic Business Partner; and an ‘unincorporated model’ with the Strategic Business Partner embedded into the existing DIO.<sup>27</sup>

These plans were abandoned in December 2015. Sir Michael Fallon told the House that having completed an assessment, the department had concluded the DIO should not become a GovCo:

We have completed this assessment and concluded that, at the present time, the MOD’s business interests are best served by the DIO retaining its current status within the Department. We assess that this will achieve further transformation by delivering rationalisation and improvements to the way the DIO delivers infrastructure to support defence capability, without the risks and costs associated with incorporation. We shall, therefore, not be pursuing incorporation.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> PQ54026, 24 November 2016

<sup>24</sup> PQ53486, 21 November 2016

<sup>25</sup> HC Deb 10 March 2014 c3WS

<sup>26</sup> HC Deb 9 June 2014 c24WS

<sup>27</sup> Dialogue, issue 6, March 2013

<sup>28</sup> HCWS379, 10 December 2015

## Appendix: list of sites with staffing levels

The [Better Defence Estate](#) strategy provides a full list of the 91 sites identified for disposal together with dates for disposal and proposed moves. For reasons of brevity this is not included in this briefing paper. However the following is a full list with the number of military and civilian staff at each site. This was provided in a written answer on 7 December 2016 ([PQ55968](#)).

<b>Site</b>	<b>Military Staff</b>	<b>Civilian Staff</b>
ABERCORN BARRACKS	0	54
DBS FINANCE LIVERPOOL	0	290
RAF MOLESWORTH	14	17
RAF ALCONBURY	190	116
ALDERSHOT DISTRIBUTION OUTLET	<10	20
AMPORT HOUSE	<10	30
JSCS ASHCHURCH (EAST)	0	0
AZIMGHUR BARRACKS	427	17
RAF BARNHAM	<10	14
BRECON BARRACKS	98	85
BEACHLEY BARRACKS	655	12
KINNEGAR LOGISTIC BASE	356	0
BURGOYNE BARRACKS	0	<10
CARVER BARRACKS	881	71
CAWDOR BARRACKS	645	15
DSG COLCHESTER	0	0
MOD CALEDONIA	0	<10
CHALGROVE AIRFIELD	0	0
DBS CHEADLE HUME	0	260
CHIVENOR AIRFIELD	0	0
CHIVENOR BARRACKS	1123	29
CLARO BARRACKS	530	15
CLIVE BARRACKS	605	<10
CLAYTON BARRACKS	<10	0
LAND AT COVE	0	0
RAF COLERNE	97	0
COPTHORNE BARRACKS	0	0
CRAIGIEHALL	28	60
COMMANDER AND STAFF TRAINER (NORTH)	0	0
CATTERICK TOWN CENTRE PARCEL	0	0

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THE ROYAL CITADEL	467	12
CHILWELL STATION	1099	142
CAVALRY BARRACKS HOUNSLOW	500	<10
DIO ALDERSHOT	0	0
DALE BARRACKS	531	0
DALTON BARRACKS (ABINGDON AIRFIELD)	950	27
DALTON BARRACKS (see above entry)		
DIO HEAD OFFICE	0	439
DEVERELL BARRACKS	0	0
DISHFORTH BARRACKS (AIRFIELD)	602	18
FORT BLOCKHOUSE	140	57
SOUTHWICK PARK	277	108
MEADOWFORTH BARRACKS (HQ 51 HIGHLAND BRIGADE)	172	45
DSG FORTHSIDE (see above entry)		
FORT GEORGE	585	10
FULWOOD BARRACKS	399	121
GLENCORSE BARRACKS	552	<10
HARDEN BARRACKS (DUCHESS OF KENT PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL)	0	0
HARLEY HILL	0	0
BUCKLEY BARRACKS (HULLAVINGTON AIRFIELD)	600	<10
BUCKLEY BARRACKS (HULLAVINGTON BARRACKS) (see above entry)		
IMPHAL BARRACKS	728	365
INVICTA PARK BARRACKS	638	13
KNELLER HALL	30	30
JSCS LONGMOOR	0	32
LEIGHTON HOUSE (AOSB Westbury)	20	<10
LODGE HILL	0	0
WETHERSFIELD AIRFIELD	23	327
MDPGA WETHERSFIELD (see above entry)		
MIDDLEWICK RANGES	0	0
MOAT HOUSE	0	0
ATHENA HOUSE	0	14
NELSONS WARDROOM	0	0
NEWTONARDS AIRFIELD	0	0
NORTON MANOR CAMP	710	15
SWANSEA AIRPORT	0	0

OLD DALBY	0	0
DEFENCE GEOGRAPHIC CENTRE, FELTHAM	19	321
PARSONS BARRACKS DONNINGTON	215	215
1300 PARKWAY	46	79
PRINCE WILLIAM OF GLOUCESTER BARRACKS	928	108
QUEEN ELIZABETH BARRACKS	138	52
HENLOW AIRFIELD	0	0
FITZWYGRAM HOUSE (ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS CENTRE)	0	0
REDFORD CAVALRY BARRACKS	240	80
REDFORD INFANTRY BARRACKS (see above entry)		
RAF MILDENHALL	370	306
HALTON AIRFIELD	0	<10
CONDOR AIRFIELD	0	0
ST DAVIDS BARRACKS, BICESTER	534	<10
SIR JOHN MOORE BARRACKS WINCHESTER	208	<10
ROBERTSON BARRACKS	365	<10
SOMERSET BARRACKS	11	11
SSG WARRINGTON	0	27
ST GEORGES BARRACKS NORTH LUFFENHAM	883	0
STONEHOUSE BARRACKS	673	72
SENNYBRIDGE TMP COMPOUND	0	0
HMS SULTAN	351	183
TOWTHORPE LINES	193	<10
THORNHILL BARRACKS	0	<10
TOMLINSON HOUSE	0	376
VAUXHALL BARRACKS	260	20
VENNING BARRACKS	215	53
MOD WOODBRIDGE (Rock Barracks)	592	13
WOOLWICH STATION	1054	97

All military personnel will be relocated with their unit or re-assigned in accordance with existing career management procedures. Civilian staff will be managed in accordance with normal Departmental policy and processes. Formal Trades Union consultation.

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